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How do people who have participated in extensive violence against the state 
and members of their community, understand and reflect on their experiences?  What 
meanings do they attach to violence, and how do they go on to reformulate their lives 
and deal with the consequences of their actions in its aftermath?  These are among the 
key questions that this thesis considers.  Anchored in a little-known violent period that 
took place in southern Sri Lanka in the late 1980s, known locally simply as ‘the 
Terror’ (Bheeshanaya), this ethnography of political violence analyses the memories 
and narratives of those who have engaged in violence.  It explores how violence is 
negotiated and lived with in the aftermath and its implications for the self and 
sociality. As such, this study is concerned with how people mediate and articulate 
discomforting memories of violence, in a post-terror context of silence and fear, 
where justice and reconciliation are lacking.  Through the accounts of people who 
have participated in violence, this thesis provides rich insight into the consequences of 
violence, and further highlights the flawed nature of one-dimensional ‘victim’ and 
‘perpetrator’ binaries generally assumed in studies of violence, emphasising instead 
the ambiguity that marks the experience of violence.  
This thesis is based on 14 months of fieldwork carried out primarily with 
former insurgents in southern Sri Lanka.  For balance and to maximise representation 
in what remains deeply contested terrain, their accounts are set against the stories of 
people who did not directly engage in violence, but whose lives were nevertheless 
touched by the Terror. This thesis argues that for those who have participated in 
violence, the mediation of its memory is an on-going ethical exercise.  It finds that 
former insurgents remember, give meaning to, and live with, their violent pasts in 
ethical terms.  Remembering violence is morally tendentious and carries significant 
implications for the self and sociality in the present.  Recreating life after terror 
involves finding an ethical framework to deal with violence, and entails ongoing 
efforts to allocate moral responsibility for it.  This thesis contends that as much as the 
violent past is kept alive in the present as an ethical issue, moral accountability for it 
remains un-reconciled and in a constant state of flux.  It shows overall the narratives 
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of former insurgents to be contradictory and convoluted, highlighting the ambivalent 
nature of memory and lived experience of violence.  Moreover, it argues that for those 
who have participated in violence, life in the aftermath is about finding ways of living 
with one’s violent past, rather that ‘healing’ or ‘moving on’ from it.  









For all those who were killed and disappeared in Sri Lanka’s Bheeshanaya, 
and for those who continue to live with its memories. 
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Glossary of Acronyms and Sinhala Terms 
 
ahinsaka : innocent, naive 
 
apē kollo : our boys 
 
avabōdaya : understanding, awareness, knowledge 
 
avanka : honest, trustworthy, having integrity 
 
avastavādi : opportunistic 
 
ayya : older brother  
 
bhaya : fear 
 
bheeshanaya : terror 
 
daksa : talented 
 
darunu : dangerous, harsh, thuggish 
 
dharma, dhamma : the teachings of the Buddha 
 
duka, dukkha : suffering, sadness, sorrow 
 
duwa : daughter 
 
gama : village  
 
hartāl : unofficial strike or curfew 
 
hita : mind, heart 
 
ILPA : Indo-Lanka Peace Accord 
 
IPKF : Indian Peace Keeping Force 
 
jātiya : ‘ethnic group’, ‘race’, type, caste 
 
JVP : Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna/People’s Liberation Front 
 
kalabala kālaya : period of chaos, period of disturbance 
 
karma : natural law of moral causation (cause and effect) according to Buddhism 
 
LTTE : Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
 
malli : younger brother 
 
nangi : younger sister 
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nirvāna, nibbāna : Buddhist enlightenment or liberation, freedom from rebirth 
 
PA : People’s Alliance 
 
paligänīma : revenge 
 
pav : sin, demerit, wrongful act of negative karma 
 
pin : merit, good karma 
 
pirit : Buddhist ritual chanting (usually for protection) 
 
prārthanā : religious wish, religious aspiration 
 
pudgalika : private, personal 
 
putā : son 
 
rälla : herd 
 
sangha : the Buddhist monastic order 
 
SLFP : Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
 
taruna : youth 
 
taruna asahanaya : youth unrest 
 
tarunakama : youthfulness 
 
tatvaya : social status, situation, standing 
 
UF : United Front 
 
UNP : United National Party 
 
vadakāgāraya : torture chamber 
 
visvāsaya : trust 
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I use a simpler version of the standard Sinhala transliteration, following the 
approaches taken by anthropologists of Sri Lanka, such as Gombrich and Spencer.  
 
Sinhala vowels a, ä, e, ā, ē, ō, approximate respectively to the English vowels in sun, 
cat, ten, yarn, take, coat. 
The macron ā etc., is used to highlight long vowels. 
c is pronounced ch, as in churn or champion. 
t and d are dental consonants, while  ṭ and ḍ are retroflex. 
th, dh, kh, gh etc., are aspirated consonants. 
Double consonants are pronounced twice, such as dhamma, or in English ‘bookcase’. 









I don’t have the words to describe it…it’s like a cup of tea. You get the sweet 
taste of sugar, you get the creamy taste of milk, and you get the bitter taste of 




These were the words of Nikhil, an ex-insurgent reflecting on his personal 
experiences during Sri Lanka’s Bheeshanaya (the Terror), which submerged much of 
the southern and central regions in violence, fear, and immense suffering. He was a 
small, intellectual man with kindly eyes and a reputation for alcohol-fuelled raucous 
behaviour at the weekends. We were sitting in a dank and remote public house. He 
insisted that this was the only place in which he felt comfortable enough to talk to me 
about his life during the Terror. He went on to unfold a convoluted and somewhat 
contradictory narrative, colourful and positive at points, dark and unsettling at others. 
It followed the highs of a young man’s youthful energy and optimism directed at 
transforming an unjust socio-political system into a just one, and it followed the lows 
of being detained by the state and subjected to horrific torture. He remembered his 
eventual release to entail a reinvigorated thirst for reformulating his life, accompanied 
by a renewed sense of religiosity, and also recounted the challenges of rebuilding 
social relationships fractured by violence, while grappling with the memories of his 
traumatic experiences. Nikhil interrupted his story at points to take a gulp of his beer 
and a drag of his cigarette. Silence, hesitation, gaps, and at times an apparent 
difficulty to find the words to articulate his memories of violence, stuttered the flow 
of our conversation.  
How do people who have participated in extensive violence against the state 
and members of their own community, understand and reflect on their experiences? 
What meanings and value do they attach to violence and their motivations for it? 
Moreover, how do those who have engaged in violence reformulate their lives and 
deal with the social, material, and cultural consequences of their actions in its 
aftermath? These are among some of the key questions that prompted this study, 
which is centred on stories belonging to those who lived through a time of terror in 
southern Sri Lanka. Anchored in a little-known violent period in the late 1980s, 
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known locally simply as “the Terror” (Bheeshanaya), this research is centred on the 
memories and narrative representations of those who have engaged in political 
violence. It looks at how violence is negotiated and lived with in the aftermath, and its 
implications for the self and sociality, from the perspectives of former insurgents who 
have inflicted it. Rather than being an attempt to construct a ‘history’ of the event, this 
study is an ethnography of the present that is primarily built on the work of memory.  
This research finds that for those who have participated in violence, the 
mediation of its memory is steeped in the moral, and that it carries important 
implications for notions of the self and the negotiation of sociality in the present. 
Memory does not entail an abstract recording of the past, but is ethically tendentious 
and shaped by the moral and socio-political context of recall. In other words, people 
who have engaged in violence remember and give meaning to their experiences in 
ways that allow them to continue living with themselves, with their violent pasts, and 
with others, in the aftermath.  
Life after terror involves efforts to find an ethical framework to deal with past 
violence (see Mueggler 2001), and entails continuous moral evaluations of a violence 
that is situated uncomfortably ‘close to home’. The narratives that run through this 
thesis suggest that while the memory of violence is kept alive in the present as an 
ethical issue, the allocation of moral responsibility for it remains in a constant state of 
flux. Life after the Bheeshanaya then, for those who have engaged in violence, 
involves findings ways of living with the past and its un-reconciled ethical 
implications in the present, as opposed to ‘moving on’ or ‘being healed’ from 
violence. This research substantiates and builds on compelling arguments put forward 
by scholars concerning the practice of memory and its moral entailments, along with 
its implications for constructions of self-identity and relationships with others. These 
arguments are drawn on as necessary and where relevant throughout this thesis (see 
Lambek 1996, Antze 1996, Kirmayer 1996).   
While this thesis focuses on former insurgents (and to a lesser extent former 
counter-insurrectionary officers) who participated in the violence of the Bheeshanaya, 
it fundamentally highlights the flawed nature of one-dimensional ‘perpetrator’ and 
‘victim’ categories commonly assumed in the study of violence. Through the accounts 
of those who have participated in violence, this study suggests that these simplistic 
labels ignore the ambiguities of the lived ‘reality’ of violence on the ground and that 
they run the risk pathologising violence and with it entire groups of people, as either 
‘perpetrators’ or ‘victims’. As such, this thesis is about people who have participated 
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in violence who are also themselves both ‘victims’ and ‘witnesses’ of violence, 
having experienced violence from multiple subject positions.  
 The 1980s opened a new chapter in the turbulent modern history of Sri Lanka. 
In addition to the dramatic escalation of the well-documented civil war in the North 
and the East led by Tamil militants, the state was also grappling with a violent 
insurrection led by young Sinhala Buddhist people in the South of the country. 
Sinhala people make up the majority ethnic group in Sri Lanka and are predominantly 
Buddhists.1 This bloody insurgency was led by a radical youth movement known as 
the JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna/People’s Liberation Front), whose aim was to 
replace the regime in power with one based on Marxist-nationalist ideology. Its 
protracted struggle lasted approximately three years, and involved a campaign of 
violence being launched against the state and members of the Sinhala community. 
Just as their success seemed imminent, within the space of a few months the 
insurrection was brutally crushed by state sponsored counter-insurrectionary violence. 
Estimates of those who died vary from around 40 thousand to 100 thousand, while 
thousands were ‘disappeared’.2  It is this era that is commonly known as the 
Bheeshanaya.  
In 2007 I set out to seek those surviving ‘youth’ who had participated in this 
insurrection by engaging in guerrilla-style warfare against the state. I spent 14 months 
travelling through several villages and towns in the South of Sri Lanka, speaking to 
numerous people, mostly former insurgents, about their memories of the 
Bheeshanaya. I had never planned to carry out my fieldwork in the southern region of 
Sri Lanka. My initial months in the field had been spent amidst the mountains of 
Kandy in the central region, working on my language skills and hoping to make some 
contact with former insurgents in the area through the University there. At the same 
time, I had also decided to keep my options open and to explore other avenues and 
areas conducive to my research. A weekend break in the South changed everything. I 
had travelled to meet an old friend Amila. She was keen to hear about this research of 
mine that was important enough to bring me into a country that everyone else, as she 
saw it, was trying to get out of.  
                                                      
1 The violence carried out here took place within the Sinhala community itself (as opposed to being 
inter-ethnic between Tamil and Sinhala people). 
2 Definite figures for those who died and were disappeared in the Bheeshanaya are not available. 
However, estimates of those who were killed during this period as quoted in various literature on the 
topic and by the JVP itself, varies from the conservative figure of 40 thousand to 100 thousand people. 
The JVP has claimed responsibility for around 6 thousand deaths. 
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I already knew the centrality of the ‘deep South’ (as it is locally known) to the 
insurrectionary period. It was commonly regarded as the birthplace of the JVP and its 
insurgencies. I also knew that many people in this region had suffered through the 
worst of the Bheeshanaya, and that in these picturesque villages and towns there were 
those who had taken up arms against the state and apparently, against Sinhala 
Buddhist society itself. My friend was optimistic that she could introduce me to the 
very people I was having some difficulty tracking down. She did not have much to do 
by way of persuading me to base much of my fieldwork here. The magical South 
simply made me not want to leave.  
The South was idyllic. At sunset when the skies above the clear turquoise 
ocean were a mixture of purple, orange, and gold, I would often have to pinch myself 
to believe that I was really there.  The setting was breath-taking, with seemingly 
endless golden beaches, coconut trees that swayed sleepily in the sea breeze, and 
thickets of lush jungle to the interior. But, I had heard whispers, and found it difficult 
to imagine, that there was a time when corpses littered these golden beaches, when 
sinister and shadowy gangs would stalk their human prey in these jungles, and when 
the hospitable people who lived in this area, apparently violently ‘turned on each 
other’, or went into hiding in fear for their lives.  
It was a jarring contrast, and one that hounded me throughout my time in the 
field. The seeming peaceful normality of people’s daily lives seemed oddly 
juxtaposed to the ‘abnormality’ of the Bheeshanaya.  I found it difficult to reconcile 
the narratives of intense suffering and terror with the surrounding visual landscape. 
People just seemed to go about their lives as normal and the atmosphere seemed 
tranquil on the surface. If I was reading them correctly, the Terror that had convulsed 
their social worlds was now long forgotten and relegated to the ‘dustbin’ of history. 
The Bheeshanaya was not mentioned, and nothing in the landscape indicated that the 
people living in this area had just under 20 years ago, been through southern Sri 
Lanka’s “most intense period of political violence and terror in modern memory” 
(Perera 2001: 157).  
But the more my cautious conversations about this subject progressed over 
time, the more I came to realise that people in fact lived with the Bheeshanaya in the 
present and that its memory continued to shape their everyday in powerful ways. I 
came to find that the South was a place pregnant with the hidden memories of its 
people; the fearful and ugly memories of a generation, and of a nation. I wanted to dig 
beneath this veneer of ‘paradise’ and apparent amnesia, and find out why people were 
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so silent about it. I wanted to know what life was like for those who had lived through 
the Terror, what it meant to them, and how people had come to terms (if at all) with 
such colossal violence that had ravaged their lives and communities just two decades 
ago. I wanted to learn about it from the very people whose lives were inextricably 
entangled in it. What I unearthed fills the pages of this thesis. 
 
Existing Literature and Scope of Research 
 
The Bheeshanaya occupies an awkward position in the modern history of Sri 
Lanka and in the contemporary lives of its people. It has received little sustained 
academic attention and is an event that continues to be shrouded in fear, amnesia, and 
silence. The discomforting nature of violence that took place within members of the 
same community, often involving neighbours and even friends, has rendered it 
incomprehensible and a shameful blot on the modern history of Sri Lanka. Many of 
those who engaged in atrocities during the Terror continue to hold positions of power, 
and the post-terror context is one in which ‘perpetrators’, ‘victims’, and ‘witnesses’ 
must live in close proximity to each other, in the absence of justice and reconciliation.  
The sparse literature available on the Bheeshanaya is, on the one hand, 
clustered around the course and processes of the insurrection (Alles 1990, 
Chandraprema 1991, Gunaratna 1990), or on the experiences of ‘victims’ of violence 
post-terror, on the other hand (Perera 1995, 1998, 1999, 2001; Argenti-Pillen 2003). 
The latter has been the work of anthropologists who have focussed on trauma, and 
more specifically on the challenges faced by female survivors of violence. The stories 
of those who engaged in the violence of this period are noticeably absent. Scholars 
have called for more empirical work on the Bheeshanaya itself, and particularly on 
the experiences of those who participated in the violence of that period (see De Mel 
2001, Hettige 1992, Moore 1993). My research is situated in the post-terror context 
and builds on the latter category of work. It provides a missing piece of the jigsaw by 
analysing the accounts of those former insurgents who participated in violence, 
thereby contributing to a richer picture of the violence of this period. 
Through the accounts of former insurgents, which were supplemented by 
interviews with their own families and the families of those killed or disappeared, 
there emerges a wider story of the effects of violence and mutual betrayal on kinship 
and community ties. In a situation of terror where neighbours denounced each other, 
and exploited the climate of terror to settle personal scores, my research also found 
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instances where family and community ties transcended the acute binaries created by 
violence. This study thereby also sheds light on how communities, wracked by 
violence and mistrust, function in its aftermath. 
There has been a recent shift in anthropological scholarship on violence 
towards considering the transformative impact of violence on subjectivity and the 
everyday (see Das 2000, 2007; Nordstrom 1995; Green 1999), and some of the most 
important work has come from research on Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict (see Daniel 
1996, Lawrence 2000). However, such studies overwhelmingly focus on the 
experiences of ‘victims’ of violence. They have shown violence to be ‘world-
making’, with a capacity to create meaning, distort subjectivity, individualise 
experiences, and powerfully alter the everyday, which victims strive to re-create. My 
research makes an important contribution here, through its focus on a ‘neglected 
group’, and further builds on the emerging literature on ‘perpetrators’ of violence (see 
Mahmood 1996, Browning 2001, Foster et al. 2005, Payne 2008, Hinton 2004a, Ellis 
2004). 
Scholars have shown memory to involve creative (re)construction, to be 
shaped by cultural frames and social context, and to entail moral purposes (see 
Lambek 1996, Kirmayer 1996, Antze 1996). The study of memory in relation to 
violence has recently highlighted further interesting issues such as the influence of 
master narratives and individual agency on memory, the role of moral projects and the 
moral consequences of recall, memory as a site of resistance and hegemonic struggle, 
and the heterogeneous nature of subaltern memories (see Cole 2003, Spencer 2000, 
Becker et al. 2000, Amin 1995, Tarlo 2003, Fudjitani et al. 2001, Swedenberg 1995, 
Mueggler 2001). The few studies available on those who have perpetrated violence 
have shown amnesia, gaps, disassociation, and altered remembering to be 
characteristics of their memories of violence (see Browning 2001, Mahmood 2000, 
Hinton 2004a and 2004b, Payne 2008). These narrative trends are picked up and 
analysed as they emerge through the stories of former insurgents in this thesis.  
 
 
Why Study Former Insurgents? 
 
Recent research on Sri Lanka has focused on the well-publicised ethnic 
conflict in the North and East of the country between the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam) and the Sri Lankan state. Intra-group violence in the South of the 
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country has received little academic attention in comparison. One must be cautious of 
the dangers of reducing violence to the inevitable outcome of ethnic difference, 
considering the common occurrence of political violence in our world between those 
who appear to be the same; as Siegel puts it, the type of violence in which “one kills 
those in one’s own image” (1998: 1). Scholars have highlighted the study of 
‘perpetrators’ in anthropological research on violence overall, as well as that on non-
ethnic based political violence in southern Sri Lanka in particular, as clear gaps 
warranting important attention (see Tambiah 1996, Perera 1999, Uyangoda 2003, Das 
1990, Schmidt and Schroder 2001). The dearth of information on both those who 
participate in violence overall and more specifically on Sri Lanka’s Terror, prompted 
this study. 
My key protagonists are former insurgents, whose voices have been ignored 
thus far in anthropological literature on this topic. They talk about their lives during 
the Bheeshanaya for the first time here. By former insurgents, I mean those who took 
part in any kind of insurrectionary activity against the state. During the Bheeshanaya, 
insurgents were loosely construed as being those who engaged in ‘subversive’ 
activity, which could range from putting up revolutionary posters and organising 
student agitation, to those who perpetrated outright violence such as murder, assault, 
and intimidation. My ex-insurgent research participants were drawn from a diverse 
range of backgrounds. Some had held positions of leadership at local level with 
several insurgents under their command during the Terror, while others had been 
guerrilla cadres on the ground. I ensured an appropriate mix of representation from 
those who no longer supported the JVP (revamped and now in the political 
mainstream) and those who continued to be active members. Their ages ranged from 
approximately 35 to 65 years, and their origins lay in peasant, working-class, and 
middle-class backgrounds. The professions of my ex-insurgent research participants 
were varied and included farmers, fishermen, labourers, shopkeepers, taxi-drivers, 
teachers, and lawyers. Many of them hailed from the South of Sri Lanka, but I also 
interviewed former insurgents from Colombo, Kandy, the West coast and the central 
‘dry-zone’. All my ex-insurgent research participants were men who had engaged in 
insurrectionary activity in the second insurrection, while some had been active in both 
JVP insurgencies.3 
                                                      
3  This research focuses on the second insurrection launched by the JVP and the state counter-insurrection that followed, from 
1987 to around 1991. The JVP also launched an insurgency in 1971 that was crushed almost immediately by the state. Both these 
insurgencies are discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
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For balance, and to maximise representation, their accounts are set against the 
perspectives of members of the state security forces who engaged in counter-
insurrectionary violence, and the stories of those who did not directly engage in 
violence but whose lives were touched by it, such as family members of those killed 
or disappeared by one faction or the other, and others who ‘witnessed’ the Terror. 
While this research is centred primarily on the stories of former insurgents, I believe 
that locating the accounts of people with different and possibly opposing perspectives 
and interests within what remains contested space, allows for richer analysis of the 
narratives of those who engaged in political violence. 
It is interesting to note that former insurgents who participated in this research 
appear to share certain personal characteristics and attributes, as we shall see in the 
course of this thesis. For instance, I was struck by the sophisticated and highly 
articulate manner in which they expressed themselves; their apparent political, ethical 
and social awareness; and their subscription to a more rational form of Buddhism. 
Through their narratives, former insurgents represented themselves as educated, 
socially conscious ‘thinkers’, as differentiated from the popular negative stereotype of 
the rälla (the herd) - those ‘undesirable’ and unethical insurgents possessed of the herd 
mentality. The issues this raises are discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. 
In the recent growth in ethnographies on political violence the perspectives of 
those who have participated in violence have tended to be overlooked in preference 
for the survival stories of ‘victims’. Stories of ‘victims’ are important, but only 
provide “part of the full story” (Foster et al. 2005: 91). The study of those who have 
inflicted violence indeed pose particular methodological challenges as have been 
acknowledged by scholars, particularly in terms of access and ethics (see Foster et al. 
2005, Payne 2008, Mahmood 1996).  Nevertheless, if we are to gain an in-depth and 
holistic understanding of how violence is negotiated with, and its implications, we 
must carefully listen to the equally important voices of those who engage in violence.   
‘Perpetrators’ versus ‘Victims’   
 
Common approaches to the study of violence tend to refer in dichotomous 
terms to “perpetrators” and “victims”. These binary constructions differentiate 
between ‘perpetrators’ as active subjects, and ‘victims’ (or survivors) as passive 
objects (Foster et al. 2005: 3). Such simplistic labels offer a limited perspective on 
those involved in violence as this research finds, which could result in a naive 
interpretation of the world in terms of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ or ‘black’ and ‘white’. The 
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use of these one-dimensional labels also risks pathologising violence and 
homogenising diverse individuals as undifferentiated groups of ‘perpetrators’ or 
‘victims’. Foster et al. have shown that the use of the ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’ 
binaries in the context of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
resulted in a view that skirted around the “complexities and ambiguities, rich in the 
lived experience under apartheid, of collaboration and complicity with apartheid, of 
the murky terrain of spies, crossovers and informers” (2005: 3). In doing so, they add 
their voices to the increasing number of scholars who have highlighted the 
deficiencies of such mutually exclusive classifications by pointing to the reality of 
their constructed nature and fluid boundaries (see Levi 1988 and 2004, West 2000, 
Borneman 1997).  
My research is centred on former insurgents who have engaged in 
insurrectionary violence, and who thereby may ostensibly be regarded as 
‘perpetrators’ by some. However, I use this term (in inverted commas) with caution. 
The former insurgents featured in this thesis also experienced violence as victims, and 
the most blatant evidence of this can be found in their narratives of being subjected to 
torture (Chapter 3). They also told stories of being witness to violence exacted by 
others. Moreover, having come through the experience of terror, they could also be 
considered ‘survivors’ of violence. This research shows the lived reality of terror to be 
convoluted and to be experienced from different, and often overlapping, subject 
positions. Violence during the Bheeshanaya operated at multiple levels, with various 
avenues for direct and indirect involvement in it opening up, potentially leaving many 
people with various amounts of ‘blood on their hands’. This renders the application of 
absolute ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ categories unworkable on the ground.  The former 
insurgents who participated in this research were by no means one-dimensional 
characters. Their narratives epitomised the contradictions, diversity, and ambiguities 
that characterise human life and behaviour. Moreover, former insurgents categorically 
refused to accept the label of ‘perpetrator’; mainly due to the negative moral weight it 
carried. Rather than being straightforward labels, ‘perpetrators’ and ‘victims’ are in 
themselves ethical subject categories that carry significant moral meaning and shape 
people’s notions of the self and their relationships with others. I am in agreement with 
Foster et al. who state that, “the problem of the ‘truth’ in the labelling of a 
‘perpetrator’ remains just that: a problem” (Foster et al. 2005: 6).  
 
A Note on ‘Ethics’ and ‘Morals’ 
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In this thesis I use the words ethics and morality interchangeably. In recent 
years, scholars have highlighted the need to find a theoretical basis to the 
anthropological study of ethics and morality, emphasising that such theoretical 
reflection would enrich the discipline and fill the gap created by the lack of sustained 
debate on this issue (see Laidlaw 2002, Zigon 2009, Lambek 2000). Laidlaw (2002) 
for instance, delineates individual discussions on morality by anthropologists and 
philosophers through the years, from Durkheim and Kant, to Foucault and Nietzche, 
in his attempts to develop a way of studying ethics comparatively and 
ethnographically. He argues that an ethnographic and theoretical interest in the notion 
of freedom is a fundamental requirement for an anthropology of ethics.  
While many anthropologists have tended to move between the use of ‘ethics’ 
and ‘morality’ without drawing specific differentiations between these two terms, 
others have made attempts to individually define, and distinguish between, ‘ethics’ 
and ‘morals’ (see Williams in Laidlaw 2002, Robbins 2007, Zigon 2009). For 
Williams, morality is distinguished from ethics by way of its formal characteristics, 
whereby judgement is in terms of specific moral obligations (cited in Laidlaw 2002: 
316). Zigon (2009) argues that distinctions between morality and ethics must provide 
the basis for an anthropology on morality. He differentiates between “non-consciously 
enacted morality” and “the conscious awareness of ethical dilemmas” (2009: 251). 
Building on the work of Robbins (2007), he contends that morality is enacted non-
consciously and that it is un-reflective, while ethics on the other hand, is a conscious 
and reflexive process, which arises from what he calls “moral breakdowns”. 
According to him, ethics then is a creative process that involves questioning one’s 
own moral dispositions and entailing work on the self (Zigon 2009).  
The eminent ethicist and moral philosopher Peter Singer uses the terms 
‘ethics’ and ‘morals’ interchangeably in his book entitled Practical Ethics, while 
acknowledging that there is a general assumption that morality is a system of 
prohibitions and as such is considered out-dated by some (1993: 1). In a similar vein, 
distinguished scholars on Buddhist ethics move between the use of ‘morals’ and 
‘ethics’ without drawing distinctions between these terms, in their debates on 
religious ethics (see Hallisey N.d, Bartholomeusz 2002). My use of ‘morality’ and 
‘ethics’ follows the approach taken by the latter group of scholars. Drawing 
distinctions between, and engaging in debates on the nature of, ‘ethics’ and ‘morals’ 
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is not meaningful for the purpose of this particular research, and as such I use these 
terms interchangeably in this thesis. 
 
The Bheeshanaya in Context 
 
Terminology 
My use of the term Bheeshanaya and its temporal parameters reflect people’s 
own interpretations of the Terror as found during my fieldwork. For many people, the 
fear and terror that marred their lives started with the beginning of the insurrection 
and the frightening violence unleashed by the JVP. This was coupled with the 
sporadic responses it evoked from some sections of the police and state security 
forces, finally culminating in the heightened state of terror unleashed by the UNP 
(United National Party) regime. My desire from the outset has been for this research 
to be led by the people whose lives and stories it is built around. For this reason I use 
the term Bheeshanaya in this thesis to encompass the entire period of violence, 
beginning with the JVP insurrection in 1987, and ending with the tail end of the 
counter-insurrection around 1991. I recognise that 1989 witnessed a heightened 








Background of the JVP movement  
A comprehensive historical account of the Bheeshanaya is not practically 
feasible here. However, a brief review of the background of the JVP, its insurrections, 
and the state repression, is necessary. The JVP emerged in the mid-1960s, formed by 
a small group of dissident members of the Peking wing of the Sri Lanka Communist 
Party, with an agenda to establish a socialist state. It began life as an underground 
movement and most notable among its small leadership was the charismatic Rohana 
Wijeweera, who was renowned for his oratory skills and being well-versed in 
Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideology.  
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In the late 1960s Wijeweera and his colleagues travelled the country studying 
the problems of rural Sinhala people in a bid to “win (people) over to Marxism” 
(Alles 1990: 14). The JVP delivered ‘five secret lectures’ across the Sinhala majority 
parts of the country as part of its recruitment and mobilisation campaign.  These 
covered the ‘economic crisis’, which the JVP claimed could only be remedied by the 
establishment of a proletariat dictatorship, which would abolish private property and 
implement economic collectivisation; the problems of neo-colonialism; the threat of 
India’s expansionist agenda; a criticism of the established Left parties for their 
inability to appeal to and mobilise the working class; and the final lecture, which set 
out the path that the revolution should take, advocated that the revolution “should not 
follow a uniform path, but vary according to the time, place, and condition” (Alles 
1990: 44). The movement gained a significant following among educated, 
unemployed, Sinhala Buddhist young people of rural origin. What is striking about 
the JVP’s embryonic phase was its radical Marxist-Leninist stance, and its plans to 
execute a revolution to overthrow the existing state and replace it with socialist 
dictatorship from the outset.  
 
 
The First JVP Insurrection of 1971 
The insurrection of the late 1980s, which forms the basis of this research, was 
not the JVP’s first attempt at revolution. In 1971 the JVP launched an insurrection, 
which has been described as the first of its nature in modern Sri Lankan history 
(Uyangoda 2003: 38). This insurrection was relatively short lived – spanning a few 
weeks, and has been portrayed by some as lacking adequate planning and preparation 
(see Gunaratna 1990). It took the form of concerted attacks on police stations across 
the country, which brought several districts under JVP control. Communication 
problems between JVP leaders had led to a premature attack on the Moneragala police 
station. This resulted in an alert to all police stations and the imposition of an island-
wide curfew. The intensified security led to the failure of further attacks on police 
stations, and thwarted accompanying missions to abduct the Prime Minister; to attack 
a prominent army camp; to capture Colombo; and to release Wijeweera who was in 
prison at the time (see Gunaratna 1990).   
The UF (United Front) regime treated the insurrection as a national security 
threat, and the young people who participated in the insurgency were referred to by 
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the state naively as ‘misguided youth’.4 The state responded to the insurrection with 
intense brutality with the sole aim of crushing the insurgency:  
 
 
After April 5, a single day did not pass without a hundred youth being killed. 
Some were hung, or beaten to death and displayed, while others were lined up 
and shot. For days mothers searched for their missing sons. Many of them were 
shot for pasting posters or following lectures. Most of the villagers had followed 
the lectures through mere curiosity. After all, the contents of the lectures were 
about problems, which were very relevant to them. Some were purposely 
disfigured or made permanently disabled and at times parents themselves were 




The state terror employed to suppress the insurrection led to the deaths of around 20 
thousand young people, and a similar number being imprisoned, including Wijeweera 
(see Uyangoda 2003 and JVP international website). The UF Government was forced 
to recognise the ‘social volcano’ that fuelled the insurrection, and proceeded to 
implement a programme of land reform.   
 
 
The Second JVP Insurrection of 1987-1989 
The insurrection of the 1980s differed in many respects from that of 1971. The 
first one had a clear radical left-wing ideology with the rhetoric of ‘class-struggle’, 
while the second insurrection took on more of a ‘patriotic’ nationalist identity. The 
life of the first insurrection was snuffed out within a matter of weeks by the UF 
regime. The second insurrection was significantly more violent in character, and took 
the form of a protracted struggle lasting around two and a half years, which entailed 
“a vast campaign of assassination, strikes and public intimidation” (Venugopal 2009: 
30). The second phase of the JVP also saw a high level of militarisation, and the 
creation of its military wing – the dreaded DJV (Deshapremi Janatha Vyaparanaya/ 
Patriotic People’s Organisation). This allowed the JVP leadership to distance itself 
from, and deny responsibility for, much of the grisly violence that it carried out. 
The remarkable ability of the JVP to reinvent itself and re-emerge following 
considerable defeat is a feature that is particularly notable. Following its huge defeat 
in 1971, the movement was re-launched, in the main keeping with its socialist 
                                                      
4 The UF (United Front) was a coalition comprised of left-leaning parties led by the SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party). 
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principles. This was partly facilitated by the release of many of its leadership, 
including Wijeweera, with the advent of the new UNP Government in 1977 led by 
J.R. Jayawardene. Many of its supporters from the first phase had been killed and 
others had left the movement and entered ‘mainstream’ society. A handful of 
insurgents remained faithful to the JVP and went on to participate in the second 
insurrection. Many who did re-join the JVP left shortly after, following divisions on 
whether to take the revolutionary or democratic path and disagreements about the 
‘ethnic issue’. 
Wijeweera now emerged as its sole leader. The JVP proceeded to actively 
regain support, particularly among educated, unemployed young Sinhala Buddhist 
people. While the majority of its supporters were from marginalised and rural 
backgrounds, and predominantly from the lower castes, Moore (1993) points out that 
in its second phase, the JVP was also able to draw on the lower echelons of the urban 
populace (e.g., clerical and office workers). A significant and active segment of the 
second JVP mobilisation was young Buddhist monks. Shared social origins and 
grievances, including particular problems relating to the sangha (Buddhist monastic 
order) attracted them to the JVP. The JVP once again spoke to the grievances of 
marginalised young people, and offered them a viable alternative in a political system 
that was dominated by the two nepotistic parties comprising the UNP and the SLFP, 
which were led by urban elite, high caste families. By the early 1980s, the JVP had 
emerged as the strongest Left party in Sri Lanka.  
 Three significant events that took place in the 1980s set the stage for the July 
insurrection. The first was the cancelling of general elections by the UNP regime in 
1982. Instead, a referendum was held to extend the life of Parliament for a further six 
years. This took place amidst mass protests and allegations of intimidation and 
referendum rigging. With the extension of Jayawardene’s executive powers to that of 
President, and with the regime itself blighted by allegations of corruption and 
violence, the referendum caused much anger and frustration, particularly among 
young people who were denied their democratic right to effect a regime change. 
The second incident involved the 1983 anti-Tamil riots. In response to reports 
of 13 Sinhala soldiers being killed by Tamil guerrillas in the North, a spate of violent 
riots led by ‘angry Sinhala mobs’ spread from Colombo to the East of the country. 
This resulted in the slaughter of Tamil civilians and the destruction of Tamil owned 
property. Despite prominent members of the UNP being implicated in the riots, the 
Government decided to scapegoat the parties of the Left, and proscribed all Left 
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parties including the JVP. Shortly afterwards, the ban on all parties was lifted except 
that of the JVP, despite its numerous appeals. It is likely that the UNP viewed the 
growing popularity of the JVP as a threat to its own position. Its proscription and 
exclusion from the democratic mainstream drove the JVP underground, where it 
began planning its second revolution to capture state power.  
 The 1983 riots led to a massive increase in recruitment to the Tamil separatist 
movement in the North and the East, and a dramatic escalation in the conflict. With 
security forces battling Tamil militants in the North, the LTTE launched attacks on 
the South. Its murder of Sinhala civilians and Buddhist monks in particular caused 
fear and outrage among many Sinhala people who became increasingly discontented 
with the UNP regime for failing to bring an end to the war and protect the Sinhalese 
people. Protests led by JVP trade unions and student organisations in the South were 
suppressed with heavy-handed security measures and attacks by UNP-sponsored 
‘thugs’.  
 The destabilisation of its neighbour due to the escalating civil war and the 
influx of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka provoked the Indian Government to 
intervene. This was the third significant event that set the stage for the July 
insurrection. In 1987, under heavy pressure from India, the UNP was coerced into 
signing the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord (ILPA). One of its requirements was that Sri 
Lankan troops be replaced by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in the North 
and East. The perception of the ILPA being imposed from outside in flagrant violation 
of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and anxiety about the presence of Indian troops, led to an 
eruption of protests and rioting by Sinhala people in Colombo. These indicated some 
JVP involvement. Riding the wave of nationalist sentiment, the JVP launched its 
second insurrection in July 1987, taking many by surprise. As Uyangoda notes:  
 
 
The JVP’s self-understanding during this period was that it was the sole 
patriotic force with the historical mission … to liberate the “motherland” from 
‘traitors’, ‘aggressors’, and ‘foreign invaders’. (Uyangoda 2003: 43)     
 
 
The 1980s brought some of the bloodiest and most turbulent years that Sri Lanka has 
faced in recent history. The Government was embroiled in two violent conflicts - the 
separatist conflict with Tamil militants mobilised by the LTTE in the North and East, 
and the conflict in the South and parts of the central region led by Sinhala youth 
spearheaded by the JVP.  
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The targets of JVP violence were wide-ranging – from members of the UNP, 
numerous other political opponents (including Left parties), civil servants, and 
security personnel, to academics, media representatives, trade union leaders, and 
civilians who defied orders issued by the ‘patriots’. The JVP further systematically 
enforced unofficial strikes and curfews (hartāl) that demanded, on pain of death, the 
lengthy closure of private and public institutions, enforced a boycott of all Indian 
products, and attacked public infrastructure. This strategy almost crippled the 
economy, and the state apparatus was brought to the brink of collapse with a wave of 
political resignations resulting from the JVP’s murder of prominent MPs and threats 
being issued to others who failed to vacate their posts. The atmosphere of disorder 
was heightened by the lengthy closure of schools and universities (rich recruiting 
ground for the JVP) and the face of the media being taken over by army personnel 
following the murder of prominent TV personalities. While the JVP had no control 
over the Tamil dominated areas of the North and some parts of the East, the rest of the 
country was gripped in violence, fear, and confusion. Moreover, the JVP seemed to be 
gaining the upper hand in its battle with the Government, with it commonly being 
referred to as punci ānḍuva (the small government). It maintained some support at 
village level by carrying out basic community services (e.g., mending roads, helping 
flood victims), and its strongest support base was in the low caste and economically 
marginalised areas.  
An interesting aspect of the JVP’s use of violence has been its seemingly 
moral basis. Dividing the world as they saw it according to moral codes - ‘good’ 
(‘patriots’) and ‘evil’ (‘traitors’); the meting out of punishments to ‘traitors’; purifying 
local communities of ‘anti-social elements’ (e.g., punishment of errant husbands, 
prostitutes, criminals); detailed public justifications as to why certain people deserved 
to be killed; and the murder of Buddhist monks for being materialistic and immoral 
(i.e., not living by Buddhist teachings), point to an underlying sense of moral justice 
that underpinned the JVP’s thinking on violence (at least at the initial stages).  
Moore (1993) states that while in its second phase, the JVP was never widely 
and positively popular due to the violence of its methods, which alienated most 
people, it did draw admiration beyond the ranks of its own supporters for its 
reputation as the agency establishing moral order. He points to the rumours and 
stories circulating in the late 1980s of JVP work at community level and the general 
assumption that if someone had been killed by the JVP they somehow deserved it 
(1993: 628). It is true that the JVP did maintain some support for its ‘clean-up’ of 
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villages. People often told me that the JVP initially “did some good things” and 
substantiated this claim with examples such as village thugs being punished. 
However, many also claimed that the violence soon went beyond what was deemed to 
be acceptable and became more and more indiscriminate. Two senior counter-
insurrectionary officers told me that it was this that led to the JVP’s eventual 
downfall. The excessive violence directed at those who were seen not to deserve it led 
to the public turning against the JVP and denouncing them to the security forces. One 
senior counter-insurrectionary officer told me: “It was the anē pav5 that brought about 
their downfall. People started feeling sorry for those who were being killed by the 
JVP. And suddenly we found all this information coming to us about them from 
ordinary people”. 
Despite the ongoing crisis that the Government was faced with, it called 
Presidential and General elections in 1988 and 1989 respectively. The JVP ‘banned’ 
these elections and commanded that they be boycotted, doing their utmost to disrupt 
them, including murdering election officials, candidates, and voters.6 This move may 
have been generated through fear of a new government with the legitimacy of the 
electorate undermining their own position as ‘emancipators’ of the people, in their 
project to overthrow a corrupt and unpopular regime. The result of the election was 
the re-election of the UNP with President Premadasa replacing Jayawardene. The JVP 
would inevitably have been discomfited by the election of Premadasa, as he posed a 
threat to their monopoly of anti-Indian nationalist sentiment and to their image as the 
patriotic emancipators of the oppressed. Premadasa was of marginalised socio-
economic background and spoke to the poor. He was also anti-ILPA, calling for the 
withdrawal of Indian troops. In February 1989, he invited the LTTE and the JVP for 
negotiations. While the LTTE accepted, the JVP failed to respond, despite repeated 
calls and the observance of a week-long ceasefire by the security forces. On the face 
of it, the JVP seemed to be on the brink of success in its battle for state power, and 
this was probably one of the reasons for its refusal to engage in negotiations.  
Believing that success was close at hand, in August 1989 the JVP delivered its 
final blow, which was also to be its biggest mistake. It issued an ultimatum to all 
security personnel to desert their posts, warning that failure to do so would mean that 
“the patriotic armed troops will adopt merciless measures against them and their 
                                                      
5 Anē pav is generally an expression of sympathy, empathy, or shock. Pav is derived from the Buddhist karmic framework and 
denotes an immoral action that entails negative karmic consequences for the agent. Anē pav here is used to express moral 
denigration of the actions of the JVP and sympathy for the victims of those actions.  
6 The success of the JVP’s terror campaign was evident in this election, which was marked by a significant low voter-turnout, 
with some areas recording turnouts of around 20% - 30%.  
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families” (Chandraprema 1991: 12). It was probable that the lack of enthusiasm 
expressed by the security forces thus far in curtailing the insurrection led to their 
mood being misread by the JVP. The security forces responded with their own poster 
campaign addressed to the JVP that stated, “give up or your families will be killed” 
(Moore 1993: 638). The JVP is then said to have begun ruthlessly carrying out its 
threat. This gave the security forces the impetus it had lacked so far to crack down on 
the insurgents. There ensued a bloody battle between the security forces and the JVP 
that led to what has been described as “one of the most horrifying counter-insurgency 
operations in South Asia” (Uyangoda 2003: 45).   
Much like the insurrection, efforts have been made to erase the counter-
insurrection from public memory. Some basic information on events of this period 
can be gleaned from studies mainly carried out on post-terror society through the 
narratives of survivors (see Perera 1995, 1999, 2001, 2008; De Silva 2005; Argenti-
Pillen 2003; Spencer 2000). The state terror unleashed during this period was largely 
indiscriminate and consumed more lives than the JVP campaign of violence. 
Paramilitary groups, vigilantes, and various death squads stalked the country and tens 
of thousands of young people suspected of insurgent activity or of having sympathy 
for the JVP (many who were innocent) were abducted, tortured, and killed or 
disappeared. The use of the gōni billa – the masked informant, who publicly 
denounced members of his or her community to the counter-insurrectionary forces, 
put intense pressure on community relationships. The climate of terror further 
witnessed the playing out of personal squabbles as people exacted revenge on enemies 
and denounced their neighbours, adding to the overall climate of fear and confusion.  
It is significant to note that a movement that had seemed indestructible – one 
that the security forces had grappled with for two years, was wiped out within the 
space of a few months following the threat directed at the security forces’ own 
families. Many security personnel, particularly at the lower ranks, were reluctant to 
attack the JVP due to reasons of shared social background and empathy with the 
grievances highlighted by the JVP. By the end of 1989 almost the entire leadership of 
the JVP, including the omnipotent Wijeweera, had been captured and killed by 
counter-insurrectionary forces.7 
                                                      
7 There are many cross-cultural similarities between the counter-insurrectionary measures adopted in Sri Lanka and many parts 
of the world. The use of death-squads and masked informants, such as the U.S.-inspired goni billa are cases in point. In 1983 
given the backdrop of the Cold War, the UNP regime was able to use the anti-socialist stance emanating from Reagan’s U.S. to 
proscribe the JVP, and this ideological stance was also manipulated in the counter-insurrection. A few people I spoke to also 
talked of the US and Israel ‘helping’ the state in its counter-insurrection. However, these accounts are impossible to substantiate 
due to a lack of evidence and empirical challenges. 
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The JVP in Electoral Politics 
 Once again we see the remarkable ability of the JVP to pick itself up and dust 
itself off after enormous defeat. Following its near decimation, a re-invented JVP re-
appeared in the mainstream political arena in the mid-1990s. Somawansa 
Amarasingha, the only survivor of the original Politburo, who had fled into exile 
overseas, emerged as its new leader. Despite its initial years as a reinvented electoral 
party being marked by internal rivalries and fending off accusations of secretly 
plotting violent revolts, the JVP proceeded to successfully establish itself as a 
mainstream political force, winning 39 Parliamentary seats in 2004 (see Venugopal 
2009, Uyangoda 2008). Following its re-invention as an electoral party, the JVP 
political agenda contained a mix of Marxism and Sinhala nationalism. Venugopal 
contends that this “flexible allegiance to two different ideologies allowed the JVP to 
tactically bend from one to the other, in line with political circumstance, and to recruit 
and mobilise as an authentic representative of both doctrines” (2009: 18).  
Its political opposition to the Norwegian-sponsored peace process between the 
UNP-led UNF (United National Front) Government and the LTTE, contributed to the 
UNF’s electoral defeat in 2004 and the collapse of the peace-process, along with the 
failure of subsequent attempts to resurrect it (Venugopal 2009: 2-3). The JVP became 
a key coalition partner in the new UPFA (United People’s Freedom Alliance) 
Government in 2004, only to dramatically resign from Government the following year 
over disagreements on a proposed joint mechanism to co-ordinate Tsunami relief 
efforts between the LTTE and the Government. Since 2006 it consistently called for a 
military ‘solution’ to the conflict in the North.  
 Venugopal (2008) points out that the JVP does not espouse ethnic 
exclusivism, nor has it aroused anti-Tamil sentiment. Its position on the ethnic 
conflict has instead been fuelled by Marxist ideas of equality, liberation, and justice, 
and its hostility targeted at Tamil nationalist ideology as opposed to the Tamil people. 
(2009: 18-19). This position was substantiated by my own findings in the field. 
Nearly all the JVP supporters I spoke to during my fieldwork emphasised that Tamil 
people had valid grievances that needed to be addressed and pointed to the 
discrimination Tamil people had suffered as a result of their minority status. At the 
same time they expressed their animosity towards the LTTE by accusing it of ethnic 
chauvinism, terrorism, and of oppressing the Tamil people. The reasons I was 
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commonly given for their opposition to a separate state for Tamils is typified in the 
following extract of a conversation I had with a former JVP insurgent, who continued 
to support the JVP. He told me:  
 
 
The Tamils are our brothers and sisters. So we must all learn to live together as 
equals in society. That can’t happen if we start dividing the country and 
separating the Sinhalese and the Tamils. It’s like a marriage. If my wife and I 




Venugopal further argues that the mass appeal of Sinhala nationalism lies in the fact 
that it is fundamentally rooted in class dynamics. Sinhala nationalism connects the 
masses to the state, which is the largest material benefactor in society and provides 
the only realistic path out of poverty. The JVP’s Sinhala nationalism, rather than 
necessarily being a deviation from mobilisation on a class basis, “is in many ways a 
reversion to class mobilisation through more successful means” (Venugopal 2009: 
36). 
Two thousand and eight saw the surprise split of the JVP, amidst claims of 
interpersonal rivalries, disagreements over support for President Mahinda Rajapakse, 
and the mainstream JVP’s discomfort with the breakaway group’s Sinhala nationalist 
stance (see Uyangoda 2008, Venugopal 2008). One group led by Wimal Weerawansa 
(the JVP’s charismatic Propaganda Secretary) went on to form the National Freedom 
Front (NFF) allied to President Rajapakse’s administration.8  
 
 
Data Collection, Location, and People 
 
The fieldwork for this research took place over a period of 14 months, and 
across 16 villages and towns in the South of Sri Lanka, 5 villages in Kandy, and 4 in 
central and suburban Colombo, as well as 3 in the central ‘dry zone’. Interviews were 
carried out with 32 former insurgents, 12 former members of the security forces, and 
with others whose lives were touched by the Terror, such as urban elites, people who 
had lost loved ones to violence, and those who had observed the violence of this 
period. Interviews with urban elites took place in exclusively in central Kandy and 
                                                      
8 For reasons behind the JVP split, see Venugopal, R. (2008) and Uyangoda, J. (2008). 
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Colombo. Primary interview data followed on from an extended period of 
ethnographic fieldwork, which entailed informal conversations, ‘hanging-out’ with 
people, attending public functions (e.g. JVP rallies, the annual ‘heroes day’ event to 
commemorate JVP insurgents killed by counter-insurrectionary forces), and local 
literature research (e.g. drawing on local newspapers dating back to the Bheeshanaya 
and relevant locally-published articles and books from local libraries).  The sensitivity 
of the subject, and the fear, silence, and suspicion that marked the post-terror research 
context had a significant impact on my method of data collection. All research 
participants categorically refused to have their interviews recorded, due to fear of 
identification or reprisals. I recorded all interviews by hand in a small note-book I 
carried with me to interviews, in an unobtrusive a manner as was possible. My aim 
was to put research participants at ease, while respecting their right to privacy. 
Careful efforts were made to protect the privacy of research participants, and these are 
detailed in my discussion of ethical considerations later in this chapter. 
Fieldwork for this research was multi-sited, spanning several areas across the 
southern and central regions of Sri Lanka. However, many of the people whose stories 
fill the pages of this thesis lived in villages and towns scattered around the South of 
Sri Lanka, locally known by its ancient name of ‘Ruhuna’.9 Ruhuna is considered the 
heartland of the JVP and continues to form its core strength. The majority of the JVP 
leadership in the 1980s, including its charismatic founder Rohana Wijeweera, hailed 
from this region.  
The high levels of support for the radical politics of the JVP and seeming 
readiness of southern people to engage in armed uprisings against the state are 
commonly put down to social disadvantage and political-economic alienation. The 
South, like many other rural and peripheral areas, has not had its fair share of the 
spoils of development that Colombo and some of its surrounds have enjoyed, as a 
result of the Colombo-centric policies of consecutive governments. In addition, the 
majority of Ruhuna people fall into the category of those Sinhala rural youth 
“ghettoised…within the frames of vernacular education” (Rampton and Welikala 
2005: 29-30) due to the swabhāsha (“Sinhala Only”) educational policy instituted by 
the SLFP Government in 1956. The concurrent continuation of the importance 
attached to English for access to social mobility and employment has resulted in the 
                                                      
9 While this research was carried out across several regions in Sri Lanka, I focus on the South here as many of the research 
participants originated from this area.  
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exclusion of swabhāsha educated youth, creating deep social and economic cleavages 
between them and their wealthy English-educated urban counter-parts. 
A poverty brief prepared for Oxfam by the Centre for Poverty Analysis in 
2004 states that “chronic unemployment, low levels of income, and high incidence of 
poverty, especially in the interior areas, characterise the region” (CEPA 2004: 2). 
High unemployment rates among educated youth are particularly emphasised. 
However, CEPA also points to diversity in human development between localities in 
the region. It puts the persistence of poverty in the region down to “natural climatic 
shocks” and a failure of the existing policy framework to address regional 
development. The JVP has always espoused the politics of the poor and the 
marginalised. Educated unemployment and economic hardship have been two of its 
key campaign cries.  
Ruhuna is also significant because of its much vaunted distinct regional 
identity. The people that I worked among were eager to induct the ignorant outsider 
into her new environment. Ruhuna people, they often told me, were napuru (fierce, 
thuggish), valiyaṭa barai (up for scraps), eḍitarai (courageous), keling10 (direct), and 
bhaya näti gatiya (fearless). Many people drew on such terms to rationalise the 
prevalence of insurrectionary activity in the South. An analysis of such terms and 
southern identity itself is lacking in anthropological literature. However, some writers 
have drawn attention to the loaded statement “api dakunē minissu” (we are southern 
people) as carrying threatening overtones (see Chandraprema 1989), and there has 




A Very Real Problem for the Southern Sinhalese  
 
In Sinhala dominated rural areas of Sri Lanka, the military has evolved into 
the largest employer of youth (see Venugopal 2008 and 2009). The South sends a 
disproportionately large number of its youth to the Sri Lankan armed forces – mainly 
as foot soldiers. This is generally put down to feelings of Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism and to some bizarre form of re-enacting the historic role that the people of 
Ruhuna played in providing foot-soldiers for the armies of ancient Sinhala Kings, by 
some non-southern Sinhalese and urban elites. There is also a common local belief, 
                                                      
10 Keling can be translated as straight-talking, fair, and ‘what you see is what you get’. 
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particularly among high caste non-southerners, that for many southern young people, 
joining the army is simply a natural act that follows their ancient historic roots which 
lie in the Indian warrior caste (Kshātriya). The military has been the only sector of the 
Sri Lankan state to have consistently expanded since the 1980s. Venugopal argues 
that the war and connected military growth has served to preserve much of the social 
mobility and poverty reduction functions that the state previously performed.  It 
accounts for almost half of all cash-paying jobs in some areas, and provides 
employment in the deteriorating small-holder rural economy (2009: 35) 
Almost all of my research participants in Ruhuna had a family member or 
close relative in the armed forces. When I initially asked them about this, many drew 
on the so-called cultural traits of the people of Ruhuna to explain the large number of 
soldiers recruited from their region. A typical example is one where my friend Ramya 
one day explained the decision of her brother, and many of her village peers, to sign 
up using terms such as, “us southerners are not afraid” (bhaya nä) and “us southern 
people fearlessly put ourselves forward for anything” (dakunē minissu bhaya nätuva 
ōna dēkaṭa idiripat venavā). However, as the months drew on and the closer a 
relationship I developed with her family, her mother confided, “there is nothing else 
for our boys to do around here. He (her son who was in the army) can’t speak English 
well. Without that you can’t do anything”. My friend, who had previously espoused 
southern courage and fearlessness as reasons for young southerners signing up to the 
security forces, later admitted that her family was now thankfully financially stable 
because of the steady income her brother was bringing in. Ramya went on to explain 
that the family now had a bit more respect from people, and that they were able to 
access public services (that they were rightfully due) more easily without the 
harassment for bribes and time-wasting (rastiādu) that ordinary people had to endure 
in public institutions.  
In the reality of everyday life, I found poverty and a lack of alternative 
employment opportunities, rather than grand ideologies of Buddhist nationalism or 
historic calling, to be the main factors driving southern youth to sign up to the security 
forces. Interestingly and unsurprisingly, I also found more of an awareness of the 
harsh realities of war – what it meant to be on the battlefront and the suffering that 
conflict brought to people on both sides, among these families in the South. While 
many of my friends in Ruhuna disagreed with the concept of a separate state for the 
Tamil minority, the majority of people I engaged with acknowledged that a political 
solution, rather than a military one, was necessary for the war to end. I came across 
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far more militant Sinhala Buddhist nationalist ideology among the powerful elites in 
Colombo and Kandy, than I did among the people of the so-called heartland of 
Sinhala Buddhist nationalism.11  
Social status (tatvaya) is of paramount importance to many Sinhala families, 
and was no less significant to people in the South. The status (tatvaya) that one 
occupies in society is dependent on indicators such as ownership of land, formal 
education, conspicuous consumption, and family background (now decreasing in 
importance in a context where class and material success is fast over-taking caste and 
‘pedigree’ in importance). One’s status also dictates the respect one receives and their 
access to goods and services, in a country where debilitating corruption makes 
accessing the most basic public services an arduous challenge. My friend Ramya and 
her family were not of high status. However, having a family member in the armed 
forces raised the status of the family within their community and made everyday life 
somewhat easier. At the time of conducting fieldwork for this research, joining the 
army was a frightening prospect in the face of an unforgiving civil war where one was 
very likely to be killed or left severely disabled. Ramya’s brother was more or less 
forced to join the army through sheer economic need. However, admitting this (and 
expressing fear of joining the army) would have run the risk of diminishing his status. 
Drawing on respected local cultural characteristics to convey one’s ‘choice’ to sign-
up, was a measure used to prevent a deterioration of status. 
 
 
Living Context of Research Participants 
 
Everyday life for the majority of my research participants was a constant 
struggle. The impact of international markets, global trade injustice, foreign debt, the 
hefty expense of funding the civil war and its impact on sectors such as tourism and 
foreign investment, and economic mismanagement and corruption by consecutive 
governments, had led to a severely deteriorating economy. The rapid escalation of 
inflation (set at around 22% during my fieldwork) had set in motion a sharp increase 
                                                      
11 In May 2009, at the time of writing up this research, the Sri Lankan Government declared that the civil war had been brought 
to an end with the defeat of the LTTE and the death of its leader Prabhakaran. The implications of this in terms of employment 
opportunities in the armed forces for people of the South are difficult to predict at this stage. However, the Sri Lankan 
Government has announced plans to increase the security forces by 50% which it states is necessary to prevent further militancy 
and to assist in post-war development work (source: BBC World News 29 June 2009). 
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in the cost of basic necessities.12 The growing intensity of the civil war brought on an 
additional psychological and emotional burden for many of those who had family 
members in the security forces. There was also an acute awareness of the gap between 
the rich (mainly based in Colombo) and the poor, and a constant sense of being 
subjected to injustice. The extract of a conversation that I had with one former 
insurgent in many ways typified conversations I had with many people during my 
time in the field, which frequently featured the daily economic struggles one was 
forced to endure: 
 
  
If I had died in those days (the Bheeshanaya) I would not live this life of 
suffering (duka). I have so many economic problems. I work long hours and 
have a family of 5 to support, and 2 of them are children that I need to feed and 
educate, on a salary of Rs 10 thousand a month [approximately £45].13 We can’t 
even afford to live in a place of our own. We live at the parental house…I dress 
well, wear a nice shirt and smile, but only I know the problems that fill my 
mind... My wife tells me to buy milk packets for the kids. But one pack is Rs 
200. I can’t afford that…I try to borrow (money) from people, but I can’t keep 
borrowing and afford to pay them back. As a father it breaks my heart14 (hita 
ridenava) when I can’t buy milk for my children. Do you know what that feels 
like? To not be able to give milk to your children? In Colombo there are people 
who spend Rs 200 thousand [approximately £900] a month on their families. 
For many children in Colombo, from birth they live a life of luxury. My heart is 
on fire (hita gini gannava). My little children don’t live a comfortable (säpa) 




The villages and towns in which I did fieldwork were not bounded or static. At the 
time of my fieldwork many people were leaving in search of employment 
opportunities usually in the armed forces and the Middle-East (e.g., working as house-
maids and construction labourers in Saudi Arabia, kitchen hands on US army bases in 
Iraq and Afghanistan). There were no illusions about the harsh working conditions in 
these countries. However, people generally felt their options to be limited. Even in 
their attempts to seek opportunities abroad, they were subjected to the debilitating 
bureaucracy and corruption of the state.  
                                                      
12 The public owned and politically influenced Central Bank of Sri Lanka sets the official rate of inflation. The reliability of its 
information is questionable as it is commonly perceived to publish significantly watered-down rates of inflation in order to allay 
public criticism of the Government. 
13 This figure is an approximation based on the exchange rate at the time of this conversation.  
14 In Sinhala hita signifies both (what we would describe in English separately) the mind and the heart. Hita is where emotions 
are created, stored, and felt, but also where thoughts are developed.  
  34  
One friend who was desperate to work in the Middle-East, to provide a better 
life for his children as he told me, had been promised a job in Saudi Arabia. However, 
he was required to pay a hefty bribe (approximately £500) to the Government official 
in charge of allocating the posts, and through him another heftier bribe to the 
Government minister who had brokered the employment deal with the Saudi Arabian 
authorities. Having pawned his wife’s jewellery and borrowed heavily from the bank 
and from relatives and friends, he finally managed to pay the bribes and numerous 
other dubious fees requested by the Foreign Employment Ministry. Despite all this, he 
was given neither the promised employment nor a refund for the bribes and fees. The 
last time I saw him he was very disillusioned with life, having been cheated by the 
state and ending up in a worse economic situation than before. While corruption and 
bureaucracy are issues that all Sri Lankans (without the relevant political connections) 
have to deal with, its intensity varies according to one’s status in society. Many of my 
research participants from rural and semi-urban marginalised backgrounds were often 
subjected to the worst of it. Interestingly, political corruption was cited as one of the 




Trust and Access 
 
The context in which I was carrying out my research was one where 
corruption, impunity, and state-sponsored violence reigned. In addition, the civil war 
that raged in the North between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government brought 
itself to life in the South through LTTE suicide bombers detonating themselves in 
public spaces, wreaking devastation and panic. An increasingly authoritarian regime 
intolerant of criticism created an environment in which people were frightened to 
discuss sensitive politics with strangers. The appearance of white vans without 
number-plates brought back harrowing memories of the ‘white-van abduction 
syndrome’ of the Bheeshanaya. News of Sinhala people being abducted in broad 
daylight, widely rumoured to be state or politically-sponsored, led to a further 
muzzling of potential research participants. In such a climate, trust proved vital in 
chipping away at the silence that shrouded this subject. The narratives featured in this 
thesis are the product of that trust, but remain peppered with gaps, and bouts of fear.  
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Finding those whose personal history was linked to insurgency proved 
somewhat problematic to begin with since many people were unwilling to identify 
themselves as former insurgents and hesitant to talk about the Terror. As one former 






A lot of people don’t want to remember the past…there is an element of shame 
about being a JVPer. Now being identified as a JVPer (from that time) is a joke 
for people. They tease us and ask what we were doing. That all we did was try 
and attack the Government twice and failed…So some people don’t like to say 





Many people were suspicious of my motives. In his work on survivors of violence, 
Perera (2001) points to silence and the collapse of trust as legacies of the Terror. He 
states that fear of the past repeating itself and the difficulty of trusting strangers (such 
as researchers) when people could not even trust members of their own community, 
and the perception that those who have not experienced what they have would not 
understand or care, contribute to the fear (2001: 159-169). I also found the post-terror 
environment of impunity in which ‘perpetrators’, ‘victims’, and ‘witnesses’ of 
violence were all forced to share the same, small, awkward spaces, and the sense of 
taboo surrounding the Bheeshanaya further contributed to people’s disinclination to 
speak of the past. 
 In the prevailing climate of silence and fear, I utilised trust-networks to access 
potential research participants, and made extensive use of the snow-balling technique 
to widen my research participant group. I devised a three-tiered consent and access 
strategy. Given the sensitivity of the research I wanted to allow ample opportunity for 
people to think through consent and to withdraw it if they so wished. First, my mutual 
contact would visit a potential research participant to tell him about me, my research, 
and to provide some reassurance about my trustworthiness. On their agreement to 
meet me, he or she would then accompany me to a brief introductory meeting where 
my potential research participant would be given an opportunity to ‘suss me out’. 
Here I would explain the purpose of my research and seek consent, and set a date for 
an interview, which provided enough of a time-gap to allow research participants to 
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withdraw their consent. After my first proper interview I found it fairly easy to set 
follow-up interviews.  
In most cases our first interview entailed my being subjected to a ‘grilling’ 
session by a potential research participant to extract any hidden motives and political 
allegiances that I may have been secretly harbouring. On one such occasion I sat 
opposite a potential research participant, attempting to tackle his volley of questions 
and accusations, while feeling the suspicious eyes of Che Guevara and Rohana 
Wijeweera boring into me from the posters that adorned his walls. His tone was harsh, 
and his confrontational mode of questioning was clearly an attempt to catch me out. 
He emphatically stated over and over again, “I don’t know how honest (avanka) you 
are”. Suspicions of my ‘real motive’ for carrying out research on this topic were 
expressed by drawing comparisons with politicians and NGOs who “come with their 
private agendas... focussed purely on money and power”.15 This was typical of many 
of the initial ‘trust-tests’ I endured and successfully passed. 
The sensitivity of the research context and the challenges to access this posed, 
along with my desire to ensure a carefully thought-out access strategy that placed 
trust, ethical considerations, and the safety of research participants at the centre, led to 
some initial delays in starting the process of interviewing. My first introduction to a 
former insurgent took place approximately six to seven months after I had arrived in 
the field, and the snow-balling technique was necessarily localised, given the 
particular circumstances of this sensitive research. 
The building of trust between myself and research participants was a gradual 
process. I was truthful about my research and motivations, and open to questions 
about myself. Trust here entailed obligation and expectation. My research participants 
expected that by placing their trust in me and by sharing their stories with me, I would 
carry out my obligation to protect their identities and ensure that no harm would come 
to them as a result of my research. The credibility that those who introduced me to 
research participants offered, my manner of interacting with them, how I positioned 




                                                      
15 In the aftermath of the tsunami disaster, the South was inundated with NGOs and people in this region had close and direct 
dealings with various international and local NGOs. Some of these NGOs were (and continue to be) involved in corruption and 
unethical modes of operation (e.g. proselytising NGOs that provided aid in return for conversion, or those that only provided 
relief to Christian victims of the tsunami), earning NGOs overall a bad reputation. During my fieldwork I found many people 
likening NGOs to their corrupt, exploitative, and power-hungry political leaders.   
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Native or Foreign Anthropologist? 
 
Peacock contends that developing relationships of trust does not open a 
“magic door” to valid truthful data. He argues that what the researcher is allowed to 
see will depend on how he or she is defined as a person, and how his or her role is 
socially situated by others (2001: 85). My positioning in the field and how others 
situated me was complex and transient. It had a significant impact on my access to 
research participants, the level of trust they placed in me, and on the type of 
information I was able to obtain.  
So here I was returning to my country of origin to carry out this fieldwork, 
with little that tied me to it except for memories and relatives, and a level of Sinhala 
that could benefit from much improvement. The ‘native-insider’ versus ‘foreign-
outsider’ dichotomy that was born of the colonial era has recently been taken to task 
by scholars, who point to cultural complexity and the diversity that exists within 
people, groups, and cultures (see Narayan 2002, Aguilar 1981, Abu-Lughold 1988). 
Narayan (2002) emphasises the multiplex and shifting nature of identities, and the 
ways in which people can simultaneously be ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. Being ‘native’ 
certainly did not make me feel like an ‘insider’. Admittedly, it helped that I shared 
religious values with my research participants and that I had an almost instinctive 
understanding of some of their cultural mores. However, I was also acutely aware that 
I was far removed from them in terms of class, language, and life-style. Unlike that of 
my research participants, my upbringing in urban Colombo was privileged, my first 
language was English, and the lifestyle of my family had more in common with those 
in the ‘Western world’ than it did with their Sri Lankan counterparts in rural and 
semi-urban areas. So where would I fit in the insider-outsider debate? In the reality of 
the field I benefited from being both, and from consciously and subconsciously 
drawing on the various aspects of my fluid identity depending on the context.  
 In the early days of my fieldwork, I was very much aware of being an 
‘outsider’. In an eager effort to ‘fit in’ and be accepted I made an effort to ‘be more 
Sri Lankan’ (e.g., altering my dress, my accent, and certain mannerisms). This attempt 
to go somewhat ‘native’ was also fuelled to an extent by the crude taunts of a cheeky 
young local whose clichéd term “coconut” summed up my self-consciousness at 
appearing somewhat Sri Lankan but very much an outsider. “Coconut”, he explained 
gleefully, meant “brown on the outside, white on the inside”. However, I was 
surprised when my careful efforts seemed only to frighten off and further silence 
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potential research participants. It was then that I began to realise the importance of my 
‘foreignness’ to the process of building trust and enabling people to feel comfortable 
in talking candidly about their experiences. It meant that I was genuinely from 
‘outside’ and thereby not a spy for the CID (Criminal Investigation Department of 
police) or some political party. Importantly, I was also then deemed to have fewer 
preconceptions and biases than a ‘local’ researcher, and not to be as embroiled in 
local political and social dynamics surrounding the Bheeshanaya.  
 This ‘outsider-foreign’ aspect had a tempering effect on certain personal 
characteristics I originally feared might prove to be a hindrance to developing a 
trusting relationship with my research participants. My name and certain mannerisms 
instantly gave away some of these characteristics to other Sri Lankans. My access to 
an English education, my privileged background, and caste, represented the very 
sources of marginalisation and social injustice that many ex-insurgents believed they 
were fighting against in the 1980s. Simultaneously, other personal characteristics such 
as my ethnic background and religion endeared me to potential research participants, 
who always substantiated my religious background before embarking on candid 
critiques of “our religion” and “our monks” (i.e., Buddhism and Buddhist monks), or 
established my ethnic background before expressing their views on the conflict 
between the state and the LTTE. Throughout my field experience I was constantly 
subduing some aspects of my identity while intensifying others.  
I was also aware of the many instances in which people attempted to 
manipulate and define my identity, to my amusement and occasional bemusement. 
Situating me also seemed to pose a dilemma for some people. Members of the 
security forces who scrutinised my passport at checkpoints would tell me that since I 
had a Sinhala name I was Sinhala. The local researcher who told me that she was “fed 
up of foreigners coming here to study Sri Lanka”, clearly situated me as an ‘outsider’. 
Consider the plight of my confused landlady who felt that I was foreign enough to 
criticise the less desirable behaviour of Sri Lankan people (hence her refusal to take in 
local tenants), while simultaneously construing me as local enough to complain about 
the ‘dodgy’ habits of her foreign tenants.  
Most importantly, and to the benefit of this study, my research participants 
seemed to situate me somewhere in between. Research participants actively 
manipulated my characteristics to suit their circumstances. For example, my vegan 
lifestyle was (wrongly) interpreted emphatically as an act of Buddhist piety, with one 
suspicious potential research participant even telling our mutual contact with a 
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relieved smile, “If she doesn’t harm animals, then of course there is no way that she 
will cause harm to people like us. As Buddhists we should all follow that example”. 
People actively manipulated my identity and often positioned me in a manner that 
provided themselves with reassurance of their own personal judgement of my 
trustworthiness and their agreement to participate in my research. Being able to 
benefit from being both the ‘native-insider’ and the ‘foreign-outsider’ brought forth 
the rich narratives that inform this thesis. 
 
 
Representing Former Insurgents, Writing about Violence, and Some Ethical 
Dilemmas 
 
 The safety of my research participants continues to be of paramount concern. 
Many expressed fear of reprisals by ‘torturers’ who lived nearby (some of whom 
continue to hold positions of power) or by those whose families had been harmed by 
the JVP during the Bheeshanaya. Others expressed fear of JVP attacks. In a 
continuing environment of impunity, corruption, and violence, the prospect of harm to 
a research participant or their family continues to be very real. All research 
participants and places have been anonymised and stripped of personal identifiers. 
The responsibility I have towards ensuring the safety of my research participants 
underlies my decision to provide minimal context to their individual quotes in this 
thesis. Where descriptive details of research participants are available, these have 
been made deliberately misleading to prevent identification, while taking care to 
ensure that this does not affect the quality and validity of the data. 
Carrying out sensitive research with ‘vulnerable’ people is obviously ethically 
charged. Asking people to remember and reflect on a disturbing period of their life 
and to recount painful experiences left me with a constant sense of unease, as to the 
impact this may have on the mental well-being of my informants. As interviews 
progressed, I felt that some people were finding new ways of looking at their 
experiences by talking about them with an outsider. However, at other times I felt that 
the process of unearthing difficult memories may have detrimental consequences for 
the subject’s well-being. On such occasions depending on the context, I would change 
the line of inquiry, remind them of their right not to talk about things that they were 
not comfortable with and to withdraw consent, take a break, or make a decision to not 
continue the research with them. I was carefully sensitive to any signs (e.g., body 
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language), which would indicate that a particular line of inquiry was having a 
negative impact on my research participants’ mental well-being. Overall however, as 
a researcher and human being, it was a personal and moral judgement I had to make 
on such occasions, by taking careful account of the individual concerned and the 
context. 
A deeper understanding of the uncomfortable historical relationship between 
anthropology and colonisation, greater awareness of human rights, and the ability of 
the people studied themselves to read and critique what is written about them, have 
brought ethical and political concerns regarding representation and writing about 
violence to the fore of anthropological debate over the past two decades. In Tarlo’s 
(2003) work on the Emergency in India, she recounts an incident that took place 
during her fieldwork which, as well as providing a visual critique of the power 
relationship between the researcher and participants, also presents the problem of 
representation. Here, a drunken man interrupts an interview she is carrying out with a 
member of the slum community to hand her a piece of paper randomly strewn with 
his squiggles in Hindi. This leads her to contemplate how one can “reduce a person’s 
life into a series of squiggles, and that in a language that the person does not even 
understand” (2003: 124). This incident also seems to put a question-mark over the 
whole process of ethnographic fieldwork – the right of someone to enter and disrupt 
other people’s lives, and to unearth and write about private and uncomfortable 
memories. The inherent power structures of the relationship between researcher and 
participants remain skewed with the ultimate power over what is written and how it is 
written lying in the hands of the researcher.  
Nevertheless, as I found in my own fieldwork, research participants create 
various avenues through which to exercise some power and leverage in the research 
process. This was largely exerted through what people chose to tell me, how they said 
it, and what they chose to withhold. Interviews and conversations followed a direction 
that was primarily set by the teller, with silences and gaps often marking subjects that 
they wished to avoid. Research participants had their own agendas for telling, and 
their narratives were often structured in ways that they believed would best meet these 
purposes. As we shall see through the stories that run through this thesis, former 
insurgents spoke in frames of victimhood and in the main refused to talk about their 
own complicity in violence. Their memories were mediated in a manner that enabled 
them to project a carefully constructed representation of themselves and their pasts 
through narrative. Furthermore, when I embarked on my fieldwork, the intense 
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grilling-sessions that I was subjected to by potential research participants made me 
acutely aware of the power in our relationship being weighted in their favour at this 
point of the research process, as I tried to convince them of my trustworthiness and to 
persuade them to share their stories with me. In the relationship between research 
participants and myself as researcher, power was a phenomenon that constantly 
shifted from one party to another during the research process. However, it is 
inevitable that the ultimate power on writing and representation lies with me as the 
researcher. I have therefore endeavoured to exercise professionalism and ethical 
sensitivity, and to maintain respect for my research participants throughout this 
process.  
Daniel contends that accounts of violence run the risk of taking on prurience 
(1996:4). Similarly, in her work with survivors of the Delhi riots, Das questions 
whether the author stands in a relationship of a voyeur to the narratives of suffering 
(1995: 33). Perera (1998, 1999) argues that studies that emphasise the counter-
insurrectionary death squads or the JVP (which encompass my ex-insurgent and 
former counter-insurrectionary officer protagonists) could fall into this category and 
eclipse the experiences of survivors of terror, particularly women and children. He 
states that “unfortunately, for many academics experiences of women as well as 
children are perhaps less exciting, and less violent, and less graphic to deserve their 
academic attention (1999: 4 and 1998: 5). I would argue that any study on violence 
runs the risk of prurience, whether it focussed on ‘perpetrators’ or ‘survivors’ of 
violence (bearing in mind that these categories themselves are not mutually 
exclusive). Anthropologists of violence should be aware of such risks and guard 
against them throughout the process of writing. Das, in her study of female survivors 
of the Partition and the 1984 Delhi riots, rightly comments that “there is plenty of 
evidence of stories of victims and survivors that hook into a popular culture in which 
the trope of the ‘innocent’ victim provides the cover to engage in voyeurism” (2007: 
211). Similarly, scholars have reminded us that despite research with ‘victims’ being 
ethically and methodologically easier to carry out, it also entails moral dilemmas of its 
own, with researchers who follow this path potentially being labelled anything from 
“bleeding heart liberals” or “voyeurs of suffering”, to “merchants in misery” (Cohen 
2001, Foster et al. 2005).  
This is not to say that the study of people who have participated in violence 
does not bring with it cumbersome ethical quandaries, particularly concerning issues 
of representation and ‘truth’. But if, as Spencer has argued, “Anthropology is above 
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all a repository of inconvenient facts” and an important part of our work entails 
acknowledging our “moral obligation to face up to the inconvenient” (1999: 7-8), then 
it would be both ethically and professionally unjustifiable to brush the perspectives of 
those who have engaged in violence under the carpet, simply because they are deemed 
less ‘worthy’ of our attention than other protagonists. My findings may, to varying 
degrees and to different people, be considered ‘inconvenient truths’. It challenges 
‘comforting’ stereotypes of people who have engaged in monstrous acts of violence 
by showing them to be rational individuals (not much different to the rest of us) with 
the capacity to exercise moral judgement, thereby muddying the waters of clear-cut 
‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’ labels (see Foster et al. 2005)  
In approaching research with former insurgents and former counter-
insurrectionary officers, I also feel it important to recognise the common humanity 
that we all share, and to avoid demonising those who resort to violent action for their 
cause. I agree with Levi who, in his study of Nazi concentration camps, warns of the 
imprudence of issuing hasty moral judgements, pointing to the “grey zone” of 
ambiguity that such situations radiate (2004: 83–91). Rather than being psychopathic 
monsters or evil agents (as is the sensationalist approach too often taken by the tabloid 
media) on the one hand, or simply ‘ordinary’ people carried away by the requirements 
of modern bureaucracy and bound to rules of obedience (see Arendt 1994, Browning 
2001) on the other hand, the ‘perpetrators’ of violence featured in this study attest to 
the ambivalence of being human. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that to 
understand and explain the perspectives and actions of ‘perpetrators’ of violence does 
not amount to justifying their violence (Browning 2001). 
Finally, I should mention here concerns that have been expressed about 
balancing theoretical analysis with human accounts of violence, and the danger of the 
former rendering insignificant the reality of violence. Daniel (1996) contends that 
flattening accounts of violence with theory offers an easy option to the researcher who 
wants to avoid the risk of them being fattened with prurience.  However, he warns 
that the price of this is the betrayal of those who have communicated their stories to 
the anthropologist and through him or her to the outside world.  The reality of 
violence is such that “a theory that purports to inform it must … stand apart from it as 
a gesture of open admission to its inadequacy to measure up to the task” (1996: 6).  
While theory is necessary for analysis and a deeper understanding of violence, it 
should not drown out the human voices and lived reality of violence. With this in 
mind, I have tried to perform a delicate balancing act here, so that theory and the 
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human voice can inform and talk to each other. However, it must be acknowledged 
that this research is ultimately about the human experience of violence, and its value 
thereby lies in the rich empirical detail that substantiates its findings.    
 
    
Truth, Memory, and Testimony  
 
An important factor that motivated people to participate in this research was 
their desire to publicise the ‘truth’. I was charged by many former insurgents in 
particular, to use this research to challenge what they termed as the “biased” or “one-
sided” official history of the Terror with what they termed as the “truth” or “what 
really happened”. Many former insurgents felt that the state narrative of the 
Bheeshanaya was one of silence, forgetting, and misrepresentation. They believed 
that media reports and the few studies available on the subject supported this version 
of history in discrediting the JVP insurgents and down-playing the violence of the 
counter-insurrection. Significantly, people overwhelmingly said that their own 
suffering and the violence of the Bheeshanaya had been ignored by both the local and 
international community, particularly when compared to the weight given to the 
ethnic conflict in the North. As such, they perceived their participation in this research 
as an opportunity to provide an alternative narrative or a ‘counter-truth’. The official 
narrative of the state has been subject to change over the years depending on the 
political parties in power. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that denial, and officially 
imposed silence and amnesia have characterised the tenures of the UNP regime, while 
governments led by its political opposition have also tended to ignore and ‘forget’ this 
era, resurrecting it occasionally during electoral campaigns for purposes of political 
expediency.    
One former insurgent named Asthika, at the end of an intense ‘grilling 
session’ told me, “write honestly, a book that tells the truth about what happened to 
people like us. A study done properly on this will be important...Because the people 
who have done studies on this have been biased (towards the state narrative)”. The 
subjective ethnographer’s moral load here then is to write an ‘objective’ ethnography– 
an impossible task. I was met with a similar charge by Kirihami, another former 
insurgent, who put considerable effort into providing me with detailed information for 
the purposes of this research:  
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If we can make a small difference to young people. If the new generation can 
learn from our experiences, then that is the most important thing. Not much has 
been written about this insurrection. And the things that are there weigh heavily 
towards the opinion of the Government. You should write a book about us in 
Sinhala. To encourage our young people to read and learn from it … If you can 




People’s pleas to publicise their stories and to tell the world the ‘truth’ suggested that 
they believed others to care about their experiences and the injustices that they had 
suffered (see Daniel 1996). Daniel’s acknowledgement of the “impotency one feels” 
(1996: 4) in attempting the enormously difficulty task of communicating violence 
holds true in my own work. This sense of “impotency” is further intensified in my 
case through a recognition that the end product of this research is merely a PhD thesis 
that will not entail the kind of wide circulation and publicity expected by my research 
participants to take their ‘alternative truths’ to the outside world.  
The charges directed at me to publicise the ‘truth’, also left me with confusing 
questions as to whose truth, and what kind of truth to write. As this research 
unravelled it became evident that rather than the existence of one categorical ‘truth’ of 
the Bheeshanaya, there were instead a multiplicity of diverse ‘truths’, each carrying 
value, credibility, and meaning to the teller.  Memory and oral narrative are deeply 
contested terrains. The imperfections and unreliability of memory have been 
highlighted in much academic research, and its use as a method for this study comes 
with my acknowledgement of its problems. However, this by no means diminishes its 
importance and usefulness as a means through which to study violence. Instead, I 
believe that through the vehicle of memory, we obtain a rich and nuanced insight into 
the convoluted human ‘reality’ of violence. In the course of this research, I have been 
forced to recognise that people’s memories were representations of the past, and that 
they could not simply be accepted at face value. However, this is not to refute their 
‘truth’ value, as each of the narratives set out in the following pages are versions or 
“pieces” of the ‘truth’ (see Butalia 2000).  
I have not set out to write a history of the Bheeshanaya. This thesis is not an 
attempt to reconstruct a historical ‘truth’ of the Terror based on people’s recollections 
and stories of it. This would be an impossible task in such an ethically and politically 
charged context, where ‘truth’ and ‘historical fact’ are subject to considerable 
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contestation.  My aim here instead is to plot a constellation of different ‘truths’, 
sometimes contradictory and sometimes overlapping, all of which make up a larger 
reality of the Bheeshanaya as experienced by human beings whose lives were touched 
by its violence. Rather than a futile search for a non-existent and categorical ‘truth’ 
then, I believe that my efforts here are better spent on analysing the purposes that lie 
behind these ‘truths’, and people’s constructions and interpretations of it.  
Langer, in his study of the oral testimonies of Holocaust survivors insightfully 
reminds us that since oral testimonies are “human documents rather than merely 
historical ones, the troubled interaction between the past and the present achieved a 
gravity that surpasses the concern with accuracy” (Langer 1991: xv). This research 
demonstrates that such an approach gives us insight into the meanings that people 
attach to violence and its implications for life in the aftermath. It is people’s memories 
and reflections of violence that add richness and depth to its lived reality, thereby 
providing the “human dimension” and bringing to light the “underside” of its history 
(see Butalia 2000, Thompson 2000).  
Moreover, this approach allows historical ‘facts’ and assumed ‘truths’ to be 
challenged, and divulges their very subjectivity and constructed nature. Memory 
thereby contributes to a richer and more balanced version of the ‘history’ of the 
Bheeshanaya. The use of memory and oral narrative here has allowed me to bring out 
the alternative ‘truths’ belonging to a group whose voices have been ignored thus far 
(i.e., former JVP insurgents). Rather than comparing memory and history by placing 
them in opposition to each other, or suggesting that the former should be regarded as 
the sole method for excavating ‘truth’ and ‘history’, I would emphasise, as some 
scholars have done before me, the value of memory in supplementing history by 
offering a different and sometimes oppositional perspective to it, which in turn 
enriches historical ‘truth’ (Butalia 2000).  
Finally, I must recognise that the memories around which this thesis is built 
were elicited by me as a researcher, rather than being spontaneous recollections 
arising from traditional participant observation – a method that was not practically or 
ethically feasible here due to the sensitivity of the subject. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note (and I hope this is evident from the stories to follow), that these 
memories reflected valid issues that people grappled with in their everyday lives, and 
that they always followed the priorities and direction set by research participants. 
Moreover, as this research progressed and trust was gradually established, memories 
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were more spontaneously volunteered, and my role in gently drawing them out 
diminished over time. 
 
 
Limits of Research 
  
I originally set out to seek the narratives of ex-insurgents, who duly comprised 
young men, women, and Buddhist monks who engaged in the insurrectionary 
violence of the 1980s. However, the practicalities of doing this research on the ground 
soon threw up access problems relating to female and Buddhist monk ex-insurgents. 
Female ex-insurgents were hesitant to participate in my research and refused to even 
be introduced to me, usually citing fear and domestic commitments as reasons for this 
decision. Similarly, Buddhist monks in the area were difficult to access. I found that 
many had been killed or had since disrobed and were difficult to trace. Others were 
not keen to meet me and engage in this research. The absence of the voices of women 
and Buddhist monks are limitations of this research. However, it is worth nothing that 
the JVP insurgent group was predominantly made up of young lay men. This topic 
overall has been paid insufficient scholarly attention, and it will be for future 
ethnographers to build on this work and attempt to extract the stories of these groups. 
 
 
Structure of Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. It is structured around the priorities of my 
research participants, which form the themes of each chapter.  
 
Chapter one examines the ways in which people use the concept of ‘youth’ to 
remember and talk about their experiences of the Bheeshanaya. I argue that former 
insurgents draw on the idiom of ‘youth’ as a narrative strategy to explain their own 
involvement in the insurrection and to comprehend their experiences of violence. 
Through their narrative manipulation of this idiom, former insurgents reconstruct their 
violent pasts and project a specific representation of the self in moral terms. This in 
turn allows them to disassociate themselves from violence, and to deflect moral 
culpability for it.  
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Chapter two looks at the ways in which people mediate memories of a particularly 
morally burdensome nature. These are memories of what people commonly referred 
to as ‘opportunistic’ violence, which entailed acts of revenge and denunciation during 
the Bheeshanaya. I argue that these memories are morally irksome because they 
concern the perpetration of violence between ‘intimates’, and because of the personal 
(rather than political) nature of its motives. This in turn renders their mediation an 
ethical exercise, carrying important implications for notions of the self and sociality 
with others, in the present. I argue that people draw on memories of ‘opportunistic’ 
violence to comment on the impossibilities of ‘intimate’ social relationships in times 
of terror. 
 
Chapter three considers the narratives of torture survivors (mostly comprised of 
former insurgents who were tortured by the state), paying attention to how the 
experience of torture is remembered and articulated. I argue that torture is both 
expressible and meaningful. In instances where people find difficult its verbal 
articulation, they creatively draw on alternative means of communication to express 
their memories of torture. Survivors keep the memory of torture alive in ethical terms 
and root its experience in ‘intimate’ social relationships, while further engaging in 
elaborate moral critiques of violence through their narrative expressions. 
 
Chapter four turns to consider the memories of former counter-insurrectionary 
officers (‘perpetrators’ of state violence). I argue here that torture carries meaning for 
its ‘perpetrators’ (as well as its ‘victims’), which contributes to the very abhorrence of 
this particular form of violence. Former counter-insurrectionary officers, like 
survivors of torture, imbue their memories of torture with moral meanings, anchored 
in ideas of ‘intimacy’. They reject the category of ‘perpetrator’, instead making claims 
for the subject position of ‘victim’, interspersed with that of ‘hero’. Their narratives 
are structured around a language of denial, justification, and a deflection of moral 
responsibility for violence. In this sense they bear similarity to the accounts of former 
insurgents regarding their own complicity in insurrectionary violence, as seen in other 
chapters of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the possibilities of ‘intimacy’ amidst terror. It concerns people’s 
memories of ‘intimate’ relationships that surpassed the divisive violence of the 
Bheeshanaya. I argue that through the mediation of these memories, people create an 
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ethical space to come to terms with a violence whose source was awkwardly ‘close to 
the bone’, and to grapple with the sensitive task of appropriating accountability for it. 
In telling stories of social relationships that triumphed over terror, people engage in 
re-imaginings of an ‘intimate’ moral community post-terror. 
 
Chapter 6 examines the ways in which former insurgents go about reformulating their 
worlds after violence. I argue that for ‘perpetrators’, the reclamation of life and 
sociality is steeped in the mundane, and that it is focussed largely on practical acts of 
reparation. The narratives in this chapter suggest that past violence entangles itself in 
the present in intricate and complex ways, impinging on the everyday lives of those 
embroiled in the ongoing exercise of reconstructing their social worlds. This in itself 
is a challenge that former insurgents must grapple with, in their efforts to recreate life 
after terror.  
 
Chapter 7 considers the ways in which former insurgents draw on Buddhist ethics to 
give meaning to the violence of their past.  Significantly, the Buddhist ethical 
framework of karma (the natural law of cause and effect) is employed in their efforts 
to appropriate moral responsibility for violence and to communicate notions of justice 
and retribution. I argue that karma provides a means through which former insurgents 
implicitly acknowledge some moral responsibility for violence.  But in another sense, 
karma also functions as a redemptive discourse in people’s ambiguous narratives, in 
excusing ‘perpetrators’ from engaging in personal acts of ethical repair. In the stories 
that run through this chapter, we also find expressions of renewed religiosity and 
efforts by former insurgents to represent themselves as living virtuous Buddhist lives 
after terror.  I argue that on the one hand, this conveys reassurances of a reformed 
moral character, which we may interpret as a step towards moral reparation and an 
implicit acknowledgement of wrongdoing.  On the other hand, however, former 
insurgents also appear to use this as a narrative strategy to assert a discontinuity of the 
self and to distance themselves from their past violence, which amounts to a rejection 
of culpability.  Finally, I end this thesis by arguing that the work of reconstructing 
worlds after terror, for those who have participated in violence, involves continuing to 
live with that past in the present in ethical terms, rather than ‘moving on’ from, or 
‘getting over’, violence.  
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Chapter 1 
The Violence of Youth 
 
During my time in the field, I found the ‘youthful’ character of the JVP 
guerrillas featured consistently in people’s stories of the Bheeshanaya. Former 
insurgents would tell me that they were taruna (youth) at the time of the 
Bheeshanaya, and commonly put their motivations for participating in the insurgency 
down to what they called tarunakama (youthfulness). In present day Sri Lanka, the 
JVP insurrection is popularly remembered as a ‘youth rebellion’ fuelled by ‘youth 
unrest’ (taruna asahanaya). This ‘problem’ of ‘youth unrest’ featured in a brief flurry 
of popular and academic debate that took place in the aftermaths of both insurgencies, 
and in 1989 a ‘Presidential Commission on Youth’ was set up to investigate the 
causes of youth discontentment that had led to the second JVP insurgency. In this 
chapter we find that in a post-terror climate of silence, fear, and amnesia, the idiom of 
‘youth’ functioned as a relatively safe repository for memories of violence. 
The Sinhala term taruna may be glossed as “young hopeful” or “one with 
potential”, but it is also often regarded with disdain and associated with immaturity, 
dependence, and lacking responsibilities (Ibarguen 2004, Hettige 1992). Scholars 
have argued that ‘youth’ overall is a subjective and liminal category that attracts much 
ambivalence from those who fall outside its bio-social descriptors (see West 2000, 
Ibarguen 2004, Centre for Anthropology and Sociological Studies 2000).  Peoples’ 
construction of tarunakama, which they imbued with powerful meanings both of a 
positive and negative nature, reflected this ambiguity. This in turn carried 
implications for notions of the self and for moral responsibility for violence, in the 
present.  
Scholars have shown that memory is commonly invoked to heal, blame, and 
legitimate the past, and that it plays a significant role in the construction of identity 
(Antze and Lambek 1996: xii). In this chapter, I consider the ways in which former 
insurgents drew on the idiom of ‘youth’ as a narrative strategy to rationalise and give 
meaning to their violent pasts, and to grapple with issues of accountability.  I argue 
that their narrative manipulation of ‘youth’ enabled former insurgents to reconstruct 
their violent pasts, and to project a particular representation of themselves, which was 
grounded in the moral. Moreover, by negotiating their memories through the idiom of 
‘youth’, former insurgents engaged in a form of disassociation from violence and a 
deflection of moral culpability for it. In other words, while not denying outright their 
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involvement in violence, former insurgents at the same time refused to acknowledge 
moral responsibility for it.  
I argue that former insurgents refashioned notions of the self in relation to 
their unsettling pasts through the idiom of ‘youth’, in a manner that allowed them to 
continue living with their memories of violence in the aftermath. This narrative 
strategy then functioned as a coping mechanism, and provided a means of dealing 
with the consequences of their actions in a post-terror environment where 
reconciliation and justice were not forthcoming. As such, my research substantiates 
Jackson’s contention that people reinvent themselves and rework reality through the 
telling of stories in order to make it bearable (2002: 16). This thesis further attests to 
arguments put forward by scholars that memory is never morally neutral (see 
Kirmayer 1996, Antze 1996, Lambek 1996, Taylor 1989).  
 
 
Restless Youth in Southern Sri Lanka 
 
The National Youth Services Council offers a bio-social categorisation of 
‘youth’ in Sri Lanka and defines its age parameters to be between 14 and 29 years, 
although in some instances this can extend to 35 years, with marriage and ‘stable’ 
employment being considered a departure from youth (see Ibarguen 2004, Hettige and 
Mayer 2002, Hettige 1992).  In Sri Lanka (as in other parts of the world) the diversity 
which ‘youth’ encompasses in terms of class, ethnicity, religion, geographic location, 
and caste, has led scholars to rightly point out the varied and contextual nature of 
youth experience (see Hettige 1992). Furthermore, the difficulty of pinning ‘youth’ 
down as a general topic for analysis has been highlighted by Durham, in the context 
of African studies on youth, who notes youth to be “a very shifty category that seems 
to fit many people at some time but no one consistent” (2000: 116). She urges us 
instead to think of youth as a “social shifter” which situates it “in a social landscape of 
power, rights, expectations, and relationships – indexing both themselves and the 
topology of that social landscape”, rather than trying to define it as a bio-social 
category (2000: 116).  Former insurgents, whose delineations of ‘youth’ we shall 
shortly consider, largely depicted it as a bio-social and temporal category, which they 
in turn inscribed with specific affective characteristics and cultural meanings.   
Some scholars have rightly argued that explaining away the insurgencies in 
the North and South of Sri Lanka as ‘ethnic’ or ‘youth’ problems detracts attention 
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from the economic and political issues that result in social discrimination, which lie at 
the root of young people’s readiness to engage in political violence against the state 
(see Cohen 1997, Hettige and Mayer 2002).  The Presidential Commission on Youth 
published its somewhat hurried report in 1990, with recommendations for reforms in 
education and employment, for democratisation of the state, and to address the abuse 
of political power.  Its findings, which have been backed by other studies (Centre for 
Anthropology and Sociological Studies 2000, Hettige 1992, Gunaratna 1990), remain 
relevant but continue to be ignored due to a lack of political will. 
The causes that led young Sinhala people to attempt to violently overthrow the 
state in the late 1980s were largely based on valid social and political grievances.  I 
touch on these complex issues only briefly here to provide background to the wider 
discussion on how people reflected on their involvement in the insurgency, as they 
have been recorded elsewhere (Alles 1990, Hettige 1992, Uyangoda 1992, 
Presidential Commission 1990, Gunaratna 1990, Chandraprema 1991).  
 Among the widely affirmed causes of ‘youth unrest’ were political corruption 
and the excessive politicisation of society that in turn engendered social 
discrimination (e.g., political clientelism in employment).  The perception of the state 
as being untrustworthy and elitist, along with its ready use of violence to suppress its 
citizens, led to a sense of disillusionment among many young people, particularly 
those of socially disadvantaged backgrounds.  Furthermore, the poverty gap (in 
particular rural poverty) and the acute class disparity, along with problems of 
unemployment (significantly, educated unemployment), and a fundamental 
disjuncture between youth aspirations and available opportunities, have been 
identified as factors that led to the insurrection.   
In addition, problems specific to the education system, including the lack of 
adequate resources for schools in deprived rural areas, the politicisation of the 
education system, and barriers faced by youth (mainly from socially disadvantaged 
backgrounds), who are products of state-sponsored monolingual (swabhāsha) 
education when they enter the field of employment (due to the privileged position 
given to the English language), impelled young people to participate in the JVP 
insurrection. The latter issue in particular has led to further polarisation between 
swabhasha educated youth and their English-educated urban peers of wealthier 
background.  
 The harsh reality of frustrated aspirations and social discrimination for the 
majority of young people in Sri Lanka continue to form the basis of their youthful 
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experience, as I found during my time in the field. The JVP’s revolutionary ideology 
spoke to these very issues in a way that other more ‘out-of-touch’ elitist political 
parties in the mainstream, did not. These issues were passionately cited by former 
insurgents as fuelling their initial motivations to participate in an attempt at 
revolution, and examples of personal experiences of poverty, social discrimination, 
state violence, and political corruption, were drawn on in this process. All the former 
insurgents I spoke to claimed their goal to be that of overthrowing a corrupt and 
unjust regime, in order to replace it with a state based on justice and equality. 
However, these causes of ‘youth unrest’ were by no means offered as the sole or most 
significant factors that motivated their decision to take up arms against the state, nor 
did they feature elaborately in the recollection of their experiences.  
In hindsight, former insurgents overwhelmingly reflected on their involvement 
in the insurrection in terms of their ‘youthfulness’ (tarunakama). Through this, they 
went on to project a particular representation of the kind of ‘youthful’ insurgents they 
were, and demonstrated how this shaped their experiences of violence. Rather than 
subscribing whole-heartedly to the valid causes of ‘youth unrest’ identified in 
literature on the subject as being the prime motivators of their involvement in 
violence, former insurgents drew on the constructed concept of tarunakama to give 




The Portrayal of Youth in Master Narratives and Existing Literature 
 
Former insurgents’ depictions of the kind of youth who participated in the JVP 
insurrection were to an extent founded on certain aspects borrowed from existing 
notions of youth found in the master narratives, and in debates and studies on the 
Bheeshanaya. The master narrative of the state has been subject to change over the 
years, depending on the political party in power. However, it is fair to say that the 
state narrative on the Terror overall, like the less influential master narrative of the 
JVP, is marked by silence, forgetting, and a denial of its part in instigating violence. 
At the time of writing up this research, the JVP’s international website provided a 
history of the movement in which its own silence on the Bheeshanaya was palpable. 
While it provides details on the 1971 uprising that include its motivations and the 
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number of insurgents killed and detained, its reference to the second insurgency 
merely (and somewhat obscurely) states: 
 
 
During that time, there was a complex political environment in the country and 
the state suppression was intensified. Comrade Rohana Wijeweera was arrested 




Both the state and JVP master narratives construct a particular stereotype of the JVP 
insurgent, which is built around the concept of ‘youth’. According to the state 
narrative, the insurrection was a ‘youth rebellion’ in which ‘restless youth’ with 
certain grievances were ‘misled’ into joining a rebellion against the state, and 
exploited by the JVP for its own political ends. Exposed to violence and power, these 
young ‘subversives’, who included criminal elements, went on the rampage posing a 
threat to democracy and Sinhala society. This narrative is largely backed by the media 
and powerful elites, and supported to an extent by some studies on the subject - 
mainly literature charting the course of the insurrection that was published in the 
immediate aftermath of the Bheeshanaya (see Chandraprema 1991, Alles 1990, 
Gunaratna 1990).  
The portrayal of youth in the official state narrative, and in some of the 
literature on this topic, throws negative light on the category of insurgent youth as a 
group of actors. It patronisingly implies that the youth who participated in the 
insurgency were gullible (idealistic and easily led), immature (predisposed to ‘rebel’), 
and devoid of agency. Chandraprema (1991), a journalist who reported on the 
unfolding insurrection in the print media and who further published a book on the JVP 
insurgency towards the tail-end of the Terror, for instance, speaks of down-trodden 
“desperados” (i.e., unemployed, rural youth) being manipulated by a “ruthless” JVP 
leadership. He even goes as far as referring to JVP insurgents as “hard-boiled yakkos” 
(uncouth thugs or demons) (1991: 314). Gunaratna (1990) who pays more attention 
than Chandraprema to the grievances of youth that drew them to the JVP similarly 
refers to “frustrated youth” being “misled” by the JVP.  Perera, an anthropologist who 
focuses on the experiences of female survivors of the Terror, in a similar vein refers to 
JVP insurgents as,  “idealistic young rebels supposedly dedicated to usher in a brave 
new world (who) became indiscriminate killers” (1999: 19).  
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The JVP narrative on the other hand presents itself as having been the 
vanguard of the youth and portrays former insurgents in heroic terms. The JVP holds 
an annual ‘heroes’ day to commemorate its cadres who were killed in the 
Bheeshanaya. At the ‘heroes’ day that I attended during my time in the field, JVP 
insurgents were remembered as having been courageous, socially conscious, and 
filled with the energy of youth, and as having selflessly sacrificed their lives for the 
betterment of society. Former insurgents who participated in this research drew on 
some aspects of these depictions of youth, while rejecting others, in their 
reconstructions of the past, as we shall see in the following narratives.  
 
 
‘Youth’ as Conveyer of Unpopular Memories  
 
Not all former insurgents I interviewed technically fell into the bio-social 
category of ‘youth’ during their involvement in the 1980s insurrection. Some had also 
participated in the 1971 JVP uprising and were in their 30s or 40s, sometimes married 
with young families, when it came to their involvement in the second insurrection. 
Nevertheless, many ex-insurgents remembered their lives during the Terror in terms 
of their youth. They described the JVP as being a party for the youth – full of energy 
and dynamism, and in touch with the problems faced by the vast majority of young 
Sinhala people. They recounted their own experiences of the Bheeshanaya as stories 
of their youth, in both painful and nostalgic terms. 
At the time of conducting this research, the reality on the ground was one of 
increasing state repression and intolerance of political criticism. This served to 
intensify people’s fear of discussing any issue deemed politically sensitive (let alone 
the Bheeshanaya). Moreover, the ethical ambiguity surrounding the violence of the 
Bheeshanaya further rendered the resurrection of its discomforting memory all the 
more complicated, compared to other contexts of violence such as that of the 
Holocaust, which was clearly judged to be a human catastrophe with identifiable 
‘perpetrators’ and ‘victims’ in its aftermath (see Kirmayer 1996, Langer 1991). 
As Donnan and Simpson (2007) point out in their study on how border 
Protestants in Northern Ireland recall or remain reticent about violence, the challenge 
lies not in recalling one’s horrific past, but in how to recall it.  The problem facing 
many ‘perpetrators’ of violence then, was that of moving these ethically and 
politically loaded memories from the private sphere of silence and forgetting, into the 
  56  
public realm of remembering and telling. I argue that the idiom of ‘youth’ functioned 
as a relatively safe narrative strategy for beginning the work of mediating unpopular 
memories. In other words, it made “traumatic stories tell-able” (Donnan and Simpson 
2007: 22) and provided a space for the reworking of memory in a highly charged and 
convoluted post-terror environment. 
Often, in an attempt to put people at ease, I would open an interview with a 
relatively innocuous and broad question along the lines of, “What do you remember 
of the Bheeshanaya?” to which former insurgents would commonly respond with a 
reference to their youth. This would frequently be followed by stories of their 
involvement in the insurrection, which they would hook onto this notion of ‘youth’. 
For instance, Rahula a 35 year old mason, who had joined the JVP insurrection as a 




You know, it was those youthful years [smiles]…At school I was well-known 
for my art-work. One day my friends asked me to draw some posters with them. 
I thought we were just drawing some anti-Indira Gandhi posters. I didn’t know 
it was for the JVP. Through that, I was drawn to it (participating in the 




In prefacing his story with, “You know it was those youthful years” accompanied by 
what appeared to be an indulgent smile, Rahula conveyed the concept of ‘youth’ to be 
loaded with meaning, which in turn suggests that it had narrative functions other than 
the mere facilitation of easing people into their stories. Rahula implies this temporal 
category of ‘youth’ to carry special meaning and to have played a significant role in 
his involvement in the insurrection. 
This is not to say that socio-economic and political grievances underlying the 
motivations of the insurrection were entirely dismissed by former insurgents.  These 
issues were to a large extent tacitly or explicitly affirmed in people’s narratives. 
Nevertheless, it was ‘youthfulness’ (tarunakama) that the vast majority of former 
insurgents consistently emphasised when reflecting on their participation in the 
insurrection some twenty years on from the Bheeshanaya.  
Through their narratives, former insurgents (and many who ‘witnessed’ the 
violence) imbued the concept of tarunakama with a heady mix of negative and 
positive meanings, which they described as having coloured their own experiences of 
violence. I was told that being a youth entailed characteristics such as courage, 
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dynamism, energy, and enthusiasm, which propelled young people to actively pursue 
change. The thirst for new experiences in one’s youth was emphasised by Kirihami, a 
former insurgent who told me: “when you are a youth you like to grasp new things 
[makes a grasping motion with his hands]. I got involved in the JVP for my 
tarunakama and its need to get involved in new experiences”.   
By referring to his “youthful need” for new experiences, Kirihami implies 
some of these characteristics to be instinctive and to diminish a young person’s 
agency. In other words, Kirihami appears to intimate that those who occupy the 
temporal category of youth cannot be held entirely responsible for their actions, due to 
the strong pull and tug of youthful traits that they are subjected to. Tarunakama was 
also construed as a time of heightened social awareness and emotionality, intensifying 
sensitivity to issues such as social injustice. As Kavindu, another former insurgent 
who had long since left the JVP put it, “When you are young things like injustice and 
inequality really get to you. You feel it here so strong [taps his chest with a clenched 
fist]. You want to do something about it”.  
However, being youthful also apparently brought with it the burden of 
negative qualities, which people explained to me as being naivety, irresponsibility, 
impulsiveness, obsession with social image, the inability to foresee the consequences 
of one’s actions, an attraction to weapons, bravado, emotionality/quickness to anger 
(āvēgashīli), and being ‘up for scraps’ (valiyaṭa bara).  Many former insurgents who 
had left the JVP told me that being a youthful party itself, the JVP (leadership) was 
aware of these qualities and often targeted them in their mobilisation efforts.  
 
 
Tarunakama as a Motivator of Violence 
 
Kavindu drew on tarunakama to frame his motivations for participating in the 




I was doing my A’ levels at the time.  So, I was a prime target for that kind of 
thing (insurgent activity)…The JVP was a party for the youth. The youth were 
attracted to it because of the language they used, the way they spoke, and the 
kinds of things they wanted people to do, like go and smash things up. I had so 
much energy in those days. When you are young you want to smash things up, 
to be a part of it. And you don’t have much other responsibility… I wanted to 
change things. I liked their ideas (because) they believed in creating an equal 
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society. I felt angry when I saw how rich some people were, and how poor 
others were… if you didn’t know (speak) English you were ridiculed. I was 
angry about that. I remember once I threatened a police guy who I had gone to 
school with. He left school after his O’ levels and joined the police, but I 
continued my education and finished my A’ levels.  During the kalabala kālaya 
(period of chaos) I went up to him in my scheme (housing estate) and physically 
threatened him. I warned him not to take any of my friends in for questioning. 
He then grabbed me by the neck and slammed me against the wall and 
threatened to take me in (to detention) and kill me [laughs]. At that time it was 
about chanḍikama (thuggery) also. I was young. I wanted people to know. 




An assortment of negative and positive characteristics ascribed to ‘youthfulness’ crop 
up throughout Kavindu’s narrative, ranging from courage, energy, and a concern for 
social justice, to obsession with image, bravado, being up for scraps, and 
irresponsibility.  He clearly suggests tarunakama and its contradictory experience to 
have contributed to his decision to engage in the insurrection. At certain points in his 
narrative Kavindu divests his youthful years of agency (e.g., by claiming JVP 
manipulation), while at other points he talks of being deeply affected by social 
injustice and wishing to effect change. Kavindu shows his ‘youthfulness’ to involve 
emotional intensity – anger and frustration at social injustice, which in turn fuels his 
desire to participate in insurrectionary violence. Social discrimination engendered by 
the privileged position allocated to the English language, which has been highlighted 
in existing studies as motivating Sinhala youth to take up arms, is also mentioned by 
Kavindu. However, it is situated within the wider frame of tarunakama.  
Through his story, Kavindu further paints a particular picture of the kind of 
young insurgent he was, by drawing on attributes of ‘youthfulness’. He represents 
himself as having been sensitive and keenly aware of social injustice, educated (he 
makes it a point to state that he had completed his A’ levels while his peer in the 
police had merely studied up to his O’ levels), full of bravado, somewhat naive and 
easily led, and carrying many of the usual traits of ‘youthfulness’.  Kavindu relates his 
story with an air of nostalgia, indulgently laughing at his youthful escapades of acting 
the ‘hard-man’ in his housing estate. He shows his own life as an insurgent to involve 
ambiguous youthful experiences and emotions (e.g., showing off to friends and 
                                                      
16 Red is the colour of the JVP and symbolised its revolution during the 1980s. 
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beating people up on the one hand, and being sensitive and deeply affected by social 
injustice on the other hand).  
Kavindu explains his involvement in the insurrection in terms of his youthful 
lack of responsibility, “When you are young …you don’t have much other 
responsibility”. In Kavindu’s case in particular, this struck me as rather odd given that 
his childhood was far from being bereft of responsibility. Following the death of his 
parents, as a child Kavindu had taken on responsibility for looking after his younger 
siblings in conditions of grinding poverty. In fact, he took his responsibility towards 
his young siblings so seriously that he left the JVP part-way through the Bheeshanaya 
due to his fear of their being destitute were he to be killed. What Kavindu (like many 
other ex-insurgents I spoke to) seemed to be doing here was to suggest that they could 
not be held morally responsible for the actions they took in their youth, under the 
influence of tarunakama.  In drawing a clear distinction between his life now as a 
responsible adult and his life then as an irresponsible and emotional youthful 
insurgent, Kavindu was putting distance between the person he was now, and his past 
as a ‘youthful’ insurgent.  
This form of narrative rationalisation raises questions about the continuity of 
the self and about moral responsibility for violence committed in the past. Kavindu, 
like many other insurgents, through his reconstruction of memory appears to be 
saying that as an adult he is not the same person that he was during his youth, and so 
implies that he cannot be held responsible for the actions he committed in his youth. 
In doing so he suggests a discontinuity of the self. This echoes arguments put forward 
by philosophers such as Hume and the Buddha who reject the notion of a continuing 
identity and a permanent conception of the self. Buddhism emphasises the transient 
nature of the self and its lack of ego. As one Buddhist monk put it to me: “You are not 
the person who came to see me yesterday because the thoughts and experiences you 
have had since then have changed you. We are all in a constant state of flux and 
everything is impermanent”.  For Hume, the self is a series of experiences and our 
feigned conception of a continuing self is based on the memory and imagination that 
connects us to our past (Sirswal N.d). Scholars of memory have argued that the 
evocation of memory signals association and continuity. Memory presupposes a 
continuity of identity so that we feel the person who committed a crime in the past is 
the same person who should be held accountable today (Antze and Lambek 1996: 
xxv). What former insurgents like Kavindu seemed to be suggesting was the 
redundancy of moral culpability and a discontinuation of the self through their 
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reworking of memory. They remembered their involvement in the insurrection to have 
taken place during their youth when they were particularly susceptible to violence, 
and when they were different people from now.   
 
 
Good and Bad Insurgents: Refashioning the Self and Deflecting Blame 
  
Remembering violence has deep moral and practical implications for the self 
and one’s relationship with others in the present. This was reflected in the ways in 
which people portrayed themselves as the type of insurgents they were during the 
Bheeshanaya. Through their utilisation of ‘youth’, former insurgents carefully 
constructed two distinct categories of insurgent youth, which were grounded in the 
moral.  
One cohort of youth they remembered as being the genuine revolutionaries, 
driven to participate in the insurrection by a selfless commitment to its honourable 
goals. As Kavindu put it to me, “It was not just youth.  It was youth and education. 
They were youth who knew and thought about things”. People overwhelmingly drew 
on specific words to describe these moral insurgents, and through that went on to 
project a particular representation of themselves. I was told that these youth were 
daksa (talented), buddimat (learned or knowledgeable), ugat (educated), and having 
avabōdaya (knowledge, understanding, or awareness).  When people like Kavindu 
used the term ‘educated’, they did not necessarily mean formal education. Instead, 
they were suggesting something broader – young people who were ‘thinkers’, and had 
cultivated a sense of social, political, and ethical awareness.  
Invariably all former insurgents that I spoke to remembered themselves as 
having belonged to this ‘moralistic’ youth cadre. Through their use of these terms 
they carved out a particular niche for themselves in the violent past as ‘good’ 
insurgents who were ‘educated’, in possession of a social and ethical conscience, with 
the capacity to analyse the world around them. It was in these terms that former 
insurgents remembered and perceived themselves.  
 Former insurgents drew on these terms to sharpen the distinction between 
themselves and the ‘undesirable’ or ‘immoral’ youth who had apparently joined the 
JVP in their droves without any real understanding of, or commitment to, the 
honourable cause of the revolution.  The word most commonly used by people to 
describe this youth cohort was rälla, which may be translated as herd. Its use here 
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suggests young people lacking the capacity to think for themselves, and gormlessly 
following the herd.  As we shall see from the narratives in this section, it was the rälla 
that former insurgents held accountable for violence.  
Nalanda is a former local insurgent leader who is now in his early 40s, and 
continues to be politically active within the JVP. Having asserted his own ‘honest’ 
(avanka) motivations for joining the insurrection, which he told me were grounded in 
concerns about social injustice and political corruption, Nalanda went on to state that 
some young people signed up to the JVP under the influence of the negative traits of 
‘youthfulness’. He blamed this for the ultimate failure of the JVP insurrection. An 
extract of Nalanda’s story is as follows. 
 
Being a youth without a doubt had an impact on people participating in the 
insurrection. Many youth tend to have a war-like mentality (yudda 
mānasikatvaya). They like weapons. A lot of young people were attracted to the 
JVP because of the weapons. They are the ones who brought us all down. They 
made the JVP look bad and people got fed up of us. I’ll give you an example. A 
group of us on foot once went to collect identity cards from a house.17 The 
young son of the family whose house we went to was somewhat drunk. He kept 
saying that he wanted to join us. We kept trying to put him off. But he insisted 
and followed us. We were on foot and on our way back we were ambushed by 
the army. The rest of us ran away and managed to escape. But he was caught. 
He was tortured and then killed. The pieces of his body were strewn around the 
area for people to see. His head was in one place and his limbs in another. 
 
 
Nalanda tells this story centred on ‘youthfulness’ to get across a number of salient 
points. He uses it to stress various negative characteristics that are part and parcel of 
tarunakama, such as the inability to assess the consequences of one’s actions, 
impulsiveness, naivety, and an attraction to weapons and power.  He distinguishes 
between different categories of insurgent youth through the use of this idiom. A clear 
differentiation is made between the youthful protagonist of his story on the one hand 
(i.e., insurgents driven by the negative qualities of tarunakama), and ‘authentic’ 
insurgents like himself on the other hand, who he portrays in moral terms and 
represents as astute young insurgents selflessly committed to the ‘righteous’ 
revolutionary cause. After all they were able to avoid being captured and made 
                                                      
17 Forcibly entering homes and seizing people’s national identity cards, often at gunpoint, was common practice on the part of 
the JVP during its insurgency. Many research participants told me that this enabled JVP cadres in hiding to assume different 
identities to avoid detection by the state. Some ex-insurgents also said that this tactic was used to sabotage the stop-and-search 
operations of the state security forces, in that if the majority of civilians did not have identity cards it would be difficult for 
security officers who stopped them on the streets to identify them, thereby creating confusion and blurring the lines between JVP 
cadres and non-combatant civilians. 
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attempts to dissuade this inebriated young man from joining the revolutionaries for all 
the wrong reasons. 
This image of the ‘undesirable insurgent’ appears to affirm the generic 
stereotype of the JVP insurgent at a popular level. Nalanda blames the failure of the 
insurrection and the loss of popularity of the JVP on those ‘undesirable’ youth 
(symbolised by the protagonist of his story), rather than on the violent actions of the 
JVP itself. This appears to be an attempt on Nalanda’s part to protect both his own 
and the JVP’s political image. Deflection of blame for violence has been shown to be 
a characteristic feature in the narratives of ‘perpetrators’ of violence, and we shall see 
more of it in the stories that follow (see Payne 2008, Foster et al. 2005). Furthermore, 
through the graphic illustration of the brutal violence inflicted on the young boy who 
joined the insurgents on a youthful whim, Nalanda offers a veiled critique of state 
counter-insurrectionary violence perpetrated often against those who were innocent of 
any wrongdoing. This is largely in keeping with the master narrative of the JVP, 
which draws attention to violence perpetrated by the state, but remains silent, or 
denies outright, that perpetrated by its own cadres during the Terror. 
  Kanchana’s story below, gives us further insight into how people use the 
idiom of ‘youth’ to reconstruct their own experiences of the Terror. Kanchana is a 
former insurgent in his mid-30s, who works as a sports instructor. Having spent 
several years in hiding as a young insurgent, he successfully managed to evade 
capture by the security forces, and ultimately left the JVP due to disagreements over 
its policies. 
Kanchana, unlike many other former insurgents interviewed for this research, 
firmly invests his youthful years with agency and explains his decision to participate 
in the insurrection as being based on rational choice. His narrative provides an 
interesting glimpse into the political context that prevailed at the time, around which 




I was a youth then but no one from the JVP came to mobilise me. I went out and 
joined them... I joined the insurrection because of the anti-democratic political 
regime of the UNP. They broke the rule of law, abused human rights, and stifled 
the media. J.R. (President Jayawardene) was like a dictator. He singularly took 
decisions (tanimatayen) and carried them out. Workers who went on strike were 
simply sacked. They were anti-democracy. I wanted to change the system. I felt 
very strongly that we needed democracy. We needed to protect the rule of law, 
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and human rights. I knew that we wouldn’t achieve this through Socialism as 
the JVP preached. But they were the best alternative available. They were the 
only ones who stood up against the Government. So I joined because of anti-




Kanchana articulates clear and well-thought out reasons for his decision to take up 
arms to topple the state. He accepts responsibility for this decision, which he roots in 
specific political grievances. Kanchana’s narrative diverges from the explanations of 
many other insurgents (such as Kavindu whose story featured earlier) who instead 
blamed their youthful vulnerability and its exploitation by the JVP for their 
involvement in the insurgency. Kanchana presents a morally justifiable reason for his 
decision to join the insurrection, which was to overthrow a violent regime and 
establish democracy in its place. Kanchana’s youth isn’t one of naivety and idealistic 
faith in the JVP’s agenda.  He simply states that he believed the JVP to be the only 
viable alternative available at the time. Kanchana does not represent his youthful 
years as having been blinded by the burden of tarunakama, which makes one 
particularly vulnerable to violence. He is keen to show that he sought out the JVP 
rather than being one of its hapless targets, and proceeds to engage in a moral critique 




People joined the insurrection with various agendas (vivida balavēga). Intelligent 
leaders would have co-ordinated these different motivations and led them towards one 
goal. But the JVP leaders couldn’t. The JVP was about youth and youth is about 
strength and emotionality (āvēgashīli). You can’t solve problems through these two 
things... Youth are attracted to weapons. In addition, if they couldn’t work with 
weapons by joining the army, then this provided an alternative for them to carry out 
their desires.  Many young people came with the rälla (herd). I realised that the JVPs 
actions did not develop democracy. That the problems of a corrupt and anti-
democratic regime could not be solved through further acts that were anti-democratic.  
The JVP also killed a lot of people. Then the intelligent people (insurgents) started 




It should be noted here that his admission that the JVP itself committed murder was 
significant, given that the majority of former insurgents either avoided, or denied 
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outright, the perpetration of violence by the JVP.18 This was largely down to fear of 
personal and political repercussions, and particularly in the case of those who 
continued to support the JVP, concern to avoid tarnishing its political image. 
Interestingly, both the UNP regime and JVP deny responsibility for instigating the 
violence of the Bheeshanaya, instead blaming the other for aggressive violence 
against which one was forced to defend themselves.  
According to Kanchana, the incompetence of JVP’s own youthful leadership 
and its inability to exercise control over the ‘herd’ of ‘undesirable’ youth that flocked 
to its ranks ultimately led to the failure of its attempted revolution. The rälla here is 
represented as lacking intelligence and joining the JVP in their droves for all the 
wrong reasons (i.e., for personal gain, such as, access to weapons and power). On the 
other hand, ‘intelligent’ and ‘righteous’ insurgents like himself, Kanchana implies, 
were driven by selfless goals based on ethical conviction. In other words, the 
‘undesirable’ youth joined the insurrection for immoral self-fulfilling purposes, 
ultimately engaging in unjustifiable acts of violence, while the moral insurgents (like 
himself) were willing to sacrifice their lives for the righteous goals of bringing about 
social and political justice. This demonstrates the importance he attaches to the 
intentions that underpinned people’s involvement in insurrectionary violence. The 
former, he blames for the spiralling escalation of violence and the ultimate downfall 
of the JVP. The latter (including himself), he remembers as having raised moral 
objections to the violent and unethical direction that the JVP veered off to, ultimately 
disassociating themselves from the JVP and its insurgency altogether. Through his use 
of the idiom of ‘youth’, Kanchana refashions himself as having been a ‘moral’ and 
‘righteous’ insurgent, and puts distance between himself and the ‘immoral’ rälla, who 
he blames for the violence of the insurrection. In remembering his own actions in 
moral terms, he finds a way of continuing to live with himself and his past, post-
terror. 
This representation of the self in moral terms is further elaborated in Ajan’s 
story below. Ajan is a 38 year old ex-insurgent who had left the JVP soon after his 




                                                      
18 As time went on however, some former insurgents admitted to ‘minor’ acts of violence committed by the JVP such as 
threatening people to adhere to hartals (unofficial strikes and curfews). Denial was largely on the part of those who continued to 
support the JVP and were concerned about damaging the political image of the party and its revolution. 
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The problem was that you had very educated people who wanted to change 
society. But when the rälla started joining, they (the JVP leadership) lost control 
of them. The rälla had nothing else to do and didn’t really believe in their ideas 
(JVP revolutionary ideology). I got involved because I really believed in what 
they (the JVP) were doing. But after a while all the bad people – thugs, 
criminals and uneducated people all started joining. It was a problem of 
mismanagement. The whole thing was mismanaged. The leaders couldn’t 
control these people…Many young people… joined because they had nothing 
else to do. Many did it to be the thugs…to show off their power. Everyone went 
with the rälla. And many people who had broken hearts (whose love lives had 
failed) joined. But that was the problem. You then had these people who wanted 





Ajan, like Kanchana and Nalanda above, differentiates between the ‘honourable’ 
revolutionaries and the herd of uneducated ‘undesirables’. He points the finger of 
blame for violence at the latter. This violence was abhorrent because it was 
indiscriminate and perpetrated for self-gratification (e.g., to show off their power, for 
reasons of ‘thuggery’, to exact revenge and settle personal scores). Ajan here is 
implicitly engaging in a moral critique of violence, which implies some forms of 
violence (i.e., that carried out for personal benefit) to be less morally justifiable than 
others (i.e., that carried out for selfless reasons in order to benefit wider society). Ajan 
carefully situates himself in that category of ‘righteous’ and ‘moral’ insurgents who 
were ‘educated’ and participated in the insurrection out of a selfless commitment to 
its honourable goals. Through his narrative, Ajan not only engages in a moral critique 
of violence, but also clearly allocates responsibility for violence to a section of the 
JVP from which he conspicuously distances himself.  
Let us now consider Tissa’s story. Tissa is a small but somewhat formidable 
man in his early 40s. A former regional insurgent leader, he continues to be politically 




When the Bheeshanaya became harsh (darunu), party workers started being identified 
(by the counter-insurrectionary officers). So we had to get new people in to try and 
make sure the leaders’ identities became dissolved into the background. This was our 
biggest weakness. That’s when the insurrection fell. In the early days the JVP had 
educated youth. If we had stayed with them the insurrection would have been a 
success. When support fell and people started getting caught, then the new people 
began to get more responsibility. These new youth came with the rälla. They were 
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uneducated, some couldn’t even write properly, they just wanted to fight and to own a 
gun. Like you get some boys joining the army just use a gun. The JVP then couldn’t 
control these people. This was our failure. But we had to get in new people to protect 
the main activists and leaders like Rohana Wijeweera. Many of the ones who came 




The idea of ‘youthfulness’ is used by Tissa to explain, or rather justify, violence on 
the part of the JVP, and to rationalise the overall failure of its insurrection. He deflects 
responsibility for both on to that ‘undesirable’ and ‘uneducated’ youth cohort, which 
was blighted by the negative traits of tarunakama. Tissa further places those key 
activists and leaders of the JVP (like himself) out-with this youthful ‘herd’ and 
instead aligns them with the ‘morally righteous’ group of youth selflessly committed 
to the honourable revolutionary cause. In averting culpability for violence in this 
manner, he attempts to protect the image of the JVP (and himself), admitting instead 
to the lesser charge of being unable to control the problem of youthfulness within the 
ranks of the JVP. 
However, he attempts to water down even this, by drawing parallels between 
the JVP and the security forces, stating that the army too suffers from problems of 
tarunakama, with young recruits often being attracted to the access to weapons it 
offers them. Here he hints at both organisations being on a level footing when it 
comes to violence. This “language of error” (Payne 2008: 21) that Tissa as a former 
JVP insurgent leader adopts to explain the violence of the insurrection, is reflected in 
Payne’s work on perpetrators of violence, as just one form of denying responsibility 
for violence. Payne shows how in public confessions, perpetrators of state sponsored 
violence draw on human and organisational fallibility to suggest that those in 
positions of leadership were unaware of, or unable to control, the violence perpetrated 
by a few “rotten apples” belonging to the lower ranks of the security forces. She goes 
on to argue that at the most, this amounts to admitting acts of omission, rather than 
confessing to acts of committing violence (Payne 2008: 21-22). 
 
 
Remembering Past Violence and the Self in Moral Terms 
 
In remembering their own involvement in the insurrection as being shaped by 
ethical conviction, former insurgents attempted to find ways of reworking their past 
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experiences to continue living with themselves and with others in the aftermath of 
terror. This was particularly significant in a post-terror environment that lacks 
reconciliation. Taylor has argued that “selfhood and the good, or …selfhood and 
morality … (are) inextricably intertwined” (1989: 3).  In the face of a discomforting 
past entailing complicity in violence that is widely judged to be morally unjustifiable, 
rooting one’s memory of the self in the good is an important coping mechanism. It 
enables the continuation of life and sociality after violence, and helps people reform 
their sense of selfhood, which had been thrown into question by violence. Through a 
reworking of memory, these former insurgents then create a morally acceptable role 
for themselves in a reconstructed past, and thereby recreate their experiences of 
violence.  In refashioning their self identity and their relationship to the past in terms 
of the moral, they are able to continue living with memories of violence in the 
aftermath.  
‘Witnesses’ Remember the Violence of tarunakama 
 
It was not just former insurgents who explained the violence of the 
Bheeshanaya in terms of ‘youthfulness’. Many of those who ‘witnessed’ the apparent 
chaos of the Terror and the brutality of its violence, also framed their interpretations 
of it in terms of tarunakama. This provided a means through which people could 
understand and rationalise a past that appeared morally incomprehensible. It further 
enabled people to carry on living with those former ‘youthful’ insurgents responsible 
for perpetrating violence in their communities. 
Ralahami is a man in his 70s, who runs a small shop in a remote village in the 
central region of Sri Lanka. He maintains a keen interest in politics and current 
affairs, and has always been a supporter of the UNP. Ralahami was in his mid-50s 
when he observed the events that unfolded in his village during the Terror. He 




The JVP boys didn’t do what they did with any proper understanding. The 
talented orators (daksa katakayō) (the JVP leadership) pulled the minds of our 
boys (apē kollo). The problem was their age. They were at a bad age. So all the 
school boys went and did JVP. They didn’t know JVP theory or about the 
danger involved in those things... The army generally got the right ones. Now I 
remember at that age we didn’t have the awareness (avabōdaya) we have now. 
We thought that we were the big guys. At school if a younger boy was cheeky 
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or if a boy in a class below ours went after a girl our age, we would beat them 
up. So the clever JVP orators pulled them in. They altered their minds. And then 
when those boys went home with those new revolutionary ideas, and their 
parents scolded them, they even turned against their own parents. That’s how 
much their minds were changed. Children should love their parents. But in our 
village there was an incident where a young JVP boy even killed his own 
parents because they disagreed with his ideas.  Those who took part in 1971 (the 
first JVP uprising) were more educated. They had more of an understanding of 
what they were doing. In the 1980s they didn’t have any understanding – they 




Ralahami depicts the “liminal category” (West 2000: 180) of youth to be a dangerous 
period in one’s life, with increased risk of vulnerability to the malevolent external 
influences of violence. He divests young people entirely of agency and represents 
them as being devoid of the capacity to think for themselves, going so far as to 
suggest that young insurgents were brainwashed by the “talented orators” of the JVP.  
For many people like Ralahami, the violence of the Bheeshanaya was 
particularly contemptible because it was perpetrated between ‘intimates’ - people who 
shared the same social and religious background, often involving neighbours and even 
friends. That “our boys” (the familiar and the ‘intimate’) could ‘turn on us’ was 
indeed perplexing and difficult to comprehend. His narrative suggests the normative 
values around which ‘intimate’ Sinhala communities were structured, to have been 
turned upside down by the violence of the Bheeshanaya. Ralahami expresses this 
sentiment through the story of the young insurgent who kills his parents – a crime 
universally reprehensible, but felt particularly so in a culture that places great value on 
almost unquestioning respect and deference towards parents and elders. For Ralahami 
then, ‘youthfulness’ provided a way of making sense of, and coming to terms with, 
past violence. In stating that “the army usually got the right ones” Ralahami expresses 
his tacit support for the counter-insurrection, apparently considering it necessary to 
protect the values that held Sinhala Buddhist communities together and to restore 
order. Through the use of kinship metaphors such as “our boys”, he attempts to 
recreate a sense of ‘cultural intimacy’ (Herzfeld 1997) in the aftermath of a violence 
that destroyed ‘intimate’ communities and the moral values that underpinned them.  
Interestingly, in a similar but different vein to the narratives of former 
insurgents who differentiated between ‘morally righteous’ and ‘undesirable’ groups of 
youth within the 1980s insurgent cohort, Ralahami too distinguishes between two 
types of insurgents. But here he classifies into two separate camps the insurgents of 
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the 1971 uprising and those of the second insurrection. He states: “those who engaged 
in 1971 were more educated. They had more of an understanding of what they were 
doing. In the 1980s … they just went along with it because they were young”. This 
comment is ironic given that the 1971 uprising was in itself made up of youth, 
arguably more so than the second insurrection. However, it shows a clear attempt by 
Ralahami to account for the comparative excess of violence (and its particularly 
disturbing nature), perpetrated by the JVP during its second insurgency. 
On this point of differentiation between the youthful insurgents of the 1971 
JVP uprising and those of the second insurrection, let’s now turn to an extract of a 
conversation I had with Shajiv. Shajiv was a JVP insurgent in its 1971 uprising, with 
specific responsibility for procuring weapons to implement the infamous co-ordinated 
attack against police stations across Sri Lanka. Following his release from detention 
Shajiv left the JVP but has since keenly observed its developments. He had no 
involvement in the second insurrection. In fact, Shajiv was forced to flee into hiding 
after becoming a target of the JVP’s pogrom against ‘traitors’ during the Terror, 





We were very young then in 1971. We were dreaming of socialism and thought of 
achieving equality and justice through Marxism through an armed struggle. We had a 
special plan to achieve power by gathering arms and attacking police stations [laughs 
quietly]…In 1971 most of the youth were educated. The 1980s was different. There 
was a strong student component but also a lot of people from the underworld. Even the 
student wing of the 1980s was violent. It was really brutal [starts showing signs of 
distress]. I really can’t understand the violence of the 1980s [long pause]. I have tried 
to study it. But I can’t understand the things I saw. They wanted to bring fear to 
everyone and to dominate society. And for that they acted in a special way. They didn’t 
just kill. They killed anyone and everyone - in a brutal manner. It came from the 




Shajiv explains his own involvement in the 1971 uprising in terms of his youthful 
idealism, thereby affirming the youthful nature of that event. He clearly marks off the 
1971 insurgents with whom he was aligned, portraying them as being ‘educated’ and 
having honourable goals, from the youth who participated in the second insurgency, 
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who he construes as being predisposed to violence (he mentions involvement of the 
criminal underworld and the violent nature of the 1980s JVP student wing).  
He considers the violence of the second insurgency to be unacceptable 
because it was particularly brutal, random, and excessive, targeting ‘ordinary’ 
civilians and driven by people’s self-serving greed for power. In emphasising its 
permeation at the grassroots, Shajiv suggests that the violence of the 1980s was not 
appropriately directed or controlled by the leadership. Through this, Shajiv intimates 
the violence of 1971 to have been more morally justifiable, given its specific targeting 
of the state; its adherence to a specific revolutionary strategy (“special plan”); its 
control by the leadership; and its implementation by ‘educated’ young people with 
honourable goals of justice and equality.  
Drawing such comparisons between the two uprisings and apportioning blame 
for violence to the particular type of ‘youthfulness’ that the 1980s insurgency 
entailed, allows both Ralahami and Shajiv to comprehend and come to terms with the 
violence of the Bheeshanaya. In the absence of reconciliation and reparation, the 
narrative idiom of ‘youth’ allows them to put some distance between the violence of 
the Bheeshanaya and their neighbours who were responsible for it. It further suggests 
the desire for a new beginning post-terror (i.e., the adults who they must live 
alongside now are not the same people they were in their youth), and provides a 
means of re-imagining an ‘intimate’ community torn apart by violence. 
Let us now consider the perspective of yet another (albeit distant) ‘observer’ 
of the Bheeshanaya, from a background that is significantly different to that of the 
former insurgents featured in this chapter so far, as well as that of Shajiv and 
Ralahami. Rikesh is a 39 year old lawyer who works for a multinational corporation. 
He is a product of English education, of Christian background, and belongs to the 
Colombo elite. Despite being a ‘youth’ during the Terror, his experiences of the 
Bheeshanaya differed greatly from his youthful swabhāsha educated peers from rural 
and semi-urban backgrounds. Rikesh continues to live in central Colombo, which was 
largely sheltered from the violence of the Bheeshanaya, except for curfews issued by 
both the JVP and the state, which interrupted people’s daily routines of school and 
work.19 Our interview was carried out in English as Rikesh did not feel comfortable 
articulating himself in Sinhala. An extract of our conversation is as follows. 
 
                                                      
19 Studies on elite perspectives of the Bheeshanaya are lacking. Some brief references are made by Perera to the middle and 
upper-classes living in a state of denial and constructing “an alternate reality within the air-conditioned and refrigerated existence 
of suburbia” (Perera 2001: 166). See Perera 2001, 1999. 




We were also badly affected by what they (JVP insurgents) did. I was in school 
then and remember the ‘jerfews’ – we called it that because they were curfews 
set by the JVP [laughs]. We enjoyed them because it meant schools were closed 
and you got to stay at home. They brought chaos, attacking public 
infrastructure. They were simply hooligans. Just misguided youth.  They 
weren’t that educated – may be some were semi-educated. They were just 
young idealistic Marxists. They may have said they had all sorts of grievances. 
But we all have grievances. Even the middle-classes have certain grievances. 
But you can’t just cause chaos and threaten a democracy. This country has been 
a democracy for so long. And they came and tried to mess it up. … (they) 
threatened our economy...  The problem here is that Sinhala people are very 
lazy… because of the weather and because of Buddhism. People have had it too 
easy. They have never had to work for anything. All these people are 
traditionally farmers. Farming is easy here because of the weather. You just 
throw a seed and it will grow. So farmers have enough to fill their bellies and 
just wait. I ask a Sinhala person to work overtime and he won’t. As long as he 
has enough to fill his belly he is happy to just wait. It’s that Buddhist belief in 
karma and that lotus-eating passivity that has made them a lazy lot. They have 
no interest in accumulating wealth…that J.R. (President Jayawardene) was 
useless. He just sat there. He thought he was some kind of god – with his 
dharmista society.20 Premadasa came in and wiped them (the JVP) out. That’s 
what he had to do…When there is such a threat to democracy you need to take 





Rikesh uses the idiom of ‘youth’ to facilitate his understanding of the Bheeshanaya 
and in particular its motivations. Rikesh buys wholeheartedly into the state narrative 
of the Terror and its portrayal of JVP insurgents, and his parrot-like use of its 
vocabulary (e.g., “misguided youth”, “idealistic Marxists”) is unnerving. Rikesh 
construes the insurgency to have been a threat to democracy and the counter-
insurrection a necessity to protect it. He denigrates his youthful counterparts as 
“hooligans”, refusing to acknowledge that they may have had valid socio-economic 
and political grievances.  
Rikesh’s narrative is interesting because it points to the yawning chasm 
between the perspectives and lifestyles of the English-educated elites and that of their 
socially disadvantaged swabhāsha educated peers of rural and semi-urban 
                                                      
20 Dharmista translates as ‘one who follows the dharma (Buddha’s teachings)’. President J.R Jayawardene publicly stated his 
intention to create a dharmista society during his tenure, which denotes a society governed by the teachings of the Buddha. 
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backgrounds. This is well illustrated in Rikesh’s fantastical imaginings of the easy 
and carefree lives that the rural poor (here generically described as ‘farmers’) 
apparently lead. He appears unaware of the real experiences of poverty and social 
discrimination that mark the lives of the majority of Sri Lankans. Through his ‘theory’ 
of laziness that he applies to Sinhala Buddhist people belonging to the lower stratum 
of society, Rikesh insinuates that those young people who participated in the 
insurgency did so in pursuit of easy access to power (i.e., they were too lazy to work 
themselves up the social and economic ladder). 
 While for those living out-with the confines of privileged society in central 
Colombo, memories of the Bheeshanaya predominantly involve trauma and terror, 
Rikesh remembers the Terror for having offered some light entertainment. He even 
mentions deriving “enjoyment” from it. Rikesh does not face the challenge of having 
to learn to live with former insurgents after violence, since those with whom he shares 
his social world were not involved in the JVP. Nevertheless, Rikesh’s narrative work 
framed in terms of youth, like that of Ralahami and Shajiv, is also demonstrably an 
attempt to understand the violence of the Bheeshanaya.  However, instead of 
grappling with the problems of ‘our own boys turning on us’ – an identification he 
cannot make due to the class difference that separates him from his less privileged 
youthful counterparts, he attempts instead to comprehend the violent actions of ‘the 




Stories of Surviving the Terror Framed in Youth 
  
In this section we will look at some other stories that people told about their 
negotiation of the Terror through their use of ‘youth’ as a narrative device. These 
mainly took the form of survival stories in which former insurgents positioned 
themselves squarely as ‘victims’ of violence. These narratives of former insurgents 
were laden with emotion and emphasise the suffering endured through terror. Their 
stories communicated certain everyday moral values, such as kinship and community 
ties, and the obligations of communities to protect their young people. Through their 
narratives, former insurgents re-imagined community relationships and attempted to 
re-establish the normative moral values that underpinned them.  
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These painful and bitter narratives were classified as ‘youthful’ experiences, 
and showed violence as disrupting or suspending one’s youthful life. Normal 
everyday activities, such as going to school, bathing in the river, and interacting with 
friends, are shown to take on a potentially life-threatening turn during the Terror – a 
period during which youth as a social group could not ‘be seen’ in, or tolerated by, 
society. The perception of ‘youth’ as a malevolent force and the disqualification of 
young people from society is a theme that runs through the narratives of former 
insurgents.  In these stories, ‘youth’ emerge as mature, rational, strategic, and 
responsible, but also as vulnerable, persecuted, and in need of protection. 
The context in which these stories are set is one of heightened terror, 
debilitating fear, and apparent chaos, as the counter-insurrection gathered momentum 
in 1989. Unknown armed gangs stalked villages and towns, abducting and murdering 
young people. Opportunists exploited this climate to settle personal scores and 
denounce their neighbours, putting community ties under immense pressure. In some 
areas, entire populations of young people from villages and towns were forced to flee 
into hiding for months or even years. I heard many stories of young people battling 
inhospitable and dangerous environments (e.g., going out to sea stowed away in 
fishing boats, hiding in jungles) in their struggle to survive the counter-insurrection. 
What comes out of these survival stories is the ingenious and creative capacity of 
young people to evade death and their ability to take responsibility for their own 
survival under the most trying circumstances.  Let us now consider Tissa’s story of 




I was due to sit my A’ Level exam in August 1989.  In April I left school 
because the situation at home got to a stage where I couldn’t stay there 
anymore.  The army was after me… I travelled throughout the country ... 
Throughout my travels I had to do my utmost to hide my identity and constantly 
change it…A JVP Buddhist monk from this area put me in touch with another 
monk. I then travelled all over the country with him for several years as his 
assistant, reciting pirit21 and participating in rituals... He didn’t know that I was 
a JVPer.  I had to be very careful about not divulging my true identity to 
anyone. If I had been caught I wouldn’t be sitting here today talking to you. In 
1989 I felt fear, that I was alone and responsible for my own safety. Once from 
Anuradhapura to Mathugama, a journey which requires one direct bus, I took 8 
buses to avoid being caught. That was some journey! If a person looked at me in 
an odd manner I’d get off and get another bus. My sole aim was to stay alive…I 
                                                      
21 Pirit is the chanting of Buddhist protective verses or Buddhist protective ritual. 
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had to use various strategies (upakramashīli) to protect my life… When people 
talked about politics or the JVP I pretended to be very innocent and not to know 
anything about politics... I broke contact with the JVP... I even went into army 
camps to visit people who were caught and no one guessed who I was. I always 




Tissa went on to elaborate on two specific incidents where he managed to ‘cheat 
death’ by narrowly escaping members of the counter-insurrectionary forces who had 
tracked him down. He put this down to his constant state of alertness and the ability to 
think quickly on his feet. Tissa positions himself as the victim in this story of survival. 
Fear and a sense of isolation are the predominant feelings that he remembers from his 
experience of the Terror. The youthful Tissa represented in the narrative is far 
removed from traits of impulsiveness, gullibility, irresponsibility, and naivety that 
tend to afflict youth, as ex-insurgents such as him told us earlier.  Instead, the young 
insurgent represented here is portrayed as mature and capable of managing great 
responsibility, with the ability to carefully consider strategies to ensure his survival.  
Kuda is a man in his early 30s, who works in a restaurant. He comes from an 
economically impoverished background and joined the JVP at the age of 12. He was 
primarily involved in putting up posters and delivering tunḍu (notes issuing JVP 
demands). Kuda continues to vote for the JVP but admitted to me that he was 
becoming increasingly disillusioned with its leadership. His recollections of the 
Bheeshanaya were overwhelmingly painful, dominated by the experiences he endured 




The Bheeshanaya was a time when people couldn’t step out onto the road. 
Young boys couldn’t stay in their houses. Our families lived in constant fear of 
us being kidnapped. I hid in the jungles every night for about a year. All the 
boys in the village … were targets for abduction. I live in a small village in X. 
We would wash our face in the morning, and during the afternoon we would go 
to the river to bathe and play. It was a very liberating way of life. But when the 
Bheeshanaya came, all freedom vanished. We degenerated into a situation 
where we were not even able to eat.  
We hid in the jungle in groups. There were about 15 of us girls and boys and we 
looked out for each other. We didn’t have food. My mother really suffered at 
the time. Budu Ammō!22 How she suffered! Making pol-roti (coconut-bread) 
                                                      
22 Budu Ammo translates as “my Buddha/enlightened mother!”, but is equivalent to the English exclamation “My God!”. 
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and running back and forth trying desperately to sneak it in to us in the jungle at 
the dead of night. There was no division between morning and night – we didn’t 
‘get up in the morning’. People who loved us, and the village people, were 
constantly awake and alert. They’d always watch the road to see if an unusual 
vehicle or person passed. The village people were really committed (käpavīma) 
to protect the village boys. They would cook a bit of extra jak because they 
knew that at some point in the night some boys from the village in hiding may 




Through his narrative Kuda demonstrates what it meant to belong to the category of 
‘youth’ at the height of the Terror. This was a period in which being a youth was 
dangerous business, as it carried connotations of danger and subversion. The menace 
of ‘youth’ could not be seen or tolerated in society. Kuda goes on to describe, with an 
air of nostalgia, the carefree life of youthfulness before its rude disruption by the 
Terror, which thrust upon him grave adult responsibilities. The Bheeshanaya is 
described in a sense as having temporally suspended his youthful life. He talks of life 
before the Terror being marked by routines following daily temporal rhythms. But 
during the Bheeshanaya night and day blurs into one. The suffering endured is 
conveyed in collective terms – it is the collective suffering of the young people in his 
village and of his family and community. Through his story he invokes values of 
community and kinship, and the moral obligations that fall on these groups to support 
one another in times of extreme violence.  
 
 
Denial of Moral Responsibility for Violence and Avoidance 
 
In choosing to remember being the ‘victims’ of violence, and in selecting 
stories to tell centred on their suffering and persecution, as opposed to positioning 
themselves as ‘perpetrators’ of violence in their narratives and remembering their own 
persecution of others, former insurgents here engage in a form of avoidance and 
indirect denial of moral responsibility for violence. The few available studies on 
‘perpetrators’ of violence in other contexts have also shown denial, avoidance, and 
justification to be common features of their narratives of violence (see Payne 2008, 
Cohen 2001, Foster et al. 2005). Nevertheless, at the same time former insurgents do 
not seem to be engaging in a clear-cut denial of violence. They appear instead to be 
drawing on narrative strategies of distancing, deflection, avoidance, and 
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disassociation, to reject responsibility for certain forms of ‘immoral’ violence, while 
at the same time implicitly acknowledging their involvement in insurrectionary 
activity for morally righteous purposes.  
Remembering one’s complicity in violence here has significant consequences 
for life in aftermath, in a post-terror context of silence, fear, and forgetting. Moreover, 
when the overall moral judgement on the violence perpetrated during the 
Bheeshanaya is negative, acknowledging responsibility for violence potentially poses 
challenges to the moral foundation of one’s life and sociality with others after terror.  
However, we may also ask if it is valid to expect former insurgents to acknowledge 
moral responsibility for violence when they believe themselves to be innocent of any 
wrongful action, and when they further believe their present self to be different to that 
of their youthful self that engaged in insurrectionary violence some twenty years ago. 
During my time in the field, a common statement I came across from people 
who were not involved in the JVP, was that “the best” and “most educated” youth had 
died, and that it was the “undesirables” who had ultimately survived. This is typified 
in the comment by Siripala, an old shopkeeper. Having arrived in Sri Lanka some 
months earlier to carry out my fieldwork, I was becoming increasingly despondent 
over the time it was taking me to identify former JVP insurgents. He responded to my 
laments with, “A generation of our best and most educated youth was killed in the 
Bheeshanaya. The useless ones were left to survive. Why would you want to speak to 
them?” I met with variations of this statement from people whom I cautiously talked 
to about the Bheeshanaya. Similarly, in 1991 when Spencer revisited the Sinhala 
village in which he had carried out his fieldwork seven years earlier, he was told that 
“the cleverest” and “best educated” young people had been disappeared, because they 
“posed the greatest long term threat to the powers-that-be” (2000: 132).  
Siripala’s words niggled in my ears like the hum of an irritating mosquito, as I 
travelled through villages and towns speaking to former insurgents about their 
memories of the Terror. If every one of these former insurgents I was speaking to 
(according to them) fell within the category of the ‘moral’ insurgent, where then were 
all those ‘immoral undesirables’ who were apparently responsible for the most 
horrific acts of violence perpetrated in the name of the insurgency? Moreover, given 
that many people who were not themselves involved in the insurgency insisted that 
the only ones to survive the Bheeshanaya were in fact those very ‘undesirables’ who 
were responsible for much of the violence, it just did not seem to make sense that all 
those former insurgents I spoke to drew an emphatic distinction between the type of 
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‘good’ insurgents they were and those elusive ‘immoral insurgents’. This denial of 
moral responsibility through a refashioning of the self is a tension that runs through 
this thesis. Eliciting confessions is not the aim of this research. Instead, my interest 
here lies in the ways in which people remember and talk about their violent pasts in 
the aftermath of terror. As Swedenberg argues, with regard to the narratives of former 
Palestinian rebels who participated in the anti-colonial insurgency from 1936-9, the 
value of such stories is to be found in the motives for telling them, rather than in their 
“truth status” (1995: 148). 
Through their use of ‘youth’ as a narrative strategy, former insurgents engaged 
in a form of retrospective ‘white-washing’ of their past, which allowed them to 
continue living with themselves, their pasts, and with others after violence. In the 
context of surviving the Holocaust, Levi poignantly states, “the ‘saved’ of the Lager 
were not the best… preferably, the worst survived ...I felt innocent, yes, but enrolled 
among the saved and therefore in permanent search of a justification in my own eyes 
and those of others.  The worst survived … the best all died (1988: 62 - 63).  
Perhaps for former insurgents then, remembering themselves in terms of the 
good and the moral is an effort necessary to continue justifying their right to survive, 
both to themselves and others. This is particularly important in the face of challenges 
posed by the stigma attached to the JVP insurgent. In using ‘youthfulness’ as a 
narrative frame to distance and disassociate themselves from their violent pasts, to 
deflect blame and avoid moral responsibility for violence, and to project a reworked 
representation of the self in terms of the ‘good’, former insurgents were justifying 
their own survival to themselves and others. This then is part of the memory work 
they engage in to recreate life and negotiate sociality after terror. In the next chapter 
we look at how people draw on yet another narrative strategy to mediate their 
memories of terror, and in particular to comment on the ways in which violence seeps 
into ‘intimate’ relationships. 
 




‘Opportunistic’ Violence and the Impossibility of ‘Intimacy’ 
 
 
When I remember that time I feel a big Bheeshanaya (terror) in my head. In 
those days we couldn’t stay as we are doing now. We couldn’t sit here and talk 
like this. You didn’t know when the gangs (kalli)… would come and abduct 
you. It was a time during which we didn’t have the mental stability to carry on 
with our education or economic activity. It was a lonely time… My brothers and 
I had to hide... It was especially dangerous to be by the main road. You didn’t 
know when you would get abducted. You didn’t know who would abduct you. 
You couldn’t trust (visvāsa) people. I saw shootings, bodies burning piled on 




Kanchana, a former JVP insurgent, and I sat opposite each other on his small veranda 
one humid afternoon, surrounded by a thick foliage of banana trees that afforded us a 
comforting sense of privacy from the prying eyes of neighbours.  A well-groomed 
young man, Kanchana’s face was etched with a distinctly troubled and somewhat 
distant expression, as he attempted to articulate his traumatic memories of Sri Lanka’s 
Terror. His words tumbled out in cascades, following no particular chronological or 
thematic order. Fear, uncertainty, isolation, vulnerability, mistrust, and human 
relationships stretched to breaking point, were his themes. For Kanchana, engaging in 
the very act of remembering past violence was an unsettling experience. He told me 
that doing so created “a big terror” in his head. This loaded statement intimates the 
legacy of trauma left by terror and the power of its memory to impress on the present. 
Scholars have argued that memories of violence carry “additional burdens” of 
a moral and political nature (see Lambek and Antze 1996: xii, Kirmayer 1996). In this 
chapter I consider the ways in which people mediate and articulate memories of a 
particularly morally discomforting nature. These were memories of a kind of violence 
that people specifically referred to as “avastavādi”. The Sinhala word avastavādi may 
be translated as ‘opportunistic’, and its use here suggested acts of violence that 
entailed the accrual of personal benefit at the expense of others. People described as 
avastavādi, violence that primarily took the form of revenge and denunciation 
perpetrated between ‘ordinary’ civilians who apparently knew each other, during the 
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Bheeshanaya.23  Research participants overwhelmingly construed this violence as 
having been exacted by ‘opportunists’ who wrongfully exploited the climate of terror 
and chaos for personal gain. My research finds that memories of this type of violence 
were morally burdensome because of its perpetration between ‘intimates’, and the 
personal (rather than political) motives that underpinned it. This in turn rendered the 
mediation of its memory an ethical exercise, with implications for social life in the 
present. I argue that in their work of ethical remembering, people made attempts to 
distinguish between the personal and the political, and to allocate moral responsibility 
for violence, as part of the process of recreating sociality in the aftermath of terror. 
People used ‘opportunistic’ violence as an idiom through which to comment on the 
ways in which violence invades intimate social relationships. 
The occurrence of revenge and denunciation at micro-level is a disturbing and 
little talked about feature of the Bheeshanaya that has received meagre attention in 
studies on the Terror. Despite being subjected to silence and a sense of taboo, 
‘opportunistic’ violence nevertheless cropped up here and there in people’s narratives 
of the Bheeshanaya in an almost cursory but consistent fashion, indicating important 
meanings attached to it in people’s memories. Kanchana, the former insurgent whose 
story opened this chapter, alludes to its occurrence when he tellingly suggests society 
during the Bheeshanaya to be wild and uncivilised. He stresses the permeation of 
mistrust and uncertainty (e.g., not knowing who your abductors really were), and 
depicts a normative moral world turned upside down by terror, where people are 
rendered devoid of human qualities (i.e., people being reduced to behaving like 
uncivilised animals).  
Moral repugnance expressed in stories of this particular form of violence that I 
came across during my time in the field, was directed at its perpetration between 
‘intimates’ - people who shared the same ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
‘community’, often involving neighbours, work-colleagues, and even friends. As 
Spencer noted on his return visit to the village in which he had carried out fieldwork 
prior to the Terror, the violence of this period pervaded “the capillary relations of 
everyday interaction: your political opponents would be neighbours usually, kin often, 
former friends sometimes” (Spencer 2000: 134). These memories were rendered 
morally irksome because they necessitated an acknowledgement of the willingness of 
‘ordinary’ non-combatant civilians and ‘intimates’ at the grass-roots to play an active 
                                                      
23 The term ‘ordinary’ here is used with caution and recognition of it being problematic. The violence of the Bheeshanaya took 
place at numerous levels, in various forms, and operated in many layers, leaving even ‘ordinary’ non-combatant civilians with 
‘blood on their hands’. 
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role in sustaining a Terror generally considered as being imposed from ‘above’, in 
order to accrue personal advantages (see Fitzpatrick and Gellately1997).  
My research finds that in a retrospective post-terror context where 
‘opportunistic’ violence was popularly deemed ‘wrong’ and ‘immoral’, remembering 
carried significant implications for sociality, and for notions of the self and 
accountability in the present. While the majority of people remembered revenge and 
denunciation as ubiquitous, everyone I spoke to vehemently denied outright, and took 
pains to distance themselves from, complicity in this particular form of violence. This 
differed somewhat from the concurrent acknowledgement and denial of moral 
accountability for political or insurrectionary violence that characterised the 
contradictory narratives found in the rest of this thesis. Insurrectionary or political 
violence (unlike revenge and denunciation) was generally construed as having been 
motivated by morally righteous goals, unlike the self-serving motivations assumed to 
underpin the perpetration of ‘opportunistic’ violence. The moral judgement passed on 
this type of violence in the aftermath, then lay in the distinction made between public 
and private motivation, and the extent to which it was perceived as being ‘intimate’, 
rather than political. Unlike other forms of violence, avastavādi violence seeped into 
the very foundations of everyday ‘intimate’ sociality in the present.  
As we shall see in the course of this chapter, people’s narratives of 
‘opportunistic’ violence constituted elaborate moral critiques of violence, and 
demonstrated attempts to grapple with an ethics to make sense of, and come to terms 
with, its occurrence, in the aftermath of the Bheeshanaya. People also drew on 
incidents of ‘opportunistic’ violence to talk about the climate of terror overall, mainly 
to highlight the strain that terror put on social relationships and to remember the ways 
in which these challenges were dealt with. I argue that remembering ‘opportunistic’ 
violence in ethical terms, enabled people to acknowledge the damage wrought on 
their communities by violence and to deal with issues of accountability. It allowed 
people to cautiously re-imagine a moral community in the aftermath of violence and 
to continue living with their violent past in the present (see Mueggler 2001).   
 
 
Revenge and Denunciation in the Bheeshanaya: Some Background and 
Academic Reflections 
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 The occurrence of ‘opportunistic’ violence during the Bheeshanaya is a ‘well-
known secret’ within the Sinhala Buddhist community in southern Sri Lanka. It is 
commonly acknowledged at popular level that the Bheeshanaya witnessed the playing 
out of personal squabbles in the public political arena, as some people exploited the 
climate of terror to denounce neighbours and friends (in effect signing their death-
warrants), and to carry out violent revenge attacks on personal ‘enemies’.  
Nevertheless, it is a rarely broached subject, with silence and denial overshadowing 
its memory. Existing literature on the Bheeshanaya alludes to the occurrence of 
revenge, personal score-settling, and denunciation at the height of the Bheeshanaya 
(see Gunaratna 1990, Perera 1999). In his work on female survivors of violence, 
Perera states that “there were also groups and individuals who used the prevailing 
situation to eliminate private enemies with the help of state or JVP hit-squads or 
merely under the pretext of such groups” (Perera 1999: 37). An Amnesty International 
report published in 1991 refers to ‘indications’ that people were being detained by the 
state on the basis of “lists drawn up by politicians or other influential people”, which 
included their personal foes (Amnesty International 1991: 4). However, the subject of 
revenge and denunciation between ‘intimates’ during the Bheeshanaya has not been 
systematically analysed, nor have specific accounts of such “indirect violence” 
(Kalyvas 2006) been recorded. The study of these issues is hindered to a great extent 
by a lack of evidence, largely due to the taboo that surrounds this form of violence. 
This problem is not unique to research on Sri Lanka. Kalyvas, who makes a case for 
understanding civil war through the study of local micro-level dynamics, has argued 
that violence involving non-combatants “has long remained off research limits 
because of its conceptual complexity and empirical opacity” (2006: 5-6). 
 Violent revenge and denunciation during the Bheeshanaya took place both at 
the macro-political level, between politicians, the security-forces, the JVP, para-
military groups and vigilantes; and at micro-level at the grassroots involving 
apparently ‘ordinary’ civilians (often with no avowed allegiance to either the state or 
the JVP) and small-time politicians.24 During my time in the field I was told of 
numerous incidents that involved people denouncing neighbours with whom they 
were locked in land disputes, work-colleagues with whom they had a personal 
grievance, ‘love rivals’ on the basis of jealousy, and even friends against whom they 
harboured petty grievances. 
                                                      
24 See Gunaratna 1990, and also based on evidence gathered from conversations I had in the field. 
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 The stories of ‘opportunistic’ violence that run through this chapter suggest 
that the climate of terror and the impunity, fear, suspicion, and confusion it fostered, 
offered people a unique opportunity to solve their personal problems, mainly by 
getting rid of opponents. People’s willingness to exploit this ‘opportunity’ led to a 
nourishment of the Terror from below (see Fitzpatrick and Gellately 1997), that had a 
spiralling effect on violence overall. As Borneman (2002) has argued, personal 
revenge perpetuates repetitive and rebounding violence, when it is carried out to settle 
scores.25 My research finds that it also makes available to ‘ordinary’ people, 
convoluted and manifold routes for involvement in violence (directly or indirectly, 
and at various levels).   
 It was the willingness of ‘ordinary’ people on the ground to collaborate 
with terror through their betrayal of ‘intimates’ for personal gain that rendered the 
memory of revenge and denunciation so morally awkward. This in turn necessitated a 
moral critique of its occurrence and a denial of culpability for it, in people’s 
retrospective narratives. During my fieldwork I came across people who had not been 
involved in the JVP, but were nevertheless subjected to detention and torture on the 
basis of malicious denunciations based on envy and petty disputes. One retired senior 
counter-insurrectionary officer told me that the success of the counter-insurrection 
was significantly aided by ordinary people “coming forward with information” on 
(supposed) JVP insurgents in their communities. However, I was also told that there 
were many people who were genuinely frustrated with the impact of the JVP’s own 
violence and hartāls (unofficial strikes and curfews) on their everyday lives. It is 
possible that some of these people may have believed that they were engaging in a 
proactive effort to root out the ‘internal menace’ and protect the social fabric through 
their indirect collaboration in terror.  
While many research participants represented revenge and denunciation as 
having been ubiquitous, it is important to note that such ‘indirect’ violence during the 
Bheeshanaya was sporadic, and that it did not follow any discernible pattern 
(although as we shall see later in this chapter, people came up with various 
explanations in an attempt to find a logical pattern to its occurrence). More 
importantly, we must not forget that there were many people who selflessly risked 
their own lives to protect their neighbours, friends, and loved ones from violence. The 
purpose of this chapter is not to question why people perpetrated ‘opportunistic’ 
                                                      
25 Borneman acknowledges borrowing the term ‘rebounding violence’ from Maurice Bloch (1992) to refer to repetitive and new 
cycles of violence. 
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violence, nor is it to find some logic to its occurrence, but rather to consider how 
people gave meaning to it and how they mediated its memory, along with its 
implications for life after terror. The narratives that feature in this chapter 
nevertheless do show the violence of the Bheeshanaya to be complex, murky and 
messy. Particularly when it came to discussions on ‘opportunistic’ violence, many 
people remembered the reality on the ground to involve numerous, confusing agents 
drawn from various levels of the conflict, and for a multiplicity of motivations, 
allegiances, and agendas to characterise the violence of this period.  
Despite the tendency to view revenge as abnormal, irrational and even 
perverse, scholars have shown revenge to follow predictable patterns, to have rational 
goals, to comply with certain norms, and to discharge social functions (e.g., to 
regulate and diffuse violence within social groups) (see Gould 2000, Abu-Lughod 
1986, Wallace 1995, Muir 1993). Wallace (1995) provides an insightful definition of 
‘revenge’ that emerges from his comparison with ‘retribution’.  Retribution, he 
argues, is something that can be pursued “disinterestedly”, often through the judicial 
system. Revenge on the other hand, is malicious in nature, entails passion, and carries 
with it “moral defects”, with the typical object of revenge being the disadvantage of 
the revengee (1995: 365-367).  This explanation then construes revenge as being 
emotionally and ethically loaded. It is worth bearing in mind however, that people 
may have multiple and complex motives for acting, and that it is not possible to 
clearly compartmentalise all violent actions into neat categories of ‘retribution’ and 
‘revenge’. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that those pursuing retribution through 
the judicial system do so in a “disinterested” manner. Thereby, the acts of ‘revenge’ 
described in this chapter may also appear in some respects to fit into the category of 
retribution. Borneman (2002) in his article entitled ‘Reconciliation after Ethnic 
Cleansing’ differentiates between revenge and justice or legal redress. He describes 
revenge as “the arbitrary, narcissistic exercise of violence in which there is no 
accountability except to oneself and to a personal memory of the dead” (2002: 288).  
Revenge and denunciation operated hand in hand during Sri Lanka’s 
Bheeshanaya, and denunciation was commonly used a means of exacting revenge, 
operating overall as an indirect form of intimate violence. The use of the gōni billa 
(the US inspired masked denouncer with a gunny-sack slung over her or his head) by 
the counter-insurrectionary forces, put intense pressure on community relationships at 
local level, and created a debilitating climate of mistrust and fear. People simply did 
not know who was behind the mask; whether it was an ‘intimate’ or personal enemy. 
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A simple nod of the gōni billa’s head in the direction of an individual would seal the 
latter’s fate. As one man who had not been involved in the JVP but had been rounded 
up before a gōni billa’s public identification parade, put it, “If a fly landed on the gōni 
billa’s head and he shook his head to get it off, the person who happened to stand in 
the direction of that shake would be taken away and killed”. The majority of my 
research participants told me that the gōni billa often nodded in the direction of his or 
her personal enemies regardless of whether or not they had been involved in insurgent 
activity. The gōni billa was used as a key tool of “psychological policing” (Gellately 
1997: 220), whereby the state actively roused ordinary people to ‘smoke-out the 
enemy within’. Through the gōni billa then, the state nurtured a culture of 
denunciation during the Bheeshanaya, manipulating fear and encouraging people to 
monitor the behaviour of their neighbours, which in turn put insurmountable stress on 
social relationships.  
The gōni billa shows the difficulties of maintaining trust and intimate 
relationships amidst violence. It blurred the lines between the private or ‘intimate’ and 
the political. While terror undoubtedly led to a debilitating sense of fear and 
disempowerment for the majority of people, the dynamics surrounding the gōni billa 
illustrates people’s active manipulation of the wider conflict to resolve petty disputes 
and air their personal grievances. This has been referred to as the “privatisation of 
politics” by Kalyvas, who points out that “while political actors ‘use’ civilians to 
collect information and win the war, it is also the case that civilians ‘use’ political 
actors to settle their own private conflicts” in effect using these political actors as 
private “contract killers” (2006: 14). Scholars have shown denunciation to have been 
a rife, ‘everyday practice’ in the context of ‘terroristic’ regimes, such as that of Nazi 
Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union. Rather than being ideologically motivated, 
denunciations there were largely carried out to meet personal goals, showing overall 
the alarming readiness of ordinary people to actively collaborate in terror  (see 
Fitzpatrick and Gellately 1997, Gellately 1997, Kozlov 1997, Gross 1982). Fitzpatrick 
and Gellately have argued that in the absence of opportunities to participate formally 
in democratic politics, denunciation was a means through which German citizens 
participated in the Nazi system – an avenue through which “they could express their 
opinions, articulate their interests and seek to satisfy them” (1997: 6). Similarly, the 
literature on European witch-hunting further illustrates the willingness of ordinary 
people to denounce as witches those with whom they had personal grievances, in their 
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eagerness to root out ‘the enemy within’, influenced by an atmosphere of fear, 
suspicion, and uncertainty (see Geschiere 2000, Roper 2004, Briggs 2006).  
 
 
Silence and the Moral Judgement Passed on ‘Opportunistic’ Violence 
 
The vast majority of research participants were hesitant to speak directly and 
openly about the occurrence of ‘opportunistic’ violence during the Terror, and the 
morally discomforting nature of its memory shaped their narratives. Much effort and 
time had to be invested in developing trust between research participants and myself 
to elicit the stories of ‘opportunistic’ violence that fill the pages of this chapter. 
However, while acknowledgement of its occurrence was ultimately forthcoming, 
denial of complicity was a recurring narrative theme. Stories of revenge and 
denunciation were often recounted in the third person, as having taken place between 
other people, in other areas, and affecting other community relationships, thereby 
putting a distance between the teller and this form of violence. Some people however, 
readily told stories of being ‘victims’ of malicious denunciations and revenge attacks 
during the Bheeshanaya.  
Many people expressed disgust at the exploitation of the climate of terror by 
‘ordinary’ people and the perpetration of violence between neighbours and friends. 
On countless occasions I was privy to disparaging critiques of certain neighbours 
secretly accused of having personally benefited from exploiting the Terror, and who it 
was alleged continued to enjoy the fruits of their ill-gotten gains. One man in his early 
50s, who had not been involved in either the JVP or the state security forces during 
the Terror, burst into tears as he told me that certain members of his kin continued to 
make his life difficult by falsely accusing him of having exploited the Terror for 
personal gain.  He put this down to their jealousy of his success in building a house 
for his family.  
The ‘intimate’ nature of this form of violence (and its sheer scale) further 
contributed to people’s silence. This was evident in the visible sense of shame and 
apparent incomprehensibility that often accompanied statements concerning those 
involved in it (e.g., “it was our own people killing each other”). People in general tend 
to find inflicting violence on neighbours bewildering because we tend to associate 
such ‘intimate’ relationships with “trust, cooperation, intimacy, and mutual helping” 
(Hewstone et al. 2008). However, studies from across the world have demonstrated 
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that violence often involves people who knew, or thought they knew each other (Das 
et al. 2000: 1), suggesting neighbourliness and its assumed ‘intimacy’ to be a poor 
inhibitor of violence.  
Scholars have compellingly argued in recent years that violence is often rooted 
in micro-level dynamics and local cleavages, and predicated on everyday social and 
political relationships (see Das 1996, Spencer 2007, Jeganathan 1996, Kalyvas 2006). 
The ‘opportunistic’ violence that took place during Sri Lanka’s Terror was also 
anchored in everyday politics and sociality at a local level, and people’s narratives 
entailed an assumption that revenge and denunciation had transgressed the normative 




From Silence and Forgetting, to Remembering and Telling 
 
Memories of revenge and denunciation were typically embedded in people’s 
overall narratives of the Bheeshanaya. The following extract from a conversation 
between two men gradually raises the issue of ‘opportunistic’ violence in this manner. 
The men were friends from the same village. Hiran was from a rural elite family. His 
parents had been brutally murdered by the JVP and their dismembered bodies 
displayed in the town centre, because of their political allegiance to the governing 
UNP regime. Raja, on the other hand, was of working class background. He was 
primarily a witness to violence, with no particular political affiliations (although he 




Raja: I was going to the shop on my bicycle just a short distance from my 
house. Two young boys put their hands out to stop me. They were so young I 
assumed that they just wanted a ride into town. I stopped and then they pointed 
their gun at me. They told me to give them my bicycle. So I said, “have you got 
permission from Kollu (the JVP village leader) for this?”  (because they thought 
I was a friend of Kollu) they then left me and  turned to another guy who was 
going past and took his bike off him and pedalled off. Then that man started 
hassling me demanding to know why they took his bike and not mine…  Then 
we started fighting there on the street.  So we went to the police-station. I went 
in and said that I wanted to file a complaint about the incident. The policeman 
tried to chase me away, saying that he didn’t want to take down a statement. I 
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insisted that he did and he finally took it down but nothing happened. Ah!  The 
problems we had in those days (Appō! tibba karadara).  
 
Hiran: Do you remember my friend Jeevaka from the village? He was put in the 
balu-van (dog-pound van) and taken off to X camp (detention centre) where he 
was tortured for weeks. He didn’t realise until much later that it was his friend 
from the village who had denounced him.  
 
Raja: Yes. In those days crazy (māra) things happened, there is no point in even 
talking about it (kiyala väḍak nā)… Malli (little brother) who was in the army 
came in his army clothes to visit me while on leave. The neighbours were all 
JVP boys. They saw malli and jumped over their wall and ran off. I was 
terrified. I told Malli to please leave because they would now think that I was an 
army informant. Sure enough after he left… the boys from next door came in. 
They accused me of being an informant and pinned me against the wall. They 
said that they were going to kill me. Then Kollu (the JVP insurgent leader of the 
village) happened to walk past. I shouted out to him. He told the boys to let me 
go. He saved my life. He then told me “If someone bothers you just tell them 




Memories of denunciation and revenge are woven into a wider story about the 
tribulations of negotiating everyday sociality during the Bheeshanaya. This story 
depicts human relationships being stretched to breaking point by terror as it illustrates 
two men, both ‘victims’ in this instance, ‘turning on each other’ over the bicycle 
incident. The conversation between Raja and Hiran further highlights overlapping 
features of terror such as suspicion and mistrust (e.g., Raja being suspected of being 
an informant); unpredictability (e.g., neighbours seemingly turning on each other); 
betrayal (e.g., friends maliciously denouncing each other); people being ‘caught in the 
middle’ of opposing factions (e.g., as demonstrated by Raja’s tale of the impasse 
involving his soldier brother and his insurgent neighbours); impunity (e.g., the police 
refusing to follow-up complaints); and a sense of abnormality and chaos (e.g., men 
being taken off in dog-vans, children with guns).  
Hiran’s story about the man taken into detention as a result of a denunciation 
by a friend elicits a response from Raja that imbues the occurrence of such indirect 
violence between ‘intimates’ with a sense of madness and incomprehensibility. Raja 
comments, “In those days crazy things happened, there is no point in even talking 
about it”, and follows on with an anecdote about his own experience of being a 
suspected informant. His statement expresses a sense of exasperation, and hints at the 
futility of articulating memories of events that appear morally incomprehensible in 
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hindsight. The challenge in expressing these memories most probably lies in the 
inadequacy of words and the limits of language, rather than in problems of memory 
(Kirmayer 1996: 174–5). Interestingly, denunciation is remembered and recounted 
here as having taken place between other people, thereby distancing the narrator from 
any implication in this form of violence. Similarly, Raja positions himself as a 
‘victim’ in his story about the potential act of revenge he was subject to by his 
insurgent neighbours. He avoids mentioning whether or not his neighbours’ 
suspicions of him being an informant were valid.   
 
 
Remembering Revenge and Denunciation 
  
Anil, a taxi driver, who witnessed first-hand the violence and apparent havoc 
that the Bheeshanaya wreaked in his village, spoke of the occurrence of revenge and 
denunciation in the following terms. 
  
 
The key factor in it all was personal revenge (pudgalika paligänīm). It may have 
started off as a social revolution about problems between the rich and the poor. 
But … it ended in personal revenge. It really broke trust in the community. It 
came to be about private squabbles, like land disputes (iḍam prashna). Based on 
denunciations, people killed from various sides. It happened over such petty 
things, and you didn’t know who was doing it. I could be talking to someone in 
the afternoon in town, and perhaps I may have said some little thing that the 
other person took offence at, and in the evening I would be killed. Politicians 
were also at it, taking revenge on their political opponents. At that time people’s 
sense of justice/rationality (sādāranakama giyā) vanished. It was people in the 
village who were killing each other. People who knew each other! If it wasn’t 
crushed in 1989, the whole country would have been destroyed through that 




Anil’s village in the central mountainous region was particularly notorious for 
violence, including denunciations and revenge attacks, during the Bheeshanaya. 
Anil’s apocalyptic description suggests that revenge and denunciation developed a 
dynamic of its own, blurring the lines between ‘perpetrators’ of (political) violence 
and ‘ordinary’ civilians and ‘intimates’. ‘Opportunistic’ violence here is shown as 
actively contributing to a spiralling of the Terror from below. Anil remembers the 
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devastating impact that this indirect form of violence had on social relationships, 
mainly in the sapping of trust, saturation of suspicion and fear based on uncertainty 
about the potential for unpredictable violent behaviour by neighbours.  
Anil suggests that the Terror rendered people devoid of rationality and justice. 
He portrays a world in which normative values and order are turned upside down, and 
his own moral outrage is palpable in his stressing that this form of violence was 
exacted between ‘intimates’, “It was people in the village who were killing each 
other. People who knew each other!”  This indicates an underlying assumption of 
‘intimate’ relationships being bound and guided by certain normative values and 
obligations, and predicated on a modicum of trust.  The moral reprehensibility of 
‘opportunistic’ violence then is grounded in its perpetration between ‘intimates’ – 
people who supposedly knew each other, and the betrayal of trust. By willingly 
exploiting the Terror to engage in violence against others in their community for 
purposes of personal advantage, these ‘intimates’ then are viewed as having 
transgressed the normative moral values and obligations (e.g., collectivity, co-
existence, mutual co-operation, and trust) that supposedly underpin Sinhala Buddhist 
communities. This form of violence goes against the very “moral resources” of 
‘intimate’ relationships that one may expect to deter violence (Esses and Vernon 
2008). Anil perceives this crime against morality to be so grave as to threaten the very 
survival of Sinhala society. The memory work that people engage in after terror then, 
entails an acknowledgement of the damage done by violence to their social 
relationships, which calls for a re-imagining of moral communities in the present, as 
we shall see in chapter 5 of this thesis.  
Thiranagama (N.d.) in her study of Tamils labelled as “traitors” by the LTTE 
argues that the abhorrence of “treason” is based on notions of intimacy.  So the fear of 
a traitor is also a fear of being ‘intimate’ with others and the betrayal of one’s own 
self as a Tamil (as opposed to betrayal by an ‘outsider’). This, she goes on to argue, 
creates a situation of internal terror. I would also argue that, within the Sinhala 
Buddhist community, people’s ideas of ‘intimacy’ and its tacit understandings and 
values, were clearly linked to the moral reprehensibility of ‘opportunistic’ violence 
perpetrated during the Bheeshanaya.  Anil’s narrative, in congruence with that of 
others featured in this chapter, suggests that what made terror intolerable was 
uncertainty about one’s neighbours and their capacity for betrayal. ‘Intimate’ sociality 
here is shown to increase suspicion, uncertainty, and the threat of violence in times of 
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terror. Life after terror then involves recreating everyday sociality with intimates in 
the face of this knowledge. 
Anil emphasises the senselessness of ‘opportunistic’ violence: “It happened 
over such petty things… perhaps I may have said some little thing that the other 
person took offence at, and in the evening I would be killed”.  Rather than being 
extraordinary acts of irrationality or sudden madness, as implied by Anil, the 
narratives featured in this chapter suggest extreme aggravation and accentuation of 
the ‘normal’ socio-political dynamics that characterise everyday life in times of non-
terror, to have contributed to the wider violence of the Bheeshanaya. At the same 
time, the Terror itself exacerbated existing tensions, created new cleavages at the 
grassroots, and altered existing local dynamics, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
violence between ‘intimates’. Nevertheless, it is important to note that people 
overwhelmingly remembered the violence of the Bheeshanaya as an abnormality and 
spoke of experiencing it as an aberration.  
Anil expresses his support for the violence of the counter-insurrection by 
stating that if the insurrection had not been crushed, the entire country would have 
been consumed by revenge and denunciation, leading to its ultimate annihilation. The 
capacity of ‘ordinary’ civilians (who had suspended their sense of rationality and 
morals) to sustain the Terror is depicted as having the power to potentially destroy 
society itself. Brute force is thereby necessary to restore a sense of (moral) order. Anil 
moreover, recounts his story of revenge and denunciation mainly in the third person, 
showing it to have taken place between others, speaking in the first person only to 
hypothetically position himself as a potential victim. As well as distancing himself 
from this form of violence, in doing so he implicitly emphasises his innocence by 
stressing his own potential vulnerability to ‘opportunistic’ violence. 
 
 
Negotiating Everyday Life through Terror 
 
Some people employed stories of revenge and denunciation to express how 
they dealt with violence and to portray what everyday life was like during the Terror. 
People remembered drawing on a range of strategies to negotiate their very survival, 
which is in congruence with Green’s contention that survival for people living in a 
chronic state of fear depends on a panoply of responses (1999: 55–56). The everyday 
negotiation of terror was rooted in the careful management of sociality with 
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‘intimates’, and in a fear of ‘intimates’ (especially their capacity to perpetrate 
‘opportunistic’ violence). Terror then is shown to alter social interaction and to drive 
“a wedge of paranoia” (Green 1999) into the heart of ‘intimate’ relationships. 
Suspicion now becomes the primary marker in negotiating sociality and takes on a 
protective quality, as the narratives below demonstrate.   
Several research participants told me that they chose to distance themselves 
from their neighbours due to mistrust and fear, as they retreated into the relative 
‘safety’ of the immediate family. However, they stressed that they were careful to 
avoid the frightening consequences of unintentional snubs, by maintaining basic 
polite and cordial relationships at a superficial level (e.g., when bumping into a 
neighbour on the street). Some, on the other hand, spoke of treading a delicate path by 
balancing relationships with people of opposing political sides, regardless of whether 
they agreed or disagreed with the political agendas of these factions. This was a 
dangerous course to follow, but deemed necessary for survival by people who felt that 
they were caught in the middle of opposing factions. Raja (who participated in the 
conversation earlier in this chapter) told me that he secretly maintained a congenial 
relationship with the army through his soldier brother’s contacts. At the same time, he 
made an effort to sustain a good relationship with the JVP leader of his village 
(despite him privately praising the actions of the counter-insurrectionary forces in 
crushing the JVP). Raja described taking “energy drinks” and tending to the JVP 
insurgent leader of his village, Kollu, when the latter was laid up in bed having 
sustained injuries from a security-forces ambush. This parlous strategy could have 
brought on calamitous results. But for Raja this carefully thought out response to 
terror secured his life when Kollu later intervened in an incident where JVP cadres in 
the village set out to kill him (as we saw in the earlier conversation between Raja and 
Hiran).   
Others recalled making the onerous effort to go out of their way to be 
painfully ‘nice’ to their neighbours, driven primarily by the desire to avoid being the 
object of denunciation or revenge. Naren, an academic, who witnessed the 
insurrection as a young boy in the remote and impoverished village in which he grew 




There was no trust in our village at all. Everyone made a special effort in their 
behaviour towards each other. Everyone was scared of each other in the 
community. Since you didn’t know who was on what side, and due to fear of 
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denouncers, everyone made a special effort to be nice to each other. So because 
we were scared of denunciations we tried to be friends with all. Before this there 
were a lot of land disputes. But during this time these disputes reduced as 




Trust is not merely replaced by suspicion but rather it is manipulated, as social 
interactions at a superficial level are conducted under its pretence. Naren’s story, like 
the others featured in this chapter, substantiates anthropological findings on the lived 
reality of terror that have mainly emerged from studies based on the South American 
context of the 1970s and 1980s. These “cultures of terror” have been shown to have 
their own “grammar” and underlying structures (Taussig 1989 and 2004, Suarez-
Orozco 1990). The devastating impact of terror on community relationships and its 
fearful psychological grip on individuals and entire populations, along with the 
intricate meshing of its salient features such as fear, uncertainty, silence, suspicion, 
panic and paranoia have been illustrated in this work (see Green 1999, Taussig 2004, 
Warren 2000, Suarez-Orozco 1990).   
The notion of uncertainty nurtured by violence featured strongly throughout 
people’s narratives. Uncertainty here is largely depicted as being epistemological in 
nature. It is concerned with what one really knows about neighbours and friends, and 
is grounded in the notion of ‘intimacy’ itself. As we have seen, people had to grapple 
with the uncertainty of who the dreaded denouncers and abductors were - whether 
they could perhaps be an ‘intimate’, whether neighbours and friends could really be 
trusted, and what their real agendas and affiliations were. Appadurai (2000) in his 
article on ethnic violence in the context of globalisation argues that, in the face of 
uncertainty violence creates it own macabre form of certainty. Conversely, in the 
narratives here, violence is consistently shown to perpetuate uncertainty and 
confusion. The majority of stories on ‘opportunistic’ violence drew clear connections 
between terror, uncertainty, and ‘intimacy’. Naren’s narrative echoes that of Anil (as 
seen earlier in this chapter), in suggesting that the intolerability of terror is rooted in 
uncertainty about one’s neighbours and that sociality with ‘intimates’ magnifies the 
potential threat of violence during times of terror.  
 
 
Giving Meaning to Morally Incomprehensible Violence 
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In his compelling study of Holocaust survivors based on videotaped 
interviews, Langer (1991) points to a duality in memory that runs through their oral 
testimonies. Deep memory, he contends, attempts to recall the self as it was then (i.e., 
“the Auschwitz self”), while common memory on the other hand “restores the self to 
its pre- and post camp routines” and “offers detached portraits from the vantage point 
of today, of what it must have been like then” (1991: 6).  The struggles between these 
two kinds of memories and their intrusions on each other, is used by Langer to explain 
the gaps and disruptions that stutter the flow of these traumatic narratives. The 
exchange between common and deep memory was also evident in narratives of the 
Bheeshanaya, as stories appeared to hurtle between these categories of memory at 
various points. This chapter opened with an extract from an interview I had with 
former insurgent Kanchana, who referred to the “big terror” that he experienced in his 
head when he recalled the Bheeshanaya. Memories of fear, loneliness, uncertainty, 
and gruesome images of violence, flashed through his narrative, following no 
particular order – remembering the self as it were during the Terror. This engagement 
with his deep memory was interspersed with interruptions by his common memory, as 
he attempted to reflect retrospectively on his experiences of violence, remembering 
the function of society during the Bheeshanaya to be lawless and uncivilised. 
I was struck by the raw and very present quality in people’s narratives of the 
Bheeshanaya overall, and particularly when they spoke of the impact of violence and 
betrayal on human relationships. This may be understood in terms of Langer’s  
classification of deep memory. There were further points at which people attempted to 
comprehend and allocate an ethical space to, the occurrence of violence between 
‘intimates’ in their stories, which would suggest their common memory to be at work, 
as these were retrospective reflections from the “vantage point of today” (Langer 
1991: 6).  However, in the context of the Bheeshanaya, people’s mediation of 
memory and their depictions of violence were in no way “detached” as suggested by 
Langer in his reference to the working of common memory with regard to the 
narratives of Holocaust survivors. The act of remembering the ‘opportunistic’ 
violence that took place between ‘intimates’ during the Bheeshanaya was shaped by 
the context of recollection, and people’s engagement with past violence carried moral 
resonance for their sense of self and social relationships in the present. 
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 Shehan is a former insurgent who had recently left the JVP through 
disillusionment. He explained the operation of ‘opportunistic’ violence during the 




Revenge took place across the country. Gangs would dress up as the army and 
abduct people, and people would pretend to be the JVP and abduct others so 
that the JVP was blamed. Then there were so many gangs, which had various 
names like Black Cats, Yellow Cats, Green Tigers, and Eagles. So the 
Government was killing, the JVP was killing, there were paramilitary groups, 
and vigilante groups all kidnapping and killing people. You didn’t know who 
was who, because people would always assume the identity of the opponent. In 




Shehan, like Anil whose story we heard earlier, speaks of revenge as having been a 
universal occurrence, taking place across the country. Interestingly, as we shall see in 
Chapter 5, Shehan also appears to contradict this assertion when he states that 
‘opportunistic’ violence did not take place in his village, which he puts down to his 
own thoughtful management of ‘intimate’ community relationships during his tenure 
as a local insurgent leader. He narrates his story of ‘opportunistic’ violence in the 
third person, as having taken place between other actors, thereby distancing himself 
from complicity. Shehan suggests that people “lost their way” or “were stranded” 
amidst the chaos of terror. This intimates that people were in a sense ‘carried away’ 
by the violence and their ‘normal’ values and rationality suspended in the process. 
This explanation of ‘opportunistic’ violence divests its perpetrators of agency and 
instead represents them as being victims of the overwhelming power of terror. 
Nevertheless, Shehan’s rationalisation of violence is conducive to the functioning of 
relationships between people with various degrees of involvement in violence, in the 
present. However, the accounts of specific incidents of ‘opportunistic’ violence that I 
gathered for this research show revenge attacks and denunciations to have been well 
planned, clearly targeted, and backed by specific motivations based on everyday 
social and political life, rather than being mere acts of irrationality belonging to 
people swept away by the chaos of the Terror.  
Some people depicted society as having gone mad, with ‘ordinary’ people 
‘turning on each other’ and indiscriminately denouncing their neighbours. They in 
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turn tended to make sense of this violence by blaming it on the ‘nature’ of Sinhala 
people. This implied that perpetrating ‘opportunistic’ violence in this instance was 
somehow biologically and culturally intrinsic to the Sinhala people, and thereby 
unavoidable. Within the confines of the Sinhala community, people frequently 
bemoan certain stereotyped negative traits they claim to be peculiar to their ethnic 
group (e.g., envy, readiness to back-stab, greed).26  These negative stereotypes in 
reality function as a strategy to differentiate Sinhala people from other ethnic groups, 
particularly Tamils and Muslims, who are commonly assumed to be united and loyal 
to others belonging to their respective ethnic communities (see Herzfeld 1997).  
Many research participants drew on these existing myths and ‘shared secrets’ 
to make sense of the morally incomprehensible occurrence of ‘opportunistic’ 
violence. Having first reassured themselves of my own Sinhala background, people 
were quick to draw on such negative stereotypical traits to explain what they saw as a 
descent into brutality, where people trampled each other for personal gain during the 
Bheeshanaya. There is a common joke that does the rounds within the Sinhala 
community, which was repeated to me by many of my research participants, albeit 
with slight variations to suit the context of the Terror. It goes along the lines of there 
being three large pits dug deep into the ground in hell – one pit to house each of the 
main ethnic groups in Sri Lanka (Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims). While security 
guards surround the pits of the Tamils and Muslims to guard against escapees, the 
Sinhala pit is left unguarded. The reason for this, I was told, was that if one Sinhala 
person tried to escape, the others in the pit would be sure to drag her or him back 
down themselves or to denounce them to the other guards.  
This intimate joke, while appearing divisive on the surface, in reality 
functioned to represent Sinhala people as a distinct and cohesive community, by 
recasting negative cultural myths and laying bare “the sore zones of cultural 
sensitivity” (Herzfeld 1997: x). Here, in people’s attempts to give meaning to the 
‘opportunistic’ violence that took place within their ‘intimate’ worlds we can see the 
workings of what Herzfeld (1997) has referred to as “cultural intimacy”. Herzfeld 
draws on “cultural intimacy” in order to understand people’s notions of self-identity 
within the wider realm of nationalism. According to him, “cultural intimacy” exists in 
those supposed national traits, “the self-styled stereotypes that insiders express 
ostensibly at their own collective expense” which entails a “recognition of those 
                                                      
26 People used the term jatiya to mean ‘race’ or ‘ethnic group’ here. The direct translation of jatiya is ‘type’ or ‘kind’ e.g., ‘our 
kind’, but generally denotes ‘ethnic group’ or caste. 
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aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of external embarrassment 
but nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality” (1997: 3).   
In a Bheeshanaya that in many cases destroyed the ties that held communities 
together, people drew on essentialising strategies to make sense of their morally 
unsettling memories of ‘intimate’ violence. In doing so, they were trying to re-
imagine a sense of ‘intimate’ community in the aftermath of violence, where silence 
permeated and reconciliation was lacking. Telling stories of a violent past in this 
manner then demonstrates the need to belong to a sense of ‘intimate’ community, 
particularly when “the bonds of such belonging are violently sundered” (Jackson 
2002: 34).  
This is further elaborated in an extract from Bandula’s narrative. Bandula is a 
former JVP insurgent who had left the movement towards the end of 1989. His 
brother, who was also a JVP insurgent, was disappeared in detention. Having 
established my own Sinhala Buddhist background, he told me in a confidential tone 




Our race (jātiya) is too greedy (perēta), jealous (irisiyāva), and want to drag each 
other down. You could see that so clearly in the 1980s when people just took 
personal revenge and denounced each other. A revolution can never succeed 
among our race... Even my brother was taken in (to detention) based on a 
denunciation (pävādīma). His good friend, whom he trusted, with whom he 




Bandula employs negative cultural stereotypes and draws on ‘known secrets’ to make 
sense of his experience of ‘opportunistic’ violence, which in turn he blames for the 
failure of the insurrection. ‘Cultural intimacy’ involves a “familiarity with perceived 
social flaws that offer culturally persuasive explanations for apparent deviations from 
public interest” (Herzfeld 1997: 9). Bandula attempts to ground his rationalisation of 
violence that went against community interest, in culturally persuasive and familiar 
arguments. At the same time he attempts to express a sense of ‘intimate’ Sinhala 
community, ‘warts and all’, in the aftermath of terror. 
In stressing that his brother was denounced by a close friend, Bandula brings 
to the fore questions about the solidarity of friendship and values that underpin 
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‘intimate’ relationships. He says that his brother trusted his denouncer and extended 
hospitality to him, thereby acknowledging the betrayal of ‘intimate trust’ and the 
transgression of important cultural values that cement social relationships in Sinhala 
Buddhist communities. Interestingly, Bandula avoids giving any indication as to 
whether he or his brother (as JVP insurgents) were involved in perpetrating revenge 
themselves. In choosing to frame his experience of ‘opportunistic’ violence around 
the denunciation of his brother, he clearly occupies the moral category of ‘victim’ in 
this story, thereby rejecting accountability for this form of violence.  
  
 
Coming to Terms with Revenge 
 
Revenge operated at various levels, took numerous forms, and involved those 
from across the political and social landscape. This section considers in some detail, 
two narratives of revenge, paying attention to the ways in which people attempt to 
come to terms with the violence they experienced and its implications for the 
functioning of social relationships post-terror. 
Ishan is an amiable young mechanic who runs his own garage. During the 
Bheeshanaya his brother Asela, was taken in by the security forces for suspected 
insurgent activity. Asela was held in a detention centre and tortured, after which he 
was returned to the family. One week after his return Asela was abducted once again. 
This time he disappeared for good. His family was initially led to believe that those 
who took him away the second time were also members of the security forces. 
However, Ishan’s own subsequent investigation into the disappearance of his brother 
found it to be a case of revenge carried out by business rivals. According to Ishan, this 
was based on their jealousy of Asela’s success in the business community and the 




My brother didn’t do JVP. But as a businessman if someone from the JVP asked 
for help – for things like a car or goods, people gave them. Some gave out of 
fear for their lives. People felt that everyone was on the side of the JVP. With 
just one poster they could shut down the whole town, through fear. Others 
genuinely helped them out because they sympathised with them. He came back 
from the camp (detention centre) in X. He had been tortured. So he was in 
hospital for two weeks after that. Then he was disappeared. We didn’t know 
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where he was. We went to all the camps and spent a lot of time searching all 
over for him. He just disappeared. No trace of him. Later through my own 
personal investigations I found out who was responsible. It was his business 
competitors. It was purely a personal grievance. Unlike me, my brother as a 
businessman interacted closely with many people in the business community. 
Because of my brother’s experience, I now do business in a different way.  I am 
in business but I don’t engage with lots of people. I prefer to do business on my 
own. Even in the business community now you can’t trust anyone. You don’t 




Ishan’s story is typical of the kind of personal score-settling that took place during the 
Bheeshanaya. His story illustrates the difficult situations that people faced in their 
everyday lives during the Terror, having to balance relationships with, and appease 
various opposing factions. His dominant memories attached to the ‘opportunistic’ 
violence he experienced are of fear, confusion, uncertainty, and the lack of recourse to 
legal authority, which forced survivors to carry the additional burden of investigating 
the cases of their missing loved-ones themselves. Ishan’s story significantly conveys 
the impact of memories of violence on sociality in the present. He emphasises 
mistrust and suspicion to be legacies of the Bheeshanaya, and shows his experience of 
violence to have resulted in a significant alteration of his own behaviour and approach 
to social relationships post-terror.  
Sheyanthi’s story below, complements this in highlighting the legacy of 
violence and its implications for the recreation of sociality post-terror. Its significance 
lies in how the victim’s family attempts to come to terms with, and respond to, the 
violence they experienced. Sheyanthi is a young attractive mother, of rural middle-
class background. Her mother was murdered during the Bheeshanaya, seemingly by 
the JVP. However, Sheyanthi’s narrative suggests that it may have been a case of 




My mother was a pillar of the community. Our house was where everyone in 
the village came. People were always given food at ours. She was so respected 
and loved…. It was really my mother who took the family forward (pavula 
issarahaṭa geniccē). So it was a huge loss. It was a case of personal revenge 
(pudgalika paligänīma) to destroy our family. They wanted our family to fail. 
But we didn’t. Our family survived. We were not destroyed. We all managed 
and forged ahead. We all got ourselves an education, and we all got decent jobs, 
without the help of any politicians. We were not given any warning, nor were 
we issued commands about how the funeral should be carried out. A man who 
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we didn’t recognise came to the house. Ours was a house, which always saw 
people coming and going. And anyway, we were never guilty of doing anything 
wrong, so had no need to fear strangers even during that time. The man just 
came in and shot my mother and left... My brother chased after the man but 
never caught him. My brother is so angry and has that anger in him even today. 
They never found the person who murdered my mother. There are 
people I suspect. But we don’t chase after it to find out because what he did was 
pav (demerit, bad karma) and he will have to deal with the natural 
repercussions. It was the JVP who did it. They put posters up saying (so)... We 
weren’t hassled again in any other way. He tried to destroy the family, but it 
was a success for us. We made it a success by studying hard and finding jobs 
ourselves. When the police wanted me to identify the man and give a 
description I didn’t. We didn’t denounce anyone. I don’t want to fill my life 
with pav (sin, bad karma). That man must also have a wife and children. The 
wife and children may be perfectly innocent people. I don’t want to destroy 
their family. The man who did that won’t ever do well in life. After that incident 
we moved away from society. Our family was always involved in village 
affairs. But after that we stopped engaging in society as much. If someone asks 
for help we give it. We still go for funerals or pinkam (Buddhist merit-making 




Sheyanthi’s story illustrates the confusion that surrounds incidents of revenge that 
took place during the Bheeshanaya. With opportunists taking on the guise of either 
the JVP, security forces, or another group, people were unsure as to who killed or 
disappeared their loved ones. She shows violence here to create further ambiguity and 
uncertainty, particularly when it comes to holding people to account. At one point she 
believes the attack to be a case of personal revenge, motivated by jealousy of the 
apparent success of her family. However, at another point she states that the JVP 
carried out the murder and remembers posters put up by the JVP acknowledging 
responsibility for it. The murder may have been carried out by an opportunistic JVP 
supporter with a personal grievance against the family, by the JVP itself, or by an 
ordinary person under the guise of the JVP. The victim’s family is not likely to get to 
the truth of the matter.  
Sheyanthi engages in a moral critique of ‘opportunistic’ violence, which is 
rooted in Buddhist ethics. In opening her story with a remembrance of her mother as a 
popular and upright member of the community (which was affirmed to me by several 
other people in her village), she sets the context of her moral evaluation of revenge 
and makes a clear distinction between her mother who was the victim on the one 
hand, and the morally reprehensible perpetrator of ‘opportunistic’ violence on the 
other hand. Sheyanthi invokes the Buddhist ethical framework of karma as a coping 
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mechanism in her attempts to come to terms with, and make sense of, her experience 
of violence. She rationalises that the perpetrator will have to suffer the karmic 
consequences of his crime. She also later told me that the person she suspected of 
murdering her mother was already suffering terribly in life. Reflecting on past 
violence through Buddhist ethics inadvertently works to prevent further acts of 
violence post-terror in the form of revenge attacks, particularly in the absence of 
justice and reparation. By telling herself that the natural law of karma would ensure 
that justice is meted out to her mother’s murderer, she finds a way of deflecting 
resentment, reconciling her past, and continuing to live with those responsible for 
violence post-terror. 
Sheyanthi emphasises that she is careful not to engage in bad karma herself 
and that she even refused to give a description of the perpetrator to the police – an act 
she classifies as denunciation. Through this she makes a clear her moral judgment on 
denunciation, and distances herself from it. Her narrative is an empowering one, in 
which she represents herself as ‘defeating’ the perpetrator of violence both in moral 
and practical terms. In a situation that she was unable to control, Sheyanthi 
emphasises defying the odds and making life a success, while further refusing to 
‘stoop’ to the level of the murderer by partaking in bad karma (immoral acts) herself. 
In doing so she reconstructs her experience of violence, and her notions of the self, in 
order to make her past more tolerable to live with in the present. She also implies the 
success in her life and her adherence to Buddhist ethics to be her own form of 
‘revenge’ against the man who murdered her mother. This attests to Jackson’s 
argument about the capacity for people to alter the balance of power between “actor” 
(‘perpetrator’) and “acted upon” (‘victim’) through the stories they tell, thus giving 
people a sense of control and agency in situations that left them feeling disempowered 
and overwhelmed (Jackson 2002: 16). 
Sociological analyses of revenge, particularly relating to ‘societies of honour’ 
suggest a regulatory element to revenge and a predictable pattern that follows a 
violent act, entailing appropriate and commendable retaliation. Gould for instance 
argues that revenge is part of a social system and occurs when “a social group’s 
reputation for cohesiveness has been damaged by a collaborative attack” (2000: 683).  
However, this did not seem to apply to many cases of revenge and personal score-
settling that I came across in the Sri Lankan context, as seen in the two incidents 
discussed above. For instance, Sheyanthi’s refusal to even give a description of the 
aggressor to the police, defies a predictable course of events that sociological analyses 
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would usually ascribe to such an aggressive act, directed arguably at the solidarity of 
her family. Rather than triggering a course of vengeance, Sheyanthi instead chooses to 
make sense of the event through her religious beliefs, and focuses on making a 
success of her own life. Similarly, in Ishan’s case, the attack on his family by business 
rivals is not met with further vengeance. Having carried out his own investigation into 
the disappearance of his brother Ishan chooses not to retaliate, and instead uses the 






Using Revenge as a Political and Military Weapon  
 
Revenge and denunciation were also commonly remembered by people, 
particularly those who observed the violence and were not officially linked to any 
political faction, as being utilised as political weapons in the military battle between 
the state and the JVP. There have been some studies on revenge and militant ideology, 
notably with reference to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the Tamil Tigers in Sri 
Lanka (see Hinton 1998, De Silva 2002), compared to the relatively sparse academic 
attention paid to the workings of revenge in periods of terror among ‘ordinary’ 
civilians at the grassroots. The political revenge attacks themselves were staged in 
public, mainly to instil fear, to deter, to assert power and control, and in some cases to 
justify the attacks to the public. Attacks carried out by the JVP were accompanied by 
posters, explaining why the victims deserved to be punished. Latterly, some sections 
of the security forces, as well as other ‘unknown gangs’ also mimicked the JVP by 
communicating reasons for their targeting of specific victims. On the part of the 
security forces, revenge was directed at group solidarity, rather than at the particular 
JVP insurgents who may have been responsible for violence. This involved the 
murder of people who were supporters of the JVP (whether or not they had committed 
a crime), those who were friends of JVP supporters, and those who inhabited villages 
where support for the JVP was assumed to be strong (mainly due to social 
disadvantage). Others, who by virtue of their age and gender were perceived as 
potentially belonging to the JVP, were also targeted (see Gunaratna 1990). 
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The JVP further used revenge as part of its rhetoric, largely couched in terms 
of ‘punishing traitors’. ‘Traitor’ was particularly powerful in justifying the violence of 
the JVP. It was used to describe those who were seen as ‘un-patriotic’ (deshadrohi), 
and those who in the eyes of the JVP were obstructing the course of the revolution. 
While at the inception of the insurrection this term was tight in encompassing 
supporters of the UNP and the ‘Indian invaders’, as time went on interpretations of 
this label became looser and expanded to include various individuals and groups who 
were accused of disobeying the orders of the JVP. People who had witnessed the 
violence of the Terror, along with a small number of former insurgents who had since 
left the JVP, told me that at the height of the Bheeshanaya the term ‘traitor’ was used 
as an easy excuse by some individual cadres to settle personal scores.  
The retrospective retelling of one particularly ‘infamous’ episode (widely 
considered to have been the turning-point of the ‘revolution’) is in itself steeped in the 
notion of revenge. The event in question concerned the ultimate threat issued by the 
JVP to the security forces. This is commonly regarded as the JVP’s biggest mistake 
and that which sealed its fate.  The widely accepted official history, as professed by 
the state, the media, and recorded in literature on the Terror, goes along the following 
lines (see Gunaratna 1990, Chandraprema 1991). Between the months of July and 
August 1989, the JVP embarked on the final (and fatal) step of their revolutionary 
strategy. Convinced that success was close at hand, they issued a warning to the 
security forces, via a poster-campaign, to abandon their posts and join the “patriotic 
revolutionaries” or to face having their families being punished (see Gunaratna 1990, 
Chandraprema 1991).27 In response to this threat, a surge of retaliatory posters were 
put up by the security forces throughout most of the country. These ominously warned 
the JVP that for every family member of the security forces killed, the latter would 
respond by killing 12 JVP insurgents (Chandraprema 1991). The following weeks 
witnessed the families of several members of the security forces being brutally 
murdered. This raised the stakes, and the security forces who had thus far appeared 
reluctant to crack down on the JVP now showed renewed commitment to eliminating 
the JVP. A heightened period of terror ensued, with the armed forces, police, para-
militaries, vigilantes, and the JVP carrying out revenge attacks on each other. The 
revolutionary organisation that had apparently been impossible to crush for two and a 
                                                      
27 Communication between the JVP and state counter-insurrectionary forces (and the general population) often took place via 
posters that would appear on walls across the country.  
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half years was eliminated in a matter of months, apparently fuelled by the thirst for 
revenge.  
 Almost all the former insurgents (and a few ‘witnesses’ of violence 
with no avowed allegiance to either the state or the JVP) I spoke to, rejected outright 
this official history of the demise of the insurgency, and instead offered an alternative 
history. This counter-narrative also afforded the notion of revenge a prominent 
position in the history of the Bheeshanaya. While it shared some basic similarities 
with the official history (which was undoubtedly required to enhance its credibility) it 
also diverged at significant points thereby substantiating its oppositional stance.  
Former insurgents generally agreed that the threat to members of the security forces 
had indeed been issued by the JVP. The JVP (and the majority of the Sinhala 
population) had believed that the success of the revolution was close at hand, and this 
demand was seen as the final step towards capturing state power.  
However, their memory diverged from the master narrative on the point of the 
JVP implementing this threat in actuality. Former insurgents remembered the UNP 
regime as having exploited the opportunity that this threat afforded to crush the JVP 
once-and-for all, by pitting the security forces against the JVP. According to them, the 
threat was intended by the JVP merely to frighten, but not to be implemented. This 
oppositional memory held that state counter-insurrectionary elements murdered the 
families of prominent security-personnel themselves under the guise of the JVP. This 
was done in order to instigate a thirst for revenge amongst members of the security 
forces, who had thus far been reluctant to crack down on the JVP, and to bring the 
revolutionary movement into disrepute. Many former insurgents reasoned that the 
JVP would not have murdered the families of the security forces, since the JVP and 
the rank and file of the army had forged close links nurtured at village-level. 
Moreover, the kin and childhood friends of many JVP cadres were in the security 
forces serving as ordinary soldiers. As one ex-insurgent Senahami, who had 




We had a lot of support from them (the army). They supported the JVP because 
they were our rural village boys (gambada kollo). They knew 
disadvantage/oppression (pīḍanaya), suffering. They also experienced 
discrimination in the army – having to constantly salute to big (high status) 
people (loku minissu). Their mess is different to that of the higher status officers 
who get good food and drink. Also many of their own brothers and sisters were 
in the JVP. So they didn’t want to kill them. But then after the poster incident 
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the army went crazy and came after us. But even at that time not all of them did. 
People didn’t want to kill others from their own village. Most of the killings 




Through the use of kinship metaphors (e.g., our rural village boys), Senahami 
establishes a sense of intimacy between the oppositional forces of the JVP and state 
security forces. In his narrative reconstruction of the Bheeshanaya, the work of re-
imagining a sense of ‘cultural intimacy’ in this way, serves to break down the binaries 
created by the Terror and to bind together social relationships torn apart by violence.   
This alternative memory clearly absolves the JVP (and its insurgents) of 
responsibility for the morally questionable act of perpetrating violence against one’s 
‘intimates’. Instead, through the use of ‘conspiracy theory’28 it deflects blame onto 
their old foes – the UNP regime itself, which it accuses of utilising ‘opportunistic’ 
violence as a military strategy to destroy the JVP and its insurrection. This 
oppositional narrative reflected a lived reality in which communities fractured by 
violence were forced to function in the absence of any form of reconciliation. A 
version of history that denied moral culpability for the perpetration of violence against 
‘intimates’, was arguably deemed necessary to re-imagine and reconstruct ‘intimate’ 
social relationships post-terror. This alternative memory also reflected the political 
context in which these stories of violence were being retold. This was a context of 
recall that was dominated by the civil war between the state and Tamil militants, 
accompanied by a vociferous nationalist rhetoric that demanded clear affiliation with 
an imagined homogenous Sinhala community. Moreover, the revamped JVP of the 
political mainstream had fashioned itself as the champion of Sinhala nationalism and 
was keen to emphasise its support for the state security forces locked in battle with 
Tamil militants in the North. Memories acknowledging responsibility for violence 
against family members of the security forces, who were now popularly portrayed as 
heroes defending the monolithic Sinhala community, would have been morally 
indigestible for the popular local audience. This rendered necessary an oppositional 
narrative that categorically and credibly denied culpability for such violence. It is 
worth noting that supporters of the state during the Bheeshanaya (including UNP 
supporters and former counter-insurrectionary officers) vehemently rejected this 
                                                      
28 The use of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ here is not intended to cast doubt over the validity of this version of history. Given the 
level of contestation, it is impossible to verify the ‘truth’ of this claim. I used this phrase here instead to refer to the narrative 
device drawn on by research participants to put forward an alternative ‘truth’ of the Bheeshanaya. 
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alternative narrative as “a lie” concocted by the JVP leadership in order to avert blame 
for their actions during the Bheeshanaya for purposes of political expediency. 
 
The stories of revenge and denunciation in this chapter show memories of violence to 
be ethically tendentious. The particular ethical charge of ‘opportunistic’ violence lay 
in its betrayal of ‘intimacy’ and in its ‘personal’ agenda, which distinguished this kind 
of violence from the more ‘palatable’ political acts of violence. People used the idiom 
of ‘opportunistic’ violence to comment on the ways in which violence seeps into 
‘intimate’ relationships, and to express the difficulties encountered in maintaining a 
benevolent form of ‘intimate’ sociality amidst terror. Moreover, ‘opportunistic 
violence’ provided an avenue through which people were able to critique and 
comprehend the morally unsettling violence of their recent past. These morally 
burdensome memories were intricately shaped by a post-terror reality in which 
everyday sociality must be renegotiated among ‘intimates’ who are left with various 
amounts of ‘blood on their hands’. In anchoring their memories of violence in the 
moral, people attempted to re-imagine a sense of an intimate ‘moral’ community that 
had been fractured by violence. In the next two chapters we explore further the ways 
in which people inject an ethical charge into memories of violence, by rooting them in 
‘intimate’ social worlds, through their narratives on torture.  
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Chapter 3 
Talking About Torture: Stories of Torture Survivors 
 
 
The JVP’s threats to the families of the security forces in the summer of 1989 
brought forth a ferocious campaign of state violence that led to a heightened period of 
terror. In addition to the police and armed forces, state-sponsored paramilitary groups 
and shadowy vigilante groups stalked their human prey across villages and towns, 
abducting, torturing, disappearing, and killing those suspected of ‘subversive 
activity’. Meanwhile, defiant sections of the JVP upped their ruthless campaign of 
violence against suspected informants and other ‘traitors’, in a battle with the state 
they were rapidly losing, given the superior man and fire-power of the former, and 
their own dwindling popularity due to their excesses of violence. Much like the JVP’s 
malleable term ‘traitor’, which was used very loosely to target its victims, ‘anti-
government subversives’ was a label used with little discretion by its opponent, and 
those hunted relentlessly by the counter-insurrectionary forces29 under its premise all 
too often included people who had little or no involvement in the JVP.  
 As in many other contexts of terror around the world, torture was a 
central and disturbing characteristic of Sri Lanka’s Bheeshanaya, and it featured 
prominently in people’s memories. Torture was extensively used by the Sri Lankan 
state to ostensibly crush the insurrection. It served to deter and punish ‘anti-
government subversives’, assert state authority, and instil fear. The measures taken by 
the UNP regime to counter the threat posed to its authority by ‘anti-Government 
subversives’ entailed the temporary occupation of private and public property by the 
state security forces.30 These, in addition to existing army camps and police stations, 
made for make-shift ‘detention centres’. This term was used by the state to refer to 
spaces that in reality functioned as torture chambers. For people of the localities in 
which they were situated, these places were simply known as vadakāgāra (torture 
chambers), and formed yet another feature of the terror they had to traverse. The 
rapidity with which torture chambers (vadakāgāra) sprung up across the central and 
                                                      
29 I use the term ‘counter-insurrectionary forces’ as an all-inclusive term, which refers to all those groups engaged in crushing 
the insurrection. These include the police, security forces, paramilitary groups and vigilante groups, the majority of them being 
state-sponsored in one form or another. 
30 This information is based on anecdotal evidence provided by numerous witnesses, including owners of buildings that were 
briefly ‘occupied’ and survivors of torture who told me that they were held in such buildings. For an idea of the kinds of spaces 
that were temporarily used as ‘torture chambers’ see Perera’s work on ghost narratives that emanated from such spaces of 
violence in the aftermath of the Bheeshanaya, where a public utility building, tourist guest-house, and library are shown to be 
among the former torture chambers wracked by ghostly disturbances after the Terror (see Perera 2001).  
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southern landscape, in which many thousands of young people are believed to have 
languished, is a ‘well-known secret’ of the Bheeshanaya. Torture during the 
Bheeshanaya is a subject that continues to be shrouded in fear and silence. 
In this chapter we turn our attention to torture survivors (mainly former 
insurgents), and consider their memories and narratives of torture. In speaking clearly 
as ‘victims’ of violence here, former insurgents throw into question the value and 
applicability of discrete categories such as ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’. While this 
chapter looks at how those who were subjected to torture remember and talk about 
their experiences, the next chapter focuses on stories belonging to those who inflicted 
it (i.e., former counter-insurrectionary officers). Torture as a particular form of 
violence entailing coercive interrogation, has the capacity to elicit powerful affective 
responses among many of us, often causing readers to recoil from the subject. The 
particular repugnance that torture engenders largely boils down to its interactions with 
particular conceptualisations of the body, pain, and language (see Daniel 1996, Scarry 
2004 and 1985, Das 2007, Aretxaga 2001,), that we shall see emerge through the 
course of this chapter.  
My pre-occupation here is with how people remember and articulate their 
experiences of this particular form of violence, and the meanings they ascribe to it. 
This takes on particular significance in light of recent compelling anthropological 
contentions about the inexpressibility of torture and problems of giving voice to pain 
(see Daniel 1996, Scarry 1985 and 2004, Das 2007). My own empirical findings 
suggest that torture is not inevitable as to categorically prevent its expression. Torture 
survivors are not a homogenous group, and while some people were able to 
communicate their experiences of torture, others were not. Based on what people who 
had experienced torture told me, I argue here that where violence appeared to be 
verbally inexpressible, people drew on various alternative means of communication to 
articulate their memories of torture. Furthermore, through their narratives of torture, 
former insurgents created the space to engage in a moral critique of state violence and 
to communicate specific ethical values. 
Some scholars on violence have argued that torture is a “hyper-individuating” 
experience, devoid of meaning, and that pain is an end in itself (see Scarry 1985, 
2004, Daniel 1996, Aretxaga 2001). A central contention of this thesis is that torture 
has meaning, both for ‘victims’ as well as for those who perpetrate it (as we shall see 
in the following chapter). This in itself contributes to its very abhorrence.  The 
narratives of torture that run through the pages of this chapter, show its experience to 
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be remembered in collective and moral terms, and as being rooted in human 
relationships and ‘intimate’ social worlds.  
 
 
The Torture Chamber 
 
The use of torture by the state during the Bheeshanaya was not unusual or 
unprecedented. Torture continues to be used as a matter of routine by the state 
apparatus in Sri Lanka, particularly by the police and security forces. Human rights 
watchdogs, most notably the Asian Human Rights Commission and Amnesty 
International, have consistently highlighted the “widespread”, “habitual”, and 
“endemic” use of torture by the Sri Lankan police and security forces from the 1980s 
through to the present, in numerous public statements, press releases, and reports.  
The abduction, further torture and even murder of those who seek to complain about 
torture in Sri Lanka has also been brought to light, along with the impunity offered to 
torturers and lack of political will to address the violation of human rights by state 
authorities.31  What was anomalous about the practice of torture during the 
Bheeshanaya was its widespread use and the special designation of public and private 
civilian spaces throughout the Sinhala-speaking areas of the country for this purpose.  
With reference to Tamil detainees held between 1983 and 1987 by the Sri 
Lankan security forces, Daniel claims that the aim was for torture to leave no visible 
marks that could be provided as evidence to an investigating magistrate (1996: 139). 
De Silva’s (2005) response to his statement in her study of the notorious Embilipitiya 
case, where 22 schoolboys from the village of Embilipitiya were abducted and 
disappeared by the security forces during the Bheeshanaya, gives us an idea of the 




The very mass-based nature of the second (JVP) Uprising militated against such 
niceties: in a situation where thousands of detainees were imprisoned and 
released everyday on an island-wide basis, investigating magistrates had now 
become something of a legal fiction. Further, every army camp was not supplied 
with ‘specialist’ torturers – ordinary army functionaries seemed to be learning 
                                                      
31 There are numerous reports and articles, which make reference to human rights abuse in Sri Lanka regularly using terms such 
as “endemic”, “habitual”, and “widespread” to describe the use of torture by the Sri Lankan state. These can be accessed via 
Amnesty International’s official website www.amnestyinternational.org and the website for the Asian Human Rights 
Commission www.ahrchk.net  
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on the job – with results that were not so ‘professional’: many captives did die 




The majority of people I spoke to for the purposes of this research were either 
detained, or worked (as counter-insurrectionary officers), in specially designated 
torture chambers situated in army camps, police stations, and temporarily occupied 
public and private buildings, such as ancestral homes, private business premises, 
public libraries, and guest-houses. People’s stories were set against these backdrops, 
and here I intend to briefly build a picture of this backdrop before moving on to 
examine narratives of torture.     
 De Silva’s (2005) study contains a vivid description of the torture 
chamber in which the abducted schoolboys from Embilipitiya were detained. This 
delineation in many ways typifies the numerous torture chambers that were dotted 
across the country during the Bheeshanaya. The torture chamber described in her 
study was known as the mas kaḍē (the butchers). It was located in a large communal 
bathroom with a line of toilets in one corner, at the camp of the Sixth Artillery 
Regiment. What stood out for survivors interviewed by De Silva, was the pungent 
odour of “a butcher’s outlet” and the clutter of “material remnants of human pain - 
whole finger nails, hair, blood, and even fragments of flesh” (2005: 200). Based on 
the testimony of her research participants, De Silva goes on to describe a room that 
was bare except for the torture implements that included a wooden hammer, an iron 
rod, various batons, and bags of chilli-powder, and “a comfortable armchair…for the 
officer conducting the operation to sit on” (2005: 200).  
What lingered in the memories of torture survivors I spoke to were the smells, 
the sounds, the sights, and the extreme emotions aroused, in the places in which they 
were held captive. Survivors of torture emphasised severe over-crowding, appalling 
sanitation, and the spread of disease that resulted from this. I was given graphic 
descriptions of the overpowering smell of blood, of ‘death’, and of scorched flesh; the 
sight of fresh corpses and wounded bodies crumpled on the floor; and of the sounds of 
beating and cries of distress. People’s narratives were stuttered by the emotions 
brought on by these painful memories. The sensations of sight, sound, and smell, 
served to heighten the sense of terror associated with this form of violence, and 
aroused emotions of intense isolation, fear, powerlessness, and a sense of proximity to 
death, which run through the narratives of torture survivors.  
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Speech and Silence: the Context of Recall 
 
The post-terror social and political context of recall that shaped people’s 
stories of torture was one of fear, silence, forgetting, and denial, largely imposed by 
the powerful official narrative. Remembering and articulating experiences of torture 
was not only traumatic, but also dangerous. The almost deafening silence that 
continues to shroud the perpetration of torture during the Bheeshanaya is largely of a 
protective nature. In a continuing climate of impunity, where people are literally faced 
with ‘living with torturers’32 (many of whom continue to occupy powerful positions in 
the state and political apparatus), silence and amnesia reflects a valid and pragmatic 
concern to protect the self from personal or political reprisals.  
Survivors of torture who participated in this research insisted that I arrived at 
their houses for interviews under cover of darkness to avoid arousing the suspicion of 
neighbours. They grilled me incessantly to gauge my trust-worthiness before agreeing 
to divulge their memories of torture. Fear marked their narratives, and was evident in 
their apprehensive body language and whispering voices. Nevertheless, what struck 
me was their apparent eagerness to break the silence on the violence they had been 
forced to endure, and to challenge the denial of the official narrative. The moral 
credence afforded by the subject position of ‘victim’, one that research participants 
readily occupied (as opposed to that of ‘perpetrator’), appeared to break down some 
of the barriers that stood in the way of ‘sharing’ memories of violence.  
 During the course of conducting interviews with torture survivors, it became 
evident to me that a sense of shame and concern about loss of face appeared to 
mediate their memories of torture. This was particularly evident through their body 
language and the gaps, abrupt silences, and clear discomfort, which interrupted their 
narratives at certain points, particularly when it came to violence that entailed specific 
forms of humiliation or degradation (e.g., sexual abuse). In a society where läjja 
(shame) and tatvaya (social status) carry deep cultural resonance, this was 
compounded by a concern to prevent loss of face and protect one’s own self-image 
(see Spencer 1999, Obeyesekere 1984, De Silva 2005).  My own positioning as a 
relatively young, female researcher further had an influence here.  Some research 
participants told me directly that it was inappropriate to share with me certain details 
                                                      
32 To borrow the title of Perera’s book on female survivors of the Bheeshanaya and other essays (Perera 1995). 
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of their violent experiences. Levi’s (1988) reference to his own incarceration in a Nazi 
concentration camp sheds some light on the sense of shame that lingers with those 
who have been subjected to violence. He puts this down partly to being forced to 
endure dehumanising conditions and live at an “animal level” where one’s “moral 
yardstick was changed” (1988: 54-56).  
 
 
The Therapeutic Value of Talking: Is it Always Good to Talk? 
 
An issue that niggled at me throughout my time in the field, gaining particular 
potency when it came to eliciting narratives on torture, concerned the value and 
consequences of asking people to excavate their traumatic memories of violence. A 
day of interviews with torture survivors would typically be followed by a restless 
night of lying awake in bed questioning the point of the overall exercise in 
encouraging people to actively remember and talk about that which was perhaps best 
left ‘unruffled’. As my research progressed, I came to realise that the silence and 
forgetting overshadowing the Bheeshanaya operated at a superficial level. In fact, I 
came across many survivors who seemed willing, even eager, to haul the hidden and 
stifled past of torture out of the shadows, and to provide their own versions of ‘truth’. 
During the course of my fieldwork, I also gradually came to recognise that for some 
the work of reconstructing an unsettling past offered certain benefits, particularly in 
terms of self-empowerment and their capacity to negotiate life after terror. The 
narratives that run through this thesis show the mediation of traumatic memories and 
their retelling, to enable people to make sense of, and give meaning to, their 
incomprehensible pasts. As Jackson (2002) has eloquently argued, telling stories can 
function as a coping mechanism, through which people are able to alter their 
experience of a past that may have left them feeling overwhelmed or confounded.  
Questions concerning the potential benefits of talking about, and 
remembering, violence as opposed to forgetting and silence, to put it simply, have 
received significant scholarly attention (see Langer 1997, Jackson 2002, Payne 2008, 
Das 2007). The field of psychoanalysis has highlighted, perhaps most vividly, the 
ethical complexities and political tensions that charge debates on memory and 
narrative in relation to the healing of trauma, primarily through contentions 
surrounding recovered memory therapy. Recovered memory therapy is fundamentally 
based on notions that equate forgetting with trauma, which is considered by its 
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proponents in psychotherapy to be an understandable but negative state of being. It 
thereby follows that the recovery of memory and its expression brings with it healing 
(Hacking 1995).  
Anthropologists of violence have recently concerned themselves with issues 
around the representation and narrativisation of violence and pain. The presumption 
that pain is beyond language has led to the creation of “a therapeutic role and moral 
space for anthropology, a way of contributing to the social and individual healing 
process” (Jean-Klein and Riles 2005: 178). Jean-Klein and Riles comment that in this 
manner, anthropologists assume “a role in assisting victims to re-enter language, 
sociality, and humanity” and that they “position themselves as professional listeners 
and even as proto-therapists” (2005: 178–9). Das (1990b) for instance, has pointed to 
the potential for anthropology to be a form of therapy in the lives of survivors of 
violence through the sharing and articulation of their pain.  
The blurring of boundaries between anthropology and therapy strikes me as 
somewhat problematic and risky, particularly given the responsibility that we have as 
anthropologists to the well-being of our research participants who (in a sense) agree to 
“relive” their traumatic experiences for the purposes of anthropological knowledge 
(see Aretxaga 2001). Bearing in mind that anthropologists are not trained in 
psychosocial therapy, to assume such a role in as sensitive a field of inquiry as that of 
violence (where the subject group more often than not includes people with specific 
‘vulnerabilities’) would be ethically tenuous and could potentially have detrimental 
effects on survivors of torture. Moreover, as Jean-Klein and Riles have pointed out, 
“what exactly constitutes ‘listening’ remains curiously undefined” (2005: 179). Of 
course in some cases, as I found in my own research, mediating traumatic memories 
and reconstructing the past may have its benefits for some people, particularly in 
allowing them to rework their experiences of violence in order to find ways of coming 
to terms with it in the present. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind human 
diversity, along with the ambiguous and subjective experience of violence itself. 
Those who have experienced violence should not be treated as a homogeneous group, 
and the sweeping application of an ‘it’s good to talk’ mantra, which ignores individual 
context and the complexity of human being, carries with it ethnocentric and 
patronising undertones, along with significant ethical risks.  
Many ‘victims’ of torture I came across during my fieldwork refused to talk 
about their experiences and declined to participate in this research altogether. People 
had various reasons for not wishing to remember and ‘share’ their traumatic 
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experiences. Some indicated that they did not see the point of exhuming distressing 
memories that they had relegated to the past, and a few people implied that this would 
simply get in the way of dealing with the mundane challenges that they faced in the 
present everyday. Others, despite showing some initial hesitance, nevertheless 
expressed a desire to talk about their experiences and with that to work against the 
silence and amnesia that enveloped the violence of the Bheeshanaya overall. It is their 
stories that fill the pages of this thesis. In that sense, a limit of this research could be 
considered its bias in featuring only those who believed that there was some benefit 
(not necessarily cathartic) to the process of remembering and talking about their 
experiences of violence. Whether the process of sharing their stories with me for the 
purposes of this research had any sustained ‘therapeutic’ benefits for all my research 
participants, is impossible to say. And it should not follow that we ignore the concerns 
of those whose voices are absent from this research about the possible detrimental 
effects that talking about traumatic experiences could bring.  
With reference to Aboriginal people in Australia who have recently begun to 
publicly give voice to their hitherto untold stories of shared histories and enduring 
grievances, Jackson draws our attention to the ‘mixed results’ that have arisen from 
‘talking’ and ‘sharing’. He suggests that while some find telling their stories to be 
cathartic, “others feel as though salt has been rubbed into their wounds” (2002: 57). 
Nevertheless, his overall argument is that telling stories can in some contexts offer a 
way of bridging “the gap between solitariness and sociality, the singular and the 
shared” (2002: 62). In her work on stories of the Partition, Butalia ponders similar 
questions surrounding the dredging up of unpleasant memories, and of talking and 
healing.  She surmises that “the dilemma remains: is it better to be silent or to speak? 
Or, for the researcher, is it better to ‘allow’ silence or to ‘force’ speech?” (2000: 282). 
This is indeed a dilemma that persists and it is vital that in considering it, researchers 
exercise careful ethical and practical judgement based on the particularities of the 






A further complexity surrounding the recollection and articulation of torture 
concerns the moving of such discomforting memories from the private realm of 
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silence to the public realm of narration, and the extent to which these personal 
experiences of pain could in any real sense be ‘shared’. Das rightly emphasises the 
importance of recognising the relationship between pain and language in the overall 
exercise of collecting narratives of violence (2007: 55-57). She notes further the 
absence of “any standing language on pain” short of hysteria (2007: 39). My own visit 
to a now derelict torture chamber from the Bheeshanaya era, left me struggling to find 
the appropriate words to describe to a trusted relative the mere remnants of torture 
that I had witnessed. The sheer enormity of what I had seen, added to the feeling that 
someone who had not been there with me would not be able to comprehend its 
significance or magnitude, contributed to the difficulty I faced in verbalising my 
experience. If I was finding it a challenge to articulate what I had seen, having merely 
witnessed the remnants of torture some twenty years after the Bheeshanaya, I found 
myself wondering how those who directly endured its reality in places such as this 
could possibly communicate their experiences of violence.  
While I did not come across ‘hysteria’ when gathering stories of torture 
(possibly due to the time lapse between the event and this research), there was 
undoubtedly an emotional intensity to the mediation of these memories. Many torture 
survivors I spoke to appeared to have trouble verbally communicating their 
experiences of torture.  A typical response I came across was, “I don’t have the words 
for these things. I can’t say it (kiyanna bä)”, as said by Rahula, an ex-insurgent who 
had spent just over a year as a teenager in a ‘detention centre’. Many of the torture 
stories I was told followed a similar pattern. They would usually involve a detailed 
account of the process of being captured and taken to a ‘detention centre’. This would 
be followed by hesitation, verbal gaps, and an apparent struggle on the part of the 
narrator to articulate himself when it came to ‘sharing’ the experience of being 
subjected to torture. The narrative would then jump to the next stage and pick up 
pace, where rich descriptions of life in rehabilitation centres (for those who were 
moved on from ‘detention centres’) and their return home, followed. 
The relationship between pain and its expression has been the subject of recent 
debate among scholars specialising in the anthropology of violence. Scarry (1985 and 
2004) argues that pain actively destroys language. This resistance to language brings 
about “an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries 
a human being makes before language is learned” (Scarry 1985: 4). With reference to 
the torture of Tamil detainees by the Sri Lankan security forces in the 1980s, Daniel 
(1996) points to the speechlessness and incommunicability that torture invokes. The 
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apparent struggles that many of my research participants seemed to experience in 
recounting their memories of torture would suggest on the surface that such 
arguments would seamlessly apply to the context of the Bheeshanaya. Indeed, Perera 
has appropriated such contentions in his study of female survivors of the 
Bheeshanaya. He states that complete documentation of the experience of terror can 
never be fully achieved because there will always be “gaps in terms of experience, 
perception, and the nature of pain itself” (2001: 159).   
That memories of torture were difficult to express verbally was found in my 
research, particularly in the case of torture survivors. The sheer psychological weight 
of such painful memories, the affective magnitude of its personal experience, and the 
ethically and politically charged nature of the subject itself played a significant role in 
complicating its expression. Indeed this very incommunicability of violence puts it at 
risk of being blotted from social memory (see Green 1999), and scholars have 
suggested that for ‘victims’ of violence this renders a double-edged form of suffering, 
both in terms of the actual violent act and in its inexpressibility and un-shareability 
(Donnan and Simpson 2007). However, torture survivors are not a homogeneous 
group, and not everyone I spoke to found their violent experiences incommunicable. 
In other words, while many of my research participants found pain difficult to express 
verbally, it was not entirely inexpressible or completely un-shareable. Furthermore, 
what was striking about the process of collecting narratives of torture was the 
apparent eagerness of torture survivors to share their experiences and the efforts they 
made to render their recollections in some way intelligible. Where words were 
unavailing, people creatively utilised alternative means to articulate their memories of 
torture. This took various forms, from expressive body-language, to the adoption of 
sarcasm, and it even involved the use of creative and visual means of communication. 
Let us first look at the ways in which torture survivors of the Bheeshanaya gave 
‘voice’ to their experiences of violence, before going on to consider some of their 
motivations to do so.  
 
 
Alternative Forms of Expressing Violence 
 
The testimony of my research participants took the form of a mishmash of 
words and gestures, of saying and showing (see Das 2007). Often, their words were 
interspersed with expressive body language, and their stories were thick with emotion. 
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The majority of torture survivors I interviewed appeared to consider their bodies a 
repository for violent memories and a locus of evidence. They drew on their bodies to 
facilitate the articulation of their violent experiences and to mediate traumatic 
memories. Often torture survivors would point to their bodily scars as “tangible signs 
of evidence” (Fassin and D’Halluin 2005: 598) of the torture they had experienced, in 
the process of recounting their stories. This would be accompanied by a brief and 
stilted commentary on each scar (e.g., “this is the scar of a cigarette butt”, “this is the 
scar of a PVC pipe filled with sand”). Some others contorted their bodies in various 
ways, in an effort to show me how they were hung or confined during their detention. 
Scholars have highlighted the use of the body as a site of power and truth. In 
the case of survivors of the Partition in India, Das (2007) suggests that women’s 
bodies were containers of poisonous knowledge - of violence and betrayal, thereby 
highlighting the link between violence and the body. Similarly, in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1984 anti-Sikh riots in Delhi, she goes on to illustrate the ways in 
which women used their bodies as evidence of their loss and the violence done to 
them (2007 and 1990b). On a similar note, Fassin and D’Halluin (2005) argue, in the 
context of people seeking asylum and the increasing emphasis placed on medical 
certificates by French authorities, that for the marginalised and poor, the body 
becomes the place that produces and displays evidence of truth.  In the face of an 
overpowering official narrative of denial and suffocating silence, many who had been 
tortured during the Bheeshanaya drew on the body as an affirmation of their ‘counter-
truth’ and a witness to the suffering they had been subjected to by the state. As well as 
supporting the narrativisation of their traumatic memories, the body was further 
drawn on to lend a sense of credibility to their stories.  
The paradox of modern ‘clean’ torture, which is said to leave no bodily scars, 
did not apply in the case of the torture survivors I interviewed (see Fassin and 
D’Halluin 2005, Rejali 2007). The majority of my research participants had visible 
bodily scars to show me, although there were some marks that had faded somewhat 
with time. Daniel’s (1996) experience with former Tamil detainees in Sri Lanka was 
different to mine. He was unable to see the scars that his research participants so 
enthusiastically showed him. Referring to the attempts of one torture survivor, 
Benedict, to show him scars on his wrists from rope handcuffs and cigarette burns, 
Daniel states, “I could not tell the difference; he saw them very clearly”. Benedict 
then goes on to show Daniel the scars of beatings and further burn marks on his feet. 
Daniel simply says, “I could not see these, either” (1996: 140). He rationalises that 
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this may have been down to the wounds having healed, his feet not scarring, or that 
“he was never tortured but merely claims that he was” (1996: 140).  I am moved to 
agree with De Silva (2005) who, as mentioned earlier, has argued that the mass-scale 
practice of torture and accompanying impunity during the Bheeshanaya prevented it 
from being kept ‘clean’. In addition to the overall chaos and confusion of the 
Bheeshanaya, I got the distinct impression from some former counter-insurrectionary 
officers (and some survivors of torture), that there was little interest shown by the 
international community in the human rights abuses perpetrated by the state against 
the Sinhala community during the Bheeshanaya. This perceived lack of scrutiny from 
the international community and the diminished likelihood of legal reprisals it 
entailed may have contributed to the ‘clumsy’ infliction of torture by state actors who 
did not bother to avoid hiding the evidence of the violence they inflicted. 
Levi draws on the tattooing of registration numbers on the arms of prisoners 
by Nazis in Auschwitz to illustrate the symbolic meaning behind the infliction of such 
indelible bodily scars by torturers on their victims. He points out that these marks 
stated: “you will never leave here; this is the mark with which slaves are branded and 
cattle sent to slaughter, and that is what you have become” (1988: 95). The deliberate 
infliction of bodily scars here then carried powerful symbolic connotations of power, 
identity, and memory. In light of Levi’s reflections, we may consider that the torture 
scars former insurgents so eagerly showed me were an embodiment of their memories 
of degradation and suffering, and a tangible legacy of the violent power exerted over 
them by their torturers. By actively drawing on their scars to reconstruct their violent 
pasts, former torture ‘victims’ attempted to politically re-occupy these marks of power 
in ways that reversed the power-structure between themselves and their ‘torturers’. 
These scars further lent authenticity to their subject position as ‘victims’ of violence, 
and lent former insurgent survivors of torture moral credence.  




At a distance of forty years, my tattoo has become a part of my body. I don’t 
glory in it, nor am I ashamed of it, I do not display and do not hide it. I show it 
unwillingly to those who ask out of pure curiosity; readily, and with anger, to 
those who say they are incredulous. Often young people ask me why I don’t 
have it erased, and this surprises me: why should I? There are not many of us in 
the world to bear this witness. (Levi 1986: 95) 
 





Levi here shows the capacity of bodily marks to function as witness to violence and as 
an embodiment of its memory. This powerfully resonates with the ways in which 
those who survived the torture of the Bheeshanaya used their scars as evidence of a 
violence personally endured but officially denied. 
Where language faltered in the face of violence (Das 2007), alternative means 
through which to communicate their experiences were drawn on by survivors of 
torture. One ex-insurgent, Nikhil, frustrated at his inability to describe what went on 
between him and his torturers, suddenly grabbed my note-book and pen. He went on 
to patiently sketch his own experience of torture. His facial expression was one of 
serious concentration – almost as though he wanted the sketch to be perfect. He 
handed back to me a drawing of a man (himself) strung-up on a pole by his hands and 
feet, like a pig roasting on a spit-fire, and told me: “They called this the 
Dhammacakra (Buddhist wheel of life symbolising the Buddha’s teachings)…we 
were turned around and around and beaten at every turn”.33 Prema, an ex-insurgent 
and farmer, who continues to be a keen JVP activist, further resorted to sarcasm to fill 
the gap that disrupted his narrative. His only bitter words on his time in detention 
were “let’s just say that they treated us well in there (apiṭa hondaṭa sälakuva)”.  
Where violence suppresses the capacity of speech, people draw on alternative 
means to give violent memories a voice. However, torture survivors are diverse 
human beings and while I did find that many struggled to express their experiences of 
torture verbally, some people seemed content to speak of their violent pasts with 
relative ease and in detail, albeit with some obvious and inescapable interruptions 
attached to recalling traumatic memories. Where there were verbal gaps, these were 
augmented by other forms of expression.  
Nevertheless, it is also important to note, that people’s narratives of torture did 
not mean that they ‘shared’ their experiences of it with me in any real sense, or that I 
(or any researcher for that matter) could truly understand what it felt like. Scarry 
argues that this remoteness and un-shareability of pain is due to the “absolute split” 
(2005: 365) that physical pain brings about between one’s own reality and the reality 
of other persons. While I make no claims of having really ‘felt’ the pain of the torture 
                                                      
33 The use of this specific method of torture ironically referred to as the Dhammacakra (the wheel of life symbolising the 
Buddha’s teachings) during the Terror has been documented in other literature on this topic (see Perera 1999, Amnesty 
International 1991).   
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survivors who shared their stories with me, being first and foremost a human being, 
and a researcher second, meant that I was able to empathise and further to believe 
their stories, acknowledging the suffering and injustice they had been subjected to.  
Daniel notes the sheer lack of passion and “utter listlessness” in the manner in 
which stories of torture were recounted to him by estate Tamil torture survivors in Sri 
Lanka, which he puts down to the un-shareability and highly individuated nature of its 
experience (1996: 143). Scarry similarly likens the narration of torture to a mere 
sketch, “the experience it describes is utterly clear in its outline but all the emotional 
edges have been eliminated” (1985: 32). While not being quite the “flat-toned 
recitations devoid of conviction” (Daniel 1996: 143) that Daniel found, I too came 
across a few victims of torture who appeared to exercise restraint over their emotions 
in the narrativisation of torture. However, they were in the minority. Indeed what I 
found particularly challenging about listening to stories of torture (compared to stories 
that focussed on other subjects) for the purposes of this research, was the weight of 
emotion in the telling. Torture narratives were punctuated with stifled sobs, distressed 
pauses, and outright weeping. Moving these previously unspoken and painful 
memories from the private realm of silence and forgetting to the public realm of 
telling necessitated bearing witness to one’s own distressing past (see Jackson 2002). 
This open display of emotion in the expression of memory was further 
influenced by my own positioning as researcher and listener. My gender, the trust that 
I developed with research participants, along with their perception of me as an 
‘insider-outsider’ who offered a safe amount of distance but also retained a semblance 
of familiarity, contributed to creating a narrative space conducive to emotional 
expression in retelling.  These emotions overall served to make their experience of 
torture more ‘shareable’ in a sense, particularly at points where words appeared futile. 
I am not suggesting that the torture survivors I spoke to consciously manipulated 
emotion to embellish their narratives. Nevertheless, the emotional expression of 
torture narratives functioned as an affirmation of truth, made the experience of torture 
more ‘shareable’, and lent a sense of moral credibility to the ‘counter-truth’ that 
torture survivors communicated. By allowing their stories to be saturated with 
emotion, torture survivors added a private and personal edge to them, which in turn 
affirmed these memories to belong to them and gave former insurgents ownership of 
their stories. For survivors of torture then, emotion in narrative functioned as an 
empowering mechanism, which eased the transition of violent memories from the 
  120  




Pushing Memories of Torture Out of the Shadows of Silence and Forgetting 
 
In the face of fear, trauma, and silence, why did research participants who had 
survived torture go to such lengths to ‘share’ their violent experiences with me? One 
important reason was the desire to have someone bear witness to their testimony. 
What many survivors sought from their narrative expressions was for the outside 
world to bear witness to their alternative ‘truth’, and importantly to have people 
believe them. In the context of violence, “telling the truth” can legitimise an end to 
silence as it provides a righteous and just purpose for storytelling (Donnan and 
Simpson 2007: 17).  This appeared to be particularly important in the face of an 
official narrative of silence and denial on the perpetration of torture by the state, 
which was perceived by former insurgents as drowning out their ‘truth’.  
This alternative narrative carried a strong moral undercurrent. It laid an 
emphasis on the ‘innocence’ of former insurgents by deflecting the focus from 
insurrectionary violence to torture perpetrated by the state. Their subject position as 
‘victims’ of violence and injustice further offered moral purchase over former 
insurgents’ unsettling memories of the Bheeshanaya, which made easier its 
expression. As Scarry has argued, “it is difficult to think of a human situation in 
which the lines of moral responsibility are more starkly or simply drawn, in which 
there is a more compelling reason to ally one’s sympathies with the one person and to 
repel the claims of the other” (1985: 35).  
The majority of people I spoke to believed that their suffering during the 
Bheeshanaya had been disregarded, and this perception contributed to torture 
survivors’ desires to put forward an alternative history of the Bheeshanaya. Many 
torture survivors told me that the violence they were forced to endure during the 
Terror was ignored and ‘forgotten’. They drew comparisons with the attention paid by 
the international community to the plight of suspected Tamil militants tortured by the 
state, to illustrate their point. They assured me that they did not wish to depreciate the 
suffering endured by Tamils, but that they wished to emphasise the extent to which 
their own, had been marginalised.  
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This view is evident in an excerpt from my interview with Nikhil, a former 
insurgent who was detained and tortured for over a year by the state security forces. 
He was held in isolation in a cramped cell for the first 6 months of his detention, 
following which he was moved to another larger cell, which he shared with a member 
of the Tamil Tigers. The two detainees developed a strong bond of friendship during 




The Red Cross came in one day. They said [puts on American accent and speaks 
in English] “hello there, we are from the Red Cross. We are here to help you. 
What organisations are you from?” [switches back to Sinhala] In our broken 
(rudimentary) English we (his LTTE cell-mate and himself) managed to tell 
them that we were from the LTTE and the JVP. When I said that I was from the 
JVP they looked frightened and stepped back. They thought ‘OK, we’ll leave 
him alone. He is dangerous (darunu). He’s of no interest to us’. They took the 
LTTE guy out, and left me behind in the cell [long pause, gets upset, tries to 
repress tears, takes a drag of his cigarette]. They spoke to the CSU (Counter-
subversive Unit) on behalf of the LTTE guy, and he was released. No one cared 
about me. The LTTE guy visited me after that and we stayed in touch. When we 
discussed this he privately told me that he then realised that us Sinhala rural 
boys (gambada kollo) were even worse off than they were…This is something I 
saw with my own eyes. Something that happened to me [looks visibly upset. 
His eyes fill up. He runs his hands over his face, takes a long drag from his 




Torture as a Collective Experience 
 
Daniel (1996) contends that the “excruciating particularity” of pain and its 
absolute “privatisation” renders torture unbelievable.  His argument is a furtherance of 
Scarry’s claim that pain’s certainty and its very present and individual nature, throws 
doubt on the pain of another (Scarry 1985: 7). Indeed Daniel goes as far as arguing 
that this “hyper-individuation” of pain even leads victims of torture to deny the pain 
of others who have undergone similar experiences.  With reference to Tamil survivors 
of torture in Sri Lanka he states, “I encountered time and time again torture victims 
who had been subjected to the same tortures by the same torturers in the same camps 
and jails, and even at the same time, and who – when finally they were capable of 
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speaking about their experiences – denied that their fellow inmates were tortured and 
accused them of lying” (Daniel 1996: 143).  
The findings of my own research diverge significantly from this position. 
Without exception, those former insurgents who were tortured during the 
Bheeshanaya, framed their stories in terms of the collective experience of torture, 
while maintaining at the same time a personal resonance to them (e.g., through 
emotional telling). In other words, my research participants’ experiences of torture 
were indeed individual and personal, but were not exclusively “individualised” to the 
extent that the torture and suffering of others was denied. In fact, I found the opposite 
of this to be true, with every survivor of torture I spoke to unfailingly placing their 
own experience within the context of the torture and suffering of others. Some people 
even seemed to find it easier to talk about the torture of others than they did to talk 
about their own experiences of violence. In one sense, the torture and suffering of 
others provided (for some people) a protective narrative guise under which they could 
candidly talk about their own traumatic experiences. Comparing one’s own pain with 
that of others allowed some people to gain a perspective on, and comprehend, their 
own experience of torture. In other words, portraying the suffering of another as being 
worse than their own appeared to provide torture survivors with a means of coping 
with their discomforting memories in the aftermath. Consider, for example, the 




I wasn’t tortured. Not like the others around me. I was just hung and beaten for 
a few days. They tortured others in the camp…They would put barbed wire in a 
PVC pipe and insert it up them. Then they would take the pipe out and leave the 




 Talking about the torture and suffering of others also enabled people to carve out a 
space to engage in a moral critique of state violence and to express their abhorrence of 
torture. Former insurgents frequently expressed disgust at women being meted out 
torture in equal measure to men, when Sinhala (mainly rural) culture sets out clear 
boundaries between men and women, generally considering the latter to be the 
‘gentler sex’. Their aversion was expressed at a form of violence utilised by the state 
that defiled core cultural values of their shared Sinhala communities. Shehan, an ex-
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insurgent who spent several months being tortured in a public utility building that had 
been temporarily converted into a ‘detention centre’, told me with a clear expression 
of disbelief mixed with disgust: “You know, they tortured the girls just like the boys. 
They didn’t make any difference because they were girls. They were also hung and 
beaten. They did terrible things to them. Things that it is not right (appropriate) for me 
to tell you about”.  Shehan here implies the sexual violation of suspected female 
insurgents, as affirmed by a few other former detainees who told me that women held 
in torture chambers were subjected to additional forms of violence entailing sexual 
assault and rape. The shame surrounding this and fear of its repetition, goes some way 
towards explaining the refusal of female ex-insurgents to participate in this research. 
 
 
Friendship in Situations of Extreme Violence 
 
Some survivors of torture, such as Tilak below, provided detailed and candid 
descriptions of their time in detention. Tilak is a farmer and continues to support the 
JVP. He told me that he spent over 5 years in various ‘detention centres’ for his 
involvement in insurrectionary violence. A murder charge levelled against him that he 
denied to me, explains his unusually lengthy detention. His denial of murder runs 
contrary to what I was told by the person who introduced us to each other. We will 
never know for certain whether Tilak really did perpetrate murder, but his denial 
raises questions about the appropriation of moral responsibility for violence and 
highlights the fuzziness of ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’ categories. An extract of Tilak’s 




They did all that they could (possibly) do to me. They ironed me with a hot iron, 
they inserted S-lon (PVC) pipes up me, they cut me with blades here (shows 
scars across his chest and shoulders), they electrocuted me, and they hung me 
and beat me. I didn’t have a single fingernail or toenail remaining. They did it to 
get information from me. I knew death then. I thought I would die. I tried as 
hard as I could not to give information. Then it got to the stage where I could no 
longer bear it. I got self strength/confidence (aathma shakthiya) from another 
JVP prisoner held there called Nilanga, who was from a village near mine. He 
suffered a great deal (hungak duk vinda). He was tortured in every possible 
manner and they even threw petrol on him and set him alight. But he never said 
anything. He knew he was going to die. He always told me ‘don’t tell them 
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(ung)34 a single thing’. He fought right to the end. Even when he was bruised 
and bleeding he fought back in whatever way he could – he’d manage to muster 
the energy to spit and hit out at them (torturers). In his last days I hand-fed him. 
He couldn’t lift his limbs – he was swollen all over and had no life in his body 
(pana nä). Then they brought him near my village, shot him, and set him on 
tyres to burn. He told me not to tell them anything, and I gained significant 
mental/emotional strength from him (hitaṭa dhaivayak gattē eyāgen). Seven of 
us were taken in the same vehicle with Nilanga. We saw them take him out of 




Tilak’s narrative describes the torture and suffering of another as being worse than his 
own, while at the same time placing his own experience of torture in focus. Making 
comparisons between his suffering and that of another appears to have provided him 
with an important means of comprehending and coming to terms with his violent past. 
In illustrating torture to be a shared experience, Tilak switches the moral focus from 
culpability to that of collective suffering and victimhood (see Young 1995). In an 
important sense, this collective narrative frame makes possible the ‘sharing’ of his 
traumatic story.  
Out of his entire experience as an insurgent during the Bheeshanaya, Tilak 
chose to centre his narrative on his experience of being tortured at the hands of the 
state (he avoided entirely talking about his own complicity in violence). In 
remembering his experiences of violence during the Bheeshanaya primarily in terms 
of victimhood, Tilak’s memories of the self are reworked in moral terms and serve to 
avoid acknowledging responsibility for the perpetration of violence. In remembering 
his experiences of the Bheeshanaya from an ethical perspective, Tilak finds ways of 
living with himself and his past in the present.  
Tilak’s narrative further conveys a sense of collective identity and camaraderie 
forged between people sharing the experience of torture. It gives us an understanding 
of the kinds of human relationships formed in situations of extreme violence and 
emphasises their importance as a mechanism for coping with torture. Throughout his 
story Tilak communicates values of friendship and loyalty. In his story, the friendship 
between two young men brought together under shared circumstances of terror, pain, 
and suffering, gives Tilak the psychological resilience to endure torture. In 
dehumanising conditions these ‘intimate’ social relationships appear to have provided 
                                                      
34 Ung which translates as ‘they’ is a derogatory term used generally to refer to non-human beings, such as animals. 
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those being tortured with a comforting sense of being human. Through it, those who 
survived torture ascribed its experience with an important sense of meaning. 
 Tilak tells us that despite the torturer’s repeated efforts to break his will 
through various means, his friend beseeches him to not divulge anything. This 
suggests recognition on his part, of the importance that torturers attach to their 
questions. Scarry (1985, 2004) throws doubt over the professed importance given to 
the question by those who perpetrate torturer, as being its aim. She goes on to theorise 
that interrogation is internal to the structure of torture, and that pain and interrogation 
are connected but conflicting experiences for the torturer and tortured. The question is 
so urgent and matters so much to the torturer, that she or he will inflict “brutality” on 
the victim, and the feigned urgency of the question neutralises the moral consideration 
of inflicting pain. To the victim, the question is of such little importance and urgency, 
that he will generally answer it (Scarry 2005: 376). Tilak says: “they did it to get 
information from me”. This recognition of the value attached to the question by 
torturers, in turn makes it an important tool of agency and a means through which the 
balance of power between the torturer and the tortured can be redressed.  
According to Tilak’s story, instead of answering the question, the victims fight 
to withhold it despite the agony they are subjected to. The perception of how vital the 
question is to the torturer, in turn leads to importance being attached to the answer by 
the victim. This results in him withholding it from the torturer. Tilak even shows this 
to be accompanied by acts of ‘rebellion’ such as spitting and hitting out at torturers. 
Tilak represents an image of courage and defiance in a situation where agency is 
apparently impossible. The sense of impotence felt in being forced to helplessly watch 
his friend being tortured and ultimately murdered is evident in his narrative. Through 
the memory work he engages in, Tilak imbues his past with a sense of agency, which 
enables a retrospective redressing of the skewed balance of power between victims 
and their torturers. In doing so he attempts to alter his relationship to the past in order 
to continue living with its memory in the present. This is in congruence with 
Jackson’s contention that “to reconstitute events in a story is no longer to live those 
events in passivity, but to actively rework them” (2002: 15).  
Through his story Tilak engages in a reconstruction of selfhood, which 
represents himself (and his friend) not only in empowering terms, but also in moral 
terms. Tilak is keen to emphasise that he and his friend refused to co-operate with 
torturers and to answer their questions. According to Tilak, and most other former 
detainees I spoke to, these questions were primarily centred on denouncing others 
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engaged in insurgent activity. We cannot know for sure whether Tilak and his friends 
did manage to withhold answering their torturers’ questions. What is of significance 
here is that Tilak remembers himself (and his friend) as having held on to their moral 
values by refusing to betray others in the face of torture. Interestingly, the large 
majority of former detainees I spoke to explained that many victims of torture, unable 
to endure the pain inflicted on them, ultimately denounced their peers to state 
interrogators, but all those who participated in this research (much like Tilak) denied 
having done so themselves. This reflects an awareness of the particular moral 
aversion that ‘traitors’ attract (see Kelly and Thiranagama N.d., Scarry 2004). In his 
retelling of the past, Tilak disassociates himself (and his friend) from this 
reprehensible category, and emphasises their moral integrity even under the most 
debilitating circumstances. 
Scarry (1985) states that those who have not been through prolonged terror 
and coercive methods imagine that under such circumstances they themselves would 
show greater courage than those who survive torture. She points to the debates that 
raged in the aftermath of the Holocaust about the complicity and passivity of Jews as 
examples of this. Quoting historian Lucy Dawidowicz, she rightly argues that 
“complicity” and “co-operation” have altered meanings in situations of captivity, as 
they are terms that generally apply to freedom of choice (Scarry 2004: 368). The 
narratives of former detainees that run through this chapter demonstrate that being 
confined within the walls of terror and pain, cut off from the outside world, results in 
detainees naturally being consumed by the immediacy of violence and the intense 
desire to survive. In an abnormal environment where moral worlds are turned upside 
down and people’s choices are restrained by excruciatingly limiting conditions, we 
can safely say that such notions of ethically informed choice are made redundant on 
the ground. In his study of the narratives belonging to survivors of the Holocaust, 
Langer vividly demonstrates how moral distinctions crumble in the face of 
subjugation to extreme violence, as people strive simply to survive. He argues that 
moral systems are reduced to “an irrelevant luxury”, in the absence of choice and 
responsibility for the consequences of choice (1991: 122).  
Influenced by the popular moral judgement passed on denouncers post-terror, 
and undoubtedly by his own retrospective ethical sensibility, Tilak’s story represents 
his own actions and that of his friend (memorialised in his narrative) as upholding 
core normative moral values. Through his reconstruction of the past, Tilak appears to 
be composing a semblance of personal dignity in a situation of debilitating 
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disempowerment where his torturers stripped him of it. By remembering his violent 
experiences in terms of agency and moral integrity under the most arduous and 
disempowering circumstances then, Tilak gives meaning to his traumatic past and 
makes its memory more tolerable to live with in the post-terror present. This attests to 
Jackson’s compelling argument that telling stories allows people to re-empower 
themselves and put right apparent injustices or imbalances (2002: 15). 
Lalin is an ex-insurgent who was detained for over a year in a torture chamber 
housed in privately owned business premises. Like Tilak, he imbues the experience of 




I had many awful experiences there... From morning ’til night we were 
blindfolded – for a whole year I was blindfolded… I was tortured, and saw and 
heard others being tortured and killed. I knew how people died in there. I could 
hear. When it went quiet for a bit I would cautiously (parissameng) slightly 
raise my blindfold and look around. I then saw the dead bodies, tortured people. 
I knew how it was in there. There was nothing I could do but paste myself 
against the wall [starts to get upset, pauses]. One of my friends in there knew 
that he was going to die. He told me where his family lived. He told me to pass 
on a message to his wife and to tell her what happened to him if I ever got out. 
But I didn’t get out for a long time, and feel sorry that I couldn’t meet his 
wishes, because he told me his address and his message orally. I had forgotten 
by the time I came out. Anyway, I was taken up by my own problems in there. I 





Lalin earnestly wants me to believe his story and is keen to show that despite him not 
having directly ‘seen’ other people being tortured, he experienced it through his 
senses - he heard the suffering of others and saw the remnants of their torture. 
However, Lalin does go on to state later that he also “saw” his friend being tortured 
and ultimately murdered. Blindfolding detainees was common practice during the 
Bheeshanaya, which served to heighten the sense of terror. It was further undoubtedly 
used by the state to reduce the likelihood of legal repercussions in the future and to 
support an official narrative of denial. At various points during the interview Lalin 
took pains to show me bodily scars to substantiate his story. While Tilak’s narrative 
entailed defiance and agency in the face of torture, Lalin remembers fear and a 
hopeless sense of disempowerment. His comment about not being able to do anything 
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but cower against the wall gives us a sense of the powerlessness that torture victims 
felt, and their intense preoccupation with survival. It brings to mind Levi’s work on 
Jewish prisoners in Auschwitz, which similarly showed how they “instinctively 
sought refuge in corners” to protect themselves from violence (1988: 75).  
Lalin emphasises that friendships with others suffering a similar fate were 
made, and important, in conditions of extreme violence. His experience of torture was 
made meaningful by the social relationships it entailed. Torture then was not simply a 
senseless or meaningless experience that severed the victim entirely from others and 
social worlds, as suggested by some scholars (see Scarry 1985, Daniel 1996). 
Nevertheless, Lalin intimates that the normative values underlying friendship are 
rendered impotent under the debilitating constraints of violence and detention. The 
overwhelmingly present and immediate nature of torture (Scarry 1985) and the critical 
focus on survival of the self, leaves torture victims unable to meet the normative 
obligations underlying social relationships (such as promises to friends), in the same 
way that they would do in ‘normal’ everyday life outside the realm of torture. 
Through his story, Lalin suggests that while social relationships gave meaning to the 
experience of torture, these convoluted relationships were subjected to ‘abnormal’ and 
oppressive constraints in situations of extreme violence. Torture is thereby shown to 




Talking about Death and Survival 
 
The feeling of being close to death or ‘knowing death’ was an aspect of the 
experience of torture that was emphasised unfailingly across all the narratives I 
gathered from survivors. This sense of being ‘so close to death as to be able to smell 
it’ so to speak, was portrayed as the catalyst for a range of other emotions, which 
made the experience of detention so unbearable. These included a heightened sense of 
anxiety, fear, uncertainty, hopelessness, isolation, and debilitating depression. Some 
survivors of torture remembered the sharp awareness of the vulnerability of one’s own 
life that it brought on, to have been a turning point in enduring the experience of 
torture. We saw earlier how Tilak showed his friend Nilanaga’s sense of imminent 
death to bring about an urge to leave behind a legacy of defiance and agency, while 
for Lalin’s friend, knowing that death was close brought a desire to establish a 
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connection with his family. Many survivors of torture further represented death as 
going hand-in-hand with survival, and stressed it to be a key factor in motivating them 
to get through its experience. They explained that ‘survival’ was a personal strategy, 
which involved gathering and sustaining emotional and psychological strength to 
endure the experience of torture, in the face of efforts by torturers to break down these 
personal resources. So, where the reality of torture rendered one physically powerless 
to resist it, people laid significance on agency and on garnering psychological and 
emotional resources to survive torture, in their memories. This notion was commonly 
referred to as mānasika shaktiya, which may be understood as psychological and 
emotional strength.  
Let us now consider the story of Randhir, a former insurgent, who came across 
as having a positive outlook on life. He told me that his experience of torture brought 
him face-to-face with the human reality of death, which in turn made him reflect on 
what a waste his death in detention would be. The result of this, according to him, was 
a reinvigorated thirst for life and renewed aspirations for the future, which helped him 




The police kept me in the station for three months in a police- cage (cell). They 
beat me for two days. But I realised that it was not as bad as the beatings the 
others got. I could tell from the extent of their wounds. I was terrified. I felt 
death. Life wasn’t certain, nothing was certain. My main problem was my 
sadness at what a waste (aparāde) my death would be. There was so much I 
wanted to achieve and what a waste of a life this would be if I was killed in 
here. I wanted to get a University education, I wanted to be a film-maker. It was 
my aspiration/hope (balāporottuva) that made me live. You have to make your 
own mental state in there. When they took me out of the cage after three months 
I was like a King- coconut (tambili geḍiya) – like this [he scrunches up his 
body] my skin was orange (pale). I hadn’t had any sunlight. There were huge 
problems of overcrowding and sanitation in there. We didn’t have a separate 
toilet but had to defecate in the cage, and there were about 20 of us in it - in this 
tiny space [he gestures space with his hands].  At night we slept with great 
difficulty. We had to sleep on our sides, pasted to each other – there wasn’t 
enough room to lie flat. If we wanted to turn over in the middle of the night, we 
had to ask the person next to us whether we could. Lots of people got various 
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Randhir’s narrative adds a little more clarity to the blurred picture that we have pieced 
together so far of day-to-day life in ‘detention centres’. Randhir’s comparison of his 
suffering to that of others, and the under-estimation of his own, echoes the narratives 
of other torture survivors. It further represents torture to be a shared experience, while 
maintaining its personal and individual character, which was a feature common to 
torture narratives. Randhir remembers fear, depression, and uncertainty as being 
emotions that spiral from the sense of proximity to death. Uncertainty in particular is 
shown to be a key feature of the experience of torture, which was reiterated by all the 
former victims of torture I spoke to. Randhir says, “life wasn’t certain, nothing was 
certain”, which conveys that violence adds to uncertainty. Randhir’s narrative 
represents the sense of impending death engendered by torture, as being the turning 
point in his experience of it. He remembers it as an agentative moment and through it 
understands his survival and appropriates meaning to his discomforting past in the 
aftermath of terror. 
 While Randhir remembered torture, and the fear of death it invoked as having 
spawned empowering reflections on life and aspirations for the future, other victims 
of torture I spoke to remembered its experience to be so immediate and present as to 
relinquish all thoughts of the future (Scarry 1985, Daniel 1996). In such 
circumstances, with imminent death hanging over the victim, survival becomes a 
preoccupation. Lalin, the ex-insurgent we met earlier in this chapter, went on to tell 
me that during his time in detention: 
 
 
You couldn’t think about the future, or about ambitions in life. I didn’t have the 
ability to mentally focus on that. Because I had to think about how I could stay 
alive. There was no time or room for aspirations…It was simply my private. 





Interestingly and somewhat surprisingly, a small number of torture victims I spoke to 
remembered individual counter-insurrectionary officers through their stories and 
understood their survival of violence through these ‘torturers’. Individual counter-
insurrectionary officers’ names were remembered (despite the time-lapse) and quoted 
directly in survivors’ narratives, some of which literally portrayed them as ‘saviours’. 
For instance, Kirihami, who spent many months in a detention centre being hung by 
his fingers and beaten mercilessly, went on to tell me, “We thought we would die (in 
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the detention centre). Even today I feel that Major Mahinda helped us greatly. He 
saved us”. Major Mahinda was the Commanding Officer of the infamous torture 
chamber in which Kirihami was detained. I was led to understand that he did not 
‘dirty his hands’ by directly perpetrating torture himself. He appears instead to have 
delegated it to soldiers further down the hierarchy. Major Mahinda’s ‘tough love’ 





Major Mahinda told us to stay out of trouble and to not get involved in these 
kinds of things (insurgent activity). That gave us great mental strength.  He 
educated us. And through our beatings in the camp, and the advice he gave us in 
the camp, and the advice he gave our families, we felt that our mental strength 




Kirihami’s story is of particular interest because it gives us a glimpse into the 
shadowy figure of the counter-insurrectionary officer and into the lives of those who 
ran such ‘detention centres’. It suggests that the experience of torture was grounded in 
convoluted social relationships not only between ‘victims’ themselves, but also 
between ‘torturers’ and their ‘victims’. Moreover, it demonstrates that many torture 
‘victims’ did not tend to remember or represent ‘torturers’ in stereotypical or 
generalised terms, but that they were careful to recognise differences between 
individual ‘torturers’. In Kirihami’s retrospective portrayal of his ‘torturer’ as a 
‘saviour’, who had Kirihami’s best interests at heart, he appears to be finding ways of 
understanding his traumatic experiences. To remember this significant and life-
altering experience as meaningless or senseless would render it intolerable to live with 
in the aftermath of terror. 
 
 
Kinship and Community Ties 
 
Family and community were afforded a prominent position in narratives of 
torture belonging to survivors. They were shown to be a vital form of emotional 
support and to offer an important lifeline of hope to tortured detainees, thereby 
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intensifying the meaning ascribed to the experience of torture. The attention paid to 
the suffering of kin and communities in people’s stories represents torture as a shared 
experience with far reaching and devastating implications for people’s ‘intimate’ 
social worlds. This was another means through which torture survivors engaged in a 
veiled moral critique of state violence and illustrated its disregard for normative 
values that underpinned ‘intimate’ Sinhala Buddhist communities. People 
remembered kinship and community ties as having withstood the pressures of state 
terror. In this sense, these narratives may be read as empowering, because they 
emphasise the strength and defiance of kinship and community ties in the face of the 
violence.  
Shehan, a former insurgent who was detained and tortured by the state security 
forces, told me that he pinned his hopes for survival on his uncle who was also a 
member of the security forces (but not based at the detention centre in which Shehan 




My family didn’t even know where I was. They had many problems and were 
unable to find me. Many people in my village, including my sister, had died of 
dengue. But one day my uncle who was in the army had managed to find out 
where I was. He came into my camp. They (torturers) didn’t allow him to speak 
to me. I was sitting against the wall, blindfolded, and chained. But I heard his 
voice. He called out putā (son) and then he tapped me on the shoulder from 
behind [pauses, stifles a sob]. That gave me mental strength [starts getting 
upset, stares at feet, struggles to talk]. Here – look, I had wounds all over my 
legs from the chains [shows me scars on his legs]. My uncle spoke to the other 
soldiers in the camp (detention centre) and told them to make sure I didn’t die. 
They said that they wouldn’t kill me and that they planned to hand me over to 




Shehan’s story emphasises the important role that family and kin played in the lives of 
those who were tortured during the Terror, particularly in terms of offering them hope 
and protection. He remembers his experience of torture as being rooted in kinship.  
During the Terror, particularly at the onset of the state counter-insurrection, 
the priority for most parents was to secure the safety and survival of their children 
through the Terror. In addition to sending young men and women away from their 
communities and into hiding, many families also believed that preventing youth from 
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interacting with the JVP in the first instance would insure their survival. Kirihami, 
whose story we heard earlier, proceeded to tell me how his cousins had forcibly 
locked him in their house for days on end, when they found out about his involvement 
with the JVP. He said that his cousins were “trying to get me to stay out of trouble. I 
respect them for that even today”. Kirihami’s cousins however, were unable to 
prevent him from being taken into detention and tortured. Upon being released from 
detention, Kirihami was handed back to the care of his family by Major Mahinda (the 
Commanding Officer of his detention centre), who advised his family to keep him out 
of trouble (involvement with the JVP). Kirihami goes on to stress the practical 
supportive role that family played in the immediate aftermath of torture. He told me 




Our families gave us medical care, because we were swollen-up and had so 
many injuries. They gave us various Ayurvedic medicines (indigenous herbal 
medicine)…we were (now) subjected to the control of our families. They 
controlled us in a very strict manner (tadin pālanaya keruvā). They didn’t allow 




This led Kirihami to gradually distance himself from the JVP and ultimately cut off 
contact with the movement. In Kirihami’s case then, his family is credited with 
having taken on the significant responsibility of securing his ultimate survival.  
Kirihami’s story, like that of Shehan, shows the effects of torture to be shared, 
as pain and suffering was inflicted on families and entire communities. In addition to 
the psychological and emotional pain inflicted on the kin of detainees, family 
members of those detained were further faced with severe economic constraints. 
Perera’s work on the female relatives of people disappeared during the Bheeshanaya 
in its aftermath gives us an idea of the kinds of economic and social pressures that the 
wives of suspected insurgents were forced to endure (see Perera 1998). Moreover, in 
the environment of terror, confusion, and impunity that prevailed, families often 
simply did not know what had happened to their loved ones following their abduction 
or arrest – whether they had been killed or whether they were being held in one of the 
numerous ‘detention centres’ dotted around the country. On top of their economic 
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woes, the onus fell on families themselves to investigate the whereabouts of their 
loved ones.  
Consider once again the case of Kirihami. His story demonstrates the burden 
put on the families of those ‘disappeared’ into detention. He emphasises the activation 
of village and community networks in the process of investigating the whereabouts of 
the ‘disappeared’, as families relied on friends and neighbours for leads to the fate of 
their loved ones. Uncertainty, fear, and urgency of the present, affected not only those 




My father was in hospital. He was ill because of the trouble I was in. At that 
time whenever villagers (gamē minissu) saw a corpse floating in the sea or in 
the river, or if they saw a body set alight on the road, they would come rushing 
and tell my family that it was me. I think they honestly thought that it may have 
been me. So my poor parents would be running in a panic back and forth to all 




Kirihami’s father subsequently died of a heart attack, which Kirihami puts down to 
the stress brought on by his detention. Interestingly, other research participants also 
told me of parental deaths during their time in detention or soon after, which they 
believed to have been brought on by intense stress and the inability of parents to cope 
with the knowledge of their children being tortured. So here we see that torture also 
suspended, and in some cases destroyed, the worlds of the families of victims. State 
violence here is depicted as being unleashed on families and entire communities, as 
opposed to being targeted at individual insurgents. These family and community 
relationships then formed an intrinsic and meaningful part of the experience of 
torture. 
Sampath was detained and tortured as a suspected JVP insurgent on the basis 
of a malicious denunciation by local political rivals. He did not have any involvement 
with the JVP. Sampath needed a lot of reassurance to share his story and remains 
frightened of being unjustly detained and tortured again. The only ‘crime’ he could 
think of as having committed he told me, was that of maintaining relationships with 
childhood friends in the village through the Bheeshanaya, including friendships with 
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some who had joined the JVP. I spoke to both him and his wife about this particular 




Wife: My husband (Sampath) was not at home. My cousin had come to visit 
us... And then suddenly about 20 men came with guns into the house. They 
dragged my cousin away. We all cried and begged them not to - my father, my 
mother, and I. He also cried as he was being taken away. 
 
Sampath: My cousin was taken away so I had to go and hand myself in. We 
went to a couple of camps to try and find out where my cousin was being held. 
When we got to X police station I realised that he was being kept there. I could 
tell from their reaction. I went with my whole family to hand myself in. When I 
gave myself up he was released. But I was transferred from there to X and then 
to Y … My family experienced significant suffering when I was inside. They 
were angry with the Government. My parents fed and looked after my wife. 
  
Wife: First we didn’t know where he was. We had to go from (detention) camp 
to camp, and police station to police station looking for him. Then, a man in the 
next village whose relative was in X said that Sampath was there. We went 
every morning to see him. We’d take his food. It was a terrible time. I had to 
carry my small baby and queue for hours in the hot sun, with hundreds of other 
people waiting to be let in. There was a lot of time-wasting and ‘running around 
in circles’ (rastiyādu). Usually, when we would get to X after having stayed in 
the queues for hours on end, they would say that he had been taken to X. And 
then we would have to get the bus all the way back to Z. When we got there, 
they would say that he was in Y, and we would then have to travel there. Like 
this it went on and on. He didn’t know! He was inside. But we were terrified 
because everyday we would hear of people being killed and burned. So we were 
in constant fear that it would be him. His relatives went to visit him as well. He 




Torturers also purposefully inflicted suffering on the families of detainees. As well as 
directly inflicting physical pain on the kin of suspected insurgents, excessive 
bureaucracy, withholding important information about their loved ones, and 
deliberately misleading families, were common tactics used by torturers to inflict 
psychological pain on them. This suggests a tendency for torturers to blur the lines 
between the ‘enemy’ and her or his family, creating a desire to inflict pain on the 
latter as an extension of the former. Sampath’s story shows how some families rallied 
around and supported each other during the Terror. Sampath’s parents, who were old 
and poor themselves, took on the burden of supporting his wife and children. We are 
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further shown the ways in which community networks and relationships functioned 
amidst violence inflicted by the state, as neighbours co-operated with each other in the 
search for loved ones. In this case, the family’s arduous search is fruitful only when a 
neighbour from the next village informs them of Sampath’s whereabouts.  
Sampath’s wife’s narrative conveys the underlying and constant sense of 
panic, fear, and uncertainty that families were faced with when she says, “We were 
terrified because everyday we would hear of people being killed and burned...we were 
in constant fear”. However, the somewhat bitter tone in which his wife told me, “He 
didn’t know, he was inside”, suggested a sense of injustice at having her own (and the 
family’s) suffering unacknowledged. It was as important to his wife to have someone 
bear witness to the pain that the family experienced as a result of state violence, as it 
was for those who had been detained and tortured themselves. 
While the narratives of torture survivors showed families to have been brought 
together during the violence of the Bheeshanaya, others were torn apart by the Terror. 
Sampath’s story told us about the kin of suspected insurgents being detained and 
tortured to pressurise suspects to turn themselves into the state. This was a commonly 
acknowledged counter-insurrectionary strategy, which in some cases led to an 
irreparable breakdown of family relationships. As an insurgent, Nikhil went into 
hiding at the height of the counter-insurrection. During this time his brother, who was 
not involved in the JVP, was detained and tortured by state counter-insurrectionary 
officers in a bid to coerce Nikhil to turn himself in. Nikhil looked distinctly upset as 




Malli (little brother) was taken away and tortured because of my involvement in 
the JVP. His education was destroyed, and to this day he blames me for it. They 
(brother’s family) have nothing to do with me. I have major regrets on that 
count (pasu tävili). So I told him that he could have the family house, which was 




Nikhil’s story also shows us the power of pain and violence to linger beneath the 
surface, and its capacity to impinge on kinship in the aftermath of terror. For Nikhil, 
the underlying memory of torture manifests itself as guilt and regret along with a deep 
sense of loss; and for his brother as anger and bitterness. 
  137  
 
 
Remembering Life in Rehabilitation 
 
Some detainees were fortunate enough to be moved on to ‘rehabilitation 
centres’ from detention. Rehabilitation centres, unlike torture chambers, were not 
officially denied. The purpose of their existence was explained in terms of 
“rehabilitating misled youth” (see Gunaratna 1990). Rehabilitation centres were also 
run by the counter-insurrectionary forces, but people’s experiences of them were 
markedly different to that of ‘detention centres’. As deduced from the stories that 
torture survivors told me, living conditions were harsh in these places – they suffered 
overcrowding, poor sanitation, and the inevitable spread of disease. Nevertheless, they 
were a vast improvement from that of ‘detention centres’.  
Rehabilitation centres were where people were held for observation before 
being released back into the outside world. They appeared to function as half-way 
houses between detention and freedom. I did not come across any reports of torture or 
abuse in rehabilitation centres. My research instead found that rehabilitation centres 
offered torture victims a breathing space in which to begin the process of piecing 
together their lives after torture. Inmates were encouraged to develop various skills in 
a bid to prepare them for life in the outside world. Buddhist monks were often brought 
in to help with their spiritual development, through meditation and sermons. 
Uncertainty (of when or whether they would be released) and boredom were the 
overriding emotions that people remembered from life in rehabilitation, as opposed to 
the intense fear and extreme uncertainty regarding life itself, which marked their 
experiences of detention. 
 Torture survivors’ stories of rehabilitation followed a nostalgic and 
reminiscent vein, as opposed to the fear narratives of life in ‘detention centres’. Their 
stories flowed easily, and were free of the emotional excess that stalled narratives of 
torture in detention. The emphasis on the self and the urgent present of ‘detention 
centres’ gave way to a more collective sense of being, and fear eased to cautious 
thoughts about the future. During their rehabilitation, some applied to go to 
university, some negotiated with counter-insurrectionary officers for day-release to 
attend various educational courses outside (chaperoned by soldiers), and many 
attended the vocational training courses and sports programmes offered within the 
confines of the rehabilitation centre.  
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 People’s memories of life in rehabilitation centres did not entail a sense of 
intimacy with death and debilitating fear, nor were they overwhelmed by a focus on 
garnering psychological and emotional resources to endure and survive pain.  Instead, 
narratives of rehabilitation centres lay emphasis on finding ways to get through the 
boredom and uncertainties (milder than that of detention) of their incarceration in 
rehabilitation centres. People represented life in rehabilitation as offering them more 
opportunities to exercise agency and more choice in their day-to-day lives. 
A theme that dominated people’s memories of rehabilitation centres was that 
of learning and self-development. Young people from rural and remote backgrounds 
were apparently exposed to new and different experiences in these centres. Many 
research participants spoke nostalgically about making friends with people from 
vastly different backgrounds, such as Tamil militants and members of the 
‘underworld’. They talked about how they learned Tamil from their new Tamil 
friends and developed a taste for the Tamil food that was brought for them by the 
families of these friends. They remembered in turn having taught their Tamil friends 
Sinhala and having their own families make special Sinhala treats for them. This 
exposure may partly explain the particularly liberal views I came across among 
almost all my ex-insurgent research participants concerning the issue of Tamil 
separatism and the civil war in the North. Many torture survivors talked about 
rehabilitation centres as being shared spaces of learning – both in a formal and 
informal sense. One ex-insurgent former detainee told me, “In that camp I was able to 
relax. The fear for my life wasn’t there. I wasn’t beaten…there were 150 people in my 
wing (of the building)…it was like a big university for me…the Red Cross would 
bring us books. The most I read in my life was in there”. 
Randhir’s narrative paints a vivid picture of the kinds of new experiences that 
people were exposed to in these places. 
 
 
We created a small group. There was a navy soldier there - he had stolen a 
weapon and run off with it. The kasippu mudalāli (illicit alcohol brewing 
merchant) was there - he always wore the national dress. A Peradeniya 
University student, and a Tamil militant. The Tamil militant was from a 
separatist group – I can’t remember the name, but they were ultimately killed 
off by Prabhakaran.35 Our society organised hygiene and social activities. …We 
started doing crafts… by digging the floors we found bits of iron and plastic we 
                                                      
35 Prabhakaran was the leader of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) fighting for a separate state for Tamils in Sri Lanka. The LTTE 
emerged supreme through its elimination of all other Tamil militant and separatist groups, claiming to be the sole voice of the 
Tamil people. He was killed by state security forces in May 2009.  
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could use. We also used coconut shells. So we were very busy… The day 
wasn’t enough (davasa madi) between all that and queuing up for meals. They 
used that disgusting condensed milk in the tea and I got a big rash from it. I 
shared my room with two JVP (Buddhist) monks, a body builder, and a person 
who did yoga. So we all did yoga and meditated. The body builder used blocks 
of wood to work out and taught us all how to do that. Our society organised 
entertainment nights for the inmates. Even the Brigadiers came to watch our 
performance. We held a huge drama festival and gave out certificates to the 
winners. I drew the certificates – I still have them somewhere. I knew about 
Cannes, Hollywood and Bollywood. The others didn’t know anything about 
that. So I shared that knowledge with them. My play won best drama. It was a 
good period (maru avadiya), and I wasn’t depressed because I was too busy. 




Randhir’s narrative is interesting because it shows us what life was like for those who 
had been tortured in its immediate aftermath, in a different environment. We can 
further detect a considerable difference in tone as compared to the narratives of life in 
detention, which suggests people’s memories of rehabilitation to entail significantly 
less trauma than the former. Nevertheless, life in rehabilitation was still incredibly 
arduous. Randhir suggests depression to be an overriding factor (in addition to the 
boredom and uncertainty mentioned earlier) that people strived to grapple with. In 
Randhir’s case, he learned meditation, yoga, and body-building, and got creative with 
his friends to get through the experience. His complaint about the kind of milk he was 
served in his rehabilitation centre is telling because it signifies the ease in fear and the 
sheer change in environment as compared to his stint at the ‘detention centre’. None 
of my research participants mentioned food in detention centres. The stories about 
detention focussed on fear, survival, and physical and psychological pain. In 
rehabilitation then, people were allowed to have cautious thoughts about the future, as 
opposed to being temporally stranded amidst the uncertain and immediate present of 
possible death.  
Randhir highlights the importance of exercising individual agency when he 
says, “we made and changed our mental (psychological/emotional) state in there”, 
thereby suggesting psychological and emotional resources to play a significant role in 
tolerating life in rehabilitation centres. The agency exercised here is shown to be of a 
more positive nature to that expressed in detention. Rather than withholding 
information and defying torturers, people are shown to draw on various strategies to 
survive the boredom, uncertainty, and depression, that tainted their time in 
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rehabilitation, and to make the most of the opportunities available for learning and 
self-development. 
 
This chapter has been preoccupied with the stories of torture survivors and paid 
attention to the ways in which their experiences of violence are remembered, 
articulated, and ascribed meaning. I have argued that torture is expressible and that it 
is infused with moral meaning, rooted in ‘intimate’ relationships, by survivors. The 
next chapter builds on these findings by exploring the perspectives of former counter-
insurrectionary officers, and in particular considering the ways in ‘perpetrators’ give 
meaning to torture. 
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Chapter 4 
Talking About Torture: Stories of Former Counter-
Insurrectionary Officers 
 
This chapter focuses on the stories of former counter-insurrectionary officers 
of the state. Here, I examine how torture is remembered, expressed, and given 
meaning by its ‘perpetrators’, and consider the ways in which former counter-
insurrectionary officers go about appropriating moral responsibility for violence. In 
the previous chapter I argued that the experience of torture was expressible and that it 
was infused with meaning by its ‘victims’, contrary to the arguments put forward by 
some scholars (see Scarry 1985 and 2004, Daniel 1996, Das 2007, Aretxaga 2001). A 
central contention of this chapter is that torture carries meaning to its ‘perpetrators’ as 
well, which contributes to its abhorrence. Former counter-insurgency officers 
anchored their memories of violence in ideas of ‘intimacy’, emphasising in particular 
the betrayal of ‘intimacy’ as being ethically unjustifiable.  
Like that of their ‘victims’, the stories of ‘perpetrators’ of state violence also 
carried a strong moral undercurrent, attesting to Lambek’s (1996) arguments about 
memory as an ethical practice. Their narratives refused to attend to the category of 
‘perpetrator’, and instead they made claims on the subject position of ‘victim’, 
interspersed with that of ‘hero’. Competing claims by former insurgents and former 
counter-insurgency officers for the subject position of ‘victim’ reflects its political 
attractiveness, which is largely based on the moral weight that it carries (see Ross 
2003b). The narratives of former counter-insurrectionary officers were structured 
around a language of justification, denial, and deflection, and as such bear similarity 
to the accounts of former insurgents concerning their own complicity in 
insurrectionary violence, as seen elsewhere in this thesis. 
 
 
Talking to ‘Perpetrators’ of State Violence 
 
 Tracking down the shadowy counter-insurrectionary officers about whom I 
had heard so much from former detainees, was challenging. Persuading them to share 
their stories with me was even harder. Many former counter-insurrectionary officers 
initially considered me with ill-concealed distrust and later divulged their suspicions 
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of my being a spy for an international human rights organisation or a local politician’s 
lackey. Here too, the gradual development of trust and assurance of confidentiality 
played a crucial role in their agreement to break the silence on the sensitive subject of 
torture during the Bheeshanaya.   
 The counter-insurrectionary officers whose stories inform this chapter 
were all retired from the state security forces, and drawn from a wide geographical 
spread across the country. The research participant group was made up of people 
ranging from the highest ranks of the security forces, to those who served as ordinary 
soldiers at the lower rungs of the hierarchy. They had all served as counter-
insurrectionary officers during the Bheeshanaya, and some had been posted in 
‘detention centres’ situated in army camps, police stations, and temporarily occupied 
public and private buildings. However, it is significant to note that all former counter-
insurrectionary officers categorically denied having perpetrated torture during the 
Terror. In the case of at least one such research participant, anecdotal evidence from 
our mutual contacts and the whispered gossip of neighbours suggested otherwise. It is 
impossible to tell who, if any, of the former counter-insurrectionary officers featured 
in this chapter perpetrated torture during the Bheeshanaya. I wish to reiterate that 
eliciting confessions is not the aim of this thesis. My interest lies instead, in exploring 
the ways in which ‘perpetrators’ of violence remember and reconstruct their 
disturbing pasts, and how they come to terms with it in the present.  
I was met with significant apprehension from former counter-insurrectionary 
officers I interviewed for this research. Their reluctance to speak of torture was partly 
influenced by fears of legal and personal repercussions, and also reflected a concern 
to protect the image of the security forces and that of themselves. One former counter-
insurrectionary officer for instance, candidly expressed to me his fear of “revealing 
official army secrets”, which he told me would pose a threat to his own life. 
Moreover, talking about the torture that took place during the Bheeshanaya would 
invariably entail remembering themselves as ‘perpetrators’ of violence - a subject 
position carrying negative moral connotations that people were keen to reject. 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the context of recall was marked by 
high profile polemics on human rights between the Sri Lankan Government and 
international human rights organisations, with regard to the detention of suspected 
Tamil militants. While these debates may have influenced the willingness of torture 
survivors to break their silence, it appeared to have a further muzzling effect on 
‘perpetrators’ of state violence. This goes some way towards explaining the denial, 
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avoidance, and hedging, that characterise the stories of the small number of former 
counter-insurrectionary officers who ultimately agreed to participate in this research.36 
 
 
Why Tell Stories of Torture? 
 
Payne’s (2008) insightful work on state ‘perpetrators’ of violence based on 
case studies from Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and South Africa, lays emphasis on 
institutionally facilitated public confessions. These entailed various means through 
which the public could collectively address their troubling past, and involved several 
forms of amnesty and judicial trials for perpetrators who agreed to narrate their pasts. 
In the context of this research, the stories of former counter-insurrectionary officers 
were told in the private sphere, and on the premise of anonymity and confidentiality. 
Thereby, they were of a more intimate nature and arguably at times more candid and 
reflexive, as a result. The ‘perpetrators’ featured in my research had no significant 
identifiable political or personal rewards to reap from speaking out about their violent 
pasts (e.g., unlike the amnesty offered to those agreeing to participate in the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission). In fact, former counter-
insurrectionary officers here appear to have had more to lose by breaking their silence 
and defying the denial that shrouded this subject. So why did they agree to speak out 
about the violence of the Bheeshanaya? 
Many former counter-insurrectionary officers I spoke to were keenly aware of 
the stigma attached to them and the moral denigration of their actions during the 
Bheeshanaya. I even came across a few incidents where former counter-
insurrectionary officers had been forced into exile from their home villages due to 
being ostracised by their neighbours after the Terror. The moral repugnance against 
the violence perpetrated by counter-insurrectionary officers was partly based on it 
being inflicted on ‘intimates’. The willingness of former counter-insurrectionary 
officers to share their stories with me, was partly influenced by this post-terror 
context. The few former counter-insurrectionary officers who did agree to participate 
in this research told me that they were keen for me to hear “their side” of the story. 
They perceived popular opinion of the state counter-insurrectionary efforts to be 
overwhelmingly negative and misinformed. As such, through their engagement with 
                                                      
36 Human rights was not an entirely ‘alien’ concept to the Sri Lankan military at the time of these high profile debates. Following 
its advent in 1994, significant efforts were made by the PA Government led by President Kumaratunga, to increase training and 
awareness of human rights among the police and Sri Lankan security forces (see Spencer 2007: 118-120).   
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memory they reconstructed what they perceived as an alternative narrative of the 
Bheeshanaya. The portrayal of counter-insurrectionary officers in moral and heroic 
terms, a division of the world into ‘good’ and ‘evil’, and a rationalisation of the 
counter-insurrection characterised their alternative ‘truth’. Through their stories, 
former counter-insurrectionary officers engaged in a reworking of the past and a 
retrospective refashioning of the self, in order to alter their relationship to that past 
and make it more conducive to life in the present. Their narrative reconstructions 
allowed them to give meaning to their morally troubling experiences, and to find ways 





In her study on the public confessions of perpetrators of state violence, Payne 
found their reinventions of the past to entail “remorse, heroism, denial, sadism, 
silence, fiction and lies, amnesia, and betrayal” (2008: 19). She argues that in the rare 
instances in which perpetrators do speak out “they often evoke a vocabulary they 
were taught by the authoritarian regime: denial, justification, excuses, and 
euphemisms that hide their acts from themselves and from others” (2008: 20). Some 
of these themes emerged in the torture narratives of former counter-insurrectionary 
officers, as we shall see in this chapter. 
As mentioned earlier, reluctance and avoidance overshadowed the overall 
narrative process. Former counter-insurrectionary officers’ stories further had a 
rehearsed and scripted quality to them, and I was surprised to find that some even 
spoke from notes they had prepared earlier, particularly at the initial stages of our 
interviews. While many relaxed into their stories as our relationship of mutual trust 
developed over time, I constantly got a sense of memories being withheld and of an 
on-going exercise of internal censorship. Their memories overall contained many 
contradictions, and in some instances articulation was marked by incoherence, which 
made analysing their stories somewhat difficult for me as a researcher. This 
incoherence and contradiction were partly due to the pressure of heavy editing. It also 
hinted at an underlying sense of moral discomfort, which was evident particularly 
when it concerned the teller’s own possible complicity in torture.37  
                                                      
37 The scripted nature of the narrative interpretations of ‘perpetrators’ of violence has also been highlighted in other studies (see 
Payne 2008), and is further evident elsewhere in this thesis, particularly in the accounts of insurrectionary violence belonging to 
former insurgents who continue to support the JVP. 
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A projection of the self in moral terms and a rejection of responsibility for 
torture overwhelmingly marked the narratives of former counter-insurrectionary 
officers. Payne (2008) has argued that ‘perpetrators’ of state violence very rarely 
confess. When they do so, rather than disclosing truths, they merely give 
explanations, rationalisations, and justifications, which entail “vital lies” minimising 
their own responsibility, and serving personal and political ends. There are many 
similarities to be found between the findings of my research and that of Payne’s 
study. However, an important divergence arises from the influence on the mediation 
of memory exerted by the private spaces in which former counter-insurrectionary 
officers told me their stories, the ‘intimate’ nature of our conversations, and the 
absence of any tangible material or political incentives for ‘sharing’ their personal 
memories. In such a context of telling, what emerged were contradictory and 
ambiguous narratives that were pregnant with ethical claims (see Lambek 1996). 
While on the face of it, former counter-insurrectionary officers appeared to avoid 
moral responsibility for violence and deny involvement in torture, their rationalisation 
of state violence suggested that they did not entirely reject an acknowledgement of 
complicity in it. Former ‘perpetrators’ of state violence it seemed, continued living 
life after violence with this contradiction, as we shall see in the stories that follow.    
 
 
‘Intimacy’ and Betrayal 
 
What made the torture of the Bheeshanaya morally incomprehensible for 
many people was its perpetration between people who appeared to be ‘the same’; 
those who were ‘intimates’. ‘Perpetrators’ of state violence often shared the same 
religious, ethnic and social background as their ‘victims’, and it was not uncommon to 
hear of people who had been tortured by their neighbours or people they knew. The 
stories of former counter-insurrectionary officers were largely woven around this 
theme of ‘intimacy’ and its perceived betrayal. They drew on it in their explanations 
of the counter-insurgency, and to support their justification of state violence. 
‘Intimacy’ appeared to function as a narrative lens through which they were able to 
reflect on an unsettling past and understand their own actions therein.  
Many former counter-insurrectionary officers attributed the initial reluctance 
of the security-forces to violently crack-down on insurgents, to a recognition of JVP 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
  146  
insurgents being ‘the same’, or “our boys” (apē kollo). This shows an 
acknowledgment on the part of the security forces, of an ‘intimate community’ to 
which they and JVP insurgents belonged. Many members of the security forces also 
had family and village friends in the JVP. The civil war with the Tamil ethnic and 
religious ‘other’, along with the accompanying nationalistic rhetoric propagated by 
vociferous politicians, further contributed to the sense of an imagined ‘intimate 
community’ of Sinhala (in particular Buddhist) people, who were perceived as 
collectively facing the threat of Tamil terrorism. 
A common perception among former counter-insurrectionary officers I 
interviewed about their initial reluctance to crush the JVP insurgency, was typified in 
the words of one senior officer who told me: “We didn’t see why we had to kill our 
own boys. We felt that we should be fighting the Tigers in the North”. This comment 
signifies recognition of JVP insurgents as being ‘the same’ and ‘the familiar’, and the 
supplementary use of kinship metaphors (“our boys”) here further suggests a sense of 
“cultural intimacy” (Herzfeld 1997). This stands in sharp contrast to how Tamil 
insurgents in the North were construed - as different, the stranger, and the distant 
‘other’. Identifying ‘the other’ as the enemy proved easier than identifying ‘the same’ 
as the enemy. References to “our boys” in the stories belonging to former counter-
insurrectionary officers implied ‘intimate’ relationships to be underpinned by certain 
unspoken values and obligations. In the context of the Bheeshanaya, this appeared to 
entail shared understandings of ‘standing together’ and ‘being on the same side’. If, as 
Das states, communities are formed through agreements (2007: 9), then ‘intimate’ 
communities can also be destroyed when these agreements, tacit or explicit, are 
betrayed. The dramatic shift in perception that resulted in the identification of ‘the 
same’ and ‘the intimate’, as ‘the enemy within’, was down to this perceived betrayal 
of ‘intimacy’ and the assumption of trust that went with it. This formed the basis of 
rationalisations offered by former counter-insurrectionary officers, for violence 
inflicted on ‘suspected insurgents’ during the Bheeshanaya. 
The unexpected betrayal of ‘intimacy’ by the JVP as perceived by counter-
insurrectionary officers, came in the form of the infamous threat issued by the JVP to 
members of the security forces and their families in 1989, and the apparent 
implementation of this threat. The resounding shock of being betrayed by ‘their own 
boys’ invoked feelings of anger, indignation, and a thirst for revenge, among 
members of security forces. The unpredicted reality of their “own boys” turning on 
them, resulted in the security forces now “running pell-mell after them (insurgents)”, 
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in the words of one senior former counter-insurrectionary officer. This officer also 
went on to tell me that he believed the audacity of the JVP to betray the security 
forces stemmed from its own belief that the latter “wouldn’t take on their own people 
militarily”. He thereby intimated that the JVP itself knew it belonged to this ‘intimate 
community’ and was aware of the underlying normative values and obligations that 
bound it. The JVP’s betrayal of ‘intimacy’ then, is depicted as having been deliberate 
and so, morally unjustifiable. 
Intimate relationships are unpredictable and it is hardest to take the betrayal of 
those seemingly closest to you. Many former counter-insurrectionary officers told me 
that they were taken completely by surprise when faced with the violence and threats 
of the JVP, of Sinhala Buddhist people themselves. So surprised were they that some 
senior officers went as far as admitting that they did not even have troops sufficiently 
trained to challenge the JVP, despite the insurrection having been well under way for 
almost two years. Faced with the reality of betrayal, the enemy now was considered to 
be on the inside, and the people who posed a threat were those like themselves, 
similar to the Indonesian notion of the ‘criminal’, who “is always on the edge of 
Indonesian society but never outside it, never the foreigner” (Siegel 1998: 2). Indeed 
for some former counter-insurrectionary officers, the ease with which insurgents 
melted into the wider population and the difficulty they faced in distinguishing 
insurgents from the rest of the rural Sinhala masses appeared to have been a vexation 
borne of the enemy being the ‘same’. The ensuing ‘witch-panic’ entailed a violent 
persecution aimed at purifying society of ‘the enemy within’ (see Roper 2004, Briggs 
2006). In some rural villages, all young male inhabitants were detained, disappeared, 
or murdered, and there were other instances where entire villages deemed particularly 
susceptible to ‘subversive’ activity (due to reasons such as social disadvantage or low 
caste status) were violently decimated (see Gunaratna 1990).  
In depicting counter-insurgency violence as being necessitated by the betrayal 
of ‘intimacy’, former counter-insurrectionary officers attempted to rationalise and 
justify their complicity in terror. Moreover, they implied that former insurgents 
brought the violence on themselves, thereby deflecting blame onto the ‘victim’. This 
has been identified as being a common position taken by state ‘perpetrators’ of 
violence in other studies as well (see Payne 2008, Foster et al. 2005). In their study of 
‘perpetrators’ of violence in the context of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, Foster et al. (2005) have identified members of the Apartheid regime’s 
state security forces to have utilised three modes of narrative deflection. These were 
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that of passing responsibility upwards to politicians, sideways to other people within 
their own organisations or other organisations, and downwards with various forms of 
victim-blaming (2005: 336).  While all three patterns of deflection were found in my 
research, and are discussed at various points in this thesis where relevant, the 
particular narrative frame employed by former counter-insurrectionary officers 
entailing betrayal of ‘intimacy’ falls within the last category. This shifts the blame on 




The Enemy Within and Affective Story-telling 
 
Former counter-insurrectionary officers continued to build on the notion of the 
‘intimate’ turned ‘enemy’ in their narrative constructions. Through this they described 
the various emotions they remembered as having experienced when faced with this 
‘internal enemy’. Indeed, a striking characteristic of the narratives of counter-
insurrectionary officers was the important role given to emotion in them. In a similar 
vein to the stories of torture ‘victims’, ‘perpetrators’ of state violence also spoke of 
the complex and ambivalent emotions that they experienced during the Terror, such as 
fear, anger, surprise, sympathy, and uncertainty. However, there was a difference in 
the use of emotion between the two groups in their narrative retellings of the past. 
Torture ‘victims’, as we saw in the previous chapter, emphasised in their stories, the 
emotions that they had experienced during their ordeals, while at the same time 
apparently ‘reliving’ some aspects of these emotions during the telling (e.g., as 
expressed through body language). This in turn affected the overall articulation of 
their traumatic memories. In the case of former counter-insurrectionary officers, the 
narrative content of their violent past contained verbal descriptions of emotions that 
they remembered experiencing during the Bheeshanaya. This did not appear, 
however, to affect the actual telling of their stories and their rigidly controlled body 
language was largely devoid of emotional expression.  
The lack of any evident emotion expressed during the process of narration 
may partly be down to the discipline inculcated by the military socialisation of this 
research participant group. I was struck by the similarities that existed across 
individual counter-insurrectionary officers who participated in this research, in terms 
of their upright postures and ‘closed’ body language, their militaristic manner of 
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interaction, and the overall authoritative and firm tone of their voices. This made me 
very much aware of being in the presence of ‘military men’. On two rare occasions 
involving two different former counter-insurrectionary officers, I noticed this military 
veneer crack briefly to express fleeting signs of emotional distress. This was the result 
of the trauma associated with recall, and signifies the psychologically (and perhaps 
ethically) disturbing nature of their memories of violence from the Bheeshanaya.  
Jackson has argued that storytelling is lived through the interaction of the 
bodies of the teller and listener, whereby people reach out to each other (2002: 28).  
The tight control exercised over body language and emotion resulted in my failure to 
feel any strong ‘connection’ between the narrative, the teller, and myself as the 
listener. One may argue nevertheless, that former counter-insurrectionary officers did 
attempt in a sense to ‘reach out’ through the emphasis they laid on emotion in their 
narrative content. This emotional detail described through their stories, either 
consciously or unintentionally, served several narrative functions. It lent authenticity 
to their stories, and a sense of moral credence to the defensive ‘truth’ they put 
forward. By remembering emotions such as fear, vulnerability, and uncertainty, 
former counter-insurrectionary officers were positioning themselves as ‘victims’ 
rather than ‘perpetrators’.  
Rishen, a former counter-insurrectionary officer belonging to the lower ranks 
of the security forces, worked in a notorious torture chamber during the Bheeshanaya, 
in which many former insurgents who participated in this research were detained and 
tortured. His comment below alludes to the complex mix of emotions that 
‘perpetrators’ of state violence felt towards their ‘intimate’ victims. Speaking of the 
detainees held in the torture chamber in which he was posted, Rishen told me, “I felt 
anger towards them. Because we were attacked. They stole our weapons and attacked 
our mobile patrols. But I also felt sorry for them.” A confusing mix of anger and 
sympathy towards suspected insurgents were emotions remembered by several former 
counter-insurrectionary officers. Anger appeared to result from betrayal, and empathy 
from recognition of similarity and ‘intimacy’. After all, we tend to empathise most 
with those who are closest to us. This mix of sympathy and rage (along with fear, 
vulnerability, and desires for revenge, as we shall see in the narratives that follow) 
show situations of extreme terror to evoke a complex blend of contradictory emotions 
in those who perpetrate violence.  
Having ‘their boys’ suddenly turn on them also stirred up emotions of intense 
fear and a sense of vulnerability among counter-insurrectionary officers. Their stories 
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depicted the fearful threat posed by the JVP to fuel the perceived urgent need to 
violently eliminate it. This is illustrated once again by Rishen in his reconstruction of 
an incident in which a unit of soldiers, including himself, were called on to guard a 
police station in a remote village, which secret intelligence had found was due to be 




That night in pitch, bitter darkness (titta kaluvara) we were guarding the station, 
and we were terrified. Then suddenly the (other) soldiers started saying that they 
could hear the boys (JVP insurgents) coming to attack us. So we started firing 
our guns. The next morning we realised that what we had thought was a group 
of 500 boys, was in fact a herd of water-buffalo, who all lay dead in the paddy-




Payne has argued that perpetrators of state violence describe defenceless victims as 
fierce enemies who must be defeated through various military virtues such as courage, 
self-sacrifice, and heroism (2008: 20). The JVP insurgents with whom counter-
insurrectionary officers were locked in battle were far from ‘defenceless victims’, and 
were in themselves terrorising people through their increasingly arbitrary use of 
violence. But within the confines of the torture chamber they were ‘victims’ 
overpowered by the violence of the state. Furthermore, many of the ‘suspected 
insurgents’ tortured, disappeared, and murdered, were innocent of involvement in 
insurrectionary activity, or had been detained on spurious charges, such as putting up 
JVP posters or being the friend or relative of a suspected insurgent.  
The narrative reconstructions of former counter-insurrectionary officers 
entailed a particular representation of the (suspected) ‘insurgent’ as fearsome and 
threatening, while imbuing the ‘perpetrator’ of state violence with the human qualities 
of vulnerability, fear, and justifiable anger. This is not to deny however, that 
‘perpetrators’ of state violence themselves would have felt such emotions on being the 
targets of insurrectionary violence. The specific articulation of these emotions 
nevertheless, served to amplify the threat posed by the JVP and to justify the 
‘retaliatory’ or ‘defensive’ violence of the state (and their own possible complicity in 
torture). Emotion in narrative here, worked against the popular stigma attached to 
counter-insurrectionary officers as ‘inhuman’, by representing them to possess 
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feelings and emotions of their own, not dissimilar to that of their ‘victims’. The 
narratives of former counter-insurrectionary officers further contributed to the 
distortion of ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’ categories, by representing suspected 
insurgents as the aggressive and threatening enemy, and ‘perpetrators’ of state 
violence as their ‘victims’.  
Foster et al. (2005) in the context of the South African conflict have shown 
how members of the Apartheid regime’s police forces in repeating ‘them’ versus ‘us’ 
contrasts, painted “a moral and rhetorical picture of (themselves) … as merely 
reactive”. The authors go on to contend that in this victim-blaming narrative strategy 
that they employ, ‘perpetrators’ of state violence tend to draw on extreme examples to 
derive sympathy from the audience (2005: 284). We may interpret Matheesha’s story 
below, which also draws on extreme examples from his past in the Bheeshanaya to 
highlight the aggressive qualities of the insurgent ‘enemy’, in a similar vein. It 
deflects blame for violence onto insurgents and depicts them as deserving of the terror 
unleashed by the state, while at the same time lending authenticity and moral credence 
to his own position. What complicates the situation of the Bheeshanaya is that while 
insurgents were indeed ‘victims’ of torture, they were also ‘perpetrators’ of violence 
themselves. As a result, his story below cannot be read as a straightforward and clear-
cut ‘victim-blaming’ narrative strategy.  
Matheesha is a former senior counter-insurrectionary officer. As is common to 
the military forces of many countries, the higher echelons of the Sri Lankan security 
forces draw their members from the educated elites (while those of poorer 
backgrounds tend to occupy the lower ranks). Matheesha’s privileged background 
was reflected in his request to conduct the interview in English, as it was the language 
he felt most comfortable conversing in. Matheesha’s parents and three siblings had 
been murdered by the JVP, because he had not heeded to their demand to desert the 
armed forces. Much of his narrative was visibly rehearsed, but this particular extract 
appeared not to be so and diverted from the script. It unusually entailed a genuine 




My family was killed because I was in the army. By that time I had seen other 
officers lose their families, and been to many funerals. But still it was out of the 
blue – a complete shock [his upright military-man veneer cracks. He looks 
stunned and then starts getting upset]. You don’t think that it could happen to 
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you. You know they were really heartless. I was a X (high rank) in the army. I 
wasn’t expected to run after them with a gun. I was expected to sit behind a 
desk in an a/c (air-conditioned) office. I went to Y (rural town) to protect the 
people…It was night and at the Y junction a young girl came running towards 
my jeep, hysterical, crying that her husband had just been shot... We got to her 
house and he was lying on the floor in a pool of blood. He had been shot by the 
JVP for working …during a hartāl (JVP imposed unofficial curfew) …He 
wasn’t involved in politics…She fell to the floor and worshipped me, begging 




Matheesha’s positioning in this narrative is one of victim, which makes the transition 




As soldiers, perpetrators contend they had a duty to defend the nation from 
communism, terrorism, or barbarism. Asserting that the ends (defeating the 
threat to the nation) justify the (usually unarticulated) means, perpetrators 





Here, the shock brought on by the unexpected betrayal of one’s own, leads Matheesha 
to clearly identify the ‘intimate’ insurgent as the heartless ‘enemy’, and to now draw 
lines of differentiation between ‘the insurgent’ and ‘ordinary’ Sinhala people. The 
former is ‘heartless’ and thus not human, while the latter he imbues with a human 
heart through the portrayal of the grieving young woman. The latter then are in need 
of urgent protection from the insurgent – ‘the enemy within’. The unprovoked horrific 
attack on his own family provides Matheesha with a personal reason to cleanse 
society of the insurgent who spreads grief and disorder throughout the body of 
intimate society. Matheesha’s story overall carries ethical and heroic undertones. In it, 
heroic members of the security forces’ who themselves have been ‘victims’ of 
violence, must put their own lives on the line to eliminate the violent threat posed to 
society by the heartless, ‘internal enemy’. 
Payne refers to “salvation myths” and heroic statements of “saving the country 
from subversion” that mark some of the rare confessions of perpetrators of state 
violence, which in turn reactivate the regimes’ justifications for these acts (2008).  
The narratives of former counter-insurrectionary officers like Matheesha lend some 
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authenticity to Payne’s overall argument here, in terms of their reliance on heroic 
purposes of salvation for the justification of state terror. Nevertheless, this is not to 
say that these “salvation myths” and stories of heroism were simply calculated 
narrative strategies devised for the sole purpose of avoiding responsibility for 
violence and deflecting blame onto the victim.  
The violence of the Bheeshanaya operated at several levels and in many 
complex layers, with the categories of ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’ constantly blurring 
and merging into each other. Some former counter-insurrectionary officers like 
Matheesha, were themselves ‘victims’ of insurgent violence, which in turn fuelled 
their desire to exact violent revenge on those they perceived to pose a real threat to 
society. While I got the distinct impression that there was some awareness (and even 
discomfort) among former counter-insurrectionary officers of the morally problematic 
nature of their past actions in hindsight, in another sense they also appeared to 
genuinely believe (or want to believe) that their actions were in fact morally driven 
and justifiable. In remembering themselves in terms of victimhood, and their actions 
as being driven by morally just purposes, they were attempting to find ways of living 




Torturing to Civilise Transgressors 
 
The vast majority of stories told by former counter-insurrectionary officers 
made implicit references to torture being a necessary tool for civilising, for meting out 
justice, and for punishing transgression. In the Bheeshanaya it would seem that 
members of the security forces believed that they should take it upon themselves to 
act on behalf of the wider Sinhala community in punishing social and moral 
transgressors and thereby restoring a sense of order. This responsibility was construed 
as taking on particular importance in the prevailing context of chaos, impunity, and 
disorder. Matheesha, the senior counter-insurrectionary officer we heard from earlier, 
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It (the counter-insurrection) has to be done in a professional way. If a man is 
caught with arms he must be tried in court with solid evidence. But in an 
insurrection of that magnitude, when the Government was fighting two wars, 
where people were scared to come forward and give evidence due to 
intimidation (by the JVP). It is difficult to prove charges…So the military felt 




Soma, a former counter-insurrectionary officer belonging to the lower ranks of the 
army further elaborated on the idea of justice as motivating his violent actions during 
the Terror. He paints a vivid picture of the context of terror, and represents violence to 
have been the necessary and viable alternative available to restore order and protect 
Sinhala society. My questions about his memories of working in a ‘detention centre’ 
were met with silence and avoidance. Soma instead, chose to articulate his memories 
of this period by recounting a story from his subsequent posting to a Sinhala village 
bordering LTTE contested territory towards the tail end of the counter-insurrection.  
 
 
We had the LTTE on one side, and the JVP on the other. We faced battles from 
both sides everyday. And we also had robberies and rapes occurring almost 
everyday in those areas. I was shot at and really faced the fear of death there 
(maraneṭa bhaya). We were really in trouble. Then one day a really 
innocent/naiive (ahinsaka) man from the village came to us and said that a man 
had come to his house and abducted his wife in front of him. I asked him why 
he didn’t take a scythe and kill the man to protect his wife. He was very shy 
(läjja). He told us who the abductor was. There was no law or court system or 
police to go to. So we just caught him (the culprit), hung him up on a mango 




The pressure that members of the security forces were under and the overwhelming 
sense of fear they felt amidst a chaotic environment of impunity and routinised 
violence is illustrated in Soma’s narrative. Soma’s story grounds state terror in rich 
context, lending support to the view expressed by many former counter-
insurrectionary officers, that the abnormal climate of terror necessitated extra-
ordinary measures to protect society and restore order. Soma’s story conveys the 
message that in a violent world in disarray, where there was no recourse to legal 
authority, counter-insurrectionary officers were forced to take on the role of being 
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purveyors of justice. Justice here was meted out through the only (violent) means 
available at the time. By rationalising torture in this manner, and in imbuing its 
perpetration with altruistic and moral purposes, Soma, both acknowledges his 
involvement in perpetrating torture and at the same time absolves himself of moral 
responsibility for it. 
Let us now return to the story of Rishen, the former counter-insurrectionary 
officer who worked in one of the notorious torture chambers. His story provides an 
example of the ways in which ‘perpetrators’ of state violence give voice to their 
dubious pasts and the means through which they rationalise their actions therein. 
Rishen adamantly denied having perpetrated torture himself. This was despite his 
neighbours gossiping that his raging alcoholism was down to a guilty conscience 
stemming from his torture of “innocent boys” (ahinsaka kollo) during the 
Bheeshanaya. Half-way through our interview, Rishen told me a somewhat strange 
story, incoherent at certain points, which was as close as he came to acknowledging 
culpability for torture during the Bheeshanaya.  Rishen framed his story in terms of a 
deserved ‘punishment’ meted out to a young drug addict during the Terror. The drug-
addict featured in his story had apparently been harassing people in the village and 
Rishen told me that he had wanted to “teach him a lesson” (pāḍamak ugannanna).  
He told me that he had detained the young man, stripped him naked, tied him to a 
tyre, and beaten him. Rishen proceeded to pour kerosene over him, which he told me 
burned the young victim’s skin. He then lit a match and held it over the young man 
who was soaked in kerosene and tied to the tyre. Rishen threatened to set the man 
alight, shouting at him over and over again “Will you do drugs again?” The young 
man had shouted in response “My mother! my mother! (magē ammō!) I will never do 
drugs again!” and Rishen said that he had then released his victim.  According to 
Rishen, the victim had apparently returned years later, glowing with health and 
material success, to thank Rishen for rehabilitating him. This story was related to me 
in a boastful manner. Rishen credited his position in the army with giving him the 
opportunity to ‘civilise’ people. He told me with an air of satisfaction: “I am surprised 
(pudumai) at how well I was able to civilise (hadanna) people in those days”.38  
The violence used on the drug-addict by Rishen, as recounted in his story, 
mimics common forms of torture used on detained suspected insurgents during the 
Bheeshanaya. Rishen indirectly appears to have been telling me about the torture he 
                                                      
38 The Sinhala word hadanna translates as ‘make’. However, its use also refers to ‘civilise’, ‘mould’, ‘discipline’, and ‘create’. 
For example, it is used with reference to disciplining children, and if one behaves in an inappropriate way s/he is said to show 
that s/he has not been properly ‘made’ (i.e., disciplined or brought up well - hadicca nati kama).  
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had perpetrated against suspected insurgents, refashioned as the more ‘acceptable’ 
story of punishing a drug-addict. Violence against ‘unsavoury’ elements in society 
(both by the JVP and the security forces) during the Bheeshanaya was generally 
judged to be morally justifiable, in contrast to political violence. This narrative device 
was a means of giving voice to his memories of torture, and an acknowledgment of 
his complicity in it. At the same time it was a rejection of moral responsibility for 
violence and an adherence to the state narrative of denial. In essence, Rishen’s 
ambiguous story provides a moral rationalisation for state violence. In portraying the 
former counter-insurrectionary officer here as a morally righteous being, and in 
injecting his motivations for violence with altruism, Rishen implicitly provides an 
elaborate justification for the perpetration of torture during the Bheeshanaya. In his 
story, the victim returns to thank Rishen for rehabilitating him, and he further reflects 
with satisfaction on a job well done, for having ‘civilised’ social transgressors during 
the Terror. Rishen remembers and justifies his own complicity in torture in ethical 
terms. This allows him to continue living with the consequences of his actions, and 
himself, in the present. 
Torture then, according to the stories we have heard thus far, was considered 
by some former counter-insurrectionary officers to be an appropriate punishment for 
the betrayal of ‘intimacy’. It was a ‘civilising’ process to re-make the moral and social 
transgressor, to restore a sense of order to, and to protect society. This division of the 
world into ‘good’ and ‘evil’, and the attempt to bring back and rehabilitate those who 
had transgressed into the world of ‘evil’ then gives us an insight into the ways in 
which ‘perpetrators’ of state violence understood and gave meaning to their actions. 
Some who were deemed to have ‘learned’ their civilising lessons were spared, like 
Kirihami the ex-insurgent who told us in the previous chapter that he been “educated” 
through his beatings, and the drug addict who changed his ways. In this sense then, 
the violence of the Bheehsanaya was interpreted in the minds of former counter-
insurrectionary officers as a means of righting a moral wrong and restoring order (see 
Feldman 1991, Das 2007).  
Rishen employs the allegory of the drug-addict above in a bid to sanitise the 
torture that he perpetrated during the Bheeshanaya. In using a drug addict who 
harasses ordinary civilians as protagonist in his story, he represents the victim as 
deserving of violence. He also gives his story a happy ending, with the protagonist 
moving on to lead a successful life and even returning to thank his ‘former counter-
insurrectionary officer’, demonstrating a lesson learned well, and of the ends 
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justifying the means employed.  Rishen was not the only former counter-
insurrectionary officer to do so. We can see a similar narrative pattern in Matheesha’s 
story below. Matheesha uses military metaphors and euphemisms to rationalise the 




In a situation of complete anarchy, disorder, and disarray, you can’t expect 
anything to go by the book. Trying people in a court of law may be soothing to 
NGOs and Human Rights organisations. I believe that a moral stand must be 
taken. But the bitter truth is that when everything is in disarray, you can’t expect 
just one thing to proceed in an orderly manner. Look at Iraq now. The US and 
UK being the best managers of democracy are fairing worse than third world 
countries there. We were not geared to take on the challenge of the northern and 
southern insurrections simultaneously…It’s like a boxing match. If there are 
two people in a boxing ring, and one is armed with a hand grenade, then the 
other one has to fight him with force and try the same means to knock him out. 
In the absence of a referee, there is no judge to give scores. The only thing left 




The pressure that the security forces were under and its lack of preparedness to meet 
the challenge posed by the JVP, is illustrated in the narrative above. It further reflects 
the power of the JVP (whose success seemed close at hand) by representing the 
insurgent as an equal (if not better equipped) contender in a boxing ring, whose threat 
could only be repelled by a knee-jerk reaction of like-for-like force. Matheesha 
rationalises that the counter-insurrectionary forces were resorting to the only means 
available to them to protect themselves and society from the colossal internal threat 
they were faced with. This suggests that survival was at the forefront of the minds of 
both those who were subjected to torture (as seen in the previous chapter), as well as 
the ‘perpetrators’ of state violence who inflicted it.  
The moral discomfort that Matheesha appears to be grappling with personally 
can be gleaned from his comment:  “I believe a moral stand must be taken, but …”, 
which suggests this to be at the root of his attempts to justify and rationalise state 
violence, and by extension his own complicity in it. His concern to avoid tarnishing 
the image of the state is evident in his drawing on valid comparisons between the 
atrocities committed by the USA and the UK in the Middle East, and that of the Sri 
Lankan Government during the Terror. The metaphor of the boxing match that 
Matheesha draws on, serves several purposes in depicting a struggle between the 
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forces of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. It primarily offers a justification of state terror, based on 
the ends justifying the means. The moralistic end here is to protect society by 
suppressing the danger posed to it by the ‘internal enemy’, and to restore order.  
 
 
Deflecting Moral Culpability and Getting on with the Job 
 
As well as deflecting responsibility for violence onto the ‘victim’ (i.e., the 
‘internal enemy’ who betrayed his or her intimates), former counter-insurrectionary 
officers also drew on the narrative strategy of deflection to apportion moral 
responsibility for state violence to their peers and political leaders.  All former 
counter-insurrectionary officers I interviewed categorically pointed the finger of 
blame at the political leaders of Sri Lanka for the emergence of the insurgency itself, 
which in turn necessitated retaliatory state-terror according to them. Some also made 
a point of emphasising individual politicians’ own complicity in torture to settle 
personal and political scores during the Terror. Many accused the UNP governing 
politicians of corruption, inertia, elitism, and a failure to address the valid grievances 
of young people and problems of social deprivation. It was evident from their stories 
that many believed their personal moral call was to protect ‘ordinary’ Sinhala society, 
as opposed to state politicians towards whom they expressed poorly hidden derision.39 
Rather than solely being a calculated narrative strategy for deflecting responsibility 
for violence up the way, many former counter-insurrectionary officers showed a 
genuine appreciation of the political failings that had led so many young people to 
join the JVP in a bid to seize state power. 
Some former counter-insurrectionary officers shifted culpability side-ways 
towards their peers through their narrative reconstructions. Rishen, for instance who 
worked in a notorious torture chamber, avoided admitting his own involvement in 
inflicting torture on suspected insurgent detainees, but spoke of torture being 
perpetrated by his colleagues, referring to them as “animals” (sattu) for their 
participation in torture. Deflection of blame as a narrative trend has also been 
highlighted in other studies on the public confessions of state perpetrators of violence 
(see Foster et al. 2005, Payne 2008). Rishen’s deflection of culpability here reflected 
                                                      
39 The vast majority of members of the state security forces (particularly at the lower ranks) shared social backgrounds (and 
kinship ties) with the insurgents they hunted down. As a result they were able to empathise with the grievances that the JVP 
highlighted. The divergence arose when the JVP started targeting family members of the state security forces. 
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the ethical judgement passed on violence in the aftermath and the need to negotiate 
sociality in the present.   
Studies have shown desensitisation to violence, bureaucracy, the division of 
labour, pressure to conform, and socialisation to follow orders, as factors influencing 
people who perpetrate violence (see Browning 2001, Arendt 1994, Milgram 1974). A 
few counter-insurrectionary officers also remembered violently crushing the 
insurgency as being a pragmatic task, and rationalised it as a means of ‘getting on 
with the job’. Given that torture continues to be a normalised component of 
interrogation in Sri Lanka, some counter-insurrectionary officers may have seen the 
torture of detainees as a routine aspect of carrying out their job. Of his work in the 
infamous torture chamber, Rishen told me: “when you are doing your job there you 
have to try and not let things affect you”. In doing so he underlines the importance of 
consciously suppressing or altering one’s own ethical discomfort in perpetrating 
violence. Matheesha echoed Rishen’s comment by telling me that, “As a Government 
servant and military man, I saw it (crushing the JVP) as a military requirement to be 
fulfilled”. The justification of torture in these terms appears on the surface to be in 
keeping with the “banality of evil” theory put forward by Arendt (1994). However, in 
the narratives we have seen thus far, we find that torture carried powerful meanings, 
particularly those of an ethical nature, for those who perpetrated it. This rendered the 
mediation of its memory an exercise that was infused with significant moral claims, 
particularly concerning accountability for violence and its implications for the self 
and sociality in the present (see Lambek 1996, Antze 1996). 
 
The moral incomprehensibility of violence perpetrated during the Bheeshanaya and 
the meaning that torture carried for both its ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’, were 
grounded in issues of ‘intimacy’, as we have seen thus far in this thesis. In the work of 
remembering then, torture was treated as a live ethical issue that was inextricably 
entangled in notions of the self and social relationships in the present. In the next 
chapter we consider how communities wracked by memories of violence go about re-
imagining a sense of ‘intimate’ moral community in the aftermath of terror.    
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Chapter 5 
The Possibilities of ‘Intimacy’ in Times of Terror 
 
 
 The preceding chapters have focussed on the encroachment of violence on 
social relationships, and the impossibilities of ‘intimacy’ amidst violence. In this 
chapter I turn to consider the possibilities of ‘intimate’ relationships in times of terror. 
I pay attention here to memories of social relationships that surpassed the violence of 
the Bheeshanaya. Many people remembered incidents involving people who put their 
own lives at risk to protect that of their neighbours, and were eager to recount these. 
These accounts were offered as alternative narratives to counter-balance popular 
perspectives on the Terror, which represents violence as having torn into the social 
fabric of Sinhala communities, with neighbours ‘turning on each other’ 
indiscriminately. Through these narratives, people expressed the ways in which 
‘intimate’ social relationships were maintained amidst violence. 
 While denial of culpability and hesitance generally marked narratives of 
violence between ‘intimates’, people were eager to tell me stories of social 
relationships that had withstood the pressures of the Terror and even transcended the 
binaries it created. Interestingly, the narratives featured in this chapter show that 
people were quick to take responsibility for actively contributing towards community 
cohesiveness and for upholding the normative moral values expected of ‘intimate’ 
relationships. Moreover, we saw in previous chapters that distancing, deflection, and 
disassociation were frequently drawn on as narrative strategies in recounting 
‘opportunistic’ violence perpetrated between ‘intimates’. However, incidents of social 
relationships that triumphed over violence were situated closer to home, and to the 
teller. I argue that these stories of ‘intimate’ relationships that surpassed violence 
communicated particular ethical values, which contributed to the recreation of a 
particular moral order. They contained re-imaginings of an ‘intimate’ community 
guided by these norms. This shows people’s engagement with discomforting 
memories of violence to be anchored in the moral, and to entail important 
implications for the function of ‘intimate’ communities post-terror. 
Mueggler has similarly shown in the context of China, how through stories of 
wild ghosts, people apportioned responsibility for the violence of the famine 
experienced during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, creating an 
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“agonistic sense of community in the face of their own shared responsibility for past 
violence” (2001: 97). He argues that these narratives of wild ghosts “cleared a space 
for regeneration of community and searched for an ethical ground on which to 
remember social relationships devastated by past violence” (2001: 269).  
In the context of post-terror southern Sri Lanka, stories of violence perpetrated 
between ‘intimates’ (particularly that of ‘opportunistic’ violence) similarly allowed 
people to acknowledge the damaging legacy of the Terror on their ‘intimate’ 
relationships. They created the space for a moral critique of an incomprehensible past, 
in a present marked by fear and amnesia. Through the work of narrative, people 
grappled with the sensitive task of appropriating moral culpability for a violence that 
was situated uncomfortably ‘close to home’. I argue here that remembering 
community relationships that had withstood the divisive efforts of terror, and telling 
empowering stories about their triumph, allowed people to re-imagine a sense of 
‘intimate’ community conducive to the continuation of sociality in a post-terror 
climate, overcast by unsettling memories of un-reconciled violence.  
 
 
Social Relationships that Triumphed Over Violence 
 
In his work on female survivors of the Bheeshanaya based in the South of Sri 
Lanka, Perera describes the apparent lack of help from neighbours during the Terror 
as “striking”, and puts it down to fear (1999: 54). In the context of my research, I 
came across several people who remembered the ties of their own communities as 
having withstood the pressure put on them by the Bheeshanaya. I was told stories of 
neighbours putting their own lives at risk to protect and help each other. These were 
empowering narratives because they construed ‘intimate’ social relationships as 
having triumphed over the challenges posed by violence. The tellers of these stories 
claimed ownership of their reconstructed past by situating themselves squarely in 
their narratives. These stories commonly involved their own neighbours, which 
entailed clear implications for the function of post-terror communities.  
Senahami, is an older ex-insurgent who fought in both JVP insurrections, who 
lives in a small rural village set in the interior. He explains the length that his co-
villagers (many of whom were not JVP supporters) went to ensure his protection 
during the Bheeshanaya:  
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The army, police, and vigilante groups were all after me. They would come at 
night in jeeps to get me. Do you know duwa (daughter), if a vehicle came 
towards our village someone somehow would get the message to me. Either a 
child from this village would come running and tell me “Ayya (big brother), 
hide quick, there is a jeep coming to the village”, or a woman in the village 
would run through a jungle path to get to my house to warn me. I survived 
because of them. Even now the village is united. Because I have always been 
good with everyone. I could even go to town sometimes during that time which 
was a very dangerous thing to do, because the village people protected me. Even 
today, if you were to ask any of the people in this village where I am, they will 
say that they don’t know who I am – especially if you are outsider and if they 
are suspicious of you. Because they don’t want to get me into any sort of 




Senahami communicates values of collective village ties and loyalty to neighbours. 
He emphasises the moral duty to protect neighbours in the face of ‘external’ threats, 
even at risk to one’s own survival. For Senahami, the notion of ‘intimacy’ applies to 
those who live in the same village, and mistrust is reserved for ‘outsiders’. In stating 
that his neighbours would continue to protect him from ‘outsiders’ and that “even 
today the village is united”, Senahami stresses the strength of ‘intimate’ relationships 
to continue long after the Terror, and portrays its very success over violence. He 
further shows the continuing legacy of past violence on post-terror communities 
(which entails suspicion of ‘outsiders’ here) by stating that his neighbours still 
“remember that time”. His dominant memory of the Bheeshanaya is that of being 
offered protection by his neighbours, and this allows him to continue living with them 
in the aftermath of violence. Senahami partly understands his own survival and that of 
his community, in terms of his personal commitment to upholding his moral 
obligations towards neighbours during the Terror.  
Let us now turn to the story of Nalaka, who was neither a supporter of the 
state nor the JVP. He was instead a member of a prominent Left party, whose 
members were also targeted by the JVP. Nalaka was detained and tortured by state 
counter-insurrectionary forces based on a malicious denunciation by a UNP political 
rival. According to him and some of his neighbours, his only ‘crime’ was to maintain 
relationships with his childhood village friends through the Bheeshanaya, including 
some who had joined the JVP. His narrative illustrates the strain that the Bheeshanaya 
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put on ‘intimate’ relationships, and like Senahami’s story, is an empowering one that 




I believe I was taken away based on a UNP petition. It was such an injustice. Do 
you know the police would come looking for me so many times and get all 
those that live in this village out of their houses and line them up on the street? 
They would hold their guns to the bellies of the children and get them to 
identify me. They were not the local police force, they were from outside. So 
they didn’t know what I looked like. They even broke the Buddha statues and 
our shrine room. They would shout and frighten all these people. But I was 
good with the villagers, so they never denounced me. They felt sorry for me and 
used to always try and protect me. They were never angry at me, even for the 
inconvenience caused to them. They were angry with the police. They now 




Nalaka provides a moral critique of state violence through descriptions of  harassment 
of villagers (including children), encouragement of denunciation among ‘intimates’, 
and desecration of sacred property of personal and community value. The destruction 
of Buddha statues and shrine rooms by state actors in particular symbolises the 
breaking of moral order and a lack of respect for Buddhist values that are meant to 
guide community life. The actions of the state here are shown clearly to be morally 
unjustifiable. Like Senahami, Nalaka emphasises clear moral values, one of which is 
the primacy of community relationships and the obligation of neighbours to protect 
each other (even at risk to their own lives). The importance of this value is further 
stressed by his elaborating that even children, who were held at gunpoint, upheld it.  
In pointing out that his neighbours still refer to this violent episode in their 
conversations with each other, and in acknowledging his gratitude to neighbours for 
securing his own survival through his story, Nalaka shows the ways in which 
memories of violence continue to impinge on sociality in the present. Nalaka points to 
continuing resentment and mistrust of the state as being a legacy of the Terror, and 
suggests that community ties have been strengthened post-terror in the face of the 
suffering that ‘ordinary’ civilians were subjected to at the hands of the state. Through 
his mediation of memory, Nalaka refashions his traumatic experience into an 
empowering one, where ‘intimate’ relationships ultimately succeed the violence 
unleashed on it by an immoral state. The triumph of village relationships over terror is 
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illustrated through his reference to people now being able to joke about that traumatic 
past.  
In both narratives above, the Terror is clearly shown to be a threat posed from 
‘outside’ to the village community. By emphasising this distinction, the village 
community is clearly depicted as an ‘intimate’ community governed by certain 
normative moral values and responsibilities. The threat posed by violence from 
‘outside’ was not just a threat to individual survival, but to the survival of the 
‘intimate’ community as a whole and to the moral order that underpinned it.  
 
 
Making Sense of a Violence that ‘Defied Logic’ 
 
I argued in Chapter 2, that the incomprehensibility of ‘opportunistic’ violence 
was grounded in its betrayal of ‘intimate’ relationships, and the favouring of personal 
interests above that of the ‘intimate’ collective. Through stories of social relationships 
that surpassed the violence, people also made attempts to make sense of, and attribute 
some coherence to, an ‘opportunistic’ violence that appeared to “defy logic” (Kalyvas 
2006). Several former insurgents put forward explanations based on the relevance of 
geographic and kinship ties. They argued that revenge and denunciation were more 
prevalent in urbanised areas, such as towns and cities, as opposed to smaller rural 
villages. According to this rationalisation, urbanised areas offered the population 
density and anonymity, with people being guided by ‘individualistic’ values, 
conducive to the perpetration of such violence. On the other hand, they reasoned, in 
smaller, less urbanised villages people tended to lead more collective and inter-
dependent lives. These people were further more likely to be intimately connected to 
the village community through historical kinship ties. One former insurgent Vimukthi, 
who was no longer a member of the JVP, explained the paucity of revenge and 




The people in this village were on good terms with each other and united. We 
are all related to each other. In the next section those people are also related to 
each other. But beyond that, in town there were problems. The problems 
occurred in areas where outsiders had come in and settled, and where people 
lived in flats and didn’t engage much with each other. 
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According to Vimukthi’s explanation, ‘intimate’ relationships based on long-standing 
kinship ties linked to the village brought with it a strong sense of ‘intimacy’ that acted 
as a barrier to the destructive efforts of violence. Such explanations were used by 
people like Vimukthi, to reflect their concerns about social issues that impacted on 
their current lives. Through his narrative above, Vimukthi engages in a critique of 
modernisation and urbanisation. This is a phenomenon that is perceived by some 
sections of present-day Sri Lankan society as posing a threat to the traditional and 
collective way of Sinhala Buddhist community life, organised around the triad of the 
village (gama), temple (pansala), and tank (väva). According to this view then, the 
erosion of traditional normative moral values brought on by modernisation, was partly 
to blame for the destructive violence that took place between ‘intimates’ during the 
Bheeshanaya. Re-imagining and re-establishing these moral values through the work 
of narrative then becomes an important means through which past violence and its 
devastating impact on community relationships is dealt with post-terror. 
The validity of this argument (i.e., that ‘opportunistic’ violence predominantly 
occurred in urban areas as opposed to rural areas) is difficult to substantiate due to a 
lack of evidence and the sensitivity of the subject. It may be worth noting however, 
that both Nalaka and Senahami (whose stories of community ties transcending the 
violence of the Bheeshanaya we heard above) lived in small villages located in the 
rural interior, which on the surface of it adds weight to this argument. Nevertheless, I 
also gathered accounts of revenge and denunciation from people who lived in other 
such apparently close-knit villages, which suggests that these incidents were not 
exclusively reserved to urban areas. My own experience in the field suggested that the 
occurrence of ‘opportunistic’ violence appeared to follow no discernible pattern 
related to kinship or geography. It is more likely to have been contingent on local 
context and on pre-existing social and political dynamics that preceded the Terror. As 
some scholars have pointed out, we need to know what kind of ‘neighbourhood’ and 
‘neighbourliness’ existed before the violence (see Esses and Vernon 2008, Hewstone 
et al. 2008). 
The villages in which I carried out my fieldwork were by no means 
harmonious, collective bubbles. They reflected the complex dynamics that mark all 
human relationships, and it is highly unlikely that life before the Bheeshanaya was 
one of idyllic non-violence. Violence usually based on an escalation of local 
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animosities was a marker of everyday life. The state impinged on people’s personal 
lives in violent ways, largely through fear and harassment, and the police were the 
most common culprits here. Local political actors along with the various gangs of the 
‘underworld’, contributed to the low intensity sense of fear and violence that 
characterised everyday life for the vast majority of research participants. Spencer 
(1999) documents the violence that accompanied local party politics at his own field-
site in Ratnapura in the early 1980s. Alexander (1995), who carried out research in a 
fishing village he calls Gahavella, in the southern region over 30 years prior to my 
time in the field, notes the frequency of everyday violence in his field-site. He 
comments that in Gahavella “where everyday language sounded aggressive and 
offensive to other Sinhalese, most villagers lacked a vocabulary to express degrees of 
anger and even minor disputes could quickly escalate into physical attacks” 
(Alexander 1995: 254-255). 
Many communities in which I carried out my fieldwork were divided by 
family disputes (most commonly over land), which led to grudges being harboured, 
sometimes escalating into outright violence. The importance attached to social status 
among Sinhala families also led to envy in some cases, made particularly acute in 
settings where people lived in close proximity to each other and one could not avoid 
having their noses rubbed in the success of their neighbours. Living in an environment 
in which one was always watched and often talked about could sometimes be 
suffocating, and the threat of losing both face and status under such close scrutiny and 
surveillance, loomed constantly.  
While former insurgent research participants like Senahami and Nalaka 
proposed that ‘intimacy’ (here based on shared kinship and geographical space, 
generally found in small village communities) acted as a protective barrier against 
violence, we have also seen thus far in this thesis, that ‘intimate’ sociality can in fact 
increase the threat of violence. Kalyvas (2006) refers to ‘intimacy’ as the “dark face 
of social capital” and presents numerous examples from Stalinist purges and Mao’s 
China to the US-UK led war in Iraq, to illustrate that most violence in war is carried 
out by those who know each other, and that ‘intimacy’ is crucial to civil war. Kelly 
and Thiranagama similarly argue that intimacy can lie at the foundation of violence, 
rather than in opposition to it, with those who seem closest evoking the most anxiety 
and fear (N.d.: 4).  
A vivid example of the capacity of ‘intimacy’ to evoke such fear and 
uncertainty came in the form of the gōni billa (the masked informant) - a spectre that 
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sent shivers of terror down the spines of ordinary people at the height of the 
Bheeshanaya. While the masked-informant is one that has been used globally in state 
terror (said to originate in the US), in Sri Lanka its use was negotiated and understood 
through local idiom. The figure of the gōni billa was one that people had grown up 
with and ‘known’ all their lives. A well-known figure of fear in Sinhala children’s 
stories, the gōni billa is said to carry a gunny-sack and abduct naughty children to eat. 
Here, the informant masked with a gunny-sack was recognised as this figure of terror, 
instilling fear not only among children but also adults. His victims (like that of the 
character in the children’s horror stories) were abducted supposedly for ‘being bad’, 
never to be seen again. What made the spectre of the gōni billa terrifying was this 
very familiarity and the possibility of her or his ‘intimacy’.  
Nevertheless, I also came across many instances where ‘intimacy’ acted to 
diminish the threat of violence, as we shall see in the narratives that follow. 
Anthropologists have highlighted the ambivalence of kinship (see Spencer 1999, 
Obeyesekere 1981, Das 2007). With reference to the Partition in India, Das has 
illustrated two opposite sides to kinship and intimacy that operated. One involved kin 
on the Indian side of the border helping victims by giving them shelter and assisting 
them with employment, while the other entailed a betrayal of trust (2007: 10). My 
research similarly points to the manifestation of the ambiguous and contradictory 





Managing Community Cohesiveness  
 
The majority of former insurgents I spoke to suggested that the incidence of 
revenge and denunciation in their communities was contingent on their own 
behaviour (in their capacity as insurgents) towards neighbours. While a denial of 
culpability and avoidance marked narratives on the occurrence of ‘intimate’ violence 
(as we saw earlier in this thesis), former insurgents readily acknowledged 
responsibility for its active prevention in their own localities. In doing so, they 
contributed to the construction of an ethical self through the work of memory. Many 
ex-insurgents denied that ‘opportunistic’ violence took place within their 
communities. They put this down to their own conscious and careful management of 
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‘intimate’ social relationships during the Bheeshanaya. They remembered upholding 
their moral responsibilities to neighbours over and above their obligations to the JVP. 
In doing so, former insurgents remembered themselves and their role in the violence 
in positive and moralistic terms.   
Consider Shehan’s story below, which in many ways was typical of the 
rationalisations offered by former insurgents for the occurrence of ‘opportunistic’ 
violence during the Bheeshanaya. He was adamant that his own small village set in 
the rural interior, did not witness a single incident of ‘opportunistic’ violence during 
the Bheeshanaya. He put this down to the kinship ties that bound his ‘intimate’ 
community, as well as his own leadership style and efforts to manage community 




When I was working, I got death lists from my superiors. These lists named the 
people who they said were opposed to the insurrection and needed to be killed. 
But I didn’t carry these out. I didn’t allow for anyone in my village to be killed. 
Because I wouldn’t be able to live amongst these people. I didn’t allow a single 
person in this village to be killed. I wasn’t denounced by a man from my 
village. (He) didn’t come from this area. I never harassed people here. I can still 
go out to these people and ask for their votes representing any party. That’s 
because at the time I thought long-term, and behaved in an educated way. I was 
always aware of my responsibility and was accountable to my superior. And 
even when I had orders from my superiors I sometimes over-rode them to 




Shehan represents himself as champion of moral values, going as far as to claim that 
he defied the orders of his JVP superiors to fulfil his responsibility towards his 
neighbours, and that in doing so he inhibited the perpetration of ‘intimate’ violence in 
his village. He emphasises the importance of maintaining one’s obligations to 
‘intimates’, which he suggests should override loyalty to one’s political cause. He 
remembers his own engagement in the insurrection as being grounded in moral values 
and an abstinence from ethically unjustifiable violence. 
Shehan indirectly denigrates ‘opportunistic’ violence as being abhorrent and 
depicts its perpetrators as lacking morals, (social) education, and foresight. These are 
characteristics he suggests to be antithetical to his own self-identity, and in doing so 
he distances himself from this form of violence. Furthermore, by drawing lines of 
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demarcation between the ‘intimates’ of his village and the ‘outsiders’ responsible for 
denouncing him, he implies that ‘intimacy’ offers some protection from violence. The 
moral responsibilities that ‘intimacy’ entails are shown to be reciprocal, with all 
actors having to adhere to their obligations towards the other. 
Through his narrative reconstruction, Shehan exercises some agency over 
violence that at the time was overwhelming and unmanageable in many ways, thereby 
rendering its memory and his own entanglement in an unsettling past more tolerable 
to live with in the present. Shehan further draws links between his past actions and his 
relationship with his neighbours in the present. He attempts to illustrate the extent of 
trust neighbours continued to place in him by stating that they would readily lend him 
political support. This is a significant statement given the post-terror environment of 
suspicion and fear, shown particularly towards former JVP insurgents by their 
neighbours. In doing so he lends credibility to his story and adds weight to his self-
portrayal of ‘innocence’. Remembering himself in this manner allows him to alter his 
relationship to the past and to continue living with its memory in the present. 
Lal, a former insurgent who participated in both insurrections told me that his 
neighbours protected him when he was being hunted down by the state during the 
Bheeshanaya precisely because he actively fulfilled his responsibility towards them 




Even when I was in the JVP I never harassed anyone here. I received orders to 
get rid of UNP supporters or workers. But I didn’t carry them out in the village 
here, and I didn’t allow for people to come to harm from the JVP in this village. 
I didn’t do it because I was going against the party or anti-JVP. But we must 
know right from wrong, and prevent doing wrong things. If the party wanted me 
to do something wrong, then I would make the judgement and not do it. That’s 




Lal portrays himself as having made ethically informed decisions during his tenure as 
an insurgent. The representation of the self in these narratives shows the importance 
that former insurgents attach to remembering themselves and their own involvement 
in a violent past in ways that enable them to live with its memory and consequences in 
the present. Memories of violence here are shown to be entangled in the continuing 
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moral construction of self-identity and in the negotiation of sociality with others in the 
present. Remembering the self in ethical terms is a vital aspect of continuing to live 
with one’s complicity in past violence. 
 
 
‘Intimate’ Relationships that Transcended the Binaries of Terror 
 
Many of former insurgents were keen to tell me stories of ‘intimate’ 
relationships (between members of the security forces and JVP insurgents) 
transcending the political binaries that permeated during the Bheeshanaya. Many of 
these narratives featured individual members of the security forces and JVP 
insurgents who hailed from the same village actively helping and protecting each 
other from the violence of their respective ‘factions’ during the Bheeshanaya. These 
stories expressed certain moral values concerning social relationships, and contributed 
to the overall construction of an alternative memory of the Bheeshanaya. 
 In the course of my fieldwork I frequently came across families with some 
members who had belonged to the security forces and others who had joined the JVP 
in the 1980s. This comes as no surprise given that similar factors such as social 
disadvantage, economic deprivation, and the lack of alternative employment 
opportunities, drew people into both organisations. Accordingly, I also heard of 
numerous occasions where kinship ties overrode the political oppositions created by 
the Bheeshanaya, with people in the counter-insurrectionary forces working to ensure 
the survival of their insurgent kin and vice versa. Some people also told me that the 
state often delegated counter-insurrectionary violence to paramilitary groups whose 
members originated from out-with the locality due to the reluctance of soldiers to kill 
suspected insurgents from their own communities. 
Collaboration between some sections of the JVP and the security forces 
(particularly at the lower ranks) has been acknowledged by some writers, particularly 
in the smuggling of weapons from the army to the JVP and the passing of state 
security intelligence to the JVP. This has largely been couched in terms of the JVP’s 
strategy of infiltrating the security forces (see Gunaratna 1990, Chandraprema 1991). 
I was told that these links were mainly developed at village level – between friends 
and kin of the same village, involving lower-ranking soldiers and JVP cadres who 
shared a similar social background. The type of relationship I refer to here is of a 
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more personal and ‘intimate’ nature - one based on kinship and village ties, rather 
than a formal military strategy of infiltration and collaboration. 
The information I gathered for this research in many instances, strongly attests 
to ‘intimate’ kinship and village relationships overriding the wider political binaries 
of the Terror. This remains a silenced aspect of the Bheeshanaya, which is commonly 
depicted in simplistic binary terms framed in macro-level politics, as a conflict 
between the JVP on the one side, and the state on the other side. My interest here lies 
in people’s eagerness to remember and emphasise this particular aspect of their 
experience of violence, which has clear implications for life after terror. In recasting 
their memories of violence in such a manner, people made them more conducive to 
the functioning of post-terror sociality. 
Such stories further reflected a post-terror context of recall in which members 
of the security forces were popularly viewed as ‘heroes’ who sacrificed their lives on 
behalf of the imagined ‘intimate’ Sinhala community. Remembering one’s complicity 
in perpetrating violence against members of the security forces in this context then 
was practically and morally unpalatable, and potentially detrimental not only to one’s 
own image and that of the JVP, but also to social relationships post-terror. The 
emphasis placed by former insurgents on communicating this alternative memory 
further reflects a desire to resurrect positive aspects of ‘intimate’ relationships from 
the Bheeshanaya, in an effort to provide a more ‘balanced’ portrayal of southern Sri 
Lanka’s troubled history.  
Dasa, a former insurgent who had a leadership role at village level, hailed 
from a village that was notorious for revenge and denunciation during the 
Bheeshanaya. Ironically, Dasa told me that while many of his neighbours had 
denounced him, he had managed to survive the Bheeshanaya because of the 
protection he received from his village friends who were in the security forces. Dasa’s 
narrative emphasises the strength of ‘intimate’ relationships among young people who 
grew up together in the same village but followed different ‘political’ paths, with 
some joining the army, and others the JVP. These ties he remembers as having 
surpassed the ‘political’ oppositions of the Bheeshanaya. His story is particularly 
interesting because it represents these social relationships as having remained strong 
in a village that was at another level divided, with neighbours apparently constantly 
having “petitioned” (informed) the police on him and his JVP brother. His narrative is 
as follows. 
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I mainly managed to survive because of the close connections we built with the 
army. These were internal village relationships. Our friends in the army from 
this village helped save my life. Our intra-village friendships were strong. On so 
many occasions JVP insurgents hid in army people’s houses when the army was 
out to get them and they hid in ours, in our village. I was arrested a couple of 
times and imprisoned. My other brother was a policeman, and he searched for 
my details and whereabouts and got me out. He did get into some trouble for 
that. A couple of other times when I was taken in, my army friends managed to 
get me out. Mostly they gave us information. Once there had been talk in the 
army about targeting my brother and getting him as he went to visit our sister 
who was in hospital. I got a phone-call straight away from a friend in the army 
telling me this, and asking me to be careful. He told me to protect my brother 
and to tell him not to go to the hospital. Like that there were occasions when I 




In crediting his childhood friends who were members of the state security forces for 
his survival, Dasa communicates the value of village and friendship ties and the moral 
responsibilities that this entails. In stating that he too protected them from the violence 
of the JVP, Dasa further acknowledges his own contribution to upholding the 
normative values that underpin ‘intimate’ relationships. His narrative is an 
empowering one because it shows the strength of friendship ties to have withstood the 
divisive pressures of violence.  
 Similarly, Senahami emphasises the responsibility that people have towards 
their co-villagers. These, he intimates, must supersede one’s obligations to ‘outsiders’. 
He highlights the cohesiveness of his own village and remembers his neighbours as 
having abided by such normative values. Once again, the violence here is depicted as 
being injected by ‘outsiders’ who fell out-with the boundaries of the ‘intimate’ social 
world of the village. In emphasising the tenacious ties between people who represent 
polar opposites in the violence of the Bheeshanaya, Senahami remembers his 
community as having withstood the pressures of violence. These memories then 




We had a lot of support from the army. But then after the poster incident the 
army went crazy and came after us. But even at that time not all of them did. 
People don’t want to kill others from the same village. Most of the killings were 
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contracted out to the vigilante and paramilitary groups. The army soldiers used 
to help their sisters and brothers from the village. I remember if the army were 
asked to carry out a search operation in the village, they would sometimes fire 
warning shots from outside the village, pretending that they were shooting a 
wild animal or some suspect, so that we (insurgents in the village) had time to 




In the following narrative, former insurgent Kanchana, further lays emphasis on the 
strength of ‘intimate’ relationships that defied the acute political opposition that 
existed between UNP supporters and the JVP during the Bheeshanaya. Here the 
emphasis is placed on friendship ties and the moral responsibilities this entails, as 
opposed to village ties per se. Kanchana’s depiction of his ‘intimate’ community goes 
beyond the boundaries of the village, and is built around his network of friends. 
Kanchana credits his survival to his UNP friends on whom he was completely reliant 




Society knew that I was a JVP activist, so I couldn’t go to work. The army and 
their connected gangs would keep coming to search our house. So I left and 
went into hiding in various parts of Sri Lanka. I mainly stayed at the houses of 
UNP friends. They offered me protection. Even though as JVPers we were anti-
UNP they looked at me as their friend and knew that we joined the party for 
political reasons rather than to kill UNPers. They knew that we weren’t going to 
kill them. I hid in their houses for 4 years. I couldn’t work then. I completely 
relied on the support of my friends who protected me. JVP supporters also 




Stories of social relationships that transcended violence served to create an alternative 
memory of the Bheeshanaya, which was more convoluted than its depiction in 
simplistic binary terms in popular memory. Through these empowering stories, people 
commented on the possibilities of ‘intimacy’ in situations of terror. They involved the 
search for an ethical ground to come to terms with the morally unsettling violence of 
their recent past. People’s ethical engagement with memory here involved attempts at 
re-imagining an ‘intimate’ moral community after violence. In the next two chapters 
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we explore the ways in which former insurgents went about trying to recreate their 
lives and re-inhabit their ‘intimate’ social worlds, in the aftermath of the Terror.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Recreating Life and the Mundane 
 
When they released me from detention I was very happy.  I would not be beaten 
anymore.  I would not have to see those same grey walls day in day out.  I could 
go home and see my family.  But you know, that happiness only lasted one day 
[holds up index finger].  That was all.  Then I started thinking “what do I do 




Ananda smiled ruefully and leaned forward in his worn armchair as he reflected on 
his release from detention and return home in 1991. He was a small tired-looking 
man, who looked older than his 48 years.  He told me that he had been detained by the 
state for his involvement in ‘subversive’ activity during the Bheeshanaya; more 
specifically for sourcing weapons for the JVP insurrection.  His words took me 
somewhat by surprise.  I was fresh to the field and Ananda was the first former 
insurgent I interviewed for this research.  After listening to his harrowing tale of 
torture in detention, I naively assumed that freedom would entail uncomplicated 
happiness, and an opportunity to start life afresh. However, the more people I spoke to 
about their lives after the Bheeshanaya, the more I came to realise that survival for 
those who had perpetrated violence was “a complicated affair” (Green 1999: 170). 
 Scholars have shown us the capacity of violence to destroy the ‘normal’ 
everyday and people’s worlds with it (see Das 2007, Green 1999, Nordstrom 1995, 
Lawrence 2000).  How then do you pick up the pieces of your world and begin to live 
everyday life again after violence?  How can you bear to carry on living with your 
torturers, with those who denounced you to the authorities, with those you victimised, 
and amidst people who perpetrated violence against your loved ones?  How can you 
re-inhabit this world again (Das 2007) – a world pregnant with violent memories, and 
come to terms with your own questionable past?  
These questions haunted me throughout my time in the field, as I moved 
through seemingly tranquil and harmonious villages and towns, listening to people’s 
stories of violence and betrayal, in many instances involving neighbours and people 
they thought they knew.  This chapter is concerned with how ‘retired’ insurgents 
reformulate their worlds after violence, and explores the very questions posed above 
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through their narratives.  It considers the ways in which people who have perpetrated 
violence recreate everyday sociality in the aftermath of Sri Lanka’s Terror, in a 
context where ‘perpetrators’, ‘victims’, and ‘witnesses’ must continue living side by 
side, under the sinister shadow of past violence in fear, silence, and with feigned 
amnesia.  
My research finds that for many of those who have perpetrated violence, 
rebuilding lives in its aftermath is steeped in the mundane, and focuses on reclamation 
of an (altered) everyday.  The experiences of reformulating lives after violence for 
those who have engaged in it then bears similarity to that of ‘victims’ of violence as 
shown in existing literature (see Green 1999, Das 1990a and 2007, Chatterji and 
Mehta 2007, Mehta and Chatterji 2001).  Moreover, the narratives that feature in this 
chapter suggest that despite the silence and apparent forgetting on the surface, past 
violence entangles itself in the present in intricate and complex ways, impacting on 
the everyday lives of those embroiled in the ongoing exercise of reconstructing their 
social worlds.  Memories of violence continue to linger beneath the everyday, 
emerging to the surface unexpectedly under the most banal circumstances (see Das 
2007). This in itself is a challenge that former insurgents must grapple with in their 
efforts to reformulate life after terror.  
I further argue that former insurgents are active agents who consciously put in 
place carefully thought out strategies to negotiate social life in a convoluted post-
terror environment, and that they draw on various resources to facilitate this exercise.  
This in many ways resonates with findings from research on ‘victims’ of violence, 
which have highlighted their agentive efforts to remake social worlds after violence 
(see Green 1999, Das 2007).  Interestingly, the former insurgents who participated in 
this research placed an overwhelming emphasis on the practical and material aspects 
of recreating sociality after terror, as opposed to that of moral reparation. This 
diverges from arguments put forward by scholars highlighting the crucial necessity of 
moral reparation in the recovery of social relationships after wrongdoing (see Urban-
Walker 2006, Griswald 2007).  The ‘perpetrators’ of violence who participated in this 
research conveyed through their narratives that life after violence for them was about 
the pragmatic task of ‘getting on with business of living’ (with their past). 
 
 
Academic Reflections on post-Bheeshanaya Southern Sri Lanka 
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As mentioned earlier in this thesis, anthropological studies on the 
Bheeshanaya overall are lacking, and have been sidelined in favour of studies on the 
internecine conflict between the Sri Lankan Government and Tamil militants in the 
North and East.  The few studies that do exist on the Bheeshanaya predominantly 
focus on the experiences of survivors (i.e., ‘victims’ of violence) who lost loved ones 
to violence, and I briefly review some of this work here.  The lived experience of ex-
insurgent survivors of violence is a glaring gap in the existing knowledge base on 
post-terror southern Sri Lanka.  Anthropological research on survivors of the 
Bheeshanaya emerged around the mid-1990s and at the turn of the century.  Much of 
this work homes in on the stories of female survivors of the Bheeshanaya, raising a 
whole host of interesting issues.  Perera’s work is by far the most extensive here (see 
Perera 1995, 1998, 1999, 2001).  Focussing on the multiple concerns of those women 
who lost family members to the violence of the Bheeshanaya, he highlights issues 
around harassment and stigma, psychological trauma, problems of escalating poverty, 
and guilt (1998, 1999).  He further looks at the use of spirit possession and popular 
religion as a socially acceptable means of dealing with experiences of violence in the 
immediate post-terror environment (2001); and emphasises issues of prolonged justice 
and desires for revenge in an environment of impunity where ‘perpetrators’ and 
‘victims’ must live in close proximity to each other, as well as the social problems 
related to mourning in the absence of bodies (1995, 2001).  
Argenti-Pillen (2003) analyses the discourses of female survivors of violence 
within the context of spirit possession, contending that ambiguous terms and tactics of 
avoidance in discourse allow people to distance themselves from the experience of 
terror.  She argues that women reconstruct their worlds and interrupt the cycle of 
violence through culturally specific narratives based on the belief of yakku (the wild) 
and spirit possession.  Her work has been criticised for its “unquestioning faith in 
‘tradition’ ” that has clouded her ability to see the detrimental effect that this system 
of belief and rituals has on women, in terms of constraining and disciplining them 
(see De Alwis 2004: 105).  Argenti-Pillen’s (2003) study also raises some 
methodological and ethical problems, mainly concerning trust, anonymity and 
confidentiality.  For example, she breaches consent when she publishes a transcript 
that details an experience that her research participant has asked her specifically to 
omit from the final written text.  Not only is the narrative detailed at length, but also 
included is the request by the research participant, “Don’t write this down…if they 
happen to see your book they will say that we told you.  If they see your book, they 
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would be angry again.  We don’t need those things now” (2003: 58).  In another 
instance, a photograph of a research participant has directly beneath it a quote from 
her interview, which relates the picture to her narrative, thereby raising concerns for 
anonymity, confidentiality, and the safety of research participants, given the sensitive 
nature of the subject (2003: 133). 
When we consider anthropological studies on the aftermath of violence in 
South Asia overall, we find valuable and thought-provoking studies on Tamil 
survivors of violence in Sri Lanka (Kanapathipillai 1990), Sikh survivors of the 1984 
Delhi riots and survivors of the Partition in India (Das 2007), survivors of the 
Bombay riots (Chatterji and Mehta 2007), and survivors of Hindu-Muslim violence in 
Hyderabad in 1990 (Kakar 1996) to name just a few.  These studies have thrown up 
important findings on how survivors of violence remake their lives in the aftermath, 
and on the nature of the post-violence environment itself.  Scholars have emphasised 
the intimate relationship between violence, fear, and silence that permeates long after 
the actual violent event, and further of the absorption of past violence into the 
ordinary and everyday, post-terror.  As Das eloquently puts it, past violence “attaches 
itself to the ordinary as if there were tentacles that reach out from the everyday and 
anchor the event to it” (2007: 7).  ‘Victims’ of violence, have further been shown to 
recreate their everyday lives through a descent into the everyday, which in itself is an 
act of agency, despite our tendency to think of agency as an escape from the ordinary 
(Das 2007: 4).  My research on the experiences of ‘perpetrators’ of violence post-
terror, found many parallels with that of ‘victims’ as highlighted in existing studies, as 
we shall see through the course of this chapter.  In the existing literature on the 
aftermath of violence in South Asia overall too we see that the experiences of those 
who have engaged in violence have been overlooked in preference for survival stories 
of ‘victims’ of violence.40  This chapter then provides a fresh and important 
perspective to knowledge on reconstructing everyday life after violence.  
 
 
Returning Home  
 
                                                      
40 Das (2007) while not directly carrying out research with those responsible for violence against Sikhs in the 1984 Delhi riots, 
nevertheless attempts to understand what drove their violence. Kakar’s (1996) work on the aftermath of the Hindu-Muslim riots 
in Hyderabad includes the views of some who directly engaged in the violence. However, neither of these studies pays focussed 
attention to the experiences of ‘perpetrators’ in the aftermath of violence, nor of how they recreate their lives. Das’s interest is 
placed squarely on ‘victims’ of the 1984 Delhi riots and the Partition, while Kakar focuses more on the psychological 
foundations of inter-ethnic violence, exploring issues such as Hindu-Muslim identity, religious stereotyping, and ethnocentric 
histories. 
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Before moving on to consider ex-insurgents’ narratives of their return home 
from detention or hiding, let us take a brief look back at the nature of the immediate 
post-terror environment that awaited their return.41 By 1991, the insurrection had been 
brutally crushed by the state almost as suddenly as it had begun, at the cost of tens of 
thousands of lives, and the JVP as a political movement had been practically 
decimated.42  The Government still led by the UNP, now turned its full attention to 
fighting the war with the LTTE, which continued to rage in the North and East, and to 
grapple with an economy that had been dealt a severe blow by both insurrections (in 
the North led by the LTTE, and in the South by the JVP).  Many of the communities 
that insurgents were returning to were fractured by violence, loss, and betrayal.  In the 
absence of justice and any formal reconciliation, ‘victims’, ‘perpetrators’, and 
‘witnesses’ were forcibly “locked within the necessity of cohabitation” (Soyinka 
2004: 475).  The spaces that people had to share with their denouncers, torturers, and 
their victims, were pregnant with memories of terror and betrayal.  
Perera’s (2001) work on how ordinary people coped with terror is situated in 
the immediate aftermath of the Bheeshanaya.  It is largely based on local newspaper 
reports from the early 1990s recounting stories of supernatural activity and ghostly 
sightings emanating from spaces where specific acts of violence took place during the 
Terror.  We thereby see that spaces of violent death were clearly marked by the 
community.  We are told of one young man suffering shock after seeing a frightening 
ghostly black dog with fireball eyes standing on its hind legs at the specific place in 
which four bodies were set on fire (2001: 172).  Further, both a guesthouse and a 
library that had functioned as torture chambers during the Bheeshanaya also reported 
supernatural activity, such as screams through the night and books being thrown about 
by unseen forces (2001: 173).  Perera argues this to be an expression of the desire for 
justice, and part of communities’ own “healing” mechanism in the aftermath of terror.  
In many ways, this situation reflects the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward and 
famine in China as set out by Mueggler (2001).  He has similarly shown ghost stories 
featuring those who died, to voice demands for justice and express ideas of revenge 
post-violence.  In the wake of the Bheeshanaya too, persistent haunting memories 
worked against the silence and amnesia that surrounded the violence.   
                                                      
41 The vast majority of young people, particularly from the rural areas, spent months and even years in hiding at the height of the 
Bheeshanaya through fear of abduction or detention, while others were detained by the state.   
42 All but one member of the JVP politburo had been murdered by counter-insurrectionary forces. The JVP leader Rohana 
Wijeweera was killed by UNP Government forces in 1989. Somawansa Amarasingha was the only member of the original JVP 
leadership to survive, having evaded capture and going into exile in the UK. He returned to Sri Lanka in 2001 to take up 
leadership of the revamped JVP that was now in the political mainstream.  
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While Perera’s work was situated in the immediate wake of the Terror, my 
research was carried out nearly 20 years after the Bheeshanaya.  I did not come across 
any stories of supernatural activity harking back to that era.  In her aptly titled edited 
work Ghosts of Memory, Carsten has argued that ghostly sightings and strange 
hauntings signify people’s sense of connection to the past, reflecting “losses that are 
excessive, or circumstances in which those who bear them are not resigned to giving 
up their attachments” (2007: 13).  This explanation may help shed some light on the 
context of this research.  During my time in the field, I came across stories of a 
different kind also emanating from the Bheeshanaya and carrying powerful 
undertones of moral justice and accountability for violence.  These were stories 
framed in the Buddhist ethical framework of karma that featured clearly identified 
wrongdoers suffering the negative consequences of their past actions in the aftermath 
of the Terror.  They will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.  For our 
purposes here, drawing on Carsten’s argument we may assume the dissipation of 
ghost stories to result from the passage of time and the gradual changes in the process 
of grieving that this brings.  In one sense, it signifies a sense of ‘letting go’ of 
attachments.  However, in another sense, the prevalence of karmic stories that appear 
to have replaced the ghost stories that marked the immediate wake of the 
Bheeshanaya, reflect the continuing legacy of trauma and signify an un-reconciled 
past.  Moreover, it highlights the powerful impact that memories of violence have on 
the present everyday, and suggests a deep-seated, lingering desire for justice and 
revenge.  Nevertheless, the post-terror environment I worked in did share some 
similarities with the immediate one in which Perera’s work is located, particularly in 
terms of the permeation of fear and silence, of past memories lurking beneath the 
surface of everyday life, and of suppressed animosity and desires for revenge in the 
absence of justice or reconciliation.  
 What was an insurgent, fresh from months or sometimes years in hiding or 
detention, to do?  And how was he to live again (to borrow the words of the former 
insurgent Ananda, who opened this chapter)?  Ananda’s statement reflects the 
ambiguous thoughts and emotions that accompanied many insurgents in the early 
days of their return home.  I was often told by former insurgents reflecting on this 
particular experience, that the initial feelings of euphoria at being set free soon gave 
way to the harsh reality of the task of rebuilding their lives, that lay ahead of them.  
For many returning ex-insurgents like Ananda, facing the enormity of their recent 
experiences, concern about the reaction of their communities, along with pragmatic 
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worries about the future, were aspects of this harsh reality that they were now left 
with.  Some men were returning to young wives and small children that they had been 
separated from, and with this came an acknowledgement of the suffering that their 
families had endured due to their absence.  The stark realisation of the impact of 
violence on their education, career prospects, and social standing (due to the stigma 
attached to the now discredited JVP), among other things, made the future seem 
somewhat bleak and the task that lay ahead of them, enormous.  
 
 
Getting a Job  
 
Rebuilding livelihoods was generally emphasised by former insurgents as 
being the first step in the exercise of rebuilding lives after violence.  However, in the 
immediate aftermath of the Bheeshanaya many remembered the stigma attached to 
the JVP insurgent as posing an obstacle here with its potential to frighten off 
prospective employers.  Large gaps in employment history (due to time spent in 
hiding or detention) also caused suspicion among recruiters.  The reaction of some 
former insurgents to what they saw as the continual negative impact of the 
Bheeshanaya on their livelihoods and futures was evident during my fieldwork.  On 
separate occasions, I had agreed to assist two ex-insurgent friends in writing up their 
CVs.  They were both desperate to find employment in the Middle East due to the dire 
economic situation in Sri Lanka (particularly the lack of employment opportunities 
and unbearable cost of living).  Both got visibly upset and frustrated as we struggled 
to fill in the glaring time-gaps in the ‘career history’ sections of their CV when we 
came to the years covering their time in detention and hiding.   
The majority of former insurgents I spoke to lamented what they saw as the 
destruction or disruption of their education, and with it their future prospects (e.g., 
career and social status prospects) due to the Bheeshanaya.  They claimed that the 
Bheeshanaya continued to plague them throughout their lives and depicted it as 
having the power to restructure their present and future.  Many former insurgents had 
clear imaginings of alternative futures for themselves, in the absence of past violence.  
Almost all of those ex-insurgents who had not received a university education told me 
that one would have automatically followed, resulting in successful white-collar jobs, 
accompanied by a higher social status and material comfort - possibly in a Western 
‘developed’ country.  “I wouldn’t then have to live this life of suffering and poverty”; 
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“I would have a good job in an A/C (air-conditioned) office and be earning a big 
salary if I had been able to finish school and get my degree”; and “I would be living 
abroad by now”, were common statements (extracted from various interviews) of 
missed opportunities and alternative futures imagined by former insurgents continuing 
to grapple with rebuilding lives and livelihoods after violence.  Ex-insurgents then 
portrayed the experience of violence as having restructured their lives and altered the 
flow of time and future.  
In depicting the Bheeshanaya as a life-shaping event and by using it to explain 
developments in their later life, former insurgents demonstrated the significant 
meaning and power they attached to this event.  Many identified the Bheeshanaya as 
the root cause of their failure to reach certain social and material aspirations in life, 
and used it as a lens through which to understand their everyday lives after violence.  
Loizos in his study on the forced migration of Greek Cypriots, reflects on a similar 
question about the consequences of one severe event (i.e., displacement) and its 
disruption of people’s “steady state assumptions” (2008: 118), on the social lives of 
his research participants.  He surmises that while the question is easy to pose, it is 
impossible to answer (2008: 132).  
Shehan is a former insurgent who left the JVP in disillusionment shortly after 
his release from detention.  While appearing excessively confident and ‘tough’ on the 
outside, on the inside Shehan seemed depressed and constantly blamed his 
involvement in the JVP for the economic difficulties he endured in the present.  He 
frequently talked about where his life would have been had it not been for his 
involvement in the JVP during the Bheeshanaya.  His narrative extract below 
illustrates the immediate concerns of newly returned insurgents in the wake of the 
Bheeshanaya.  It further shows us how they went about the business of getting a job 
as that all important first step in rebuilding their lives.  His narrative overall is tinged 





When I came back I had problems.  Mainly about finding a job.  I couldn’t think 
of what to do.  My education had been disrupted (kaḍā kappal).  So ... I went 
through a relative to get a job as a parking warden.  I told them my background, 
but it wasn’t a problem for them because the boss was a cousin and knew me 
from the village.  I was in that job for two years.  I then wrote a letter to Brig. 
Ajith (the Commanding Officer of his rehabilitation centre) explaining that due 
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to my detention my education had been destroyed and asked him please to find 
me a stable job…  So then he put me forward for the army.  I passed all the 
interviews and the medical test.  I was offered a position but … I couldn’t take 
it…My wife didn’t like me going for it.  So I missed that opportunity.  After 
that I felt I couldn’t go back and ask him for help since I hadn’t taken up the 
position he had given me.  My experiences from the Bheeshanaya have had a 
huge effect on my life.  If not for that I could have continued my education and 
been in a permanent job.  I could have gone places in society.  Later when I 
tried to get a job at Y (organisation) they asked me to get a certificate from the 
police.  The letter they (police) gave me said that I was detained for being 
involved in JVP activity and that I was now free.  I got really upset at that.  It’s 




Shehan’s story gives us an insight into how former insurgents manoeuvred their way 
through obstacles that lay in the path of rebuilding livelihoods in the immediate 
aftermath of the Bheeshanaya.  His narrative blends the past with the present, and 
shows his experiences of the Bheeshanaya to entail significant consequences for his 
present and future life.  He attaches powerful meaning to his violent past and blames 
it for his failure to meet specific social and material goals in life.  As Loizos (2008: 
132) has pointed out with reference to his own research participants, it would be 
impossible to predict whether Shehan’s life would have been any different if it had 
not been for the Bheeshanaya. Indeed, to do so would involve fruitless attempts at 
‘fortune-telling’ on my part, and is not of relevance to this study.  But, we may safely 
assume that barriers to achieving his aspirations, posed by social and economic 
discrimination (some of the very issues that formed the basis of the JVP’s 
revolutionary platform) would have remained for Shehan to grapple with even in the 
absence of the Bheeshanaya.  That his violent experiences undoubtedly intensified 
these challenges in many ways is indisputable.  Past violence is represented here as 
casting a dark shadow over the present, and as being experienced through the 
everyday.  Like many other former insurgents, Shehan draws on his experience of the 
Bheeshanaya to comprehend and give meaning to the unfolding of his life overall.  
Shehan’s expectations of time and the future are shown to have been 
significantly disrupted by violence, and he perceives the impact of past violence on 
his life as continuing.  When Shehan faces difficulty in finding work, his kin come to 
his assistance and provide him with employment, accepting him unconditionally, 
regardless of his past.  The strength of kinship ties featured throughout the narratives 
on the Bheeshanaya.  In the preceding chapter, we saw the capacity for kinship ties to 
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transcend the binaries created by the Terror, and in Chapter 3 we saw the crucial role 
that families played in supporting those in detention.  There were also instances where 
families were torn apart by violence and betrayal.  Nevertheless, for some like 
Shehan, kin proved to be a vital source of support in the process of reconstructing 
lives, particularly in the early days. 
The sense of regret and injustice that runs through his narrative is made clear 
when he expresses upset at having to get a reference letter for employers from the 
police, establishing his past.  This letter attaches the label of ‘insurgent’ (with its 
accompanying stigma), bringing the past into the present and impeding the new life 
that he is trying to build.  His upset suggests that he wished his life after the 
Bheeshanaya to be a new chapter, separated from a past that he wanted to leave 
behind.  For Shehan then, rebuilding life with the shadow of his murky past hanging 
over him is a continual process.  Following his work as a parking warden and a stint 
in farm labour, he moved on to work at a small local shop, which he felt offered better 
pay and prospects.  However, this career was brought to an abrupt end when the shop 
was destroyed by the Asian Tsunami in 2004.  Having struggled to find suitable 
employment after this, he resorted to borrowing heavily to pay a hefty sum to a 
dubious local travel agent and headed off to work in the Middle East. 
It is interesting that Shehan turned to the Commanding Officer of his 
rehabilitation centre for assistance in finding employment in the early days of his 
return to the village, and that the former offered him employment.  This apparent 
irony of former insurgents seeking assistance from those who detained them is not 
unusual.  Kirihami, whose story features below, also turned to the counter-
insurrectionary officer who ran the detention centre in which he was tortured.  He 




Major Mahinda (Commanding Officer of his detention centre) gave us his card 
with his phone number. He told us to call him any time, and that if ever we were 
in trouble he will help us.  He also told us to stay out of trouble, to not get 
involved in these kinds of things…  In school I had done an army training 
programme.  So I knew about the army.  The two of us who were taken to the 
camp got together with two other boys from the neighbouring village and called 
Major Mahinda, and explained (to him) that we would like to join the army.  At 
the end of 1989 when the JVP was coming to an end, we joined the army.  I had 
the capabilities to go in at Officer rank.  But I joined as a normal soldier.  Now 
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looking back, I think I joined the army as a means of saving myself from the 




Kirihami pragmatically considers his options in the wake of the Bheeshanaya and 
decides upon a career in the security forces, based on his familiarity with the army 
through a training programme he followed at school.  For this Kirihami then turns to 
his torturer for assistance with rebuilding his livelihood and with his help goes on to 
join the army.  He creates a new career for himself with the death of his old one - 
signified here with the decimation of the JVP.  By telling me of his capacity to “go in 
at Officer rank”, Kirihami attempts to project a particular picture of the ‘JVP 
insurgent’ - one with skills and capabilities, willing to position himself at the bottom 
rung of the career ladder in order to work his way up through sheer hard work.  This 
image defies the negative stereotype of the JVP insurgent in the environment in which 
he lived.  This stereotype largely saw the kinds of people who became JVP insurgents 
as ‘uneducated’, ‘country-bumpkins’ (gamē goḍē), and ‘good for nothings’ who went 
on the rampage, inflated by ‘the power of the gun’. 
Kirihami says that he joined the army to “save himself” from the “problems” 
of the Bheeshanaya.  He told me elsewhere that various local JVP leaders were trying 
to make contact with him following his release from detention, in a bid to persuade 
him to re-join efforts to fight the counter-insurrection.  This had proved somewhat 
tempting, but also threatened his very survival and relationship with his family, which 
was by now closely monitoring his behaviour in a bid to prevent him from falling in 
with insurgents once again.  Proactively seeking work in the army then was a means 
through which Kirihami could cut ties with the JVP and his past therein, as well as an 
opportunity to recreate his life.  However, this did not mean that he was leaving 
behind his past experiences of violence.  Kirihami understood this career move to be 
an important step not only in recreating a life for himself, but also as his salvation.  
His story featuring the compassionate counter-insurrectionary officer makes us reflect 
on the need to abstain from passing hasty moral judgements on those who perpetrate 
violence, and on the capacity of human beings to show both brutality and compassion 
in situations of extreme violence (see Browning 2001, Levi 1988). 
 
 
Re-building Social Relationships and Dealing with Stigma 
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Along with economic problems and the challenges of rebuilding livelihoods, 
restoring their relationship with the community was one of the most significant 
concerns expressed by former insurgents.  Their relationship with, and place in, their 
communities in many ways lay at the foundation of reconstructing their worlds.  
Suspicion, secret animosity, and fear were legacies of the Bheeshanaya that severed 
the ties that held communities together.  As we saw in Chapter 2, neighbours 
denouncing each other to either the JVP or state security forces often on the basis of 
petty squabbles, opportunists exploiting the climate of terror for their own ends, and 
people exacting violence against their neighbours, all had to live together.  Former 
insurgents then were often returning to share the same, small awkward spaces with 
their denouncers and torturers, and those against whom they themselves had 
perpetrated violence.  The long-term destruction of community ties and sociality is a 
consequence of violence that has been highlighted in much of the research on 
‘victims’ of violence (see Kakar 1996, Das 2007, Chatterji and Mehta 2007, Mehta 
and Chatterji 2001). Mehta and Chatterji contend that what remains of violence is a 
“multiplicity of fractured communities” each charting their way through their own 
strategies of survival (2001: 202).  The narratives in this chapter show individual ex-
insurgents to exercise considerable agency in devising their own strategies to rebuild 
sociality after violence within their fractured communities.  What is striking about 
these accounts is the emphasis former insurgents place on practical repair, as opposed 
to acts of moral reparation.    
The community reception of returning JVP insurgents varied, depending on 
context, and factors such as the severity and dynamics of violence in the locality (and 
the behaviour of local JVP insurgents during the Bheeshanaya).  I was told of 
instances where rejection by the community was so severe as to force ex-insurgents 
out of their home communities altogether, while others found this process to be 
somewhat more successful. The majority of former insurgents told me stories 
involving efforts on their parts to rebuild social relationships.  Consider the case of 
Kanchana, a former insurgent who spent many years in hiding. Kanachana told me 
that upon returning to his home village he went back to his career as a sports 
instructor. This extract from Kanchana’s interview shows the kinds of practical 
strategies that former insurgents put into action in order to re-seal fractured 
relationships within their communities.  
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With my return to the village I left the JVP. Some people in the village looked 
at me with animosity (vapara). Others didn’t react either way. And those who 
supported the JVP treated me like a hero…When I came back (to the village) 
from the very beginning I actively took steps to alleviate people’s fear of me 
and any bad opinion they had of my character. When I came back I quickly built 
friendly (suhada) relationships with people and helped them. I spoke well to 
everyone. When I saw people from my village standing outside the sports 
complex I would make the effort to go up to them…to show them around …and 
would help them out... I would give them a discount, or just take whatever they 
offered me (for coaching their children). When I was coaching I would make a 
special effort to be nice to my students, especially those whose parents were 
wary of me. I would call them “duwa” (daughter) “putā” (son), because then I 
knew that they would go home and tell their parents that I am a good person. So 
I took action from the very start. Even UNP supporters in my village started 




Upon returning to his village, Kanchana actively sets about re-creating a new life for 
himself. He leaves the JVP, reclaims his career, and puts in place a well-thought out 
strategy to rebuild social relationships and trust damaged by violence. The 
reconstruction of community relationships is pivotal to his efforts to remake his life 
after terror. He makes attempts to change community perceptions of him from violent 
insurgent to helpful, upstanding member of the community. He is well aware of the 
long-lasting damage done to community relationships and his own reputation as a 
result of violence, and realises the effort needed on his part to repair this damage and 
regain the trust of his neighbours, even at cost to himself (e.g., foregoing full payment 
for his services).  
The extent to which he has consciously thought through his strategy to 
recreate social relationships in his community is evident in his statement, “I would 
make a special effort to be nice to my students. Especially those whose parents were 
wary of me. I would call them ‘duwa’ (daughter), ‘putā’ (son) because I knew that 
they would go home and tell their parents that I am a good person”. In the aftermath 
of Terror, Kanchana then saw himself as an active agent who put in place proactive 
strategies to recreate sociality after violence, exploiting the resources that he had at 
hand. His efforts to rebuild his life after terror are focussed on the pragmatic. They 
entail practical and material acts of repair. This was a feature that was evident across 
the narratives of former insurgents.  
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In the narrative below, Prema (another former insurgent) echoes Kanchana’s 
efforts in carving out a public and practical role for himself in his home community, 
situated here in the communal realm of village societies and the temple, rather than 
seeking forgiveness or making amends. Prema is an old ex-insurgent farmer who 
remained a JVP supporter during the time of his participation in this research. During 
the Bheeshanaya, Prema was detained and tortured for several years by the state. In 
his narrative below, Prema sheds more light on the concerns that newly returned 
insurgents were faced with, in particular on the challenge of earning acceptance of 




When I came back to the village after 2 years it was a big change for me. It was 
a new environment even for me, because I had been away so long. I didn’t 
really have community related problems because ...I had also helped people in 
the village. But I had significant economic problems. One or two people looked 
at me with animosity (vapara), like I was some new strange animal (amutu 
satek) in the village. But … I started getting involved in village societies and 
temple activity then I slowly started engaging with people again. So there were 
no major problems there. But I had major economic and personal problems. I 
had a small child and a new wife who were left behind with no means of 
livelihood. Also, my wife was new to my village and wasn’t familiar with the 
people or the environment. She struggled to bring up our daughter in those days. 
I had some paddy fields that she sold. Also, my father had died just days before 
I was taken away … So my main problems were economic problems. I still had 




 Prema’s story is located in the mundane and pragmatic, and his work to reformulate 
life after violence features the personal and the family, as well as his village 
community. He talks about his economic problems, concerns for his family, and 
reception by his community, highlighting the multiple challenges facing those who 
returned home in the aftermath of terror. Return to his family brings with it an 
acknowledgment of the impact of his incarceration on them and immediate practical 
concerns about economically supporting his family. The need to find work is urgent, 
and he goes for the option that is available and familiar to him from before the 
insurrection, which is rice farming.  
Prema’s story in many ways reflects Kelly’s (2008) findings on his research 
concerning West Bank Palestinians’ search for the mundane and ordinary during the 
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violence of the second Intifada. Kelly argues that this search for the ordinary amidst 
conflict emerged from a “practical engagement with the obligations of kinship, and 
the desire to produce and provide for their families” (2008: 371). In a similar vein we 
find that Prema’s focus on the mundane and practical (in this case after violence) also 
appears to have emanated from pragmatic concerns about unreconciled obligations to 
provide for himself and his family. Similar to the West Bank Palestinians featured in 
Kelly’s research then, for Prema his search for the ordinary illustrated “an inherently 
ethical attempt to [re]inhabit the world” (2008: 371). 
For Prema, having to face up to these new and urgent responsibilities is 
coupled with having to manage neighbours’ perceptions of him and the challenges of 
resealing ties with his village community. That his neighbours gawped at him as 
though he was some “strange animal” suggests hostility, and he goes on to say that 
some expressed outright animosity towards him. But he gets involved in community 
affairs and in the work of the village Buddhist temple. These offer socially acceptable 
means through which to interact with neighbours and to claim a position in his 
community. The Buddhist temple is important here, as it provides a safe environment 
in which to rebuild relationships with neighbours again, and his acceptance by the 
temple automatically sets the precedent for acceptance by the village. Through a 
demonstration of community-spirit and of dedication to the spiritual life of the village, 
he makes inroads into being accepted once again by those in his village. He went on 
to tell me that he was now on good terms with everyone in his community, but that his 
work in the village was continual. This was something I witnessed myself. Our 
interview was constantly interrupted by various people from the village coming into 
his house to seek advice about village-related issues, such as local religious events.43 
However, it is important to note here, that the social relationships that people like 
Prema rebuilt, and the everyday they reclaimed, were not the same as that before the 
Bheeshanaya. The everyday that was ‘reclaimed’ after violence by former insurgents 
was an altered one, based on new meanings, memories of loss, and new forms of 
knowledge (see Das 2007, Chatterji and Mehta 2007, Mehta and Chatterji 2001). 
The majority of former insurgents told me that their reception from the local 
community was mixed. A common statement was that some people had looked to 
them as heroes (vīrayō) while others would look at them with animosity (vapara). 
Some withdrew from the community altogether, while others like Prema and 
Kanchana put in place carefully thought out practical strategies to meet these 
                                                      
43 During such interruptions I would the change topic and pretend that I was carrying out a study on rural farming practices. 
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challenges head on and to rebuild relationships with their respective communities. 
Sometimes, these strategies failed to bring about the desired result. Kirihami, an ex-
insurgent who had broken all contact with the JVP soon after his release from 
detention, also told me of proactive efforts to rebuild sociality and carve out a space 
for himself in his home community. His strategy involved throwing himself into 
village youth activities and taking on a leadership role therein, in a bid to rebuild his 
life. His narrative is interesting in that it shows the process of reconstructing life after 
violence to be ongoing and continuous, and the mundane realm in which he anchored 




I soon began to realise that young people (in the village) were not turning up for 
my (youth) meetings. When I finally questioned some of them (about this), they 
were embarrassed and said that their families did not allow them to come 
because they didn’t like them having any involvement with me. I decided at that 
point to resign. If people think like that then they don’t want my services. Since 
then the societal belief (samāja mathaya) is that I am still a ‘JVP kāraya’44 – 
mainly among the older generation. This really struck me again recently. A few 
weeks ago I went with my wife to the bank. A man who knows me from my 
village saw me and said ‘Ah…this is the JVP kāraya isn’t it! (Ah mē JVP kāraya 
nē!). [Looks upset and stares into the distance]. It’s been 20 years since the 
period of chaos (kalabala kālaya). I haven’t been a (JVP) party member or 
worked for the party (since then). I am stunned (pudumai) that people still think 
of me like that. I was not hurt but I decidedly told myself such is the mental 
development of people here still. (So) like that I have experienced a few 




Local youth affairs may not have been the wisest choice of vehicle through which to 
endear oneself to neighbours, given the negative connotations around ‘youth’ during 
the Bheeshanaya. The restrictions placed by parents in his village on their children 
regarding their attendance of his youth events give us a sense of the sheer extent of 
mistrust and animosity that permeated community relationships in the wake of the 
Terror. Memories of past violence, and the fear, animosity, and suspicion they entail 
linger beneath the surface of the everyday for years, even decades, creeping into 
mundane social interactions when least expected, such as a chance meeting outside 
the local bank. Despite the silence and apparent forgetting on the surface, the 
                                                      
44 Karaya is a derogatory term that refers to ‘person’ 
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behaviour of Kirihami’s neighbours towards him suggests that people (particularly 
those who lived through the Terror) continue to feel anger at having to live with those 
they perceive to have ‘blood on their hands’, and shows the importance attached to 
remembering the violent past. It further shows the ways in which memories of past 
violence continue to inflect and shape everyday sociality in the present. In the absence 
of appropriate justice and reconciliation, people draw on whatever means available to 
them to punish ‘wrongdoers’ (e.g., through ostracism, derogatory name-calling).  
Kirihami’s neighbour still refers to Kirihami as “JVP kāraya” almost twenty 
years on from the Bheeshanaya. The Bheeshanaya retrenched the identity of the 
insurgent - the “JVP kāraya”, and this label is one, which proves difficult to shake off. 
Kirihami’s narrative illustrates the stigma attached to the JVP insurgent and the power 
of accompanying negative labels, that continued to haunt the former insurgent years 
after the Terror. That the stigma and label are difficult to shake off is understood by 
Kirihami, and (as I could see) clearly continue to cause him upset, despite him telling 
me that he did not feel hurt by the slight. Dealing with such obstacles is part of the 
continuous work he must do in reconstructing the everyday after terror. Just as in the 
early days following the Bheeshanaya he dealt with the village boycott of his youth 
work through withdrawal by resignation, here he consoles himself by philosophising 
on the (lack of) intelligence of his neighbours. These psychological and physical 
strategies are tools he uses to negotiate life after terror. 
Memories of violence had the power to keep communities divided long after 
the Terror. For some ex-insurgents, rejection from the community was so severe as to 
make life within it unbearable, forcing them to move out of the community altogether. 
Consider the story of Nikhil, a former JVP insurgent leader who is now a lawyer. 
Nikhil spent several years being tortured in detention. When he returned to his village, 
he was met with intense hostility due to his role in the insurgency. As well as giving 
us a glimpse into the factors that fuelled ordinary people’s animosity towards 
insurgents returning to live with them, Nikhil’s narrative also shows us the ways in 
which ex-insurgents then managed such animosity and negotiated their way through 




Without a doubt the village people looked at me with animosity. Particularly the 
families of those who had been killed. They thought, “our son, our brother died, 
and you lived”. And their upset is justified. The families of those boys felt that I 
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as a leader survived, and they blamed me for their deaths. I didn’t know that I 
would survive. If I knew that they would die, I would never have led them into 
that. I couldn’t stay in the village for a long time. They didn’t let me. They 
ostracised me (pilihul kalā), and on many occasions reduced me to tears…So I 
had to move from the village and came here… Now all that is forgotten and 
there is no problem. Our people forget easily…Even now people from my own 
village don’t give me their (legal) cases. No person who did 1980s JVP was 
ever treated as a hero when they came back to the village. But in my mind I was 
a hero. Even if no one else thinks I am.  No one appreciated what we did, not 
even our own party. No one thinks about the sacrifices we made, how I was 
forced to live in hiding, how I sacrificed my education, and how I spent time in 
prison, all for the benefit of the country. Even our party leaders don’t care. Now 
you get wrongdoers living freely (väradikaruvō nidällē häsirenavā). But there 
are no problems about people like that living among others in the villages. All 





Nikhil’s narrative is littered with contradictions and reflects the imperfect nature of 
memory. It shows how violent memories continue to haunt and divide communities, 
beneath the veneer of silence and amnesia. These memories allow space for secret 
grudges and desires for revenge to be harboured. When Nikhil returns to his village, 
he comes face to face with the sense of injustice that members of his community feel 
at having those they perceive as wrongdoers, roaming free. Despite Nikhil believing 
that he paid penance by spending time in prison (detention), his neighbours beg to 
differ, and in their eyes justice has not been done. Their desire for retribution leads 
them to mete out their own form of punishment, directed at those they perceive to be 
responsible for violence against their loved ones. In the absence of appropriate official 
justice, ordinary members of the community draw on whatever means available to 
punish transgressors in their own communities – in this case by ostracising Nikhil to 
the extent of forcing him out of the community altogether.  
In his narrative, Nikhil attempts to downplay the power of memories of 
violence and their impact on social relationships. Contrary to the evidence that 
surrounds him, Nikhil tells me (and seems to want to believe) that people have 
forgotten the Bheeshanaya (and presumably his own actions therein), and that things 
are back to ‘normal’ as before the Terror. However, almost in the same breath he 
contradicts this statement by saying that members of his natal community still refuse 
to give him their legal cases. He also later told me that he feels unable to visit his 
natal village due to hostility from neighbours and some members of his family, 
because of his involvement in insurrectionary activity. This shows the capacity of 
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memories of past violence to disrupt sociality in the present. Almost two decades after 
the Bheeshanaya then, despite silence and apparent forgetting on the surface, ordinary 
people seem keen to ensure that its memory is kept alive in ethical terms, and that 
‘wrongdoers’ are held to account.  
Nikhil rejects moral responsibility for violence by emphasising the altruistic 
and selfless motives that apparently underpinned his actions. His denial could be 
interpreted as a form of self-consolation and an important aspect of remembering the 
self in moral terms. It is a survival strategy that he uses to continue his work of 
reconstruction, uninterrupted by discomforting memories of his own complicity in 
unethical acts.  
Nikhil represented himself as a devout Buddhist, and as we shall see in the 
next chapter, he rationalised and made sense of his violent past through a framework 
of Buddhist ethics. Here, he appears to implicitly draw on the notion of intent that 
precedes one’s volitional act, which is afforded prominence in Buddhist ethical 
philosophy, to deal with the issue of moral accountability for violence. According to 
Buddhist ethical tradition, the moral value of an action and thereby the karmic 
consequences (negative or positive) that follow are dependent on the intent of the 
agent. As Gethin explains it, “the only criterion for judging whether an act is ‘moral’ 
(kusala) or ‘immoral’ (akusala) in …Buddhist thought is the intention that motivates 
it” (2004: 167).  Nikhil intimates that because his motivations were altruistic his 
actions cannot be construed as immoral. This is a means through which he rejects 
moral responsibility for past violence. Through this interpretation of Buddhist ethics, 
Nikhil then communicates his ‘innocence’, which in turn implies the irrelevance of 
engaging in acts of moral repair after terror. However, this runs contrary to the 
implicit acknowledgement of moral responsibility that former insurgents (including 
Nikhil himself, as we shall see in the next chapter) engaged in, through claims they 
made about suffering the negative karmic consequences of their past actions in their 
present lives. For our purposes here it is interesting to note how Nikhil draws on 
Buddhist ethics to reconstruct his past and deal with issues of culpability in the 
aftermath of violence.  
By telling me about his altruistic motives and the sacrifices that he as an 
insurgent made “for the benefit of the country”, he also engages in a particular moral 
representation of the kind of JVP insurgent he was. Nikhil refashions the ‘JVP 
insurgent’ as a selfless martyr, acting with the altruistic aims of benefiting all of 
mankind. Through this reconstruction, he attempts to counter the negative stereotype 
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of the JVP insurgent. It is ironic that Nikhil grumbles that “wrongdoers” roam free. 
He clearly does not perceive himself as having been one, despite the reaction towards 
him by members of his community suggesting otherwise.  
Nikhil’s story of alienation from one’s home community was not an isolated 
case. Dasa, another former insurgent who had since left the JVP, had been a local 
leader during the Terror. He complained to me that he continued to face hostility from 
his neighbours. Upon his return from hiding Dasa decided to withdraw from 
community life into the security of his home and family, while still physically living 
in his home village. His attempts at rebuilding his life after terror were shaped by 
memories of betrayal by neighbours who had readily denounced him to the counter-
insurrectionary forces during the Bheeshanaya, and by feelings of being surrounded 
by those he mistrusted. Dasa told me that as a result of the actions of those in his 
community during the Bheeshanaya and their attitude towards him in its aftermath, he 
now avoided non-essential interaction with neighbours, and refused to participate in 
village events such as funerals, weddings, and temple rituals. His physical and 
psychological withdrawal from community life was symbolically illustrated by the 
large concrete wall that he had built around his house, which separated his space from 
that of the community. This was indeed a strange sight in a seemingly close-knit 
village, where people and their yards seemed to spill into each other. 
The continuing animosity of his neighbours and their desires for retribution 
fuelled by memories of past violence, threw obstacles in the path of Dasa’s project to 
reclaim his everyday life. During my time in the field, I came across malicious 
rumours pertaining to the Bheeshanaya and clearly intended for the ears of Dasa and 
his family, that were being circulated in his village. These rumours suggested that 
Dasa’s brother Kollu, an unpopular JVP insurrectionary who was disappeared during 
the Bheeshanaya, had been spotted ‘living it up’ in Europe.45 Dasa was clearly 
distressed by the stories, and incessantly questioned why they were being circulated, 
whether there was any truth in them, and why if Kollu was in fact living comfortably 
in Europe, he had not bothered to contact his family. He told me at one point during 




                                                      
45 The country in which Kollu was apparently ‘living it up’ varied according to the rumours. 
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We don’t believe this. He would have been in touch with me or at least written a 
letter to my mother … [looks upset and somewhat stunned, repeats this sentence 
a couple of times]... I don’t know why people would say something like this. He 
was close to my mother. She cried everyday for him until the day she died. He 




The circulation of such malicious rumours shows us the ways in which violent 
memories continue to shape community relationships in the present. The past merges 
with, and is experienced through, the everyday present. Its memory continues to affect 
former insurgents’ projects of reconstruction. Dasa’s manner of traversing this 
disruption to his ongoing work of remaking life is to withdraw further from his 
community into the safety of the domestic realm.  In marked contrast to Dasa’s and 
Nikhil’s experiences of life back in the community, stands Shehan, who lives in a 




When I came back I didn’t have a problem with the village people because most 
of them had visited me in the camp (rehabilitation centre). I was accepted by 
them. Most of the people in my village are my relatives, so there wasn’t a 
problem. Some may have thought of me as a dangerous (darunu) person, but 
they didn’t show it to me. No one from my village denounced me (pavādunna) 
... I didn’t do unjust (asādārana) things to them… We were not fighting against 




Shehan acknowledges his own actions in the past to have paved the way for his 
present positive relationship with his community. However, it is important not to 
downplay the strength of kinship in supporting the process of reintegrating into 
communities after violence. Kinship ties formed the basis of community cohesiveness 
in Shehan’s village. He told me that his family lineage tying him to his village went 
back generations. Practically everyone in his small village, he told me, was related to 
him in some manner through “blood or marriage”. Kinship then played an important 
role in helping Shehan to reformulate his life after the Terror. As well as supporting 
him through detention (as we saw in Chapter 3) and assisting him in rebuilding his 
livelihood, his family facilitated his seamless reintegration to the community by 
accepting him whole-heartedly (despite some reservations). 
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We see in Shehan’s story an attempt to reconstruct the past and in a sense to 
‘set the record straight’ on the Bheeshanaya. While the official narrative and 
collective memory of the Bheeshanaya in general holds the view that JVP violence 
was directed at the Sinhala community as a whole, Shehan here wants to emphasise 
that the insurgents’ ‘fight’ was with an unjust Government, as opposed to ordinary 
Sinhala people. As well as being a means of rejecting moral accountability for 
violence, through these narratives, former insurgents were also engaging in a 
reworking of the past and a refashioning of the self. This in itself was an important 
element of their efforts to come to terms with past violence, and part of their ongoing 
work overall to reconstruct worlds after violence.  
 
 
Practical or Moral Repair after Terror? 
 
The carefully devised strategies that former insurgents (such as Kanchana, 
Nikhil, Kirihami and Prema) put in place focussed on carving out a role in the public 
and impersonal social realm (e.g., taking up prominent positions in temple and village 
societies). Personal attempts at ethical repair, such as apologising for past violence, 
seeking forgiveness, and making amends, are notable for their absence in ex-
insurgents’ narratives. The pragmatic aspects of ‘getting on’ with living life after 
wrongdoing are apparently perceived by those who have perpetrated violence, as 
being of more importance and relevance to recreating sociality in the aftermath, than 
that of moral repair.  
This appears to diverge from arguments put forward by some scholars, which 
offer moral reparation a central position in the restoration of social relationships after 
wrongdoing. Griswald identifies the act of forgiveness as “indispensible” in a “world 
torn by wrongdoing” (2007: epilogue). Similarly, Urban-Walker (2006) highlights the 
importance of repairing moral relationships through the creation or re-establishment 
of hope and trust after wrongdoing. She construes hope and trust (damaged by 
wrongdoing) to be individual and social necessities (2006: 42) that give meaning to 
life, and thereby purports the moral recovery of relationships to be “an unavoidable 
human task” (2006: 6). She further goes on to contend that it falls to the wrongdoer to 
make amends, and that this process should entail an acknowledgment of responsibility 
for wrongdoing, and reparative gestures to redress the wrong.  
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For moral reparation to take place, relevant actors must take ownership of 
such identifiable categories as ‘perpetrators’ and ‘victim’, which is not possible in 
post-Bheeshanaya Sri Lanka where people on the ground reject such mutually 
excusive categories and where the boundaries between them collapse into each other. 
If we were to apply Urban-Walker’s (2006) conditions for making amends to the 
context of the Bheeshanaya, former insurgents would be expected to identify 
themselves as ‘perpetrators’, accept moral responsibility for their actions, express 
repentance, and engage in specific acts of ethical repair to redress their past 
misdemeanours. However, former insurgents refuse to perceive themselves as 
‘wrongdoers’ and have instead consistently positioned themselves as ‘victims’ in their 
narratives, which allows them to distance themselves from, and reject culpability for, 
past violence. As a result we find that the basic conditions necessary to facilitate the 
process of moral reparation after the Bheeshanaya are lacking in the context of post-
terror Sri Lanka (see Urban-Walker 2006, Griswald 2007)  
Such a situation also raises questions as to whether it is fair of us to expect 
former insurgents to repent and make amends, when they do not see themselves as 
having engaged in wrongdoing. Their innocence has been conveyed through a variety 
of narrative strategies employed, from denial, deflection, avoidance and distancing, to 
representation of the self in terms of victimhood and the moral. In the politically and 
ethically charged post-Bheeshanaya context, where a myriad of alternative histories 
compete with each other for ‘truth’ value, and where boundaries between ‘victim’, 
and ‘perpetrator’ remain fuzzy, a straightforward application of moral reparation is 
not an easy task. 
Wilburn further builds on Urban-Walker’s argument by stressing that there 
must be a commitment from the wrongdoer to improve their character and avoid 
repeating the wrong (2007: 4). In the chapter that follows, we come across 
enthusiastic expressions of Buddhist piety in the narratives of former insurgents, and 
portrayals of the self in terms of living virtuous lives after the Bheeshanaya. In one 
sense we may interpret this newfound commitment to living an ethical Buddhist life 
as a sign of reassurance framed in terms of a reformed moral character. This signifies 
a sense of moral discomfort with their past, or at least an acknowledgment of the need 
for some form of ethical reparation in the exercise of rebuilding life after violence. 
However, at the same time it may also serve as a narrative mechanism for asserting a 
discontinuity of self-identity and thereby a means through which ex-insurgents 
distance themselves from violence they may have committed in the past. What former 
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insurgents seem to be telling us through their stories here, is that rebuilding life after 
terror is about the pragmatic work of ‘getting on with the business of living’ with ones 
past. It is an ongoing exercise that does not necessarily entail a reliance on grand 
moral tropes and the personal catharsis that this may offer.   
 
 
Living with ‘Grasses’ in Silence and Forgetfulness 
 
Silence in the wake of violence fulfils various purposes. Green has argued that 
Mayan widows of violence in Guatemala used silence as a survival strategy post-
terror (Green 1999), while in the aftermath of the Partition in India it offered 
protection to women who had been violated, enabling their communities to accept 
them once again (Das 2007: 54). There was something surreal about the unwillingness 
of people to talk about or openly remember the Bheeshanaya, the tranquillity on the 
surface of communities that had suffered horrendous violence, and the nonchalant 
dismissal of this event in ordinary conversations. In their work on the aftermath of the 
Hindu-Muslim riots in Bombay, Mehta and Chatterji similarly comment on an 
everyday present that is moulded through “zones of silence” (2001: 228). My research 
found that while silence automatically stifled open remembering of the Bheeshanaya, 
it did not necessarily follow that silence equated a real forgetting of past violence (or 
forgiveness for that matter). Instead, this silence and apparent amnesia on the surface 
operated as a means of enabling people from various opposing sides to carry on living 
together. Ordinary people often told me that the Bheeshanaya was now forgotten, and 
that there was “no point in remembering those things now”. This suggests an 
underlying general assumption that no positive benefit could be derived from openly 
remembering past violence. 
However, with time, trust, and further probing, I came to realise that the 
violence of the Bheeshanaya was indeed far from forgotten. Memories of past 
violence lingered beneath the surface of the everyday; taking various forms, such as 
hidden animosity, grudges nursed in secrecy, quiet suspicion, and suppressed desires 
for revenge. As we saw in the case of Kirihami earlier in this chapter, past violence 
has the capacity to rear its head unexpectedly and impact on sociality, under the most 
banal circumstances. This, I have suggested, is a challenge that those former 
‘perpetrators’ of violence engaged in rebuilding sociality and reclaiming the 
everyday, must continually negotiate. These findings complement what Das came 
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across in her work on ‘victims’ of the Partition in India, where memories of the event 
had the capacity to “suddenly present themselves without any notice” (2007: 11). 
In the case of post-terror southern Sri Lanka, the silence and forgetfulness 
surrounding this subject had a protective quality to it. It seemed as though it was 
“dangerous to remember”, as one female survivor of the Partition told Das (2007: 54). 
By denying, claiming to forget, and staying silent, people who were surrounded by 
those ‘perpetrators’ of violence, by their ‘victims’, and by denouncers, were 
protecting themselves. But at the same time they were also protecting the social fabric 
of their communities. Justice has been described as “the first condition of humanity” 
(Soyinka 2004: 476) and in its absence, silence and forgetting allowed for 
‘perpetrators’ of violence, opportunists, and denouncers, to reintegrate into their 
communities. In this sense, the silence and memory of the Bheeshanaya was also 
agentive. People chose what they said and what they withheld, and what they openly 
remembered and appeared to forget, in order to protect themselves and to allow 
everyday community life to continue after the Terror. In other words, silence and 
forgetting as well as being influenced by fear and trauma, constituted a pragmatic 
survival mechanism that enabled people to live with their ‘enemies’ (in the absence of 
an alternative) and permitted individuals to carry on with the exercise of 
reconstructing their worlds after terror.  
Many people told me that forgetting past violence was necessary in order to 
live after violence. Nevertheless, it was clear from the large number of conversations I 
had with people that the memories of betrayal and suffering inflicted on themselves, 
their loved ones and communities, could not be easily forgotten nor forgiven, and that 
they had to be lived with instead. Rajitha, an entrepreneur, highlights the role that 
forgetting and silence plays in enabling communities to function in the aftermath of 
terror. Rajitha’s village suffered a high incidence of insurrectionary violence and 
many ordinary villagers with no political affiliation like himself, found themselves 
caught between state violence and that of the JVP. His story illustrates what it was 
like for ordinary people to have to make room for the return of insurgents to their 
communities and to carry on living with them. It is interesting to note that at the 
beginning of our conversation Rajitha claimed dismissively that the Bheeshanaya was 
“now forgotten” and that people lived together in “unity” (ekamutu). It was only after 
some probing that he came out with the story below.  
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People haven’t forgotten what happened. They have a lot of anger underneath 
(hita yaṭa taraha). They don’t show it. How can we forget those things? In my 
area they (the JVP) burned buses, the post office, and killed our GA 
(government agent). Then in the night they came and forced everyone in the 
village to go on an anti-government rally the next day (pelapāli)… We were 
terrified, but had no choice. They …told all the householders except the old and 
the sick to turn up the next day for the protest or they would kill us... We had 
JVP boys holding guns to our backs and pushing us forward from behind. And 
… we had the army and police firing tear gas at us from the front… All of us 
were innocent people caught in the middle. And then army trucks came to pick 
up the protestors, and we started running for our lives. . I remember seeing 
women with their children running madly all over, and people kept falling and 
injuring themselves but they still carried on running. How can we forget those 
things? People know who killed their relatives, and they keep that anger inside. 
Any opportunity they get they will take revenge… But they can’t talk about it… 
We know who they (former JVP insurgents) are in our village. I don’t 
personally engage with them. They hang out in the same crowd with the other 
JVP boys from that time. In the Bheeshanaya people could go straight to the 
army camp and get revenge that way. But now that Bheeshanaya is over we 
can’t do that. We have to live with each other. People have to keep their anger 
(vairaya) inside. A few might come to terms with their anger. They may go to 
temple and listen to sermons (bhana). ... But a lot of people also go to take 




Rajitha’s voice had a very present quality to it. It felt as though he were recounting 
incidents in such detail from two weeks before, rather than from two decades earlier. 
This suggests that the memories of violence and betrayal were still raw and at the 
forefront of ordinary life, rather than being long forgotten. Rajitha clearly affirms the 
necessity of silence and suppression of animosity to enable opposing sides to carry on 
living together after violence when he says, “We have to live with each other”. 
Beneath the thin veil of tranquillity, the foundations of communities damaged by 
violence continue to remain fragile, and community ties are saturated with suspicion, 
desires for revenge, and animosity emanating from past violence.  
As we saw in Chapter 2, a climate of terror provides an opportunity for 
ordinary people to delegate violence to political actors (see Kalyvas 2006) and this is 
clearly recognised by Rajitha. In a post-terror environment such opportunities are 
scarce and people must resort to alternative means to manage their anger and hurt. He 
points to the use of the spirit religion here (e.g., exacting revenge via deities) by some 
to manage the remnants of past violence in a climate of silence and superficial 
forgetting. This has already been researched elsewhere (see Perera 2001, Argenti-
  201  
Pillen 2003). Rajitha further briefly mentions that some people may draw on Buddhist 
teaching as a means of reconciling past violence.  
Former insurgents often had to negotiate everyday sociality with memories of 
past violence and betrayals hanging over them. The initial reluctance of many former 
insurgents to speak to me about their experiences during the Bheeshanaya, they later 
told me, was partly due to fear of repercussions from their torturers and denouncers 
amidst whom they lived. Breaking the silence and openly remembering past violence, 
it would seem, posed a threat to life after terror. One ex-detainee (who was not 
involved in the JVP but detained and tortured on a malicious denunciation by a work 
colleague) told me about how he regularly bumped into his torturer as he went about 
his daily business in his home town. When I asked him how he reacted to these 
chance encounters, his response after an uncomfortable pause was that he put his head 
down and walked on past them. He was careful however, not to do so in a manner that 
may offend the person in question. Many people had to devise various strategies to 
continue sharing the same spaces as their ‘opponents’ in a post-terror environment.  
Let’s turn to the story of Tilak, an ex-insurgent farmer who was tortured and 
detained for several years. He was denounced by his neighbour who lived just a few 
doors away from him. Tilak told me that he experienced a bout of depression when he 
returned home from detention, but that this lifted when he threw himself into re-
organising the JVP. He continues to be an active supporter of the JVP. His story of 




You know, it was someone from my own [his emphasis] village who grassed me 
up (pavādunnā). I know who it is [abrupt, awkward pause]. He still lives here. 
But I think then, if I wasn’t caught I wouldn’t have learned all the things I know 
today about injustice. He did me wrong (eyā maṭa vairayak keruwē), and I think 
if that is good for him, then it is good for me. I learned all that I did in prison 
(detention)…He is now old. I’m very friendly (suhada) with his children. It’s 
because we learned forbearance (ivasīma) from our experiences (during the 
Bheeshanaya) that I don’t have anger (vairaya) towards him … I took the 
correct path because of what I went through. So let him live as he likes, and I 
continue to live, as I like. The village accepts me, and the villagers know what 
type of a person I am and what type of a person he is. If there is any event in the 
village, like a wedding or funeral, I am at the forefront organising it. I am 
constantly put forward by the village to represent it at various things and 
committees… It’s got to the stage where they just put me forward for 
everything. So he knows that – he sees it. He didn’t ask for forgiveness. At first 
I felt anger towards him when I initially returned to the village. But later when I 
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got involved in (JVP) party work that (anger) went away. Now they (the village 




Tilak puts in place a two-pronged strategy to meet the challenges posed by past 
violence to his present efforts to reclaim everyday life. This strategy encompasses a 
psychological aspect involving efforts to understand and give meaning to his violent 
past through a focus on the positive outcomes of his experience in detention. And a 
material aspect wherein he goes about taking proactive and practical steps to carve out 
a public role for himself in the community in a very visible manner. Interestingly, like 
the cases we discussed earlier, his strategy is focussed entirely on the pragmatic 
elements of recreating sociality, as opposed to acts of moral repair.  
Tilak’s story conveys his innocence. He clearly identifies himself as the victim 
here, and focuses on the wrongdoing of his denouncer, rather than reflecting on his 
own involvement in the perpetration of violence.46 He feels that as the victim, he 
should be the object, rather than the agent, of moral reparation (i.e., forgiveness) here. 
Urban-Walker (2006) has argued that wrongdoing damages trust in a relationship, 
which one seeks to rebuild through an act of moral repair such as forgiveness. The 
sense of anger and betrayal that Tilak feels at being denounced by a neighbour and 
‘intimate’ was evident in the body language that accompanied his first sentence, 
“Someone from my own village … grassed me up”.  This statement illustrates the 
“intuitive tie between forgiveness and the moral anger one feels at being unjustly 
treated” that Griswald refers to (Griswald 2007: 39). Griswald construes forgiveness 
as a virtue in the ethical scheme of our imperfect world, which entails moral 
reciprocity. He identifies several conditions that are necessary for the ‘victim’ to 
dispense forgiveness. These include that the wrongdoer acknowledges responsibility 
for the wrong, that she or he repudiates the deed, and that she or he expresses regret 
for it, all of which are dependent on memory and ‘truth’. In a post-terror environment 
such as that of southern Sri Lanka, where blurred boundaries and denial render the 
clear identification of ‘wrongdoers’ and their ‘victims’ impossible, and where 
memory and ‘truth’ remain contested fields charged with powerful ethical and 
political claims, which in turn elicit competing and diverse ‘truths’, such models of 
moral repair are problematic.  
                                                      
46 Tilak was detained on murder charges, which he denied to me.  
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Tilak is aware that expressing anger at his denouncer or exacting revenge is 
not appropriate in the post-terror climate. He is also aware that he has no choice but to 
carry on living with him. Ironically, it is one of the skills that he developed in 
detention (i.e., forebearance) that he puts into use in his life after violence to deal with 
the challenge of living with his denouncer. Throwing himself into re-organising the 
JVP gives him a sense of purpose and is an important component of his project to 
reformulate his life after terror. In his efforts to rebuild relationships with his 
community, he follows the path of many other newly returned insurgents. He puts 
energy into involvement in community events and apparently wins approval from his 
neighbours for his efforts.  
Tilak is conscious that his denouncer is aware of the important part he plays in 
the community and the community’s acceptance of him. According to his story, Tilak 
has also succeeded in showing the rest of the community that he is above holding 
grudges and taking revenge. This in itself is sufficient retribution. In emphasising his 
close relationship with his denouncer’s children, he communicates that the violence of 
the Bheeshanaya has not passed down generations, and that he will not hold his 
denouncer’s children responsible for the actions of their father. Tilak’s efforts to 
portray his moral character after violence may in one sense imply some form of moral 
reparation, or at least an acknowledgement of a morally discomforting past. His life in 
the aftermath of violence then has been an exercise of drawing on various resources 
and putting into place pragmatic strategies to reclaim his (altered) place in the 
community, to come to terms with past violence and betrayal, and to carry on living 
with his ‘enemies’ from that past. 
 
 
Immersion in the Mundane and the Ordinary  
 
For many ex-insurgents, as we have seen so far in this chapter, reformulating 
life after terror was about the mundane and pragmatic business of the everyday – 
getting a job, supporting your family, interacting again with your neighbours, getting 
involved in community life, and learning to live with your enemies. However, we 
have also seen how violence remains entangled in the ordinary long after the ‘violent 
event’, lingering continuously beneath a veneer of silence and forgetting, emerging to 
the surface of everyday sociality unexpectedly under the most banal circumstances 
(see Das 2007). This “mutual absorption of violence and the ordinary” (Das 2007: 2) 
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is evident in studies set in the context of post-violence (see Das 2007, Chatterji and 
Mehta 2007, Mehta and Chatterji 2001, Green 1999).  
 For ex-insurgents, the experience of violence and in particular the sense of 
being close to death (as discussed in Chapter 3), also brought with it a renewed 
appreciation for the mundane and ordinary in the aftermath. Mundane domesticity for 
some became the locus of their efforts to reconstruct worlds after violence. This is an 
instance where parallels can be drawn between the experiences of those who have 
perpetrated violence and those ‘victims’ of violence as found in existing literature. 
Das has shown how a “descent into the ordinary” provides an agentive means through 
which victims of violence recover their lives in the aftermath (2007: 7). The everyday 
reclaimed through an immersion in the mundane is one shaped by memories of loss 
and betrayal, marked by new meanings and new forms of knowledge (see Das 2007, 
Chatterji and Mehta 2007, Mehta and Chatterji 2001).  
During the Bheeshanaya Nikhil, the former insurgent we heard from earlier, 
spent over a year in hiding, taking on various false identities and moving constantly to 
avoid detection. He was ultimately captured by counter-insurrectionary officers and 
subjected to several months in detention where he was tortured. His story shows the 
important place that the mundane occupies in the lives of those reconstructing their 




While in hiding I used to feel sad (duka) when I saw young couples walking 
together. Because I never thought that I would ever get the opportunity to find a 
girlfriend and experience love. I used to watch people sweeping their yards and 
feel sad. Because I felt that I wouldn’t live long enough to experience the 
contentment of that myself. So it was a deep depression (däḍi kalakirīmak) that 
set in. In my mind I always knew that I would die. But I would comfort myself 
(hita hadāgatta) by believing that I would at least live today before I die…Now 
I have a beautiful wife and children. My wife is from a poor family, but she is 
beautiful. Now I do my house chores, painting, gardening, and cleaning the 
toilet, with great appreciation. Now it is a form of happiness (truptiya) for me. 
Unlike someone who complains about it because they haven’t been in a 
situation where these things were taken away from them. Do you like 
gardening? I spend a lot of time doing gardening now. I do it very happily. And 
I always want to do the chores in the house. I sweep my yard everyday and 
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Nikhil’s narrative is steeped in the domestic world. As we saw earlier in this chapter, 
Nikhil faced rejection and ostracism from his home community, which may explain 
his retreat into the domestic environment. After the chaos, uncertainty, and fear of the 
Bheeshanaya, and rejection by his community in its aftermath, the domestic realm 
perhaps provides Nikhil a comforting sense of security, familiarity, and ‘normality’. 
Similarly, female survivors’ testimonies to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission have been shown to utilise domestic tropes. Ross contends that 
domesticity here is used “to mark a world relatively ordered and predictable, where 
kinship relationships have a degree of coherence, and time flows predictably” (2003a: 
264). For similar reasons, Nikhil chooses to anchor the work of rebuilding his world 
after violence in the ordinary domestic realm. It is a realm in which his family 
features strongly, on whose trust and support he relies.  
Kelly (2008) has argued that for those living amidst violence, ordinariness 
entails hopes and aspirations. It can reflect “a hope to live in an ‘ordinary state’, 
where life was benevolently mundane” (2008: 365). Former insurgents had to go 
about recreating their lives in the face of a traumatic and morally unsettling past, and 
in a post-terror context of continuing fear, suspicion, hostility, and impunity, where 
people of various opposing sides were forced to carry on living with each other. In 
such a situation, it is understandable that for people like Nikhil, seeking out the 
ordinary and the familiar also expressed such an aspiration to live a “benevolently 
mundane” life beyond violence in a post-terror reality that in many ways was far from 
‘peaceful’ or ‘ordinary’.  
The reformulation of life in the realm of the mundane was overshadowed by 
past violence. Nikhil’s narrative shows the prevalence of the past in the present, and 
he depicts memories of violence as having the power to shape lives in aftermath. 
These memories are continually negotiated and lived with in the process of rebuilding 
life after violence. His experiences in detention and hiding, particularly the 
uncertainty of his own life, along with restrictions on engaging in normal activities 
that we would take for granted (e.g., sweeping the yard, involvement in romance), 
brings about a renewed appreciation of the mundane in his life after the Terror. His 
absorption in ordinary domestic rituals is taken up with vigour, and is an important 
tool that he consciously draws on in his endeavour to reclaim the everyday after 
terror, which continues to be influenced by past violence.  
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From the former insurgents’ stories that we have heard so far, it is evident that efforts 
to rebuild life beyond violence are anchored in the pragmatic and mundane, but that 
this is a realm overshadowed by powerful memories of a violent past. These 
memories remain ethically charged, and the exercise of recreating worlds after 
violence for the majority of former insurgents involve attempts to traverse the morally 
discomforting issues that these memories raise, often in the most banal everyday 
situations. This explains people’s constant efforts to allocate moral responsibility for 
violence and to restore a sense of justice and moral community in the aftermath. All 
the former insurgents I interviewed for the purposes of this research (except one) 
drew on religion to mediate their memories of violence and to make sense of the 
moral issues raised in the aftermath. We shall now turn to look at this in some detail 
in the final chapter of this thesis. 
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Chapter 7 
Buddhism and Reformulating Life after Terror 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that rebuilding life after violence for 
‘perpetrators’ was steeped in the mundane and focussed on the pragmatic.  However, 
during my time in the field I also found a significant aspect of reformulating life for 
ex-insurgents was that of giving meaning to their violent pasts in ways that allowed 
them to continue living with its memory in the present.  My research found this 
exercise to be firmly anchored in religion, with nearly all former insurgents I spoke to 
using their own interpretations of Buddhism for this purpose.  
In the narratives featured in this chapter we see how former insurgents drew 
on Buddhist ethics to understand, and come to terms with, the violence of their past.  
Significantly, the Buddhist notion of karma (the natural law of cause and effect) is 
employed in their efforts to grapple with the sensitive task of appropriating moral 
responsibility for violence, and to communicate notions of justice and retribution.  As 
we have seen throughout this thesis, denial of moral culpability has been a 
characteristic feature of narratives belonging to former insurgents.  However, I argue 
here that the Buddhist ethical framework of karma provides a means through which 
some moral accountability for violence perpetrated during the Terror is implicitly 
acknowledged.  But in another sense, karma also functions as redemptive discourse in 
people’s ambiguous narratives, as a means of excusing ‘perpetrators’ of violence from 
the task of engaging in personal acts of moral repair. 
The overwhelming majority of people I spoke to also told me elaborate stories 
situated firmly within a karmic framework, which featured ‘wrongdoers’ suffering the 
terrible consequences of their immoral actions during the Terror, in the present.  I 
argue that such stories, which draw on moral karmic tropes express re-imaginings of a 
moral order destroyed by violence.  They convey people’s continuing desire for 
justice in a post-terror context of impunity where formal justice and reparation are 
severely lacking.  Buddhism overall provides people with an ethics to come to terms 
with the violence of their past (see Mueggler 2001). 
Buddhism further functions as a coping mechanism in the absence of formal 
psycho-social interventions.  In post-terror Guatemala, Green (1999) shows how 
renewed religiosity shapes the survival of Mayan widows in a context of continuing 
fear.  There, Evangelism operates as a survival strategy for these Mayan women and 
helps them to deal with the social and psychological effects of violence in its 
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aftermath.  Perera (1995, 1998, 2001) and Argenti-Pillen (2003) demonstrate the use 
of the spirit-religion by ‘victims’ of the Bheeshanaya as a psychological coping-
mechanism. In the stories that run through this chapter, we also find expressions of 
renewed religiousness and efforts by former insurgents to represent themselves as 
living virtuous Buddhist lives after terror.  On the one hand, this conveys reassurances 
of a reformed moral character, which we may interpret as a step towards moral 
reparation and an implicit acknowledgement of wrongdoing.  On the other hand, 
however, former insurgents also appear to use this as a narrative strategy to assert a 
discontinuity of self-identity and to distance themselves from their past violence, 
which amounts to a rejection of culpability.  We find then, that Buddhism plays an 
important but complex role (particularly concerning the appropriation of moral 
responsibility for violence) in the ambiguous and contradictory narratives belonging 
to ‘perpetrators’ of violence in the reformulation of life after terror. 
As this thesis draws to a close, we take an overall look at how former 
insurgents reflect on their violent deeds, considering whether guilt or remorse play a 
part in their engagement with memory. Finally, this thesis argues that the work of 
reconstructing worlds after terror, for those who have participated in violence, is a 
continuous and ongoing exercise steeped in the moral.  It is a learning process in 
coming to terms and continuing to live with past violence in the present, rather than 
an exercise in ‘moving on’ from or ‘getting over’ violence.  People continue to keep 
memories of violence alive in ethical terms, with ongoing efforts to allocate moral 
responsibility for violence in the aftermath.  The allocation of accountability is a 
process that is constantly in flux and often contradictory.  It is an issue that continues 
to remain morally un-reconciled.  This then forms an integral aspect of the reality of 
life after violence for ‘perpetrators’.   
 
 
Understanding Present Life through Karma 
 
According to Buddhist philosophy, karma is the natural law of cause and 
effect that applies to all living beings.  Gombrich describes karma as “the foundation 
of the Sinhalese view of causation and the way in which the universe functions” 
(1971: 144).  He provides the following useful delineation of karma. 
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Karma means ‘deed’ or ‘act’. Strictly speaking your karma is what you do, not 
what is done to you – that is the maturation (vipāka) of your karma, the result of 
one of your previous acts in this or one of your former lives. Karma is a 
doctrine of free will. Indeed, will is paramount: the doctrine is that what counts 
is the intention, not the effect. ‘It is intention (cētanā) that I call karma’ said the 




This explanation highlights the important connotations of intention and personal 
responsibility that karma carries according to Buddhist doctrine. Rather than being 
fatalistic, karma puts individuals (through their intentional actions) in charge of their 
own destiny. As Obeyesekere puts it, karma “places responsibility for each 
individual’s present fate quite squarely on the individual himself” (Obeyesekere 1968: 
21). Keyes comments that Buddhists find karmic ideas meaningful when they are 
faced with “the ultimate conditions of existence”, as it gives “explanations for human 
misfortune” (1983: 3). My research finds that karma provided a powerful ethical 
framework through which people made sense of a morally incomprehensible past. 
People drew on karma as a system of meaning to make connections between past 
violence and its continuing life-shaping influence in the present. This demonstrated 
the significance and meaning that people attached to the violence of the Bheeshanaya.  
Former insurgents’ stories of negotiating life after terror were located squarely 
within this Buddhist ethical framework, and through it they attempted to allocate 
moral responsibility for violence perpetrated during the Terror. As we have seen 
throughout this thesis, former insurgents employed a range of narrative strategies to 
reject moral responsibility for past violence. Interestingly however, in their narratives 
on reformulating life after terror, many drew on the concept of karma to implicitly 
acknowledge some moral culpability for violence during the Bheeshanaya. Several 
former insurgents explained the trials and tribulations they suffered in their present 
lives in terms of the negative karmic consequences resulting from their past wrongful 
actions. This highlights the ambiguous and contradictory nature of their narratives, 
and suggests that those who have perpetrated violence continue to live with both the 
acknowledgement and denial of moral responsibility for their actions.  
At another level, however, ‘perpetrators’ appeared to use karma as a 
redemptive discourse, which allowed them to avoid engaging in acts of moral repair 
after violence. By explaining that they were already being made to suffer the negative 
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karmic consequences of their past actions, former insurgents intimated that there was 
no further need to make amends with others in the exercise of recreating sociality 
post-terror.  
Shehan, a former insurgent who no longer supports the JVP, told me that he 
regretted his involvement in the insurrection. This was because he now understood 
through Buddhism, that he engaged in wrongful actions during the Bheeshanaya 
thereby accumulating bad karma, the effects of which he was experiencing in his 
present life. He regularly complained to me that the poverty and hardship he faced in 
life was due to the karmic consequences of his wrongful actions during the 
insurrection. He confided that he had threatened people at gun-point, destroyed public 
property, and extorted for the JVP - specific wrongful actions, which he believed 
explained his suffering today. However, on the other hand, he told me that he had not 
died in detention despite the significant torture he endured, because he had abstained 
from what he considered to be more serious immoral acts, such as murder.  
Here, Shehan acknowledges some moral responsibility for violence during the 
Bheeshanaya through the utilisation of karma. He further illustrates the significant 
meaning he attaches to his experiences of violence, in showing its power to continue 
shaping his life in the present. Shehan in one sense may be engaging in a redemptive 
discourse through his use of karma here. By telling us that he is already paying 
penance for past violence, he appears to excuse himself from the need to engage in 
specific acts of moral reparation.   
In his work on survivors of the Bheeshanaya who lost loved ones to violence, 
Perera (2001) shows how people understood their experiences of violence in terms of 
karma, set within the wider context of popular Buddhism. For example, we are told 
the story of Sumanapala, a man who frames the massacre of his wife and four children 
along with the destruction of his house, in Buddhist karmic philosophy. Sumanapala 
explains this massacre to be the result of bad karma accumulated by the wrongful 
actions of his dead family in a past life, wherein his wife and children had tortured a 
family of birds in a nest and then set the birds and their nest on fire. This was 
apparently revealed to him by a deity that possessed his surviving daughter (Perera 
2001: 179-181). The former insurgents who participated in this research were 
overwhelmingly cynical about spirit-possession and to an extent popular Buddhism. 
However, they understood the natural moral law of karma overall to impact on their 
own lives, in accordance with Buddhist teaching. 
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Exerting Control Over Karma 
 
Obeyesekere states that while in Buddhism karma is recognised as the cause 
of all fortune, “in the context of day to day behaviour the karma theory of causation 
presents logical problems which arise from ordinary human social and personal 
needs” (1968: 20). Among these is the uncertainty that the psychologically 
indeterminate nature of karma brings - “I cannot know what the future holds in store 
because I do not know what my past sins and good actions have been” (1968: 21). 
Bearing this in mind, let us now turn to consider Kirihami, a former insurgent who 
attempts to bring about a sense of certainty to his karma.  
Kirihami is a staunch Buddhist and told me that he practices meditation daily 
and reads Buddhist texts. We may remember from before that upon being released 
from detention, he was given a job in the armed forces by the Commanding Officer of 
his detention centre. Kirihami acknowledges the necessity of violence as a practical 
human reality, and structures his ideas of ‘being a good Buddhist’ around this. He told 
me (in a sardonic tone) that both the JVP and the army wanted him to do the same 
thing – to kill people: the only difference being that killing by the army was validated 
by law. His narrative is coloured with Buddhist teachings rooted in the natural law of 
karmic cause and effect, and with southern cultural idioms. Through his story, 
Kirihami communicates specific virtues he deems necessary for leading a moral life 




I know I have no pav (bad karma resulting from wrongful/immoral action)... I 
shot people in the army but every time I did it I kept thinking may no pav 
happen to me as a result of this (maṭa pavak sidda novēvā) and then pulled the 
trigger. So I know that I have no pav… So I have been saved… I got involved 
in the JVP because of my youthfulness (tarunakama). But I did not harm 
society. Or it was a minimal form of harm (avama hāniyak)... Now if I had 
killed a lot of people at that time (Bheeshanaya), I would not be here today. 
This became very clear to me because of a particular incident. When I was held 
in the torture chamber (vadakāgāraya), there was a really hard hearted/minded 
(tada hita) soldier. He used to do terrible things, really torture people and kill, 
and he would get drunk at night. He gave us very severe beatings. A few years 
later when I myself was an army soldier, we were called up to a Muslim village 
in the east…(because) the Tigers had decapitated 105 Muslims there... When we 
got there, the LTTE started attacking us. Amidst all that, I saw a familiar face – 
a soldier I had seen before. I suddenly realised that this was the hard 
  212  
hearted/minded soldier who had tortured me those years ago in the camp 
(detention centre). Not a moment had passed after this realisation, than the 
soldier went forward, he had a hard mind/heart you know and put himself 
forward without fear for things. He was subjected to a volley of LTTE bullets. 
He was shot like nothing I’d ever imagined (hitanna bäri vidiyaṭa). His body 
was riddled with bullets like a sieve (penēre)… That happened to him because 
of the things he did... Because I had good experiences and didn’t do pav 
(wrongful actions that result in bad karma), I am now able to live … like this 




Kirihami makes links between the past and the present, and understands his present 
life through his past violent experiences. In line with Buddhist ethical teaching, he 
rationalises his survival of the Terror in terms of his abstinence from pav väḍa – 
wrongful/immoral actions or ‘sin’, which result in bad karma. Put in a situation that 
necessitated pav (i.e., being in the army and having to kill) he attempts to mitigate or 
negate the consequences of bad karma through what appears to be a prārthanā 
(religious wish).  
In his study on Buddhism entitled Precept and Practice, based in the rural 
highlands of Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon), Gombrich found prārthanā (which he 
defines as religious wish) to be a common practice in the everyday lives of Buddhists. 
Gombrich suggests that prārthanā arises from an emotional need, and comments, “to 
what extent prārthanā are made and to what end, I cannot say, as they are for the most 
part a private affair, nor need they be made out loud” (Gombrich 1971: 219). 
Although prārthanā appears to counter the natural law of karma, Gombrich suggests 
that it (along with certain other practices), steers clear of serious inconsistency with 
orthodoxy. He argues that while “the canonical theory of karma survives intact – 
cognitively; affectively its rigour is sometimes avoided” (1971: 243). 
Kirihami seems to believe that by making a private prārthanā before 
committing the wrongful act of killing he can alter his karma and avoid its negative 
consequences. This appears to be a means through which he is able to come to terms 
and continue living with his own complicity in violence. Kirihami’s story here 
appears to be in congruence with Keyes’ (1983) argument about the prominence given 
to individual moral responsibility in popular theories of karma among Buddhists. 
Keyes compares this with popular Hindu theories of karma and contends that among 
Buddhists, “much greater emphasis is laid upon the moral responsibilities that one 
  213  
assumes for one’s actions than upon the constraints of karmic destiny, whereas among 
Hindus the emphasis is reversed” (1983: 19). 
Kirihami’s story also intimates some understanding of the important position 
given to the ‘intent’ that precedes an act according to Buddhist doctrine. The first and 
arguably most important Buddhist precept clearly defines intentionally killing a living 
being (human or animal) as being a wrongful act, which inevitably results in a 
negative karmic consequence for the agent. This is based on the belief that it would be 
impossible for one to engage in such immoral acts when virtuous mental states (e.g., 
compassion) exist in the mind (Gethin 2004). In the narrative above, Kirihami makes 
an effort to portray the intent that precedes his violence, as not being immoral by way 
of his prārthanā. In so doing, he denies moral responsibility for violence. Although he 
uses his experience in the armed forces to elaborate on this point, we may safely 
assume that he also implicitly refers to the violence he perpetrated during the 
Bheeshanaya. He substantiates his rationalisation by pointing to his ultimate survival 
against the odds. 
Kirihami instead holds his former torturer accountable for the violence of the 
Bheeshanaya, and shows him to suffer the consequences of his immoral action. 
Kirihami imbues his former torturer with southern cultural traits, showing us the 
shared origins of his tormentor. A hard heart/mind and a characteristic of fearlessly 
putting oneself forward in the face of danger are common cultural traits popularly 
attributed to Sinhala people from the South, to emphasise features such as courage 
and bravery. By emphasising the hard mind/heart of his former torturer, Kirihami 
suggests that his torturer’s wrongful actions were preceded by wrongful intent, 
invariably accumulating negative karma. On the other hand, Kirihami is keen to show 
that his own intent and accompanying prārthanā, which preceded killing was not 
wrongful and so would not result in negative karmic consequences for him. In other 
words, through an implicit representation of the moral self and righteous intentions 
underpinning his violent actions in the past, he intimates that he cannot be held 
morally responsible for violence, in the present. 
Kirihami also categorises wrongful acts according to a hierarchy. The five 
basic precepts that every Buddhist must follow are that of not killing living beings, 
not stealing, not lying, not taking intoxicants (which cloud the mind and make one 
susceptible to breaking the other precepts), and not engaging in sexual misconduct. 
Kirihami shows his hard hearted/minded torturer to have broken two of the basic 
Buddhist precepts – that of abstaining from killing living beings and from taking 
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intoxicants. As a result, it is inevitable that the natural consequences of his immoral 
actions follow and his former torturer dies a horrible death - sudden violent death 
being the least desirable form of dying for Buddhists. Kirihami himself believes that 
his abstinence from what he classifies as pav väḍa - wrongful action that accumulates 
negative karma (i.e., intentional murder during the Bheeshanaya), secured his own 
ultimate survival. In an environment in which torturers were not brought to justice, 
Kirihami wants to believe that retribution came forth in the form of the natural law of 
karma. Through this, he is able to come to terms with his past, and to restore a sense 
of moral order.  
 Kirihami’s narrative throws up a chronological discrepancy, which is worth 
noting here. He talks about an incident involving the decapitation of 105 Muslims by 
the LTTE. This description fits the well-publicised murder of 105 Muslims who were 
praying at a mosque in Kattankudy, Batticoloa (in the East of Sri Lanka) by the 
LTTE. This incident took place on the 3rd of July 1990. In the following week, one 
hundred Muslims were killed in Eravur, also in Batticoloa, by the LTTE. However, 
despite the two events sharing similar features relating to place, and the numbers and 
ethnicities of people killed, Kirihami (by specifying the decapitation of 105 Muslims) 
seems to be referring to the Kattankudy massacre. The discrepancy in his narrative 
arises in the time that has passed between the Bheeshanaya and the Kattankudy 
massacre. While in reality, approximately a year (if at all) stood between the two 
events, Kirihami allocates the passing of ‘years’ to the temporal space between the 
Bheeshanaya and the Kattankudy massacre.  
 Kirihami was one of my most trusted and reliable research participants, and 
this was clearly not a deliberate attempt to mislead me. How then are we to explain 
his confusing interpretation of time, which defies the neat logic of chronology as we 
understand it? Narratives are essentially ‘meaning-making structures’ through which 
people create and structure their experiences in order to make sense of them 
(Reissman 1993). We cannot take Kirihami’s interpretation of time at face value. I 
have already mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, the striking ‘present quality’ to the 
voices of people telling stories of events that occurred almost 20 years ago. We have 
also seen through the various narratives of former insurgents, that there seems to be 
an immersion of the past in the present, and a collapsing of boundaries between an 
ordered sequential past, present, and future.  
This particular incident attests to Langer’s compelling argument that despite 
testimonies sounding chronological to us, those who have experienced violence and 
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who narrate them are “mental witnesses” as opposed to “temporal” ones. So they are 
“out of time” as they narrate their stories (1997: 55). Drawing on the testimonies of 
holocaust survivors, he goes on to show that for those who have had experience of 
violence, “time is durational as well as chronological” with the former being 
experienced continuously as a durational present (1997: 4). So we cannot expect 
Kirihami to offer us a specific chronology of events, based on the sequential order of 
time as we (who have not experienced violence) understand it. What was important 
for Kirihami was not the specific years that stood between the Bheeshanaya and the 




Karmic Stories of Justice and Retribution 
 
The need to believe that wrongdoers had been brought to justice was strong 
among people after the Bheeshanaya. Many ordinary people emphatically told me that 
those who had murdered their loved ones or those who had tortured them had come to 
some sort of harm. I was told numerous stories of former torturers being in car 
accidents, ending up paralysed, and being killed in a variety of horrific ways. When I 
asked people how they knew of this, they would often say that they had heard as 
much from trusted sources. The sense of frustration and anger brought on by the 
continuing lack of justice and official denial appears to have led people to draw on 
cultural models of ethics to appropriate moral responsibility for violence. These 
karmic stories clearly identified ‘perpetrators’ of violence and provided elaborate 
details of the specific karmic consequences they suffered as a result of their immoral 
acts, in the aftermath of the Bheeshanaya. Stories of karmic retribution further 
allowed people to restore a sense of justice and to re-imagine a moral community, 
destroyed by terror. In other words, the Buddhist ethical framework of karma 
provided people with a means of dealing with the ‘unfinished business’ of the 
Bheeshanaya.  This was necessary for communities to carry on functioning in the 
aftermath of terror. 
Mueggler (2001) has similarly shown how in the aftermath of the Great Leap 
Forward and famine in China, people utilise stories of vengeful wild ghosts to 
distribute responsibility for violence and recreate an “agonistic sense of community in 
the face of their own shared responsibility for past violence” (2001: 97). He goes on 
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to persuasively argue that along with divination and healing rituals, this provided an 
ethics to deal with violence in daily life (2001: 33). Similarly, it is evident that for 
those who survived the Bheeshanaya, the Buddhist karmic framework provided a 
culturally appropriate model of ethics to give meaning to, and come to terms with, 
past violence. Moreover, it allowed people to grapple with the awkward task of 
appropriating moral responsibility for it, and to restore a sense of justice in the 
aftermath by holding wrongdoers to account.  
These karmic stories further attest to Lambek’s argument about the moral 
claims that memory entails. He notes that where history is denied, “the moral function 
of memory is to compel us to confront what we wish to leave behind” (1996: 61). In 
post-terror southern Sri Lanka, people kept the memory of the Bheeshanaya alive as 
an ethical issue and continued to grapple with the unreconciled past through these 
karmic stories. In the absence of any formal justice then, Buddhism and its law of 
karma, as well as giving meaning to their experiences of violence in the past, ensured 
that ‘perpetrators’ of violence were held to account in the present.  Post-terror, 
Buddhism also kept a check on violence and prevented its escalation (in the form of 
revenge attacks), and further facilitated co-existence between various opposing sides. 
In Chapter 2, we heard the story of Sheyanthi, the young woman whose 
mother was murdered, apparently by the JVP. The way in which she coped with and 
reconciled her traumatic experience was to understand it through a karmic framework. 
She told me that the murderer would never do well in life and later even mentioned 
that he had suffered terribly and subsequently died, due to the wrongful act 
committed. She also emphatically stated that she did not want to fill her own life with 
pav and for this reason even refused to give a description of the murderer to the 
police. If the natural law of cause and effect took care of punishing perpetrators of 
violence then, in the absence of formal justice there was no need to act violently to 
avenge the murder of loved ones.  
 
Karmic Retribution in the Present Existence 
 
It is interesting to note that when research participants told ‘karmic stories’ of 
people who had perpetrated violence during the Bheeshanaya, they unfailingly 
depicted the protagonists of their stories as being faced with karmic retribution within 
their present existence. In other words, in this instance, people overwhelmingly lay 
emphasis on negative karma coming to fruition within one’s lifetime, as opposed to 
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ripening in subsequent lives. According to Theravada Buddhist teaching, karma 
broadly falls into 3 categories, based on the time of its maturation. In his discussion of 
karmic rebirth, King (1994) distinguishes between these types of karma by referring 
to Ven. Nyanatiloka’s quotes from the Pali Canon: “Threefold … is the fruit of 
karma: ripening during the (human) lifetime … ripening in the next birth… ripening 
in later births” (1994: 2). Gombrich (1971) draws our attention to a fourth type of 
karma, based on his interviews with Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka, known as ahosi 
karma, which is karma that doesn’t come to fruition as it is “superseded by the course 
of events” (1971: 214). By confining the ripening of negative karma within the 
wrong-doer’s present life through their narratives, research participants appear to be 
referring to a specific category of karma known as drstadharmavedaniya, which 
yields results within the same existence in which the act was committed.   
There are plenty of examples available in popular Buddhist ethical stories 
(Jātaka stories), which illustrate these different types of karma. One such well-known 
Jātaka story, which conveys the power of karma to ripen within one’s present 
existence, is that of Cunda “the pig-killer”. This story provides elaborate descriptions 
of Cunda, a pig-butcher, who falls violently sick, having frightening hallucinations of 
hell, crawling on his knees and writhing in pain, squealing and screaming like a pig - 
in effect being forced to endure a similar fate to the suffering he inflicted on pigs. 
Cunda here is clearly shown to suffer the karmic consequences of his immoral actions 
in his present existence. The story also intimates that he will go on to suffer the 
karmic consequences of his sinful acts in his future life as well (according to the 
Jātaka story, Cunda is then said to be reborn in Avici hell). The story ends with a 
moral lesson articulated by the Buddha as follows, 
 
whether you be monks or laymen know this: if a man immerses himself in sinful acts like this 
man did, at the point of death he will say, ‘I have done nothing good in my past life’ … 
Sinners suffer remorse in both worlds. (Obeyesekere 1991: 191-192)  
 
 
The overwhelming majority of research participants would have undoubtedly been 
familiar with such stories (most likely from their childhood).  People may have been 
inspired by these stories in their utilisation of karma to give a sense of moral meaning 
to their experiences of violence and to hold wrong-doers to account. The theory of 
karma is generally drawn on as an interpretive framework of meaning by Buddhists to 
explain and give meaning to certain existential dilemmas. As Keyes puts it: 
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to invoke karma when one is confronted with suffering about which one can do nothing but 
suffer, with injustice which one can do nothing to rectify, or with existential paradoxes that 
yield to no logical solution is to assert that there is an ultimate order within which these 
experiences are meaningful. (Keyes 1983:18) 
 
 
In choosing to hook their karmic stories onto a specific category of karma that clearly 
demonstrates wrong-doers being held to account primarily within their present 
existence, research participants seem to be attempting to re-establish a sense of moral 
order in the face of un-reconciled violence. Where justice is not available through 
formal legal means and where it is not resorted to through other more informal or 
traditional means (e.g. through the spirit religion), people seek to institute a sense of 
moral justice through their specific interpretation of karma theory in this manner. 
 
Living a Virtuous Life after Violence 
 
While karma at one level may have functioned as a redemptive discourse, 
former insurgents eagerly expressed a commitment to living a virtuous Buddhist life 
after violence. This seemed to suggest new possibilities for ethical reparation, at the 
same time. Their narratives were characterised by the interpretation of their past and 
present lives through complex Buddhist teachings and elaborate examples of efforts to 
live in accordance with Buddhist ethics. Through this, former insurgents implied that 
they had learned important moral lessons from their violent pasts, and suggested a 
moral reformation of character in the present, as a result of this. Negotiating life after 
terror for ‘perpetrators’ appeared to entail not only grappling with appropriating moral 
responsibility for violence, but also an effort to respond to practical questions of how 
one ought to live for the self and for others in the aftermath (see Hallisey N.d.). 
Through their narratives, former insurgents drew on Buddhist doctrine to 
communicate specific virtues that were deemed a moral necessity for rebuilding life 
after violence, for the benefit of the self and others. The path was one of self-
salvation, in line with Buddhist textual teachings, as opposed to seeking help from 
supernatural intermediaries such as gods. Refashioning the self in virtuous terms after 
terror allowed ‘perpetrators’ of violence to continue living with themselves and to 
alter their morally discomforting relationship to the past. 
In his study of the role of reading in cultivating the virtues of satisampajannā 
(moral discernment or prudence) and moral creativity in Buddhist ethical life, 
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Hallisey (N.d.) shows the interconnectedness of two contemporary ethical 
conceptions drawn from the modern West concerning the question: “How ought one 
live?”. On the one hand this entails considerations of living well with and for others, 
in line with the thinking of Ricoeur. On the other hand, Hallisey shows that it 
concerns one’s relationship to the self, referred to as “technologies of the self” by 
Foucault, in moral life. Hallisey argues that these two ethical conceptions have been 
studied as distinct entities too often. He makes a case for considering them in 
connection with each other by employing the Buddhist virtue of satisampajannā as an 
example, which he shows to entail both self-appraisal and the appraisal of others. His 




The desire to live well with and for others frequently provides both motive and 
guidance to those undertaking a wide range of practices of self-fashioning in 
any particular moral culture or ethical tradition. This is especially the case 
whenever these practices of self-fashioning presume and entail a critique of the 





The former insurgents who participated in this research appear to tell us that 
rebuilding life after violence involves an ethical improvement of the self through self-
salvation in line with Buddhist teachings, which inevitably impacts on one’s sociality 
with others. People drew on a range of colourful examples from their everyday lives, 
from the daily practice of the Buddhist meditation of compassion, to efforts directed 
at avoiding harm to animals, in order to demonstrate their commitment to Buddhist 
ethical practice for the moral improvement of one’s own character and through that 
their relationship with other living beings. Learning moral lessons from the past, 
which in turn resulted in a moral reformation of character through concerted efforts to 
lead a virtuous life implied an acknowledgement of the ethically troublesome nature 
of their violent past. But, this did not amount to an outright acceptance of moral 
culpability for violence.    
Indeed this capacity for human beings to radically transform themselves is in 
itself fundamental to Buddhist teaching (see Deegalle 1997). This is perhaps best 
illustrated in the Buddhist ethical story of Angulimala, an infamous mass murderer 
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who lived during the time of the Buddha, whose moral and spiritual transformation 
after wrongdoing led to his ultimately attaining enlightenment. The story illustrates 
the redemptive power of Buddhism through compassion, based on the reformation of 
one’s moral character in accordance with Buddhist ethics. However, it is important to 
note here that Angulimala’s moral and spiritual transformation after violence did not 
negate the natural karmic consequences of his actions, but instead simply changed his 
response to it. Former insurgents’ representations of their moral and spiritual 
transformation after wrongdoing and their acknowledgement of having to suffer the 
karmic consequences of their past in the present, bear striking similarity to this 
Buddhist ethical story. For ‘perpetrators’ of violence, learning a moral lesson from 
past wrongdoing, and transforming oneself by adhering to Buddhist ethics is depicted 
as being a crucial aspect of reconstructing life after violence. In other words, specific 
virtues drawn from Buddhist doctrinal teachings (e.g., compassion, non-violence, 
wisdom, meditation) are deemed a moral necessity for life after violence, for the self 
and for others (see Hallisey N.d.). In another sense, however, we may also interpret 
this representation of the morally transformed self as a narrative strategy deployed to 
reject accountability for violence. One may argue that by engaging in a refashioning 
of the self after violence, some people were in fact asserting a discontinuity of self-
identity and distancing themselves from past misdemeanours (i.e., the virtuous 
Buddhist of today is not the violent insurgent of the past). 
Senahami, an older ex-insurgent who participated in both insurrections frames 
his understanding of violence in Buddhist teachings. Like many other ex-insurgents I 
spoke to, he too believed that abstaining from specific wrongful acts during the Terror 
secured his survival. He continues to practise, and be guided by, Buddhism in his life 




My own understanding of revolution is the betterment of man (minisā suvapat 
kirīma). ... If you love mankind then you love animals and nature. Now I care 
greatly about nature and animals. We have a river with freshwater fish. I never 
catch them. I’ve built a ditch to prevent others from catching them. I always 
give animals food...I live by Buddha’s teaching. A man who loves animals can 
never harm another human being. So the question then is ‘how can one then 
take up weapons?’ My answer to that is youthfulness (tarunakama)…I don’t 
even eat fish. I am a good Buddhist. So that helped me. If you protect nature, 
then nature protects you. I never killed anyone. I didn’t even punish and 
humiliate people. That’s why I escaped the second time. I had to hide from the 
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party itself for some time. Because I tried to reason with the young (taruna) 
leaders at the time and opposed their moves to kill people. I tried to show them 
that if you punish a so-called traitor by killing him, then you upset his whole 
family and the whole village. So I helped a lot of people in that way. But for 
their youthfulness (tarunakama) they didn’t understand that and didn’t like 




In reflecting on the violence of the Bheeshanaya, Senahami comes across a stumbling 
block in his attempts to understand it – that of Buddhists, who are meant to follow the 
Buddha’s teaching on non-violence, taking up weapons. He explains this as a feature 
of ‘youthfulness’ (discussed in Chapter 1), which apparently clouds one’s judgement 
and hinders the ability to abide by Buddhist ethics. Senahami has a clear 
understanding of what being a good Buddhist involves. He communicates specific 
Buddhist ethical values as being necessary for leading a virtuous life after terror. 
These include compassion and respect for life and the natural environment. He 
believes that adhering to the Buddha’s teachings during the Bheeshanaya - not 
inflicting violence on others and acting with moral intent (i.e., participating in the 
insurrection for the betterment of humankind) ensured that negative karmic 
consequences did not follow him. As a result he was able to emerge alive from terror. 
He comprehends his survival of the Bheeshanaya through a Buddhist ethical 
framework, and through his narrative he conveys his innocence and rejects moral 
responsibility for violence. 
Senahami told me that his interest in Buddhist philosophy intensified after his 
‘retirement’ from insurrectionary activity. I often found him engrossed in Buddhist 
texts or on his way to the local temple. For many former insurgents like Senahami, 
this renewed faith in Buddhism was an important resource in the exercise of 
reconstructing their lives after violence. It provided guidance and a purpose in life 
after violence. His efforts to live a virtuous life formed an important aspect of 
learning to live with his violent past in the present. Senahami’s representation of 
reformed moral character may also be interpreted as an implicit act of moral 
reparation, which further suggests an acknowledgement of the ethically troubling 
nature of his past actions.  
Nikhil, the ‘retired’ insurgent who we met earlier in this chapter, emphasises a 
commitment to Buddhist textual teachings and highlights specific virtues as being 
necessary for ‘being a good Buddhist’. These include virtues of compassion, non-
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violence, meditation, and wisdom, which are important for living life for the self and 
others. Nikhil told me that after 56 years he had found Buddhism. He had begun 
studying Buddhist texts and meditating regularly following his release from detention. 
He smiled shyly and told me, “I’m not saying I know everything about it (Buddhism). 
But I have read a lot and I try to live my life by it”. His story emphasises a 
reformation of character following moral lessons learned from a violent past. Like the 
case of Senahami above, this too may intimate an engagement at some tacit level in 




Do you know that today, I can’t even bring myself to damage a Government 
(public) light bulb. The law of my human conscience (mānava nītiya) does not 
allow it. I damaged so much public property in those days, which I never had 
the right to do. We killed about 60,000 people and the other side killed the 
same. Through Buddhism I later learned these things. We were never taught the 
value of Buddhism in school. We just learned gāthā (Pali verses) and 
memorised precepts. But now I know anitya (impermanence/non-self), dhukka 
(suffering), and samānya (equal value of all life)...I know that we are just made 
up of atoms. But we get attached to things in this world. When we really 
understand the principle of non-self (non-ego) that we are merely made up of 
atoms and nothing is permanent, then we realise that nothing really belongs to 
me. So then there is no need for anger).   From morning till night I try not to do 
anger (vairaya) to others, and every night I do maithree meditation (Buddhist 
meditation of compassion)… I love Buddhism. Now I have no desire for 
important positions, for more and more money, or for high status. Because of 
my understanding of Buddhism I know that all these things are a joke…In our 
country, Buddhism is practised only in name. Keeping up with the neighbour is 
a preoccupation for our people. And envy (irisiyāva) is everywhere. I know a 
little about Buddhism. But the majority of our people know even less about it. 
People don’t like it if another person does well... They follow the McDonalds 
culture and have a greed for the flesh of animals. These are not Buddhists. They 
may kill and claim to love Buddhism. But they don’t know what it is. I know 
that I suffered in jail (detention) because of the wrong acts I committed… I 
know that in my case, my pav is affecting me in this life. Even when things go 
wrong in my day-to-day life, I know that it is because of the pav I committed in 




Nikhil actively draws on Buddhist teachings to understand his past, and perceives 
time as a continuation of the past into the present set within an ethical framework of 
the natural law of karma. He demonstrates knowledge of formal Buddhist philosophy 
and its complex concepts (e.g., non-ego, impermanence), which suggests that he has 
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committed time and effort to studying Buddhist philosophy. Nikhil suggests the 
reformation of his character to be the result of moral lessons learned from his violent 
experiences, and elaborates on his efforts to live a virtuous life in the aftermath. The 
project of reformulating everyday life after violence is guided by his interpretation of 
Buddhist ethics. He practices the Buddhist meditation of compassion daily (generally 
considered the antidote to violence), which helps him to deflect anger presumably 
towards his former torturers and those members of his community that ostracised him 
(as we saw in the previous chapter), and also to nurture this virtue within himself.47 
He further demonstrates the virtue of wisdom in recognising non-ego and the transient 
nature of the mundane world. His work to reformulate life after violence entails active 
efforts to reform his moral character from violent insurgent to compassionate and 
virtuous Buddhist, which is deemed necessary to live a moral life for the self and for 
others after violence. However, at the same time, Nikhil also indicates a 
discontinuation of the self through the emphasis he places on this moral 
transformation of his character (e.g., he says that he cannot bring himself to even 
damage a public light-bulb and compares this to the public property he destroyed 
during his life as an insurgent). In doing so, he distances himself from his violent acts 
and implicitly argues that he cannot be held morally accountable in the present, for his 
actions of the past.   
  Buddhism for Nikhil operates as a survival strategy, helping him to 
deal with the challenges posed to the work of reconstructing life after terror. He 
comes to terms with his past actions through an analysis of Buddhist teaching, and 
even blames the ineffectual way in which Buddhism is taught and disseminated in Sri 
Lanka for his own participation in violence during the Bheeshanaya. In the aftermath 
of violence, Nikhil shows his reclamation of the everyday to be centred on efforts to 
lead a virtuous Buddhist life and to bring about a moral refashioning of the self, based 
on lessons learned from his violent past. In doing so, he rejects moral responsibility 
for past violence, and makes his troublesome past (and himself) more tolerable to live 
with in the present. 
 
 
                                                      
47  There is an interesting distinction between the ways in which ex-insurgents and those ‘victims’ of violence (as shown in 
existing literature) drew on religion in the aftermath of the Bheeshanaya. Former insurgents used religion in a manner that helped 
them to control and abate potentially violent emotions (e.g., anger, desires for revenge). On the other hand, ‘victims’ of violence 
who had lost loved ones during the Bheeshanaya, drew on the spirit religion or popular Buddhism for its “emotional appeal” 
(Douglas 1992) – in order to express powerful ‘negative’  emotions, as opposed to keeping them in check (see Perera 1995, 1998,  
2001; Argenti-Pillen 2003).  
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Reflecting on Violent Deeds 
 
A study centred on those involved in violence naturally begs the question of 
whether people regretted their actions. Was shame, guilt or even pride, expressed by 
those who had engaged in horrific acts of insurrectionary violence? My research 
rendered no easy and clear-cut answers to these complex and highly sensitive 
questions. Throughout this thesis we have found the narratives of those who have 
perpetrated violence to be ambiguous and contradictory, with both a refusal to accept 
moral responsibility for violence taking place alongside an apparent tacit 
acknowledgement of it. This research has found memories of violence to be mediated 
in ethical terms by those who have engaged in it.  Selective and altered remembering, 
disassociation and deflection, avoidance, denial, and amnesia, which have been shown 
to mark the testimonies of ‘perpetrators’ of violence in other contexts (see Browning 
2001, Payne 2008, Foster et al. 2005), also smudged the narratives of those ex-
insurgents who participated in this research. Some offered vague and ambiguous 
responses to my gentle probes on their direct involvement in violence during the 
Terror. The majority avoided this sensitive issue altogether, with their narratives 
verging on the incoherent when it came to their own perpetration of specific violent 
acts. This overall suggests a sense of moral discomfort attached to these memories as 
substantiated by efforts to morally justify their own involvement in the insurrection 
and to retrospectively refashion memories of the self in ethical terms, as we have seen 
throughout this thesis. 
One man remembered himself as being the altruistic and popular JVP 
insurgent of his village during the Bheeshanaya, who was well liked by neighbours. 
He told me that he protected the lives of many people in his village and that 
neighbours would often come to him for help during the Terror. Conversely, however, 
two of his neighbours described him to me as a dangerous (darunu) man feared by 
those in the village; a man who had exploited the power given to him by “the gun”. 
His co-villagers were apparently relieved when this former insurgent was taken into 
detention by the counter-insurrectionary forces. This is a clear example of altered 
remembering charged through with ethical undertones. Through this retelling of the 
past, the former insurgent in question attempts to alter his experience of that 
unsettling past in order to continue living with his violent acts in the present.  
Those most vociferous in denying past violence (i.e., their own violence and 
that of the JVP overall) were former insurgents who remained active supporters of the 
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JVP during the time of their participation in this research. After significant trust had 
been built over time between ex-insurgents and myself, those who were no longer 
involved in the JVP began to volunteer snippets of personal information about their 
various ‘misdemeanours’ from the Bheeshanaya era. These ranged from the 
destruction of public property, to extortion and threatening people at gunpoint. 
However, they denied culpability for those acts of violence they categorised as being 
more heinous (i.e., murder and physical assault). In some cases this ran contrary to 
quiet anecdotal evidence (usually given to me by neighbours or our ‘go-between’), 
and I often felt that I was being presented with sanitised versions of individual pasts. 
Some ex-insurgents are likely to have believed that talking to me about committing 
those violent deeds, which they perceived as having higher stakes (e.g., murder, 
physical assault), would result in frightening consequences for them. A sense of moral 
discomfort and concern about their own reputation and social standing, are likely to 
have further contributed to their reluctance to broach this issue. In the case of those 
former insurgents who continued to support the JVP, their over-enthusiastic denial of 
individual violence and that of the JVP was a protective strategy, employed to 
safeguard their image. Denial may also have functioned as a coping mechanism 
necessary to continue unhindered the intricate work of rebuilding social worlds after 
terror. However, denial (while for some it signified a sense of moral discomfort with 
their complicity in violence) did not necessarily indicate regret. The majority of 
former insurgents (particularly those who continued to support the JVP) offered 
various ethical justifications for the necessity of violence (often hypothetical violence 
in the case of those who denied that violence took place at all on the part of the JVP), 
thereby suggesting a refusal to accept moral culpability.  
Let’s now turn to Tilak. We may remember from earlier that as an insurgent 
Tilak spent several years being tortured in detention and was accused of murder 
during the Bheeshanaya, which he denied to me (despite our ‘go-between’ privately 
telling me otherwise). Following his release from detention he went about re-
organising the JVP and continues to be a staunch supporter. This section of our 
interview was the result of some gentle probing on my part, and followed his lengthy 
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Tilak: The JVP didn’t murder people. The Government killed 100 thousand 
people. Their actions were blamed on the JVP. The JVP did not engage in 
violence (aparāda).  In any revolutionary organisation, if someone is a grass 
who hinders your goals, they are a traitor, and they must inevitably be removed 
(ahak karanna). But the JVP didn’t murder people. We were never taught to 
murder people. We had to go forward together with the people. Others used us 
as scapegoats for murders they committed. Like the army captain. Yes, the army 
gang that went everywhere identifying themselves as JVP and using the names 
of JVP boys, including my name. We didn’t burn buses, or raid co-ops. We held 
virōdi days (protests/strikes) because we needed to let the country know what 
we were doing. But on those days the army did various things to change that 
(stumbles, incoherent)… and do their own things and blame us.  
 
Me:  I personally know people who lost family members to JVP violence and 
who were forced to go on anti-Government protests threatened at gunpoint. 
 
Tilak: Yes there may have been some over-sight (aḍu pāḍu) on our part too. 
Some (insurgents) raided the co-op through sheer hunger, because that is a 
public resource belonging to the people isn’t it. The leaders lost control of the 
people…Many uneducated young people just joined (the JVP) with the rälla 
(herd), and didn’t get the party education. Then, these people may have done 




Tilak’s narrative is riddled with conflicting statements, and he flits between denial 
and attempts at justifying insurrectionary violence. He clearly states that JVP 
insurgents did not commit murder, extort from co-ops, or set buses alight.48 However, 
he then goes on to comment on “traitors” being “removed” by the JVP and insurgents 
raiding co-ops “out of hunger”. On being probed, he uses euphemisms and chooses 
language that offers a watered-down version of the violence committed by insurgents. 
Tilak uses the word “remove” instead of “murder”, and “oversight” to denote 
violence. This need to sanitise and justify violence suggests that Tilak feels a sense of 
moral discomfort on the subject of his complicity in violence. Denial, disassociation, 
and a deflection of blame on to others (i.e., ‘uneducated’ young recruits) feature 
throughout his narrative, which comes across overall as an attempt to avoid moral 
responsibility for violence. 
It is interesting to note that up to this point in the interview Tilak reflected on, 
and spoke of his experiences during the Bheeshanaya as an individual, using the term 
“I”. However, when it comes to the awkward issue of culpability, he speaks in terms 
of a collective ‘we’; a term which encompasses himself, his insurgent peers, and the 
                                                      
48 These were among the most common and well-known acts of violence committed by the JVP. 
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JVP organisation as a whole, thereby sharing the burden of responsibility. This 
suggests some defensiveness and a sense of unease about these particular issues. His 
justification of violence and denial on behalf of the collective ‘we’ are of a protective 
nature, which attempts to convey his own ‘innocence’ and to safeguard the reputation 
of the JVP leadership.  
In Payne’s (2008) study of the testimonies of ‘perpetrators’ of violence to 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, we can see some parallels in 
the way people talked about their own culpability when it came to violence. Her 
research illustrates their tendencies to block memories, disassociate themselves from 
their violent acts, and to find ways of justifying and explaining violence. She contends 
that very few ‘perpetrators’ accept responsibility for past violence, and that those who 
do so rarely consider their acts wrong or evil. It is evident from her study that 
‘perpetrators’ of violence tend only to admit to a sanitised version of the past, 
providing us with “partial truths, fictions, and lies” (2008: 263-266). In the case of 
those former JVP insurgents who admitted having committed ‘mild’ acts of 
insurrectionary violence to me (and even these usually preceded by altruistic 
motives), only a handful expressed regret at their actions. And even here, this was 
largely due to the perceived negative consequences that their past ‘misdeeds’ had on 
their life in the present (e.g., bad karma in their present life, disruption of education 
and with it their future prospects), rather than remorse over the harm they had caused 
to their ‘victims’. Those former insurgents who continued to avidly support the JVP 
showed the least remorse and often strongly justified any violence that may have been 
carried out on the part of insurgents.49 
 We will now consider Vijitha’s story.  He, like Tilak, was a politically active 
supporter of the JVP during the time of his participation in this research. I met Vijitha 
through a chain of mutual friends. He was a friend of a friend of a friend. A 
consequence of this was that I was not equipped with any information about him prior 
to my visit to his house, which was situated in a notoriously ‘rough’ area. I had made 
it a point to generally gather as much information as possible from ‘go-betweens’ 
about potential research-participants prior to meeting them, following a couple of 
unpleasant interviews with some rather dubious people who made me fear for my 
safety, during my early days in the field. 
                                                      
49 Their eagerness to deny violence committed by themselves or by the JVP led to contradictions at various points in their 
stories, which often left me rather confused. 
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As I entered the dark and cramped house to meet this slim but strong and 
upright man in his late 30s, all I knew of him was that he had been a JVP insurgent in 
the 1980s. Vijitha is one of my most memorable research-participants simply because 
he was possibly one of the most disturbing people I have had a one-to-one interview 
with. Vijitha’s voice was stern and his mannerisms, spine-chillingly cold. His hard 
and direct gaze into my eyes was broken only once during the interview, when we 
heard a noise outside. My interview notes observe that the hairs on the back of my 
neck remained prickled throughout my interview with him, and that sheer relief swept 




I tell (you) truthfully that I have not even killed one person. The party (JVP) 
never asked me to. If I was asked, I would. I am aware of the consequence of 
my actions as a Buddhist, the pav (negative karma) and hell (apāya) that will 
follow.  But I wouldn’t let the party down. Out of the love for my country. If I 
had followed the other path (Buddhism), then I would have taken up robes and 
be working towards gaining nibbana (nirvāna)50 …I wasn’t put in a situation 
where I had to kill. If I am given a gun now I will kill. The party would not tell 
me to kill normal people. The person I’d have to kill would be the enemy, 
someone who would cause harm to the party and society. If I think ‘pav’ and 
dither about whether I should or not kill, then in that time the enemy would 
have killed me already. It is my duty. In the Bheeshanaya we were soldiers... 
Soldiers must take firm decisions. It’s as if we are having a debate. The climax 





Vijitha not only sees violence as a necessity, but also as obligatory (he states it to be 
his ‘duty’). He justifies its perpetration in moralistic and militaristic terms. The 
positive end result of violence (and thereby its honourable motivations), which is the 
abating of harm to the JVP and society, overrides its negative karmic consequences. 
He sees the role of the guerrilla insurgent as that of a soldier, with responsibilities that 
naturally include perpetrating violence and killing ‘the enemy’. His justification of 
violence, based on it being inflicted on ‘the enemy’ as opposed to those he classifies 
as ‘normal people’ may appear somewhat bizarre to us. This distinction allows him to 
construe violence as a necessity, as unproblematic, and justified due to its altruistic 
aims (to protect humanity). Vijitha, like many other ex-insurgents, constructs the 
                                                      
50 Nibbana is the Pali word for nirvana, which means enlightenment, extinction, or liberation from rebirth  – the ultimate goal for 
Buddhists. 
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image of the ‘JVP insurgent’ as a martyr, imbued with altruistic qualities such as that 
of selfless sacrifice for the benefit of humanity. It is worth taking note here of 
Mahmood’s warning that “without understanding that from the viewpoint of most 
guerrilla fighters, what they are doing is the pinnacle not of inhumanity but of 
humanity, we will never be able to effectively grapple with the problem of insurgent 
violence” (2000: 7). 
 Allied to remembering the motives of their actions in altruistic terms, followed 
the response from many former insurgents that they had no regrets about their 
involvement in insurrectionary activity. I was commonly told that the sacrifices they 
had made and the suffering they endured during the Bheeshanaya, had paved the way 
for improvements in society. Spaces for democracy and employment opportunities in 
rural areas being created were often cited as such improvements. Remembering their 
past violence as being underpinned by morally righteous motives, enabled former 
insurgents to continue living with unsettling memories of their own violent actions, in 
the present. Conversely, some former insurgents (particularly those who were not 
supporters of the JVP during the time of their participation in this research) admitted 
regret, mainly concerning the continuing negative impact that their violent past had on 
their present lives. Some stated the insurrection and their involvement in it to have 
been a futile project, which achieved little despite its honourable aims.  
Every one of my ex-insurgent research participants nevertheless, affirmed that 
positive benefits in terms of personal development had been an important outcome of 
their insurgent past. Those traits most commonly cited were increased political and 
social education or awareness; strength to face challenges that life throws at them; 
alertness and sensitivity to changes in their environment; forebearance; and the ability 
to face death without fear. I have set out below three responses of former insurgents to 
my questions on whether they had any regrets about their involvement in the 
insurrection. What is striking about their responses is the moral undercurrent that runs 
through the rationalisations they offer for their involvement in the insurgency, and 
with it the refusal to accept moral responsibility for it. Moreover, through their 
narratives these former insurgents clearly assert a lack of regret. Their emphasis of the 
positive outcomes of their violent experiences for society and the self, seem necessary 
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 Tilak [continues to actively support of JVP]: Regrets? (pasu tävili) [sounds 
incredulous, laughs]. No! I was an FT (full-time) for 10 years. I feel a great 
sense of happiness (loku satuṭak) when I now see a protest or campaign 
because I feel happy that I played a part in paving the way for that. By 
suffering… we enabled people to protest freely. We uplifted society 
(samājaya goḍa nagāgatta).  
 
Vijitha [continues to actively support JVP]: I have no regrets [voice firm]. 
Because … I am a stronger person as a result of what I have learned from my 
experiences, and I can face up to life without any fear. No matter how little 
money I have, I managed to be victorious in life. No matter what decision I 
take, even if it is wrong I don’t retract…I see people who are only focussed on 
the present and are totally unaware of what is going on around them. They 
aren’t aware of earthquakes and volcanoes around them. These are the people 
who should have been taken away by the (2004 Asian) Tsunami. Because they 
are of no use to society or the future of the country. 
 
 
Kirihami [does not support the JVP]: Looking back …it was my life’s most 
significant experience. I learned a lot from that. If not for my involvement (in 
the insurrection)… I would not be as well read…the JVP forced us to 
read…This hugely helped in developing/uplifting my life. Because I read and 
developed my knowledge and understanding, I went down the correct path. I 
avoided vices like getting involved in drugs or the underworld…I have no 
regrets at all about that period…those experiences gave me a lot of strength…I 
have so much knowledge and understanding about politics and society. I notice 
that even today when I speak to people of my generation. They have no 




Perera (2001) in his work on ghost-stories in the immediate aftermath of the 
Bheeshanaya, refers to a sense of “community guilt” that arose from the violence of 
the Terror. However, he fails to adequately substantiate these claims (e.g., he doesn’t 
provide evidence of this through people’s narratives), and simply suggests that the 
sighting of ghosts in specific spaces in which violence took place (as reported in 
newspapers) emanate from a sense of community-guilt. Ghost-stories relating to sites 
of violence from the Terror were markedly absent during my research, as mentioned 
earlier. However, my research did find that a small number of individuals who were 
involved in the violence of the Bheeshanaya felt a sense of guilt and remorse. In 
Kanchana, whose story is set out below, we find a former-insurgent who seems to 
suffer what can only be described as ‘survivor’s guilt’. Following the development of 
significant trust between Kanchana and myself over several months, he revealed to 
me the following, with a troubled expression.  




You know, I remember that time a lot now. When I meet others who were also 
involved in the insurrection. I naturally/instantly (shanikava) remember it at 
weddings and funerals and events like that. At weddings we talk about our 
friends from that time. Those who died, and we feel sad about them not being 
here with us to share this happiness [pauses, gets upset]. Sad about not being 
able to go to their weddings. I feel great sadness (tada kanagāṭuva) when I see 
their children. The families of those killed were left destitute and have suffered 
a lot. Due to poverty and hardship many of their children had to be brought up 
by relatives and grandparents. It was a useless thing that happened. Those poor, 
innocent little children (ahinsaka poḍi daruvō) now live a life of suffering 




I found listening to Kanchana’s words emotionally upsetting. His eyes were clouded 
with tears, and his voice filled with a genuine sense of remorse and sadness. 
Kanchana feels a sense of personal responsibility for the consequences of the 
collective violence of the Bheeshanaya. He is acutely aware of the destructive legacy 
of past violence and its impact on future generations. Memories of loss and 
devastation linger continuously beneath the surface of the everyday, of the present 
and the future (e.g., in the form of future generations). Past violence rears its head to 
the surface during ordinary life events such as weddings and funerals, when 
communities are brought together, and where Kanchana must come face to face with 
the consequences of his past (i.e., in the form of his dead comrades’ children). For 
Kanchana, reconstructing life after terror is not about ‘leaving the past behind’. It is 
about learning to survive and live with the past continuously through the present and 
the future. And it is about reflecting on, understanding, and finding ways to come to 
terms with it, while reclaiming an altered everyday that continues to be shaped by 
violence. As Langer puts it, “life after atrocity is not a call to new unity, but only a 
form of private and communal endurance, based on mutual toleration rather than 
mutual love” (1997: 63). 
 
 
‘Healing’ and ‘Getting Over’ violence  
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Much of the research that has been carried out on survivors of violence is 
framed in therapeutic and cathartic terms of ‘healing’ (see Das 2007, Perera 1995, 
1998, 1999, 2001). I am in agreement with Scheper-Hughes who comments that this 
master narrative of “healing” and “getting over” violence which emerged in the early 
20th century is romanticism, conjuring up “biblical images of safe passage, of 
reaching the other side, and finally, of overcoming” (2004: 459). “Healing” also 
somewhat patronisingly implies violence to be an illness or pathological disease that 
is inflicted on hapless victims who are in need of a cure. This denies agency to those 
who have survived violence, and who actively undertake work to reconstruct their 
worlds in its aftermath – a task that is intrinsically agentive.  
My research found that the complex work of reconstructing lives after 
violence was not a simplistic matter of ‘healing’ or ‘getting over’ violence. None of 
my research-participants (those who had engaged in violence, those who had 
witnessed violence, nor those ‘victims’ of violence) spoke in ways that signified 
‘healing’ from or ‘getting over’ violence, leaving it behind in some distant past. And 
they certainly did not appear to have been miraculously ‘cured’ of their past 
experiences. Their stories about reformulating life after violence were complex, 
fragmented, and unfinished (see Ross 2003a). When we consider that those who have 
witnessed violence experience time as duration, rather than a neat chronological 
sequence (as argued by Langer 1997 and discussed earlier), then it automatically 
follows that ‘past’ violence is not something can be ‘left behind’ or ‘gotten over’ in 
the process of reconstructing lives. As Langer puts it, “the passage of time cannot 
appease durational memory” (1997: 57-58).  
For ex-insurgents, recreating lives after violence was about acknowledging the 
past and coming to terms with it. It involved devising various strategies to continue 
living with past violence, and finding ways to recreate the self and one’s relationship 
with others under its constant shadow. Past violence continued to powerfully impinge 
on the present everyday through ethically charged memories. Life after violence for 
ex-insurgents then, involved the active mediation of these memories, the constant 
assigning and re-assigning of moral responsibility for violence, and the negotiation of 
everyday life in its midst. It was clear from people’s testimonies that the Bheeshanaya 
was an experience to be understood, learned from, and lived with in ethical terms, as 
opposed to a traumatic past to be healed, forgotten, forgiven or liberated from.  
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My thesis started out by asking how people remember and talk about Sri 
Lanka’s Bheeshanaya, and has focussed primarily on the memories and narratives of 
those who were in some way involved in perpetrating violence during this period.  
Violence is remembered, given meaning, and lived with in the present, in ethical 
terms. As we have seen from the stories belonging to former insurgents and former 
state counter-insurrectionary officers, the mediation of violent memories is 
fundamentally an ethical exercise for ‘perpetrators’. It entails a reconstruction of 
one’s experiences in moral terms, in ways that enable ‘perpetrators’ to continue living 
with their unsettling pasts in the present. I have argued throughout this thesis that 
memories of violence are morally tendentious, rather than being abstract and objective 
recollections of a recorded past. Shaped by the changing socio-political and moral 
contexts of recall, memories of violence are continuously reworked in the present, 
with profound implications for notions of the self and sociality. As such, this thesis 
has substantiated and built on recent arguments put forward by eminent scholars of 
memory, particularly those concerning the moral and political claims that the practice 
of memory entails, and its relevance to the construction of self-identity and 
relationships with others (see Lambek 1996, Antze 1996, Kirmayer 1996).  
I initially set out to gain an understanding of how people who have perpetrated 
horrific acts of violence understand, reflect on, and come to terms with, their troubling 
pasts and how they recreate life and social relationships in the aftermath. This thesis 
came about partly because of my original inability to make sense of how people like 
the ex-insurgents and former state counter-insurrectionary officers, whose voices run 
through the preceding pages, can perpetrate violence against their ‘intimates’ and 
people they know – neighbours, work colleagues, and even supposed friends. And 
then, carry on living everyday life in the present with their denouncers, torturers, with 
‘witnesses’ and with those they victimised, beneath the shadow of violence and 
betrayal. In recent years anthropologists have done some remarkable work to 
enlighten us about people who inflict violence on ‘the other’, and have contributed 
significantly to our understanding of how ‘victims’ of violence recreate their lives in 
the aftermath. However, comparatively little research has been forthcoming on people 
who kill “those in one’s own image” (Siegel 1998: 1), and even less so on how these 
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‘perpetrators’ reformulate their worlds after violence and deal with the social and 
material consequences of their actions. The paucity of ‘answers’ to these troubling 
questions prompted this study.  
As such, this is an ethnography of the present constructed on the work of 
memory, rather than an attempt to recreate a historical account of the Bheeshanaya. I 
have already discussed (see Introduction) the problematic nature of attempting to 
piece-together the historical ‘truth’ of this event. The strength of this work lies in the 
prominent position given to individual stories and the rich empirical data that this 
gives rise to. It provides a convoluted and contradictory picture of the human 
experience of violence, from the unique perspectives of people who themselves 
engaged in it during Sri Lanka’s Terror. Their voices have for too long been ignored. 
By creating a space for their reflections on violence, ‘perpetrators’ here are positioned 
as critics in themselves and speak from an array of fluid subject positions, thereby 
highlighting the complex and ambivalent nature of the practice of memory itself (see 
Antze and Lambek 1996). Moreover, this fluidity of subject positions supports an 
important contention of this thesis, which is that the mutually exclusive categories of 
‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’, as customarily used in approaches to the study of violence, 
are misleading and not workable on the ground. As well as being rejected by 
protagonists themselves, these one-dimensional categories fail to reflect the 
ambiguities of violence and the complex diversity of human beings (see Levi 1988, 
Foster et al. 2005, West 2000).  
The stories belonging to ‘perpetrators’ in this thesis carry strong moral 
undertones and contain careful representations of the self and one’s involvement in 
violence along these lines. Accountability for violence is overwhelmingly denied or 
deflected through the use of various narrative strategies, while at the same time 
complicity in wrongdoing is implicitly acknowledged in some instances. People’s 
engagement with memory and narrative overall involve efforts to find an ethical 
framework to deal with the unspeakable violence of the recent past. In a climate of 
fear, forgetting, and silence, this thesis has shown people to create spaces to engage in 
elaborate moral critiques on violence and to appropriate accountability for it in their 
narrative reconstructions. Through the work of memory, people shared specific ethical 
values and attempted to re-imagine a sense of moral community in the aftermath of 
terror. In other words, where justice and reconciliation were not forthcoming, through 
their engagement with memory people attempted to allocate an ethical space to an un-
reconciled violence that was awkwardly ‘close to the bone’ (see Mueggler 2001). In 
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this climate then, life after violence involved a process of continuous moral 
evaluations. The narratives that run through this thesis suggest that the allocation of 
moral responsibility for past violence is in a constant state of flux and that the 
violence of the Bheeshanaya is never fully reconciled in the present.  
This thesis is as much about how people give voice to unsettling memories, as 
it is about how they make sense of, and come to terms with, past violence. The first 
chapter for instance, showed people to creatively utilise narrative strategies to mediate 
their memories of violence. Here, former insurgents carefully structured their 
narratives around the idiom of ‘youthfulness’ (a category that they imbued with 
powerful meanings), in order to articulate ‘untellable’ stories of their complicity in 
violence. Those who ‘observed’ the Terror similarly framed their stories in this 
manner in a bid to rationalise the morally incomprehensible violence of their recent 
past. In a post-terror climate of silence, fear, and forgetting then, ‘youth’ appeared to 
function as a relatively safe repository for discomforting (and dangerous) memories. 
Moreover, I have argued that through this narrative vehicle of ‘youthfulness’ former 
insurgents reconstructed an alternative narrative of the Terror that contributed to a 
more convoluted history of the Bheeshanaya.  
The manipulation of this idiom further enabled former insurgents to intricately 
negotiate issues of culpability as they proceeded to disassociate and distance 
themselves from violence. While not denying outright their involvement in it, former 
insurgents at the same time refused to acknowledge moral responsibility for violence, 
thereby highlighting the contradictory nature of being human. Former insurgents also 
drew on the idiom of ‘youth’ to project a particular moral representation of 
themselves as honourable insurgents, which in turn allowed them to deflect blame 
(onto those they considered to be ‘immoral insurgent youth’). I argued that this 
narrative strategy provided people with a means of dealing with the consequences of 
their actions and allowed them to continue living with their violent pasts (and 
themselves), in the present.  
The ‘personal’ motives that underpinned the violence of the Bheeshanaya, and 
in particular its perpetration between ‘intimates’, contributed to the morally 
burdensome nature of its memory, as discussed in Chapter 2. This rendered the act of 
mediating memory an ethical exercise. People used the idiom of ‘opportunistic’ 
violence to comment on the ways in which violence invades ‘intimate’ relationships, 
and to acknowledge the damage suffered by their communities as a result of the 
Terror. People also told stories of ‘intimate’ relationships that transcended the divisive 
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violence of the Bheeshanaya, as discussed in Chapter 5. Remembering social 
relationships that withstood the pressures of violence allowed people to re-imagine an 
‘intimate’ community after violence. This was conducive to the function of sociality 
post-terror. 
Issues concerning the articulation of violent and traumatic memories are 
arguably most evident in the torture narratives that featured in Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4 of this thesis. Scholars have overwhelmingly pointed to the inexpressibility of 
torture and problems associated with giving voice to pain (see Scarry 1985, Das 2007, 
Daniel 1996). This thesis has argued that torture is expressible. In those instances 
where violence appears to be verbally inexpressible, people draw on various 
alternative means of communication to express their memories of torture. We saw for 
instance, the ways in which former insurgents used the body and other (non-verbal) 
means of communication (e.g., drawings) to convey their experiences of torture. Both 
former counter-insurrectionary officers and survivors of torture also employed various 
narrative strategies, such as speaking in terms of the collective and in the third-person, 
for these purposes. For ex-insurgents in particular, the desire to have someone bear 
witness to their suffering and the moral significance afforded to the subject position of 
‘victim’, made important the need to communicate their experiences of torture. 
I have drawn on these narratives of torture in particular to emphasise one of 
the fundamental arguments proposed in this thesis. This is that, rather than being 
senseless or devoid of meaning (see Scarry 1985, Nordstrom 1995, Daniel 1996), for 
those who have been subjected to violence and significantly for those who have 
perpetrated it, violence carries meaning and moral resonance. This thesis further 
suggests that in the aftermath of violence, recreating life entails a process of ascribing 
powerful meanings (largely of an ethical nature) to one’s violent past through the 
negotiation of memory. In so doing, people attempt to substantiate and morally re-
empower the self and construe their lives as being meaningful. What former 
insurgents who were subjected to torture by the state appeared to be telling us here 
was that there was a point to their traumatic experiences. In so attributing ethical 
significance and meaning to their pasts, people find ways of coming to terms with, 
and living with their violent experiences in the present. Where violence renders a 
discontinuity or fragmentation of the self, remembering one’s troublesome 
experiences in morally meaningful terms allows for a sense of continuity. People 
(both those who perpetrated torture and those who were subjected to it) remembered 
their experiences of torture in moral terms and as being rooted in ‘intimate’ social 
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worlds, which stands in stark contrast to the “hyper-individuating” nature of its 
experience as suggested by Daniel (1996). The infusion of torture with meaning by 
both those who perpetrated it and their victims was an important means through 
which people could continue to negotiate life in the present with the traumatic 
memories of their violent pasts. Another interesting feature that characterised the 
narrative reconstructions of ‘perpetrators’ throughout this thesis, but which was 
arguably best illustrated in the torture narratives, was the position of victimhood and 
moral high-ground that both former-insurgents and former state counter-
insurrectionary officers vied for. This carried important implications for 
representations of the self and the appropriation of moral responsibility for violence. 
I had begun my fieldwork with the naive assumption that the narratives of 
‘perpetrators’ would, to some extent at least, reflectively acknowledge past 
wrongdoing and even perhaps express remorse or attrition. As my fieldwork 
progressed I grew increasingly confused and frustrated by the denial, refusal to 
acknowledge moral culpability, and tone of victimhood that marked their narratives. 
Moreover, ‘perpetrators’ took pains to represent themselves and their own past actions 
in positive moral terms. In other words, what I came across was a sort of reflective 
‘white-washing’ of the self and one’s questionable past that was firmly anchored in 
the moral. ‘Perpetrators’ of violence offered a sanitised version of their past 
‘misdeeds’, provided moral justifications for their involvement in violence, denied or 
deflected moral responsibility for it, took pains to represent themselves as honourable 
people (often drawing on religion for this purpose) with a highly developed sense of 
social and ethical conscience, and spoke overwhelmingly in frames of victim-hood. 
At the same time, it seemed to me that these efforts to remember their violent 
experiences from the position of a moral high-ground also intimated some underlying 
moral discomfort attached to their violent pasts. 
This thesis finds that where one’s own personal history is marred by 
complicity in violence, there appears to be a more urgent need to re-create self-
identity in terms of the good, in order to make the self (and one’s past) more tolerable 
to live with in the aftermath. What the ex-insurgents and former state counter-
insurrectionary officers who participated in this research have shown us is that 
“memory … enables us to creatively fashion ourselves, remembering one thing and 
not another, changing the stories we tell ourselves (and others) about ourselves” 
(Antze and Lambek 1996: xvi). 
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Re-imagining the self and one’s past in moral terms, and attempting to find an 
ethical framework to make sense of past violence, and in particular to deal with the 
awkward issue of culpability, was an important aspect of recreating life after terror for 
the protagonists of this research. This process was to a large extent facilitated by an 
appeal to Buddhism, which as we have seen in this thesis, played a vital and complex 
role in the narratives belonging to ‘perpetrators’ of violence. People overwhelmingly 
gave meaning to their experiences of violence by interpreting it through a karmic lens. 
This allowed for lines of continuation to be drawn between the past and the present. In 
a post-terror environment of impunity and silence, karma further allowed the 
restoration of justice and a sense of moral order, thereby providing people with a 
means of dealing with the ‘unfinished business’ of the Bheeshanaya. Elaborate stories 
were provided by former insurgents about the horrific fates met by their torturers, and 
similarly others who had lost loved ones to violence also told of the justice meted out 
to perpetrators by the natural law of karma. I have argued that as well as providing an 
important means through which people could make sense of the morally 
incomprehensible violence of their recent past, these stories further ensured that in the 
absence of justice and reconciliation ‘perpetrators’ were held to account in the 
present. In the aftermath of the Bheeshanaya, Buddhism played an important role in 
preventing the further escalation of violence and went some way towards facilitating a 
fragile co-existence between various opposing sides.  
Former insurgents’ narratives were overall characterised by the interpretation 
of their past and present lives through complex Buddhist teachings. We came across 
numerous expressions of religious piety on the part of ‘perpetrators’. Former 
insurgents were keen to portray themselves as virtuous Buddhists and represented 
their everyday lives after terror as being guided by religious ethics. We heard from 
ex-insurgents who took up the practice of meditation with vigour, adopted a 
vegetarian diet signifying an adherence to the Buddhist principle of non-violence, and 
threw themselves into the study of Buddhist philosophy, among other things. This 
raised a number of puzzling questions primarily concerning the issue of moral 
responsibility for violence. On the one hand, such efforts to represent the virtuous self 
conveyed reassurances of a reformed moral character, which we may in turn interpret 
as a step towards moral reparation and an acknowledgement of culpability or 
wrongdoing. However, on the other hand, we found ex-insurgents to also use this 
narrative strategy to assert a discontinuity of the self and to disassociate themselves 
from past violence, which amounts to a rejection of culpability.  
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Moreover, despite the range of narrative strategies that former insurgents drew 
on to reject moral responsibility for violence, some ‘perpetrators’ also explained the 
trials and tribulations they suffered in their present lives as being the negative karmic 
consequences resulting from their wrongful actions in the past. In so doing, they 
appeared to implicitly acknowledge culpability for their actions. However, at yet 
another level, karma also appeared to function in this manner as a redemptive 
discourse. By explaining that they were already being made to suffer the negative 
consequences of their past actions, former insurgents further intimated that there was 
no further need for them to engage in acts of moral repair in the aftermath.  
Indeed we found that ex-insurgents placed an overwhelming emphasis on the 
practical and material aspects of rebuilding social relationships in the aftermath of the 
Terror, while largely ignoring personal acts of moral repair. Through their stories, 
former insurgents made clear that recreating life after violence for them was about 
getting on with the business of living - getting a job, supporting the family, taking on 
domestic responsibilities, interacting with neighbours, getting involved in village and 
temple activities, and learning to live among enemies, rather than seeking forgiveness 
and making amends. This diverges from the importance placed by some scholars on 
the necessity of moral reparation in the recovery of social relationships after 
wrongdoing (see Urban-Walker 2006, Griswald 2007). I have pointed out that this 
raises questions about notions of guilt and innocence and the appropriation of moral 
responsibility for violence. We may ask ourselves whether it is fair to expect former 
insurgents to accept moral culpability and engage in acts of ethical repair after 
violence when they do not perceive themselves as having engaged in any wrongdoing, 
when the boundaries between artificial categories such as ‘perpetrator’, ‘victim’, and 
‘witness’ are blurred, and when memory remains a terrain that is politically and 
morally contested, and when there are a multiplicity of oppositional ‘truths’ in 
existence.  
Interestingly, this research has also found some parallels between 
‘perpetrators’ and ‘victims’ (as set out in existing studies) in their efforts to piece 
together their social worlds in the aftermath of violence (see Green 1999; Das 2007; 
Mehta and Chatterji 2001, Chatterji and Mehta 2007). For ‘perpetrators’ too 
reformulating life after violence is steeped in the mundane and the ordinary. This 
thesis has further shown former insurgents to be active agents who consciously put in 
place carefully thought out strategies to negotiate social life in a convoluted post-
terror environment brimming with competing memories of violence and betrayal. We 
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have also seen the ways in which violence remains entangled in the ordinary post-
Bheeshanaya, lingering continuously beneath the veneer of silence and forgetting, 
emerging to the surface of everyday sociality unexpectedly and under the most banal 
circumstances, such as during a chance meeting at the local bank, or at ordinary life-
cycle events such as village funerals and weddings. This attests to arguments put 
forward by scholars on “the mutual absorption of violence and the ordinary” (Das 
2007: 7). For those who have perpetrated violence, learning to continuously negotiate 
the challenges thrown in the path of their reconstruction efforts by these lingering 
memories forms an important aspect of recreating life after terror. This thesis argues 
that the complex work of recreating life after terror is not a simplistic matter of 
‘moving on’ or being ‘healed’ from violence, but that of continuing to live with past 
violence in the present, and finding ways to recreate the self and sociality under its 
shadow. This is fundamentally an exercise that is steeped in the moral.  
The stories that have featured in this thesis are unfinished ones. They belong 
to those who continue to grapple with the legacy of terror and its “blood memories” 
(Green 1999). This thesis provides a snapshot of a particular people, in a particular 
place and at a specific time. I have pointed to the dearth of research on those who 
perpetrate violence and in particular on how these people then continue to rebuild 
sociality in the aftermath. As such, comparative lines of enquiry by other researchers 
into this subject set in different sites and covering different populations, would 
contribute greatly to our anthropological knowledge base on violence. Moreover, 
comparative research focussed specifically on the Bheeshanaya involving former 
insurgents at a later point in time, as well as other ‘perpetrators’ (such as the elusive 
members of paramilitary and vigilante groups that operated during the time) would 
also enhance our understanding of how violence is given meaning and its 
consequences negotiated with over the course of time, along with alterations in 
patterns of memory work that take place with changes in context. I have also 
highlighted the absence of the female voice as being a limit of this research. This 
renders the experiences of women who have perpetrated violence a useful progression 
of this research. Furthermore, this thesis has raised many other questions, particularly 
concerning issues of ethics and responsibility for violence, which could benefit from 
further enquiry.  
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